JAVED ALAM Vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001240-001240 / 2006
Diary number: 9567 / 2006
Advocates: (MRS. ) VIPIN GUPTA Vs
DHARMENDRA KUMAR SINHA
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1240 OF 2006
Javed Alam ..Appellant
versus State of Chhattisgarh and Anr. ..Respondents (With Criminal Appeal No. 1241 of 2006) (With Criminal Appeal No. 1242 of 2006)
J U D G M E N T
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of
the Chhattisgarh High Court, Bilaspur upholding the conviction of the
appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’). By the impugned
judgment, the High Court upheld the conviction of appellant Samar Vijay
Singh for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC for committing the
murder of Ku. Preeti (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’) on 3.12.1998
in Government Girls College Campus, Ambikapur by running over her a
jeep. The co-accused appellants Javed, Raj Kumar and Ganesh were
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC for causing death of
Ku. Preeti in furtherance of their common intention with the appellant Samar
Vijay Singh. Co-accused Ranvijay Singh, father of accused Samar Vijay and
owner of the jeep was acquitted of the charge under Section 201 IPC.
2. Prosecution case is that on 3.12.1998 Ku. Preeti Srivastava, a student
of B.A. final in Govt. Girls College, Ambikapur was sitting with Ku.
Vijaylaxmi Mishra (PW-7), Ku. Seema Mishra (PW-8) and Ku. Nisha
Thakur (PW-17) in the campus of the College since the second period was
free. Her bag and tiffin were kept by the side of the road. Many other girls
were basking in the sun inside the campus. At about 10:45 A.M., a jeep
driven by Samar Vijay Singh suddenly entered the college campus and
crushing the bag and the tiffin of Ku. Preeti Shrivastava underneath, went
ahead. Accused Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed Alam and Ganesh Kashyap were
accompanying Samar Vijay Singh in the jeep. Seeing her tiffin and bag
crushed by the jeep, Ku. Preeti Srivastava decided that she would stop the
jeep on its return and ask the driver to make good the loss suffered. When
the jeep returned, Ku. Preeti stopped the jeep, stood in front of it and asked
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accused-appellant Samar Vijay Singh to repair the tiffin and bag for her.
Hearing this, the occupants of the jeep including the driver started laughing.
The girls noticed that the occupants of the jeep were calling each other by
names and thereby learnt that Samar Vijay Singh, the driver of the jeep was
accompanied by Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed Alam and Ganesh Kashyap.
Appellant Samar Vijay Singh asked Ku. Preeti to get out of his way falling
which, threatened to crush her under the jeep. However, Ku. Preeti stood
firm and did not budge. Accused Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed & Ganesh asked
Samar Vijay Singh to crush Ku. Preeti if she did not give way. Upon this,
Samar Vijay Singh moved the jeep ahead and pushed Ku. Preeti who fell
down. When the girls were about to move for picking up Preeti, Samar Vijay
Singh reversed and then accelerated the jeep ahead, crushing Preeti's head
under the jeep in the process and ran away with the co-appellants.
Ku. Vijaylaxmi PW-7, threw a stone at the jeep, which hit the bumper
of the jeep. She noted down the number of the jeep in her palm as M.P. 27-
1962 Lalita Yadav PW-6, attempted to catch hold of one of the appellants
but she was pushed and fell down. Ku. Vijaylaxmi noticed that the jeep had
a sticker “Vote for the Congress” on the back number plate.
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The girls got frightened and informed Asst. Professor Smt. Archana
Singh (PW-9) and Asst. Professor Smt. Pratibha Singh PW-10 about the
incident who along with Ku. Lalita Yadav (PW-6), Ku. Vijaylaxmi (P.W.7),
Ku. Kumudini Kerkatta (PW 4) & Ku. Urmila Paikra (PW-5) took the
injured Ku. Preeti to the District Hospital, Ambikapur. Clerk Tarachand
Sahu PW-11 of the Girls College reached the spot thereafter and on being
instructed by the Principal lodged the F.I.R. Ex.P-12 at 11.00 a.m. in Police
Station, Ambikapur to Assistant Sub-Inspector B.N. Singh (PW-31)
After investigation charge sheet was filed.
Since the accused persons abjured guilt the trial was held. Prosecution
examined 39 witnesses. Learned Sessions Judge acquitted Ranvijay Singh
for want of evidence and convicted rest of the accused persons as noted
above. The basis of conviction was as follows:
1. Testimony of Ku. Lalilta Yadav PW-6, Ku. Nisha (PW-
17), Ku. Seema Misra (PW-8), Dr. M.L Beatrice (PW-3), Dr.
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A.K. Jain (PW-33) proving that Ku. Preeti died a homicidal
death.
