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PETITIONER: JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD., MEERUT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LAKSHMICHAND AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/09/1962

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1963 AIR  677            1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 242  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1964 SC1140  (13)  R          1964 SC1154  (27,28)  R          1965 SC1595  (22,42)  RF         1977 SC2155  (24)  RF         1987 SC1629  (16)  RF         1992 SC2219  (55,56)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Dismissal  of  workmen-Application   for permission  before Conciliation Officer-Direction of  Conci- liation    Officer-Appeal   to   Appellate   Tribunal,    if maintainable   Grant  of  special  leave-Competence-U.    P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.  P. 28 of 1947),ss. 3,  8- Industrial  Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950  (48  of 1950),  ss. 2 (c) cl. (iii), 4-Constitution of  India,  Art. 136.

HEADNOTE: The  workmen  of the appellant company  resorted  to  direct action  in order to enforce their demands for  bonus,  leave etc.   Thereupon,  the  company served  charge  sheets  upon sixty-three  workmen.  The enquiry officer who  investigated the  charges  found  that all the  workmen  were  guilty  of sabotage and slowdown strike and that they were liable to be dismissed.   But  as  at that time  a  dispute  between  the company  and  its workmen relating to payment of  bonus  was pending  before the Industrial Tribunal, the  conditions  of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the order issued in 1954 by the Governor  243 of  Uttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947,  be  altered nor the workmen  discharged  without  the previous   permission  of  the  Conciliation  Officer.    An application  was  made  to  the  Conciliation  Officer   for permission  to  dismiss the workmen.   The  Officer  granted permission  in respect of only eleven workmen on the  ground that the rest of the workmen were mere passive  participants in the go-slow campaign.  The company preferred an appeal to the  Labour  Appellate  Tribunal but  it  was  dismissed  as

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incompetent on the ground that the Conciliation Officer  was not an authority within the meaning of s. 2 (c) (iii) of the Industrial  disputes  (Appellate Tribunal) Act,  1950.   The company then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the direction of the Conciliation Officer  and also against the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Held, that a Conciliation Officer under cl. 29 of the  Order promulgated in 1954 under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  has  to act judicially in granting or  refusing  per- mission  to alter the terms of employment of workmen at  the instance of the employer, but as he is not invested with the judicial  power  of the State, he cannot be  regarded  as  a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the  Constitution of India.  Consequently, an appeal under that Article is not competent  against the direction given by  the  Conciliation Officer. Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd., [1950] S. C. R. 459, Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani, [1950] S.  C. R. 621, Atherton West & Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union, [1953] S. C. R. 780 and Durga Shankar Mehta, v.   Thakur Raghuraj Singh, [1955] 1 S, C. R. 267, relied on. Held,  further, that an "authority" under s. 2 (c) (iii)  of the  Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950,  to be an industrial tribunal must be a body constituted for the purpose  of adjudication of industrial disputes under a  law made  by  the  State; since a Conciliation  Officer  is  not invested  with any such power, he cannot be regarded  as  an "authority"   within   the   meaning   of   that    section. Accordingly, an appeal against the order of the Conciliation Officer  is  not maintainable under s. 4 of  the  Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Sassoon  &  Alliance  Silk Mills Co. Ltd.  v.  Mill  Mazdoor Sabha, [1955] 1 L. L. J. 70, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CIVIL Appeal Nos. 37 and  38 of 1961. 244 Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders  dated July  9,  1956,  and May 9, 1956, of  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  of.  India, Lucknow, and the  Additional  Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, in Appeal No. 111-111 of  1956 and P. D. Case No. 15 of 1956 respectively. Veda Vyasa, S. K. Kapur, J. B. Dadachanji, Prem Nath  Chadha and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants. A.S.  R.  Chari,  R. K. Garg, S. O. Agarwala  and  P.  C. Agarwala, for the respondents. 1962.   September  25.   The  judgment  of’  the  Court  was delivered by SHAH, J.-Two questions arise in limine in these appeals:               (1)   Whether an appeal may be entertained  in               exercise  of  powers  under Art.  136  of  the               Constitution   against  a  direction  of   the               Conciliation Officer issued in disposing of an               application   under  cl.  29  of   the   Order               promulgated  by the Governor of Uttar  Pradesh               under the U.    P.  Industrial  Disputes  Act,               1947 ; and               (2)   Whether against the direction issued  by               the Conciliation Officer exercising  authority               under cl. 29 of the Order an appeal lay to the               Labour Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial               Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950.

