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PETITIONER: JAI NARAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KISHEN CHAND

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/02/1969

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1969 AIR 1165            1969 SCR  (3) 855  1969 SCC  (1) 724

ACT: Delhi  Rent Control Act 1958, s. 57(1), first  proviso-scope of.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent landlord filed a suit for  eviction  against the  appellant  under section 13 (1) (k) of  the  Delhi  and Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952, on  the  ground  that  the appellant  had  caused damage to the  premises.   The  trial court ordered ejectment in February, 1959, and the appellate authority dismissed an appeal in November, 1959.  The  Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 came into force in February, 1959.  In a revision application before the High Court, the  appellant invoked  the  provisions  of the 1958 Act  and  relied  upon section 14(1) (j) read with s. 57 of the new Act.  The  High Court, acting under section 14(1)(j) and sub-section (10) of the  same section gave the appellant the alternative to  pay compensation  for  the damages caused.   The  landlord  then filed  an  application for review of the  High  Court  order pointing out that the new Act was not applicable to the case in  view  of the first proviso of section 57(2).   The  High Court granted the review and reversed its earlier orders. In  appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf  of  the appellant  that  by virtue of the first proviso  of  section 57(2)  the  High  Court  was bound to  have  regard  to  the provisions  of the 1958 Act even in proceedings pending  and governed by the 1952 Act.       HELD:Dismissing the appeal, The  language of the first proviso to section 57(2)  clearly shows that the proviso applies to those cases only in  which ’Section  54  cannot be made applicable.  The  area  in  the present  case  is  admittedly subjected to  the  Slum  Areas (Improvement  and Clearance) Act 1956, which is one  of  the enactments mentioned in s. 54.  Accordingly the terms of the proviso would have no application in this case. [857 G;  859 B] The  High Court had rightly held that the phrase  "to  which section 54 does not apply", governs the word "premises"  and is  not  connected  with  the words "in  any  such  suit  or proceedings". (858A-B]

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 389 of 1966. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March  25, 1964 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit  Bench  at Delhi in Review Application No. 23-D of 1963. C.B.  Agarwala, Uma Mehta, M. L. Kapur and K.  K.  Sinha, for the appellant. B.C.  Misra,  Bishambee  Lal and R.  K.   Puri,  for  the respon- 856 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah.  C.J., This is an appeal by a tenant  who  had rented  a  shop  No. 2687 in Kinari Bazar,  Delhi  from  the respondent  on Rs. 13.50 P per month.  In those premises  he was selling Usha sewing machines and fans.  It appears  that the  level  of the shop was too high from the road  and  his clients were troubled in going to his shop and so he lowered the  level  and  thereby altered the premises  to  suit  his convenience.   The landlord thereupon filed a  suit  against him  for  his eviction under S. 13(1)(k) of  the  Delhi  and Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952.  The  suit  was  filed  on November 13, 1957.  The trial court ordered on February  19, 1959 ejectment and payment of Rs. 145/- as arrears of  rent. An appeal against the order of the trial court was dismissed by the appellate authority on November 16, 1959.  A revision application was then filed by the tenant on March 25,  1960. During the course of that revision he invoked the provisions of  the  Delhi Rent Control Act, 1956 which  had  come  into force  on February 9, 1959 and relied upon S. 14 (1) (j)  of the  new Act read with S. 57.  Previously he had not  relied upon  the new Act although the Act had been in force  during the  pendency of the previous proceedings.  The  High  Court acting  under  s.  14(1)(j)  and sub-s.  (10)  of  the  same section, gave him the alternative of paying, compensation in the  sum  of  Rs. 500 which it  appears  that  the  landlord himself had assessed as the damages caused by the act of the tenant.  The landlord later filed an application for  review of  the  order  and pointed out that the  new  Act  was  not applicable to the case in view of the first proviso of S. 57 sub.  s. (2).  The High Court thereupon granted  the  review and  reversed its earlier order and ordered the eviction  of the tenant. In  this appeal it is contended that the High Court  was  in error  in passing the order on review and that the  previous or was the correct order in the light of the provisions  of the Act of 1958.  We have therefore to consider which of the two  orders  of  the High Court is  the  correct  order  and whether the review was properly granted or not. As  is very frequent in our country, Rent Control  Acts  are changed  from time to time causing numerous difficulties  in their  interpretation and application.  Here too, we have  a succession of Acts which were passed, to say nothing of  the a amendments which were made in the body of each of the Acts as they came.  We are concerned first with the Act of  1952, namely.   The  Delhi  and  Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952. Section 13(1)(k) of that Act gave a right to the landlord to evict a tenant who, whether before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused  substantial damage to the premises, or notwithstanding previous  notice, had used or dealt with the premises 8 57 in  a  manner  contrary  to any  condition  imposed  on  the

