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PETITIONER: JAIN INK MANUFACTURING COMPANY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1980

BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1981 AIR  670            1981 SCR  (1) 498  1980 SCC  (4) 435  CITATOR INFO :  D          1988 SC1708  (23)  RF         1991 SC 855  (45)

ACT:      Public Premises  (Eviction of  Unauthorised  occupants) Act, 1971,  S. 2(2)(g)-  Unauthorised occupation  of  public premises-Tenant in  possession before  the  premises  became public premises-Eviction  whether can  be ordered  under the Act.      Public Premises  (Eviction of  Unauthorised  occupants) Act, 1971,  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958) & Slum Areas  (Improvement   and  Clearance)  Act  1956-over-riding effect of  Acts-No conflict as scope and objects of Acts are different-Premises Act whether prevails over Rent Act.

HEADNOTE:      The L.I.C. (respondent No. 1) purchased a building at a court auction. The appellant was inducted as a tenant by the prior owner  of the  premises. The  L.l.C. gave notice under section 106  of the  Transfer of  Property Act directing the appellant to  vacate the  premises. As the appellant did not vacate the  premises the  L.I.C. filed  a complaint with the Estate  Officer,   L.I.C.  (respondent   No.  2)  under  the provisions of  the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised occupants) Act  1971, who  issued a  notice to the appellant under section  4(1)  of  the  Act  to  show  cause  why  the appellant be  not evicted.  Before the  Estate  Officer  the appellant raised  preliminary objections which related to th equestion of  jurisdiction of  the Estate Officer to proceed under the  Premises Act.  The  Estate  Officer  decided  the question against him and the High Court confirmed the order.      In appeal  to this  Court on behalf of the appellant it was contended:  (1) The  appellant could not be described as an ’unauthorised  occupant’ within  the meaning  of  section 2(2)(g)  of  the  1971  Act  because  he  had  entered  into possession of  the premises  long before they were purchased by the  L.I.C.; (2)(i).  The Premises  Act of 1971 which had been given  retrospective effect  from the  16th  September, 1958 should be construed as a law having been passed in 1958 and so  construed the  Rent Act (The Delhi Rent Control Act) passed in  1959 over-rides  the Premises  Act; (ii) The Rent

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Act which  is a  special law would override the Premises Act and (iii)  The intention  of the  Legislature in passing the Rent Act  as seen  from section  3(a) was  merely to exclude from its operation only premises belonging to the Government and if the intention was to exclude other premises belonging to corporate  bodies or Corporations then section 3(a) would have been differently worded.      Apart from the Rent Act section, Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement  and Clearance) Act, 1956 which is also a Special Act  applying only to such places which are declared to be  slums under the Act, would override the provisions of both the Rent Act and the Premises Act. 499      Dismissing the Appeal: ^      HELD:  (1)(a)   The  appellant   was   undoubtedly   in unauthorised occupation of the premises. [503 D]      (b) Section  2(2)(g) does not use the word ’possession’ or the words ’entry into possession’ at any point of time at all. The  section merely  requires occupation  of any public premises.  Entry   into  possession   connotes  one   single terminus, viz.,  the point of time when a person enters into possession or  occupies the property whereas occupation is a continuous process which starts right from the point of time when the  person enters  into  possession  or  occupies  the premises  and   continues  until  he  leaves  the  premises. [502 G-H]      In the  instant case  the lease  was determined  by the landlord by  a notice  under section  106 of the Transfer of Property Act.  Therefore, there  can be  no doubt  that  the appellant was  in unauthorised  occupation of  the  premises once the lease was determined. [503 Cl      Raj Kumar  Devendra Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1973] 2 SCR 166 distinguished.      2(i) The  Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came into force on  23rd August,  1971 that is long after the Rent Act was passed  in 1959.  The mere  fact that  by  virtue  of  a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect from 1958 will  not alter  the date  when the  Premises  Act  was actually passed,  that is  August 23, 1971. The Premises Act being subsequent  to the  Rent Act  would naturally  prevail over and override the provisions of the Rent Act. [503 G]      (ii) The  scope and  the object  of the Premises Act is quite different  from that  of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much  wider application,  inasmuch as  it applies  to all private premises,  which do  not  fall  within  the  limited exceptions indicated  in section  2 of the Premises Act. The object of  the Rent  Act is  to afford special protection to all the  tenants or  private landlords  who  are  neither  a Corporation nor  Government or  Corporate Bodies. Even under the Rent  Act, a  special category  has been  carved out  by section  25B   which  provides  for  special  procedure  for eviction  to   landlords  who  require  premises  for  their personal  necessity.   Section  25B,  therefore,  becomes  a special law within the Rent Act. Therefore, the Premises Act as compared  to the Rent Act, is a Special Act and overrides the provisions of the Rent Act. [505 B-C]      Sarwan Singh  & Anr.  v. Kasturi Lal [1977] 2 SCR 421 & Shri Ram  Narain v.  The Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd. [1956] SCR 603 referred to.      (iii) once  the Premises  Act  becomes  a  Special  Act dealing  with   the  premises   belonging  to   the  Central Government, Corporations  and other  statutory  bodies,  the Rent Act stands superseded. [505 F]      3. Section  19 of  the Slums  Act shows  that it  is in