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It  would be necessary to consider the merits of the  appeal in  the  event of an affirmative answer on either  of  these questions. Facts which have a bearing on the preliminary questions  are briefly these jaswant  Sugar  Mills Ltd.-hereinafter referred to  as  ’the Company’-owns  factories  at Meerut in the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh for manufacturing sugar  245 and  straw  boards.   On  December  13,  1955,  the  Company received  a  notice relating to demands  for  bonus,  leave, retaining  allowance etc., from the Action Committee of  one of  the Labour Unions of the workmen employed in  the  Sugar Factory: It is the case of the Company that on December  26, 1955,  there  was  a  meeting of  the  workmen  and  certain employees exhorted the workmen to resort to "’direct action" and  in pursuance thereof the workmen adopted  a  "slow-down strike" which resulted in great reduction in the  operations of crushing sugarcane, and production of sugar.  The Company thereupon  served  charge-sheets  upon  sixty-three  workmen charging  them individually and collectively for doing  acts calculated  to destroy the machinery of the factory and  for deliberately adopting a policy of "go-slow" and refusing  to attend work assigned to them at the appointed time. The Enquiry Officer who investigated the charges against the delinquent workmen, by his order dated January 9, 1958, held that all the workmen were guilty of "’sabotage and  slowdown strike"  and were therefore liable to be dismissed.  But  at that time a dispute relating to payment of bonus was pending before the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Tribunal in  which the  Company  and  the  workmen  were  concerned,  and   the conditions of service of the workmen could not, by virtue of cl. 29 of the Order issued in 1954 by the Governor of  Uttar Pradesh  under  the U. P Industrial Disputes Act,  1947,  be altered, and the workmen could not be discharged without the previous permission of the Conciliation Officer. An  application was accordingly submitted by the Company  to the Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, for permission to dismiss the workmen who were, on the finding of the  Enquiry Officer, concerned with "’slow-down strike and other illegal tactics" adopted by them with a view to cause loss to the 246 Company.   The  Conciliation Officer granted  permission  in respect  of  only  eleven  workmen, for  in  his  view,  the remaining   fifty-two   workmen   were   mere   "   passive, participants  in the go-slow campaign", and that  it  "would not  be fair and justifiable to grant permission to  dismiss those  workmen  from  service".  The  Company  preferred  an appeal  to the Labour Appellate Tribunal,  Lucknow,  against the direction of the Conciliation Officer refusing to  grant permission to dismiss fifty-two workmen, but the appeal  was rejected, because in the view of the Appellate Tribunal  the Conciliation  Officer  was  not an  "authority"  within  the meaning  of  s. 2 (c) cl. (iii) of the  Industrial  Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, and the appeal was therefore incompetent.  The Company has, with special leave, preferred appeals  against the direction of the Conciliation  Officer, and  the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.  The  order of the Conciliation Officer is challenged on the ground that in  refusing  permission to dismiss fifty-two  workmen,  the Conciliation Officer ignored the principles settled by  this Court  and  the Labour Appellate Tribunal in  cases  dealing with  applications  for  granting  permission  to  discharge employees under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947. In  the  appeal against the order of  the  Labour  Appellate

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Tribunal, it is submitted that the Conciliation Officer  was an  "authority" within the meaning of s. 2 (c) cl. (iii)  of the  Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950  and the  direction  made  by  the  Conciliation  Officer  was  a decision within the meaning of s. 4 of that Act. Counsel  for the workmen contended that the  appeal  against the  direction  given  by the Conciliation  Officer  is  not maintainable because that officer exercising authority under cl.  29  of the Order promulgated in 1954 under  the  U.  P. Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947, is neither a "Court’  nor  a ’Tribunal’   within   the  meaning  of  Art.  136   of   the Constitution  and no appeal lies to this Court  against  the impugned direction.  247 Article 136(  1) of the Constitution provides : "’Notwithstanding  anything  in this  Chapter,  the  Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to  appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or  order in  any  cause  or matter passed or Made  by  any  court  or tribunal in the territory of India". By  cl. (2) judgments, determinations, sentences and  orders passed  or made by any court or tribunal constituted  by  or under  any law relating to the Armed Forces are exempt  from the operation of cl. (1).  This Court is manifestly invested with  jurisdiction  to  entertain  appeals  from  judgments, decrees,  determinations, sentences or orders in  causes  or matters   passed  by  courts  and  tribunals  except   those constituted  by  or  under any law  relating  to  the  Armed Forces.   It  is common ground that a  Conciliation  Officer exercising  authority under cl. 29 of the Order  made  under the  U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a  "court", and the impugned- direction does not amount to a judgment or decree.  In determining whether an appeal still lies against the  impugned  direction of the  Conciliation  Officer,  two primary questions fall to be considered:               (1)   whether   the  direction  made  by   the               Conciliation Officer is a determination or  an               order; and               (2)   whether  the Conciliation Officer  is  a               ’tribunal’ within the meaning of the Act? Reference to the detailed provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes  Act and Orders made thereunder from time to  time, will be made hereafter, but it may suffice at this stage  to observe that the Order made by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh in  1954 authorised the State Government by Notification  in the Official Gazettee to appoint Conciliation Officers,  and by  cl.  29  provided  that  during  the  pendency  of   any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal or an Adjudicator in 248 respect  of  any dispute, an employer shall  not  alter  the conditions  of  service  to the  prejudice  of  the  workmen concerned in such dispute or discharge or punish any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express  permission of  a  Conciliation  Officer  irrespective  of  whether  the dispute  is  pending before a Board or the  Tribunal  or  an Adjudicator. The Conciliation Officer is by cl. 29 authorised during  the pendency  of  any  Conciliation  proceeding  or  proceedings before  a Tribunal or an Adjudicator to permit the  employer to alter to. the prejudice of the workmen concerned in  such dispute  the conditions of service applicable to them or  to discharge or punish the workmen concerned in such  disputes. If the direction of the Conciliation Officer which  operates proportion vigor to authorise or to deny to the Company  the