2. Statements made by Ku. Lalita Yadav PW-6 and Ku.
Vijaylaxmi PW-7, as forming part of res-gestae under Section-6
of the Evidence Act to Shri R. N. Shrivastava PW-32 on his
reaching the hospital disclosing the names of the driver of the
jeep as Samar Vijay Singh and the occupants of the Jeep as
Rajkumar Tiwari, Javed and Ganesh.
3. Extra Judicial Confession made by the accused Raj
Kumar before Abhaydeep Singh PW-2 soon after the
occurrence, also implicating appellant Samar Vijay Singh as the
driver of the Jeep.
4. Testimony of Ku. Seema PW-8 especially in para 34 and
35 showing the three occupants of the Jeep had asked the driver
Samar Vijay to run the girl over in case she didn't give way and
Samar Vijay surging the jeep ahead crushed Preeti's head
underneath.
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5. Testimony of Arvind Gaur, Assistant Professor, P.G.
College, Ambikapur PW-12 showing that Ganesh Kashyap, a
student of B.Com 1st year ' B' section was absent from class on
03-12-1998.
6. Testimony of Professor Rajesh Srivastava, P.G. College,
Ambikapur PW-18 showing that on 3.12.1998 Samar Vijay
Singh and Raj Kumar Tiwari, students of B.Com. 1st year
Section-'A' were absent from class (10 A.M. to 10:40 A.M.).
7. The fact of surrender by accused Javed and Ganesh in
Police Station Ambikapur on 04-12-1998 vide Ex. P-74 and 75.
8. (i) Seizure of Jeep No. M.P.-27-B-1068 from, in front of
the house of appellant Samar Vijay.
(ii) Merg intimation Ex. P-19 by Mariam Tirki PW-16
showing the number of the Jeep as M.P. -27-B-1068.
(iii) Testimony of Z.A. Abbasi PW-37 R.T.O. Office
Ambikapur proving ownership of Ranvijay Singh Tomar over
Jeep M.P.-27B-1068.
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(iv) Admission by Ranvijay Singh Tomar of the seizure
of Jeep M. P. 27-B-1068, in reply to Question No.218 in
examination under Section-313 of Cr. P.C.”
3. Stand of the appellants before the High Court was that there was no
legal evidence on record to substantiate the conviction and sentence. No
common intention of the occupants to cause the death of Kr. Preeti was
established by the prosecution. Seema Misra (PW-8) had stated that the
driver of the jeep wanted to get away as fast and, therefore, offence if any
committed by the driver would not travel beyond Section 304 IPC. The act
was nothing but a rash and negligent act without any intention to kill the
deceased. The High Court did not accept the stand and upheld the
conviction.
4. In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellants re-iterated
the stand taken before the High Court. It is to be noted that there were
purportedly four eye witnesses. They are PWs 6, 7, 8 and 17. The
occurrence took place around 10.45 a.m. on 3.12.1998 and the FIR was
lodged immediately by PWs 4 and 5 around 11.00 a.m. The deceased
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breathed her last at about 12.10 p.m. The vehicle according to the
prosecution version was being driven by Samar Vijay Singh and rest of the
occupants were other co-accused persons. It is stated that identity of the
accused persons has not been established. There is no Test Identification
Parade. Names were not mentioned in the inquest or in the FIR. The accused
persons were not known earlier and Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short the ‘Evidence Act’) has no application. PWs 9 and 10 had not
told the names. The role of A-3 was not established. A1, A2 and A4 were
the students of the same college and one of the accused was 18 years on the
date of occurrence. There was no enmity or motive or any intention to kill
Ku. Preeti and in any event place of occurrence was not established and the
occurrence took place, even if the prosecution case is accepted, at the spur of
moment. There is no evidence to show any meeting of mind.
5. It is pointed out that most of the so called eye witnesses resiled from
their statements made during investigation. The Court has accepted the
identification by PWs 8 and 17 and in answer to the statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Code there was really no definite answer.
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6. The question of res-gestae has no application as the name given for
the first time is proved in the Court. Res Gestae was not in the police
statement. So far as Article D-7 is concerned paint is similar to that of jeep
which is scratched.
7. It is also re-iterated that the evidence on record does not make out a
case under Section 34 IPC.
