REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 823 OF 2003  

JAGRITI DEVI         …. Appellant

Versus

STATE OF H.P.       …. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the  

Himachal Pradesh High Court on 31.08.2000 affirming the judgment  

and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Shimla convicting the  

accused-appellant herein under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,  

1860  (for  short  “the  IPC”)  and  sentencing  her  to  undergo  

imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, and in default  

of payment of fine to also undergo Simple Imprisonment for a further  

period of one year.

2.  The  accused-appellant  herein  was  tried  for  an  offence  of  murder  

punishable  under  Section  302,  IPC  for  allegedly  committing  the  

murder  of her co-wife Shama Devi,  on 02.06.1996 at her house in  

Village Atgaon, Tehsil Chirgaon, District Shimla.

3.  The accused-appellant Jagriti Devi is the legally wedded wife of one  

Mohinder Singh who was a resident of village Atgaon.   Out of the  

aforesaid wedlock, the accused-appellant gave birth to five children,  

four daughters and one son.   The husband of the accused-appellant,  

however,  married  for  a  second time  and brought  the  second wife-

Shanti Devi home who was the deceased in the present case.

4.  The  aforesaid  marriage  with  the  deceased-Shanti  Devi  took  place  

about 2-3 months prior to the date of occurrence.   On 02.06.1996, the  

husband of the accused-appellant was out of station as he had gone to  

Rohru on the previous day.   The deceased-Shanti Devi slept outside  

the  house  in  veranda  on  the  night  intervening  01.06.1996  and  

02.06.1996.   When the said deceased was sleeping in the veranda on  

02.06.1996 at about 6 a.m., the accused-appellant assaulted her with a  

‘Khukri’.   A number of blows appeared to have been given on her  

head and one blow on her neck.   The deceased-Shanti Devi, however,  

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survived  for  about  few hours  of  the  infliction  of  the  injuries,  and  

thereafter  she  died.    The  accused-appellant  immediately  after  

committing  the  crime  fled  away  with  the  weapon  of  offence  after  

washing her hands at the water tap in front of her house.    

5. The  Police  was  informed by  Naresh,  the  brother  of  the  deceased-

Shanti Devi who lived in a separate village but not very far from the village  

of the husband of the accused-appellant.   Being informed by a boy named  

Rajesh, Naresh came to the spot and saw his sister lying un-conscious with a  

number of bleeding injuries on her head and neck.    Naresh informed the  

police.   On  being  informed,  Sub  Inspector  Dhanpat  Rai  who  was  the  

Additional Station House Officer at Police Station, Rohru, went to the spot  

of occurrence.   By the time he reached the spot, the deceased-Shanti Devi  

had died.   The body of the deceased was sent for post mortem examination.

6.   During  the  course  of  investigation,  the  police  arrested  the  accused-

appellant  in  Chirgaon  Bazar,  when  she  was  going  towards  her  parents  

village in the company of her brother.  On being interrogated, the accused-

appellant told the Police that she had kept the ‘Khukri’ hidden in a field.  On  

the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  statement,  the  ‘Khukri’  was  subsequently  

recovered and sealed in a parcel.   The Police completed the investigation  

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and submitted a charge sheet against the accused-appellant-appellant under  

Section 302 IPC.

7. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge of Section 302  

IPC and claimed to be tried.   During the course of the trial, the prosecution  

examined 21 witnesses.   After completion of the recording of evidence of  

the  prosecution  witnesses,  the  accused-appellant  was  examined  under  

Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the CrPC”).  

In the said examination, the accused-appellant did not deny having caused  

fatal injuries to the deceased, but she stated that she had killed the deceased  

in exercise of her right of private defence.   The accused-appellant also filed  

a written statement under Section 233 of the Cr.PC in which she stated that  

on the fateful day, there was altercation between her and the deceased upon  

which deceased took out the ‘Khukri’ kept under her pillow and attacked the  

accused-appellant  with  the  same to  which  the  accused-appellant  received  

some injuries on her head, but luckily through the handle of the ‘Khukri’.   It  

was  also  stated  by  the  accused-appellant  that  in  order  to  prevent  the  

deceased from further assault, she snatched the ‘Khukri’ from the deceased  

and had given a few blows of ‘Khukri’ to the deceased.