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exercise of its powers under the common law to terminate the employment   of  its  workmen,  amounts  to  an   order   or determination within the meaning of Art. 136, an appeal with special  leave  would be maintainable in  this  Court.   The expression "determination" in the context in which it occurs in  Art.  136 signifies an effective expression  of  opinion which  ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority  to whom  it is submitted under a valid law for  disposal.   The expression "order" must have also a similar meaning,  except that it need not operate to end the dispute.   Determination or  order  must  be  judicial  or  quasi-judicial  :  purely administrative or executive direction is not contemplated to be  made  the subject-matter of appeal to this  Court.   The essence of the authority of this Court being judicial,  this Court  does not exercise administrative or executive  powers i.e.  character  of  the power conferred  upon  this  Court, original  or appellate, by its constitution being  judicial, the  determination or order sought to be appealed from  must have   the  character  of  a  judicial  adjudication.    The Conciliation  Officer  is authorised by cl. 29 to  grant  or withhold  249 permission   to  determine  the  employment  of  a   workman concerned in a pending dispute or to alter to his  prejudice conditions of his service.  Clause 29 severely restricts the right  of the employer to terminate employment according  to the  terms of the contract of employment, and the  right  is made  exercisable  upon the direction  of  the  Conciliation Officer  if  at  the time when the right  is  sought  to  be exercised, a dispute in which the employer and the employees are concerned, is pending before the Conciliation Officer or in  an  Industrial  Tribunal.  The true  character  of  this direction must be examined in the light of the nature of the authority vested in the Conciliation Officer and its  impact upon the rights of the parties.  If the direction is  purely administrative,  it  will not be subject to appeal  to  this Court. Question  whether  a  decision  is  judicial  or  is  purely administrative,  often  arises  when  jurisdiction  of   the superior  courts  to issue writs of certiorari  is  invoked. Often the line of distinction between decisions judicial and administrative is thin : but the principles for ascertaining the  true  character of the decisions are  well-settled.   A judicial  decision  is not always the act of a  judge  or  a tribunal  invested with power to determine questions of  law or fact : it must however be the act of a body or  authority invested  by  law with authority to determine  questions  or disputes  affecting the rights of citizens and under a  duty to  act judicially.  A judicial decision  always  postulates the  existence  of  a duty laid upon the  authority  to  act judicially.   Administrative authorities are often  invested with authority or power to determine questions, which affect the  rights of citizens.  The authority may have  to  invite objections  to the course of action proposed by him, he  may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision  may seriously  affect  the  rights of  citizens  but  unless  in arriving  at his decision he is required to act  judicially, his decision 250 will  be  executive or administrative.  Legal  authority  to determine  questions affecting the rights of citizens,  does not make the determination judicial : it is the duty to  act judicially  which  invests  it with  that  character.   What distinguishes   an  act  judicial  from  administrative   is therefore  the  duty  imposed  upon  the  authority  to  act

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judicially.  Mukherjea, J., in The Province of Bombay v.  K. S.  Advani  observed  at p. 670 "there cannot  indeed  be  a judicial act which does not create or imposes obligations  ; but an act, x x x x x x is not necessarily judicial  because it  affects  the  rights of subjects.   Every  judicial  act presupposes  the application of judicial process.  There  is well  marked  distinction  between  forming  a  personal  or private   opinion  about  a  matter,  and   determining   it judicially.   In  the performance of an executive  act,  the authority  has certainly to apply his mind to the  materials before him ; but the opinion he forms is a purely subjective matter which depends entirely upon his state of mind.  It is of  course necessary that he must act in good faith, and  if it  is  established that he was not influenced  by  any  ex- traneous consideration, there is nothing further to be  said about it.  In a judicial proceeding, on the other hand,  the process  or  method  of  application  is  different.    "The judicial process involves the application of a body of rules or principles by the technique of a particular psychological method",  vide Robson’s justice and Administrative  Law,  p. 33.  It involves a proposal and an opposition, and  arriving at  a decision upon the same on consideration of  facts  and circumstances according to the rules of reason and  justice, vide  R. v. London County Council(2).  It is  not  necessary that  the strict rules of evidence should be followed :  the procedure  for  investigation of facts or for  reception  of evidence  may  vary  according  to  the  requirements  of  a particular  case.  There need not be any hard and fast  rule on  such  matters,  but the  decision  which  the  authority arrives  at,  must not be his  "subjective’,  ’Personal’  or ’private’ opinion. (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621. (2) [1931] 2 K. B. 215, 233.  251 It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or  criterion  laid  down  or recognised  by  law,  and  the soundness or otherwise of the determination must be  capable of being tested by the same external standard.  This is  the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it  from an  administrative  function ; and whether an  authority  is required  to  exercise  one kind of function  or  the  other depends  entirely  upon  the provisions  of  the  particular enactment.  x x x x x Generally speaking where the  language of  a statute indicates with sufficient clearness  that  the personal  satisfaction of the authority on  certain  matters about which he has to form an opinion finds his jurisdiction to  do  certain acts or make certain  orders,  the  function should be regarded as an executive function." It  may be observed that Mukherjea, J., was on the  ultimate decision  in  the case, in the minority, but  the  principle enunciated  by  him had substantially the  approval  of  the Court.   Das,  J., in the same case at p. 719  observed:  "a person  entrusted to do an administrative act has  often  to determine  questions of fact to enable him to  exercise  his power.   He has to consider facts and circumstances  and  to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his  mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or  quasi-judicial function has to do.  Both have to act  in good  faith.  A good and valid administrative  or  executive act  binds  the subject and affects his  rights  or  imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does.   The exercise of an administrative or  executive  act may  well  be  and  is  frequently  made  dependent  by  the legislature  upon  a  condition  or  contingency  which  may involve a question of fact, but the question of  fulfillment