8. It is a classic case of deficiency in the criminal justice system to
protect the witnesses from being threatened by accused. As appears from the
record, the witnesses are the classmates of the deceased who were there with
her. As appeared from the evidence of witnesses they backed out from what
was stated during investigation. The statement made before the Police
during investigation is no evidence. Unfortunately, in cases involving
influential people the common experience is that witnesses do not come
forward because of fear and pressure. In a brutal manner, the accused
Samarvijay Singh who was driving the vehicle run over the girl and she lost
her life. The trial Court and the High Court have highlighted certain aspects
which clearly bring out the guilt of accused Samarvijay Singh. Significant is
the evidence of PWs 7 and 8. PW-7 was the girl who accompanied the
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injured to the hospital and told about the incident to PW-3, the doctor which
was recorded in report Ex.P-4 containing the name of Ku. Vijaylaxmi PW-7
as the person told about the incident. The evidence of PW-6 Lalita Yadav
shows that PW-7 was sitting with the deceased when the jeep entered the
campus. As rightly noted by the High Court something transpired later on
which led to the witnesses giving a complete go bye to her earlier version.
More important is the evidence of PW-8 who blurted out during cross
examination some traces of truth which was labeled as unfair and dishonest
cross examination by learned counsel for the appellants. At the end of the
ordeal of her evidence she cried and requested the Court not to call her again
for evidence since they were disturbed for the entire year. The plight of the
girls who were under pressure depicts the tremendous need for witness
protection in our country if criminal justice administration has to be a
reality. Even close reading of the evidence shows that how she was under
tremendous pressure not to speak the truth. In reply to question No.27 she
said that she did not see the occupants. That is nothing, because in answer to
the next question she said that there were four boys in the jeep. Question
No.34 is very significant. It was specifically asked to the witness as to
whether the occupants of the jeep were asking Samarvijay Singh, the driver
of the jeep to run the girl over if she did not give way. Answer was that the
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boys had said so but afterwards. In answer to question No.35 she said that
Samar surged the jeep ahead, crushed the head of Preeti and went away.
She had admitted that the boys were laughing in the jeep and had said to
Samar that if the girl did not give way he should run the girl over. She had
answered in the affirmative by stating ‘yes’ to a specific question No.35
clearly meaning that crushing Preeti’s head Samar had surged the jeep
forward.
Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the rule of evidence
that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The test for applying the rule of res-
gastae is that the statement should be spontaneous and should form part of
the same transaction ruling out any possibility of concoction. In Gentele
Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1996 SC 2791) it was
held in para 15 as follows:
"Section 6 of the Evidence Act and some of the succeeding Sections embody the rule of admission of evidence relating to what is commonly known as res-gestae. They are in the nature of exception to 'hearsay" rule. Section-6 permits proof of collateral statements which are so connected with the facts in issue as to form part of the same transaction. Whether the statement made by a witness was a part of the same transaction or not is to be considered in the light of the circumstances of each case. The principle is that it should be so intimately connected with the fact in issue as to be a spontaneous utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion or a spontaneous
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reaction thereof, there being no opportunity for deliberately fabricating the statement. In other words, the statement which is a part of res-gestae does not narrate a past event, but it is the event itself speaking through a person thus excluding the possibility of any design behind it.”
10. The reason indicated by the High Court dismissing the appeal before
it qua accused Samarvijay Singh has no merit and is dismissed.
11. The other question is applicability of Section 34 IPC.
12. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the
commission of a criminal act. The Section is only a rule of evidence and
does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section
is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an
offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by
several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing
the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and,
therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances
appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances.
In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has
to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan
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or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to commit the offence for
which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on
the spur of moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the
crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or more persons
intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each
of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar
v. State of Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 109), the existence of a common intention
amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of
this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged
with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically
similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated
by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
13. The Section does not say “the common intention of all”, nor does it
say “and intention common to all”. Under the provisions of Section 34 the
essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention
animating the accused leading to the commission of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles
enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302
read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act
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which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by
him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be
difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who
act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what
part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch. Pulla Reddy and
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1993 SC 1899), Section 34 is
applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused
himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act
on the part of the accused.
14. The above position has been highlighted in Chimanbhai Jagabhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (SLP (Crl.) 352 of 2008 disposed of on 16th
March, 2009).
15. There is no evidence, muchless credible, which has been salvaged
from the onslaught on the witnesses which suggests that there was any
meeting of minds, because everything appears to have happened suddenly.
The evidence of PW8 on which the prosecution has placed strong reliance
for the purpose of attracting Section 34 IPC gave pre-varicating statements
so far as others are concerned, through her statement is sufficient to fasten
guilt on Samar Vijay Singh.
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16. Considering the background facts it is clear that Section 34 has no
application. That being so, while dismissing the appeal filed by Samarvijay
Singh, the conviction recorded qua other accused persons has to be set aside
which we direct. They shall be released from custody forthwith unless
required to be in custody in connection with any other case.
……..……....................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
……..… …....................................J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) New Delhi, May 08, 2009
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