8. The Trial Court, after going through the evidence on record found the  

accused-appellant guilty of the offence alleged against her and convicted her  

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for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  

Code.  The learned Sessions Judge,  Shimla thereafter  passed an order  of  

sentence against the accused-appellant to undergo imprisonment for life and  

to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, directed her to  

undergo further simple imprisonment for a period of one year.

9. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction  

and sentence, the accused-appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of  

Himachal Pradesh which entertained it and by a detailed judgment and order  

dated 31.8.2000 upheld the order of conviction and sentence by affirming  

the same.    

10. The accused-appellant  being aggrieved  by the  aforesaid  concurring  

judgments of conviction and sentence filed the present appeal on which we  

have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.   Our attention was  

drawn to the statements  of the prosecution witnesses as also the medical  

evidence and also to the statement of accused-appellant under Section 313 of  

the CrPC as also her written statement under Section 233 of CrPC.

11. The  death  of  the  deceased  on  the  morning  of  02.06.1996  is  not  

disputed.    It  is  also  not  disputed that  the  deceased died because  of  the  

injuries  received  due  to  the  blows  of  ‘Khukri’  given  by  the  accused-

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appellant.   What is, however, disputed is that the accused-appellant while  

giving the aforesaid blows by the ‘Khukri’ neither had the intention nor the  

knowledge that the same would cause bodily injury to the deceased.   The  

stand of the defense is that the aforesaid incident had taken place at the spur  

of the moment  due to altercation between the deceased and the accused-

appellant regarding doing certain daily cores.   It  is also the stand of the  

defense that the aforesaid injuries to the deceased were caused in exercise of  

the  right  of  private  defence  by  the  accused-appellant.  Therefore,  we  are  

required to examine as to whether such a case as sought to be made out by  

the defense could be deduced from the evidence on record.

12. The deceased was sleeping in the veranda outside the house.   The  

incident had taken place early in the morning i.e. at about 6 a.m.   If the  

accused-appellant  had any intention  to  kill  the  deceased,  she  could have  

done the same during the night and would not have waited till the day light  

had broken out.   It was a morning when there was sunshine all around and  

in that broad day light, the offence was committed.   The accused-appellant  

had specifically stated in her statement under Section 313 CrPC and also in  

the  written  statement  filed  under  Section  233  CrPC  that  there  was  an  

altercation between her and the deceased upon which the deceased took out  

the ‘Khukri’ which the deceased had kept under the pillow and attacked her  

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with  the  same  but  luckily  she  did  not  receive  any  serious  injuries  and  

received  certain  injuries  by  the  handle  of  ‘Khukri’  and in  order  to  save  

herself  from  further  assault,  she  snatched  away  the  ‘Khukri’  from  the  

deceased and gave few blow with the said ‘Khukri’ to the deceased.    

13. The  aforesaid  ‘Khukri’  which  was  used  as  a  weapon  for  the  

commission of offence was recovered by the Police from the field, at the  

instance of the accused-appellant, but it is also established in evidence that  

the said ‘Khukri’ was kept by the deceased under her pillow while she was  

sleeping in the veranda outside the house.

14. It  is  also  further  established  from  the  records  that  the  accused-

appellant also received some injuries on her head which of course were of  

simple nature.  But the prosecution has not given any explanation in their  

case regarding those injuries received by the accused-appellant.   The eye  

witnesses examined by the prosecution themselves namely PW-16 (Divya),  

PW-18 (Vikram) and PW-19 (Vijay Singh) have stated in their  evidence  

about  the  altercation  between  the  deceased  and  the  accused-appellant-

appellant preceding the incident.   

15. PW-16 (Divya)  is  the  daughter  of  the  accused-appellant.   She had  

stated in her deposition that on the fateful day when her mother asked the  

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deceased to go to the fields to fetch grass, the deceased not only refused to  

oblige the accused-appellant but also retorted saying as the milk is required  

for her own children, it was her job to arrange fodder.   PW-16 had also  

stated that hearing the aforesaid reply by the deceased, the accused-appellant  

lost her tamper and slapped the deceased on her face and in retaliation, the  

deceased also slapped the accused-appellant.  After that, the deceased took  

out the ‘Khukri’ which she had kept under the pillow and tried to attack the  

accused-appellant.   At that time, the accused-appellant grappled with the  

deceased  to  snatch  the  ‘Khukri’  from the  deceased  and when  they  were  

grappling at the scene of occurrence, she (PW-16) ran to call her uncle to  

intervene  but  by  the  time  she  returned,  the  deceased  was lying  with  the  