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of  which  may,  nevertheless, be  left  to  the  subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority". To  make  a  decision  or an  act  judicial,  the  following criteria must be satisfied: 252               (1)   it is in substance a determination  upon               investigation of a question by the application               of  objective standards to facts found in  the               light of preexisting legal rule;               (2)   it  declares  rights  or  imposes   upon               parties  obligations  affecting  their   civil               rights; and               (3)   that  the  investigation is  subject  to               certain procedural attributes contemplating an               opportunity of presenting its case to a party,               ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if               a dispute be on questions of fact, and if  the               dispute   be  on  question  of  law   on   the               presentation of legal argument, and a decision               resulting  in  the disposal of the  matter  on               findings based upon those questions of law and               fact. Applying  these  tests,  there is’  little  doubt  that  the Conciliation  Officer in granting or refusing permission  to alter the terms of employment of workmen, at the instance of the  employer, has to act judicially.  His decision  is  not made  to  depend  upon any subjective  satisfaction;  he  is required to investigate and ascertain facts, apply objective standards  to  facts  found,  and  to  declare  whether  the employer  makes out a case for granting permission to  alter the terms of employment of his employees.  The U. P.  Indus- trial  Disputes Act and the Order framed thereunder  do  not lay down any specific procedure, but the duty cast upon  him to  decide after investigating facts by the  application  of objective  standards  involves  an obligation  to  evolve  a procedure  consistent  with the purpose and  nature  of  the enquiry,   which  assures  to  the  disputing   parties   an opportunity  to  present  their  respective  cases,  and  to substantiate  the same by evidence and argument.   Therefore the  direction of the Conciliation Officer under cl. 29  ’of the Order, cannot be said to be purely administrative.  253 But every decision or order by an authority under a duty  to act  judicially  is  not subject to appeal  to  this  Court. Under   Art.  136,  an  appeal  lies  to  this  Court   from adjudications of courts and tribunals only.  Adjudication of a  court or tribunal must doubtless be judicial:  but  every authority  which by its constitution or authority  specially conferred  upon  it is required to act  judicially,  is  not necessarily  a  tribunal  for the purpose of  Art.  136.   A tribunal,  adjudication whereof is subject to  appeal,  must beside  being  under  a duty to act judicially,  be  a  body invested  with  the judicial power of. the State.   For  the purpose  of  ascertaining whether the  Conciliation  Officer exercising powers under cl. 29 is invested with the judicial powers  of the State, it is necessary to set out the  nature of the powers and functions of the Conciliation Officer  and the procedure, if any, prescribed for the exercise of  those powers and functions under the Order issued by the Governor, and  which was in force at the material time.  A  historical review  of the emergence of the powers and functions of  the Conciliation Officer in operation at the date when he passed the  order  impugned  in  these  appeals  has  an  important bearing.   The Legislature of the United  Provinces  enacted the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, XXVIII of 1947, to provide