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direct  conflict  with  the  Premises  Act  which  expressly provides for  the forum for evicting persons in unauthorised occupation of  premises which  fell  in  section  2  of  the Premises Act The Premises Act, being subsequent to the Slums Act, as  amended in  1964, and  again being  a  special  Act having a  very limited sphere, must necessarily override the Slums Act. [506 D] 500

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 224 of 1979.      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated 6-12-1978 of the Delhi High Court in C.W. No. 1361/78.      P.  Parameswara   Rao  and   R.  Nagarathnam   for  the Appellant.      K. Parasaran,  Sol. Genl., V. Gauri Shanker, K.L. Hathi and Mrs. Hemantika Wahi for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      FAZAL ALI,  J.-This appeal by special leave is directed against a  Division Bench judgment dated December 6, 1978 of the High  Court of  Delhi and  arises  under  the  following circumstances.      The appellant was inducted as a tenant by one Mithanlal who was  the owner  of the premises in question and the rent payable at  the time of the tenancy-was Rs 55 per month. The premises were,  however, purchased  by  the  Life  Insurance Corporation of  India (for short, LIC) at a court auction on July 19, 1958 and the appellant in view of the same attorned to the new landlord, namely, the LIC. The Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Rent Act’) came into force  on February 9, 1959 and on July 24, 1969 the new landlord gave  a notice  under s.  106 of  the  Transfer  of Property Act  to the appellant determining the tenancy. This notice, however,  was subsequently  withdrawn and after some correspondence with  the appellant the rent was increased by the LIC  from Rs.  55 to Rs. 125 per month. Sometime towards the end  of July  1966, the LIC gave a fresh notice under s. 106 of  the Transfer of Property Act purporting to determine the tenancy. Thereafter, there were some parleys between the LIC and  the appellant  and ultimately  the  LIC  agreed  to accept the  enhanced rent  of Rs.  300 per  month  from  the appellant with  effect from  December 1,  1976. On April 23, 1977 the  LIC gave  another notice  under s. 106 superseding the previous  notice and  directing the  appellant to vacate the premises on or before May 31, 1977. As the appellant did not vacate  the premises,  the LIC  filed a  complaint  with respondent  No.   2,  the  Estate  Officer,  LIC  under  the provisions of  the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants)  Act,   1971  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the ’Premises Act’).  Thereafter, the second respondent issued a notice to the appellant under s. 4(1) of the Premises Act to show cause  why the  appellant be not evicted. The appellant appeared  before  the  Estate  Officer  and  raised  certain preliminary objections  which having  been  decided  against him, the  appellant filed  a writ petition in the Delhi High Court against the order of the Estate Officer and reiterated the preliminary objections taken by him before 501 the  Estate   Officer.  After  considering  the  preliminary objections  which   mainly  related   to  the   question  of jurisdiction of  the Estate  officer to  proceed  under  the Premises Act,  the High  Court overruled  all the objections