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landlord  by the Government or the Delhi  Improvement  Trust while  giving him a lease of the land on which the  promises were  situated.  We are not concerned with the  latter  part but with the first part where the tenant before or after the commencement of the Act had caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the premises.  Whether the lowering of the floor was causing substantial damage to the premises  is a question into which we need not go, because the concurrent finding  of  the  courts of fact is that  it  did  so.  This question  was  not raised before us.  Therefore,  if  s.  13 (1)(k)  of  the  Delhi land Ajmer  Rent  Control  Act,  1952 applied, the eviction of the tenant was the proper order  to make  in view of the finding that he had caused  substantial damage  to the premises.  However, the matter comes  to  the Court because of the passing of the Delhi Rent Control  Act, 1958  which  came into force on February 9,  1959.   Section 57(1)  of  that Act provided that the Delhi and  Ajmer  Rent Control  Act,  1952 in so far as it was  applicable  to  the Union  Territory  of  Delhi,  was  being  repealed.    While repealing  it, a special saving was however made, by  sub-s. (2)  of  the same section in favour of all suits  and  other proceedings  which were then pending under the repealed  Act and it was provided that those suits and proceedings  should be  continued  and  disposed  of  in  accordance  with   the provisions of the Act as if that Act had continued to be  in force and the new Act had not been passed.  This would  have really been a very proper provision to make to separate  the operation-of  the  two Acts but the Legislature  went  still further and added two provisos.  We are concerned only  with the  first  of the two provisos on which  much  dispute  has arisen in this case.  That proviso reads as follows’:               "Provided that in any such suit or  proceeding               for  the fixation of standard rent or for  the               eviction  of  a tenant from  any  premises  to               which section 54 does not apply, the court  or               other  authority  shall  have  regard  to  the               provisions of this Act :" This proviso contains a proviso within itself which  excepts the  case  of premises to which s. 54 of the  Act  does  not apply.  That section provides as follows               "Nothing in this Act shall affect the provions               of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act,               1950,  or  the  Slum  Areas  (Improvement  and               Clearance)  Act,  1956 or  the  Delhi  Tenants               (Temporary Protection) Act, 1956." The  effect  of the proviso which we have  quoted  above  is variously described by counsel on- opposite sides, According to Mr. C.B 858 Agarwala who argued for the tenant, the words "to which sec- tion  54 does not apply" govern the words "any such suit  or proceeding"  and  not the words "any  premises".   The  High Court in the order passed on review was of the opinion  that these  words  governed  the words "any  premises".   In  our opinion, this is the correct view to take of the matter. To begin with, it must be noticed that the proviso speaks of two  things, namely, the fixation of standard rent  and  the eviction of a tenant from any premises.  The words "from any premises"  cannot  be  connected with the  phrase  "for  the fixation  of  standard rent", because then  the  preposition would  have been "of any ,Premises" or "for any  premises" and  not  "from  any premises." This means  that  the  first phrase  has to be read as complete in itself beginning  from the  words  "for the fixation" and ending  with  the  words, "standard  rent".  The second phrase then reads "or for  the

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eviction  of a tenant from any premises".  The  words  "from any premises" go very clearly with the words "eviction of  a tenant" and not with the words "any suit or proceeding". The question then arises, where does the phrase "to which s. 54  does  not  apply"  connect itself  ?  According  to  Mr. Agarwala  that phrase must be connected with the  words  "in any  such suit or proceeding".  Since the suits contain  two kinds  of  matters, namely, fixation of  standard  rent  and eviction  of a tenant from any premises, we have to turn  to the  provisions  of  the statutes to  which  S.  54  refers, namely,  the Administration of Evacuee Property  Act,  1950, the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the Delhi  Tenants (Temporary Protection) Act, 1956.  The  first two  do not deal at all with the fixation of fair  rent  and the  third speaks of fair rent, but it does not provide  for its  fixation.   It would be pointless to use  the  language ’any  suit or proceeding to which s. 54 does not  apply’  in relation to fixation of standard rent.  It follows therefore that  the  phrase  "to which s. 54 does  not  apply"  really governs  ’premises’.  Read in that way, all the  three  Acts fall in line. because they provide for premises and not  for fixation  of standard rent.  The Administration  of  Evacuee Property  Act.  1950.  the  Slum  Areas  (Improvement and Clearance)  Act.  1956  and  the  Delhi  Tenants  (Temporary Protection)  Act, 1956 all deal with premises  and  property and  therefore  the  phrase "to which section  54  does  not apply" is connected with the words "premises;".  That is the view  which the High Court has taken and we  think  rightly. The  pro so did not apply and the matter had to be  governed by the old Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 which  had bee# repealed. It  was  contended  before  us  that  this  legislation  was intended  to soft action against tenants still  further  and that the policy 8 59 of  the law had been to give more ;and, more  protection  to the  tenants  and  we must therefore  read  the  statute  in consonance  with that policy.  This would be an argument  to consider if the language of the statute was not quite clear. But  the language is clear enough to show that the  proviso applies  only to those cases in which s. 54 cannot  be  made applicable.   It  is  admitted fore us  that  this  area  is subjected  to  the- Slum Areas (Improvement  and  Clearance) Act, 1956.  If that is so, then, on the terms of the proviso on  which  much  reliance is placed  by  Mr.  Agarwala,  the provisions  of  the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958  cannot  be taken  into  consideration.   They  are  to  be  taken  into consideration  only  in  those  cases  to  which  the   Acts mentioned in s. 54 do not apply, that is to say, in  respect of premises not governed by those statutes.  Since this shop is  governed  by  one of the statutes, the  proviso  has  no application.   The High Court’s’ view was  therefore  right. In the circumstances, the appeal fails and win be  dismissed with costs. R.K.P.S.                         Appeal dismissed. 860