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"for  powers  to prevent strikes and  lock-outs,  to  settle industrial  disputes and for other incidental matters".   By s.  3  of  the  U. P. Industrial  Disputes  Act,  the  Local Government  was  authorised,  if  in  its  opinion  it   was necessary  or  expedient  so to  do  for  certain  specified purposes  to  make by general or special  order,  provision, inter   alia  for  appointing  industrial  courts  and   for referring   any  industrial  dispute  for  conciliation   or adjudication in the manner provided in the Order. The  Governor of Uttar Pradesh on March 10, 1948, issued  an Order in exercise of the powers conferred under ss. 3 and  8 of the U. P. Industrial 254 Disputes  Act,  1947.   By cl.  1 of  the  Order  power  was conferred  upon  the  Provincial  Government  to  constitute Conciliation  Boards for settlement of  industrial  disputes under the chairmanship of Conciliation Officers, and by  cl. 2  the  Provincial  Government  was  authorised  to  appoint Conciliation Officers.  By cl. 6 the Conciliation Board  had to  commence  an inquiry into a dispute  or  matter  brought before it and to endeavor to bring about a settlement of the same.   Clause 7 prescribed the procedure to be followed  by the  Board in the course of the inquiry : the Board  had  to frame issues on points on which the parties were at variance and to endeavour to secure a settlement of the dispute.   If no  amicable settlement was reached, the Board  investigated the dispute and recorded an award together with the  reasons thereof  on the issues on which the parties were  at  issue. The  award  made by the Conciliation Board  was  subject  to appeal  to the Industrial Court constituted under cl. 10  of the  Order.  By cl. 18 the Conciliation Board  was  invested with certain powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1903, such as enforcing attendance of  witnesses, compelling  production  of  documents,  inspection  of   any property  or  thing,  including machinery etc.   By  cl.  19 provision  was made for service of notice, summons,  process or order issued by the Board in the manner prescribed by the Code  ’of Civil Procedure, 1908.  But these were the  powers of  the  Conciliation  Board, and not  of  the  Conciliation Officer.   The only statutory authority conferred  upon  the Conciliation   Officer  independently  of  the   Board   was authority  under cl. 23 to permit modification of  terms  of employment  or dismissal or discharge of workmen during  the continuance  of  an  enquiry  under  the  U.  P.  Industrial Disputes  Act or appeal therefrom and pending the  issue  of the  orders of the State Government upon the,  findings  of the  Board of Court.  Under the Order promulgated  in  1948, therefore,   the  Conciliation  Board  was   invested   with authority analogous to that  255 of an Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.   But the power to sanction discharge or dismissal  of workmen  during  the continuance of the enquiry  was  vested exclusively  in  the Conciliation Officer,  irrespective  of whether the enquiry was pending before a Conciliation Board, or  in appeal before the Industrial Court.. This  Order  was superseded by fresh Order which was promulgated in 1951.  It was  presumably because of the enactment of  the  Industrial Disputes  (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, by the  Parliament which conferred authority upon the Labour Appellate Tribunal to  entertain appeals in certain matters against the  awards and decisions of the Industrial Tribunals that the necessity of  reorientation of the scheme for adjudication  of  labour disputes under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act arose.   By the  fresh Order rules were prescribed for  constitution  of

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Conciliation  Boards Industrial Tribunals and  Adjudicators. By this Order a Conciliation Board of which the Conciliation Officer  was  to be the Chairman was only  to  endeavour  to bring  about  a  settlement  of dispute  before  it.   If  a settlement   was  brought  about,  the  Conciliation   Board prepared a memorandum of terms of the settlement arrived  at and the same was submitted to the Labour Commissioner of the State’  Where no amicable settlement was secured, the  Board made a report setting forth the steps taken for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and  the attempts  made  for bringing about an  amicable  settlement. Power to make an award was taken away from the  Conciliation Board,  and was vested in the Industrial  Tribunal.   Powers exercisable  under  the Code of Civil  Procedure  under  the previous  Order were also taken away from  the  Conciliation Board  but  the  authority to alter  conditions  of  service during  the pendency of proceeding before  the  Conciliation Officer  or a Tribunal or an Adjudicator by cl. 23  remained with   the  Conciliation  Officer  of  the  area   concerned irrespective of the fact whether 256 a  dispute  was  pending before a Board,  Tribunal  or    an Adjudicator. This  Order  was superseded by a fresh Order made  in  1954. The  scheme  of the Order made in 1954 was  similar  to  the scheme  of  the  Order  made in  1951.   Disputes  could  be referred  under this Order to the Conciliation  Board  which was to consist of the Conciliation Officer appointed by  the State  Government and two members-"one representing each  of the  parties  to the dispute-appointed by  the  Conciliation Officer on the recommendation of the parties.  The  function of  the Board was to prepare a memoratidum of a  settlement, if  any,  reached before the Board or to  report  about  the failure to bring about a settlement, but it had no power  to make  an award.  By cl. 24 the Tribunal or the  Adjudicator, but not the Board nor the Conciliation Officer, were  vested with certain powers as were vested in the Civil Courts under the  Code  of Civil Procedure, 1908, such as  summoning  and enforcing   the  attendance  of  witnesses   requiring   the discovery  and production of documents, issuing  commissions in  the  examination  of witnesses  and  inspection  of  any property or thing.  Clause 29 (omitting the proviso  thereto which is not material) was enacted as follows :-               "During  the  pendency  of  any   conciliation               proceedings or proceedings before the Tribunal               or  an Adjudicator in respect of  any  dispute               and where sub-clause (3) of clause 5  applies,               for  a  further period of 30  days  (excluding               holidays but not annual vacations observed  by               courts  subordinate  to the  High  Court),  an               employer shall not-               (a)   alter  to the prejudice of  the  workmen               concerned  in such dispute the  conditions  of               service applicable to them immediately  before               the commencement of such proceedings, or                257               (b)   discharge   or  punish,   whether   such               punishment  is by dismissal or otherwise,  any               workman  concerned in such dispute, save  with               the   express  permission  in  writing  of   a               Conciliation  Officer of the  area  concerned,               irrespective  of the fact whether the  dispute               is  pending before a Board or the Tribunal  or               an Adjudicator ;" The  scheme  of the Order made by the Governor in  1954  was

