19 January 1996
Supreme Court
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JAYA DEVI Vs STATE OF BIHAR .

Bench: PUNCHHI,M.M.
Case number: C.A. No.-002229-002229 / 1996
Diary number: 10183 / 1995


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PETITIONER: SMT. JAYA DEVI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       19/01/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1174            1996 SCALE  (1)521

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           O R D E R      Leave granted.      Heard learned counsel.      The appellant  herein, is  Smt. Jaya  Devi. It  appears that her  services as  Assistant Teacher  were terminated by the Directorate  of Education,  Bihar on  February 19, 1990. She moved  the High  Court of  Patna in  Writ Petition being C.W.J.C. No.  1397 of 1990 which was allowed by S.N. Jha, J. sitting singly on November 28, 1991. It was deduced that the government directions  to terminate  services  of  Assistant Teachers were  not  meant  to  apply  to  the  case  of  the appellant. She  was  thus  put  back  to  service.  The  7th respondent herein,  Shri Shyama Kant Jha approached the High Court in  Writ Petition  being C.W.J.C.  No. 13173  of  1993 seeking similar  relief as of the present appellant arraying the appellant  as the  7th respondent  therein, possibly for support of  his case. It came up for hearing before the same learned Single  Judge. The Learned Single Judge thought that he had wrongly granted relief to the appellant. He dismissed the Writ  Petition of  Shri Shyama Kant Jha and withdrew the relief granted  to the appellant by specifically owning that his earlier  order in the case of appellant was not correct. Since the  appellant had  been reinstated  pursuant  to  the orders of  the learned  Single Judge,  he went on to correct the detected  mistake by  ordering that  her appointment  be cancelled as  no further opportunity to her was necessary as she had been heard by him in the matter laid before him. For the period  she had actually worked, the State was precluded by the  learned Single  Judge  from  recovering  salary  and allowances  already   paid  to  her.  This  order  is  under challenge in this appeal.      It is  not denied  that a  judicial order  passed by  a court can  be reviewed  or  re-called  by  the  court  after observing the legal procedure as by law devised permitting a review or a re-call. In the instant case, the High Court did not follow  that procedure.  Rather, in  a totally  distinct

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proceeding where  the appellant  was neither a necessary nor proper party,  where no  relief was claimed against her, she was caught  and deprived  of the  benefit she derived in her Writ Petition. We are not, for the moment, commenting on the merit of  the matter,  but only to the method adopted by the learned Single  Judge in  nullifying his  order in favour of the appellant in proceedings in which she had no interest at all.      Mr. B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the State of Bihar, on the  strength of  the two  decisions  of  this  Court  in Chandra Bansi  Singh and  Others etc. vs. State of Bihar and others etc.  [1985 (1) SCR 579 (583)] and State of Rajasthan vs. Gurcharandas  Chadha [1980(1)  SCC 250 ] goes to contend that if  the  High  Court  has  corrected  errors,  even  in exercise of  powers which  it did  not have, then this Court should not  cause any  interference thereto  in exercise  of jurisdiction under  Article 136 of the Constitution. As said before, we are not commenting on the merit of the matter, as to whether  the order  passed by the High Court in favour of the appellant  in the  first instance was correct or not. We have strong reservation in the manner in which the effect of the  order   was  withdrawn  in  distinct  proceedings.  The appellant was  not put  to specific notice that the order in her favour was to be re-called for grounds stated. We cannot uphold such  order of  the High  Court to  the extent  which affects the appellant. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the  impugned order of the High Court to the extent it affects the  appellant. The  ill-effect of  the same  stands withdrawn in  so far  as the  appellant  is  concerned.  The appellant shall get her costs too.