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and dismissed  the writ  petition in  limine,  though  by  a reasoned order. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.      Before dealing  with the  contention raised  by counsel for the  respondent we  might mention  that the  proceedings before the  Estate officer  under the Premises Act have only been stayed  and not  yet  decided  on  merits  because  the appellant wanted  the Estate  officer to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.      In support  of the appeal, Mr. Parmeshwar Rao submitted three main  contentions before  us. In  the first  place, he submitted that the provisions of the Premises Act would have no application to the present premises because the appellant could not be described as an unauthorised occupant as he had entered into  possession of  the premises  long before  they were purchased  by the LIC. It was argued that the condition precedent for  the assumption  of jurisdiction by the Estate officer was  that the  appellant  must  be  an  unauthorised occupant, and if the possession of the appellant was lawful, though  the   property  changed   hands  subsequently,   the appellant could  not be  dubbed as an unauthorised occupant. In this  connection, reliance  was placed  on a  decision of this Court  in Rajkumar  Devindera Singh  & Anr. v. State of Punjab &  Ors We have gone through the decision cited before us and  we find that the provisions of the Punjab Act, which was the  subject matter  of interpretation  by this Court in that case,  were substantially and materially different from s. 2(2)(g)  of the  Premises Act  which defines unauthorised occupation.  Mr.   Rao,  however,  strongly  relied  on  the following observations  made  by  this  Court  in  the  case supra:-           "If the  appellants were  in possession before the      date of  the sale of the property to the Government, it      could not  be said  that the  appellants  entered  into      possession of  public premises,  for, at  the time when      they were  in occupation  of the property, the property      was not  public premises.  Then it was either the joint      family  property  or  the  property  of  the  Maharaja,      namely, Yadavindra  Singh. The  property was not public      premises before it was sold to the Government." If these  observations of  this  Court  are  torn  from  the context they  may presumably  support the  argument  of  the appellant but  we have  to read  these observations  in  the light of  the specific  provisions  of  the  Punjab,  Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 502 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the ’Punjab Act’). Relevant portion of s. 3 of that Act may be extracted thus:           "For purposes  of this  Act,  a  person  shall  be      deemed to  be in  unauthorised occupation of any public      premises:-           (a) where  he has  whether  before  or  after  the           commencement of  this Act, entered into possession           thereof otherwise  than under  and in pursuance of           any allotment, lease or grant." [Emphasis Ours]      It would  be seen that before a person could be said to be in  an unauthorised  occupation,  the  Act  required  the following conditions:-      (1)   that the  occupant had  entered  into  possession           before or after the commencement of the Act.      (2)  that he had entered into such possession otherwise           than under  and in  pursuance  of  any  allotment,           lease or grant. That Act,  therefore, lays special stress on only one point, namely, the  entry into  possession. Thus, if the entry into possession had  taken place prior to the passing of the Act,

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then obviously  the  occupant  concerned  would  not  be  an unauthorised occupant.  What made the occupancy unauthorised was his entry into possession at a particular point of time. It was  in construing  these provisions that this Court held that if  the appellants  in that  case  were  in  possession before the  sale of  the property  to the  Government, their entry into  possession could not be said to be unauthorised. These  observations,   however,  would  have  absolutely  no application to  the instant  case where  s. 2(2)(g)  defines unauthorised occupation thus:-           "unauthorised  occupation’,  in  relation  to  any      public premises,  means the occupation by any person of      the  public   premises  without   authority  for   such      occupation, and  includes the continuance in occupation      by  any   person  of  the  public  premises  after  the      authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of      transfer) under  which he  was allowed  to  occupy  the      premises has  expired or  has been  determined for  any      reason whatsoever." To begin  with, it  is manifest that s. 2(2)(g) does not use the word  ’possession’ or  the words ’entry into possession’ at any  point of  time at  all. The  section merely requires occupation of  any public  premises. Entry  into  possession connotes one single terminus, viz., the point of time when a person enters  into  possession  or  occupies  the  property whereas occupation  is a  continuous  process  which  starts right from  the point  of time  when the  person enters into possession or  occupies the  premises and continues until he leaves the  premises. What  is germane  for the  purpose  of interpretation of  s. 2(2)(g)  is whether  or not the person concerned was in occupation of the public premises when the 503 Premises Act  was passed.  In the  instant case,  it is  not disputed that the appellant continued to occupy the property even after  the Premises  Act came  into force  and in  fact accepted the  LIC as  his landlord.  In these circumstances, therefore, the  case of  the appellant squarely falls within the ambit  of the definition of ’unauthorised occupation’ as contemplated by  s. 2(2)(g).  There is yet another aspect of the matter  which distinguishes  the present  case from  the language employed  in the  Punjab Act. Section 2(2)(g) is an inclusive definition  and consists of two separate limbs-(1) where a  person is  in occupation  in relation to any public premises without authority for such occupation, and (2) even if the  possession or  occupation of  the  tenant  continues after the  lease is  determined. In  the instant  case,  the lease was  doubtless determined  by the landlord by a notice under s.  106 of the Transfer of Property Act whose validity for purposes  of deciding  the question  of law has not been questioned  by   the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant. Therefore, there  can be  no doubt that the appellant was in unauthorised occupation  of the  premises once the lease was determined. The  second limb  mentioned  in  s.  2(2)(g)  is conspicuously absent  from the provisions of the Punjab Act. For these  reasons, we  overrule the first contention raised by the  counsel for the appellant and we hold, agreeing with the High  Court,  that  the  appellant  was  undoubtedly  in unauthorised occupation of the premises.      The second  contention put  forward by Mr. Rao was that in view of the provisions of the Rent Act which override the provisions of  the Premises  Act, s.  14  of  the  Rent  Act completely bars  recovery  of  possession  of  any  premises except in  accordance with  the procedure  laid down  in the Rent Act.  It was  contended by  Mr. Rao  that although  the Premises  Act   was  passed  in  1971,  it  has  been  given