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substantially the same as the Order which was promulgated in year 1951.  The Conciliation Officer who was to be appointed by  a Notification under cl. 2 by the State  Government  had two-fold  functions.   He was a member of  the  Conciliation Board and he functioned in that capacity under cls. 4, 5,  6 and  7  for  the  purpose  of  bringing  about  an  amicable settlement of dispute.  Authority to entertain  applications submitted  to the Conciliation Officer about  an  industrial dispute,  existing  or  apprehended  and  to  constitute   a Conciliation  Board  were  administrative  duties  in  hi  s capacity  as a member of the Conciliation Board.  His  power independently  of the Board wag invested in him only by  cl. 29.   The  true nature of an order made  by  a  Conciliation Officer  under cl. 23 of the Order promulgated  in  1951-and which  was in terms substantially the same as cl. 29 of  the 1954  Order., was examined by this Court in Athenian West  & Co.  Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union(1) where Bhagwati,  J., announcing the judgment of the Court observed :               "’It is clear that clause 23 imposed a ban  on               the  discharge  or dismissal  of  any  workman               pending  the enquiry of an industrial  dispute               before  the  Board  or an  appeal  before  the               Industrial  Court and the employer, his  agent               or  manager’ could only discharge  or  dismiss               the workman with the written permission of the               Regional Conciliation Officer x x x concerned.               Even if such written permission               (1)[1953] S. C. R. 780.               258               was forthcoming the employer, his agent or   manager               might  or might not discharge or  dismiss  the               workman  and the only effect of  such  written               permission would be to remove the ban  against               the  discharge  or dismissal  of  the  workman               during the pendency of those proceedings.  The               Regional Conciliation Officer x x x  concerned               would  institute  an enquiry and come  to  the               conclusion  whether  there was a  prima  facie               case  made out for the discharge or  dismissal               of the workman and the employer, his agent  or               manager  was  not  actuated  by  any  improper               motives  or  did  not  resort  to  any  unfair               practice or victimisation in the matter of the               proposed   discharge  or  dismissal   of   the               workman.   But  he was not entrusted,  as  the               Board  or the Industrial Court would be,  with               the  duty of coming to the conclusion  whether               the  discharge  or dismissal  of  the  workman               during  the  pendency of the  proceedings  was               within  the rights of the employer, his  agent               or  manager.  The enquiry to be  conducted  by               the  Regional Conciliation Officer x x x  x  x               concerned   was   not  an  enquiry   into   an               industrial dispute as to the non-employment of               the workman who was sought to be discharged or               dismissed; which industrial dispute would only               arise after an employer, his agent or  manager               discharged   or  dismissed  the   workman   in               accordance   with   the   written   permission               obtained from the officer concerned.  This was               the  only  scope  of the  enquiry  before  the               Regional  Conciliation  Officer x x x  x  x  x               concerned  and  the  effect  of  the   written               permission  was not to validate the  discharge               or  dismissal but merely to remove the ban  on

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             the  powers  of  the employer,  his  agent  or               manager  to discharge or dismiss  the  workman               during the pendency of the proceedings.   Once               such  written permission was granted  by  him,               that order made or direction                259               issued  by him was to be final and  conclusive               and  was  not to be questioned by  any  party               thereto  in any proceedings.  The only  effect               of  clause 24 (1) was to prevent any party  to               the  pending proceedings from challenging  the               written permission thus granted by the officer               concerned. x x x x once the written permission               was granted by the officer concerned, the  ban               against  the  discharge or  dismissal  of  the               workman would be removed and the employer, his               agent or manager could in the exercise of  his               discretion  discharge or dismiss  the  workman               but in that event an industrial dispute within               the  meaning  of its definition  contained  in               section 2 (k) of’ the industrial Disputes Act,               1947, would arise and the workman who had been               discharged  or dismissed would be entitled  to               have  that industrial dispute referred to  the               Regional  Conciliation Board for enquiry  into               the same." The  essential  characteristics of a "tribunal’  within  the meaning of Art. 136 were examined by Mahajan, J., and it was observed that in the Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank  Ltd.(1) ,tribunals which do not derive authority  from the  sovereign  power cannot fall within the ambit  of  Art. 136.  The condition precedent for bringing a tribunal within the  ambit of Article 136 is that it should  be  constituted by. the State.  Again a tribunal would be outside the  ambit of  Art.  136  if it is not invested with any  part  of  the judicial  functions  of  the  State  but  discharges  purely administrative  or executive duties." This view was  adopted by  the  Court  in Durga Shankar Mehta  v.  Thakur  Raghuraj Singh(")  where Mukherjea, J., observed : ""it is  now  well settled  by the majority decision of this Court in the  case of Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employee8 of the Bharat Bank  Ltd.(1) that the expression "’Tribunal" as used in Art. 136 does not mean the same thing as "’Court" but (1) [1950] S. C. R. 459. (2) (1955) 1 S. C. R. 267. 260 includes,within   its  ambit,  all   adjudicating   bodies, provided  they are constituted by the State and are invested  with judicial  as  distinguished from  purely  administrative  or executive functions." The  duty  to act judicially imposed upon  an  authority  by statute  does not necessarily clothe the authority with  the judicial  power  of’  the  State.   Even  administrative  or executive   authorities  are  often  by  virtue   of   their constitution,  required  to act judicially in  dealing  with question  affecting  the  rights  of  citizens.   Boards  of Revenue,  Customs Authorities, Motor  Vehicles  Authorities, Income-tax  and Sales-tax Officers are  illustrations  prima facie of such administrative authorities, who though under a duty to act judicially, either by the express provisions  of the  statutes  constituting  them or  by  the  rules  framed thereunder  or by the implication either of the statutes  or the  powers conferred upon them are still not  delegates  of the judicial power of the State.  Their primary function  is administrative  and  not judicial.  In deciding  whether  an

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authority  required  to act ,judicially  when  dealing  with matters  affecting rights of citizens may be regarded  as  a tribunal, though not a court, the principal incident is  the investiture of the "trappings of a court"-such as  authority to determine matters in cases initiated by parties,  sitting in  public, power to compel attendance of witnesses  and  to examine  them on oath, duty to follow fundamental  rules  of evidence (though not the strict rules of the Evidence  Act), provision  for  imposing sanctions by way  of  imprisonment, fine, damages or mandatory or prohibitory orders to  enforce obedience  to  their commands.  The list is  illustrative  ; some,  though  not  necessarily  all  such  trappings   will ordinarily  make the authority which is under a duty to  act judicially, a ’tribunal’. Mahajan, J., in Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd.(1) observed at p. 476 (1)  (1950) S.C. R. 459.  261               "As  pointed  out in picturesque  language  by               Lord Sankey L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v.               Federal Commissioner of Taxation(1), there are               tribunals  with many of the "’trappings  of  a               Court" which, nevertheless, are not Courts  in               the strict sense of exercising judicial power.               It seems to me that such tribunals though they               are  not  full-fledged  Courts,  yet  exercise               quasijudicial  functions  and are  within  the               ambit of the word "tribunal’ in article 136 of               the  Constitution.  It was pointed out in  the               above case that a tribunal is pot  necessarily               a Court in this strict sense because it  gives               a   final  decision,  nor  because  it   hears               witnesses  on  oath, nor because two  or  more               contending  parties appear before  it  between               whom  it has to decide., nor because it  gives               decisions which affect the rights of subjects,               nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor               because  it  is a body to which  a  matter  is               referred  by another body.  The  intention  of               the  Constitution  by  the  use  of  the  word               ’tribunal’  in the article seems to have  been               to  include  within the scope of  article  136               tribunals  adorned with similar  trappings  as               Court  but  strictly not  coming  within  that               definition." Reverting  to  the  Order issued by the  Governor  of  Uttar Pradesh  in  1954  it  is  manifest  that  no  procedure  is prescribed   for  the  investigation  to  be  made  by   the Conciliation  Officer, under cl. 29.  He is not required  to sit  in public: no formal pleadings are contemplated  to  be tendered;  he  is  not empowered  to  compel  attendance  of witnesses,  nor  is he restricted in making  an  enquiry  to evidence  which  the  parties may  bring  before  him.’  The Conciliation  Officer is again not capable of  delivering  a determinative  judgment  or award affecting the  rights  and obligations  of  parties.  He is not  invested  with  powers similar to those of the Civil Court under the Code of  Civil Procedure for eriforcing attendance of (1)  [1931] A. C. 273. 262 any   person   and  examining  him   on   oath,   compelling production   of  documents,  issuing  commissions  for   the examination of witnesses and other matters.  He is     concerned in  granting  leave to determine whether there  is  a  prima facie case for dismissal or discharge of an employee or  for

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altering  terms of employment, and whether the  employer  is actuated  by unfair motives; lie has not to  decide  whether the proposed step of discharge or dismissal of the  employee was  within  the rights of the employer.  His  order  merely removes a statutory ban in certain eventualities, laid  upon the common law right of an employer to dismiss, discharge or alter the terms of employment according to contract  between the  parties.  The Conciliation Officer has  undoubtedly  to act judicially in dealing with an application under cl.  29, but he is not invested with the judicial power of the State: he  cannot therefore be regarded as a ’tribunal’ within  the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution. We  are not in this case called upon to decide  whether  the proceeding  for  a  writ  may lie  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution before a competent High Court against the order of the Conciliation Officer.  We are concerned only to  deal with the limited question whether he is a ’tribunal’  within the  meaning  of  Art. 136 of the  Constitution  having  the attributes  of the investment of the judicial powers of  the State.  It may be pertinent to note that provisions  similar to  cl.  29 of the Order issued under the U.  P.  Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947,  are  to be found  in  s.  33  of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947.   By  virtue  of  s.33  an employer during the pendency of any conciliation  proceeding before  a  Conciliation  Officer  or  a  Board  or  of   any proceeding  before  a Labour Court or Tribunal  or  National Tribunal  in respect of an industrial dispute is  prohibited save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending, from altering to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such a disputes the  263 conditions of service applicable to them immediately  before the  commencement of the proceeding and from discharging  or punishing,  whether by dismissal. or otherwise, any  workman concerned in such dispute for any misconduct connected  with the  dispute.  Both the enactments place  restrictions  upon the power of the employer to terminate employment during the pendency of a dispute in which the employer and employee are concerned,   and  which  is  pending  before   a   statutory authority.   But  whereas under cl. 29 the  power  to  grant permission is exercisable only by the Conciliation  Officer, the  power  under  s . 33 is exercisable  by  the  authority before whom the proceeding is pending.  Section 33-A of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act  provides,  in so  far  as  it  is material,   that   "’where  an  employer   contravenes   the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of  proceedings before  a Labour Court, Tribunal or National  Tribunal,  any employee  aggrieved by such contravention, may make a  comp- laint  in writing, in the prescribed mariner to such  Labour Court, tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of  such complaint  that Labour Court, Tribunal or National  Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a  dispute referred  to  or pending before it, in accordance  with  the provisions  of  this Act and shall submit its award  to  the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act  shall apply  accordingly".   Contravention by an employer  of  the provisions  of s. 33 when the proceeding is  pending  before the  Conciliation Officer or the Board does not  attract  s. 33-A  and does not make it an industrial dispute capable  of being adjudicated upon in accordance with the provisions  of s. 33-A.  Action taken by an employer during the pendency of conciliation  proceedings contrary to s. 33,  may  therefore sustain  a  claim  for adjudication,  only  if  the  dispute arising thereunder be referred by the appropriate Government to  an  Industrial  Tribunal.  For breach of s.  33  of  the