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retrospective  effect   from  16th   September   1958   and, therefore, should  be construed  as a law having been passed in 1958  and as the Rent Act was passed in 1959 it overrides the Premises Act. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument. In the first place, the Premises Act was passed in 1971 and came into force on the 23rd of August 1971, that is to say, long after the Rent Act was passed in 1959. The mere fact that  by virtue of a fiction the Premises Act was given retrospective effect  from 1958 will not alter the date when the Premises  Act was actually passed, that is to say August 23, 1971.  In these  circumstances, therefore,  the Premises Act being subsequent to the Rent Act would naturally prevail over and  override the  provisions of  the Rent  Act. It was further contended  by Mr.  Rao that  the Rent  Act  being  a special law  as  compared  to  the  Premises  Act,  it  will override the Premises Act without going into the question as to which  of the  two Acts  were prior  in point of time. In support of his contention the 504 counsel relied on a decision of this Court in Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal where this Court observed as follows:           "When two  or more  laws operate in the same field      and each  contains a  non-obstante clause  stating that      its provisions  will override  those of  any other law,      stimulating and  incisive  problems  of  interpretation      arise.   Since    statutory   interpretation   has   no      conventional protocol,  cases of  such conflict have to      be decided  in reference  to the  object and purpose of      the laws under consideration."                                          (emphasis supplied)      It is  true that  in both  the Acts  there  is  a  non- obstante clause but the question to be determined is whether the non-obstante  clauses operate  in the same field or have two different  spheres though  there may  be some  amount of overlapping. The  observations cited  above clearly lay down that in  such cases  the  conflict  should  be  resolved  by reference  to   the  object  and  purpose  of  the  laws  in consideration. In  Shri Ram  Narain v.  The Simla  Banking & Industrial  Co.  Ltd.,(2)  this  Court  made  the  following observations:-           "It  is  therefore,  desirable  to  determine  the      overriding effect  of one  or the other of the relevant      provisions in  these two Acts, in a given case, on much      broader  considerations   of  the  purpose  and  policy      underlying  the  two  Acts  and  the  clear  intendment      conveyed by  the language  of the  relevant  provisions      therein."      In the  light  of  the  principles  laid  down  in  the aforesaid cases  we would  test the  position in the present case. So far as the Premises Act is concerned it operates in a very  limited field  in that  it applies only to a limited nature of  premises belonging  only to  particular  sets  of individuals, a  particular  set  of  juristic  persons  like companies, corporations or the Central Government. Thus, the Premises Act  has a  very limited application. Secondly, the object of  the Premises  Act is  to provide  for eviction of unauthorised occupants  from public  premises by  a  summary procedure so  that the  premises may  be  available  to  the authorities mentioned in the Premises Act which constitute a class by  themselves. That  the  authorities  to  which  the Premises Act  applies are  a  class  by  themselves  is  not disputed by  the counsel  for the  appellant as  even in the case of Northern India Caterers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Punjab &  Anr. such  authorities were  held to  form a class and, therefore,  immune from  challenge on  Art. 14  of  the