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Industrial  Disputes  Act,  or cl. 29 of the  Order  by  the Governor of U. P. no 264 penalty  may be imposed by the Conciliation Officer.      It is thus manifest that the Conciliation Officer does    not hold  the  status of an industrial  tribunal  in  exercising powers under s. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act or cl.  29 of the U.P. Order.  It must therefore be held that an appeal under  Art.  136 of the Constitution to this  Court  is  not competent  against the direction given by  the  Conciliation Officer’  exercising power under cl. 29 of the Order  issued by the Governor of U. P. under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The  question whether an appeal lay to the Labour  Appellate Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate  Tribunal) Act,  48  of 1950, does not present much difficulty  in  its solution.  By s. 4 of Act 48 of 1950, the Central Government is  authorised to constitute Labour Appellate Tribunals  for hearing  appeals from the awards or decisions of  industrial tribunals  in accordance with the provisions of the Act;  an ’Industrial Tribunal’ is defined in s. 2 (c)  as meaning-               "(i) any Industrial Tribunal constituted under               the  Industrial  Disputes Act,  1947  (XIV  of               1947); or               (ii)in  relation  to cases where  an  appeal               lies  from  any  court, wage  board  or  other               authority  set up in any State under  any  law               relating  to  the adjudication  of  industrial               disputes  made,  whether before or  after  the               commencement  of this Act, by the  legislative               authority  of the State’ to any  other  court,               board   or  authority   exercising   appellate               jurisdiction within the State; or               (iii)in  relation  to other cases,  where  no               appeal lies under any law referred to in  sub-               clause   (ii),  any  court,  board  or   other               authority  set  up in ;any  State  under  such               law,"  265 Conciliation  Officer  functioning under cl. 29  is  not  an Industrial   Tribunal  constituted  under   the   Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947, his authority being derived  from  the appointment made by the’ State of Uttar Pradesh under the U. P.,  Industrial  Disputes Act, 1947.  Nor is  any  provision made  in the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or  Orders made  thereunder  for  an appeal to  any  similar  authority against  the direction made by the Conciliation  Officer  in exercise  of  the power conferred under cl. 29.   An  appeal lies under s. 4 of the Act.48 of 1950, against the direction of  a  Conciliation  Officer  only  if  he  is  a  Court  or Authority.   The  Legislature  has used  in  cl.  (iii)  the expression  "any  court,  board  or  other  authority";  the context  indicates that the word "other authority’  must  be read  ejuadem  generis with Court or Board.   The  right  to appeal  conferred  by  s.  4  is  only  against  awards   or decisions,  and a Conciliation Officer makes no  award,  nor even  a  decision.   His  function  is  not  to  deliver   a definitive  judgment  affecting the rights  of  the  parties before  him.   He is not invested with power  to  adjudicate industrial  disputes.   It is true that  he  is  constituted under a statute which relates to adjudication of  industrial disputes,  but  his  functions  are  purely  incidental   to industrial  adjudication.   His  power is not  of  the  same character  as  that  of  an Industrial  Court  or  Board  or

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Tribunal.   In our view an ’authority’ under s. 2 (cl  (iii) to be an industrial tribunal must be a body constituted  for the  purpose of adjudication of industrial disputes under  a law  made by a State.  The Conciliation Officer  not  having been invested with any such power, he cannot be regarded  as an"  "authority" within the meaning of s. 2(c) (iii) of  the Industrial Disputes (Appellate.  Tribunal) Act.  The  Labour Appellate  Tribunal  has  consistently held,  and  we  think rightly,  that an appeal against the order of a  Conciliator is  not maintainable under s. 4 of the  Industrial  Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, vide Sassoon & Alliance Silk Mills Co.  Ltd v. Mill Mazdoor Sabba (1)[1955] 1 L.L. J. 70. 266 Both  the  appeals  therefore fail and  are  dismissed  with costs.  There will be one hearing fee. Appeals dismissed.