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Constitution. Similarly, the summary procedure prescribed by the Premises Act is also not violative of Art, 14 as held by this Court in 505 Maganlal Chhagganlal  (P) Ltd.  v. Municipal  Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.(1).      Thus, it  would appear  that both  the  scope  and  the object of  the Premises  Act is quite different from that of the Rent Act. The Rent Act is of much wider application than the Premises  Act inasmuch  as it  applies  to  all  private premises which  do not  fall within  the limited  exceptions indicated in  s. 2  of the  Premises Act.  The object of the Rent Act  is to afford special protection to all the tenants or  private   landlords  or  landlords  who  are  neither  a Corporation nor  Government or Corporate Bodies. It would be seen that even under the Rent Act, by virtue of an amendment a special  category has  been carved  out under s. 25B which provides for special procedure for eviction to landlords who require premises  for their personal necessity. Thus, s. 25B itself becomes  a special  law within  the Rent  Act.  On  a parity of  reasoning, therefore,  there can be no doubt that the Premises  Act as  compared to  the Rent Act, which has a very broad  spectrum, is  a Special  Act and  overrides  the provisions of the Rent Act.      It was  also suggested  by Mr.  Rao that  in view of s. 3(a) of  the Rent  Act, which  is extracted  below, it would appear that  the intention of the legislature in passing the Rent Act  was merely  to exclude  from  its  operation  only premises belonging  to the  Government and  if the intention was to  exclude other premises belonging to corporate Bodies or Corporations,  then s.  3(a) should have been differently worded:           "3. Nothing in this Act shall apply:-                (a)     to  any  premises  belonging  to  the                     Government." This in  our opinion,  does not  advance  the  case  of  the appellant any  further because once the Premises Act becomes a special  Act dealing  with premises  belonging to  Central Government, Corporations  and other  statutory  Bodies,  the Rent  Act   stands  superseded.  We  have  to  consider  the provisions of  the two  Acts, they having been passed by the same  legislature,   viz.,  Parliament,   and  the  rule  of harmonious construction would have to apply in such cases.      For these  reasons, we  overrule the second preliminary objection taken by the appellant.      Lastly, it  was argued that apart from the Rent Act, s. 19 of  the Slum  Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred  to as  the ’Slums  Act’), which  also would have to be construed as a Special Act applying only to such places  which are  declared to  be slums under the Act, would override the provisions of both the 506 Rent Act  and the  Premises Act. This argument appears to us to be  without substance.  The Slums  Act was  passed as far back as  1956 and  the Premises  Act was  subsequent to  the Slums Act  and would, therefore, prevail over the Slums Act. Relevant portion  of s. 19 of the Slums Act may be extracted thus:           "19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any      other law for the time being in force, no person shall,      except with  the previous  permission in writing of the      competent authority,-           (a) institute,  after the commencement of the Slum      Areas (Improvement  and Clearance)  Amendment Act, 1964      any suit  or proceeding  for obtaining  any  decree  or

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    order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or      land in a slum area;"      A perusal  of s. 19 of the Slums Act clearly shows that it is  in  direct  conflict  with  the  Premises  Act  which expressly provides  for the  forum for  evicting persons  in unauthorised occupation  of premises  which fell  in s. 2 of the Premises  Act. The  Premises Act being subsequent to the Slums Act, as amended in 1964, and again being a special Act having a  very limited sphere, must necessarily override the Slums Act  on  the  same  lines  of  reasoning  as  we  have indicated in  the case  of the  Rent Act. For these reasons, therefore, the  last contention  put forward  by the counsel for the appellant is also overruled. The High Court had also overruled all  these preliminary  objections more or less on the same reasons as given by us though not in such details.      It is,  however, not  necessary for  us to  remand  the matter to the trial court for decision of the case on merits because the  Solicitor General  having agreed  to  give  two years’ time  to the  appellant to  vacate  the  premises  on filing the usual undertaking, the appellant does not want to contest the  proceedings before  the Estate officer, LIC and has undertaken to give vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent on August 1, 1982. Meanwhile, the appellant shall keep on paying the usual rent. The appellant shall also file an undertaking  accompanied by  an affidavit  to the  effect that it  shall hand  over vacant  and peaceful possession to the respondent  on or  before August  1, 1982  and-shall not induct any  tenant on the premises. The undertaking shall be filed within  three weeks  from today. The subject matter of the appeal is accordingly disposed of finally. N.V.K.                                    Appeal dismissed. 507