bleeding injuries on the floor of veranda while the accused-appellant was  

missing.    PW-18 (Vikram), aged about 9 years who is a son of the brother  

of the husband of the accused-appellant-appellant, was also examined in the  

trial.    He had given a  detailed  account  of  what  he  saw at  the  place  of  

occurrence.   He stated that when he came out in the morning to urinate, he  

saw the  accused-appellant  giving  ‘Khukri’  blows  to  deceased.    He  had  

stated that he had seen PW-16 (Divya) standing in the veranda at that time  

i.e. when the incident took place.   He also stated that he thereafter went  

inside to call upon PW-19 (Vijay Singh), the other brother.  The Trial Court  

as also the High Court relied upon the statement of PW-18 and PW-19 and  

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discarded the statement  of PW-16 on the ground that PW-18 and PW-19  

have contradicted the statement of PW-16 who is the real daughter of the  

accused-appellant.   Both, the trial court as well as the High Court held that  

PW-18 and PW-19 proved to be truthful witnesses who had stated that they  

had  not  seen  any  quarrel  preceding  the  incident  in  which  the  accused-

appellant assaulted and inflicted ‘Khukri’ blows on the deceased.

16. We  have  examined  the  evidence  of  PW-16,  PW-18  and  PW-19  

carefully and on a reading thereof, we are of the considered view that both  

PW-18  and  PW-19  came to  the  scene  of  occurrence  when  the  accused-

appellant had assaulted the deceased with the ‘Khukri’.   PW-18 came to the  

place of occurrence when he saw PW-16 standing in the veranda.  PW-19  

was informed by PW-18.   When PW-18 went inside to inform PW-19 by  

that time the incident must have been over as it took only few minutes for  

the accused-appellant to give blows to the deceased and then running away  

from the scene of occurrence. Therefore, it is crystal clear that PW-16 has  

seen the entire  incident  from the starting point  namely altercation  taking  

place  between  the  accused-appellant  and  the  deceased  and  thereafter  

accused-appellant receiving injuries and the thereafter deceased being given  

those fatal blows by the accused-appellant.   

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17.  We find no reason to disbelieve the statement of PW-16.   In our  

considered opinion both the trial  court  and the High Court  discarded her  

evidence without any cogent reason.  The trial court and the High Court took  

the  view  that  the  injuries  received  by  the  accused-appellant  were  not  

explained by the prosecution in the trial.   It is true that those injuries were  

received  by  the  accused-appellant  while  there  was  a  grappling  going  on  

between  the  accused-appellant  and  the  deceased  for  snatching  ‘Khukri’  

which was the weapon of murder.   On appreciation of the entire evidence on  

record, we are satisfied that there was an altercation preceding the incident  

of murder in which accused-appellant was insulted by the deceased and by  

doing  so  the  deceased  provoked  the  accused-appellant  and  the  accused-

appellant snatched away the ‘Khukri’ from the hands of the deceased due to  

which the accused-appellant also received the injuries.

18. Section 299 and Section 300 IPC deals with the definition of culpable  

homicide and murder respectively.  Section 299 defines culpable homicide  

as the act of causing death; (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with  

the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (iii)  

with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death.   The bare reading  

of the section makes it crystal clear that the first and the second clause of the  

section  refer  to  intention  apart  from the  knowledge  and  the  third  clause  

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refers to knowledge alone and not intention.   Both the expression “intent”  

and “knowledge” postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude which  

is of different degrees.   The mental element in culpable homicide i.e. mental  

attitude  towards  the  consequences  of  conduct  is  one  of  intention  and  

knowledge.    If that is caused in any of the aforesaid three circumstances,  

the offence of culpable homicide is said to have been committed.   Section  

300 IPC, however, deals with murder although there is no clear definition of  

murder provided in Section 300 IPC.   It has been repeatedly held by this  

Court that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is species and that all  

murders are culpable homicide but not vice versa.  Section 300 IPC further  

provides  for  the  exceptions  which  will  constitute  culpable  homicide  not  

amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304. When and if there is  

intent and knowledge then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I  

and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder  

and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II.  

The aforesaid distinction between an act amounting to murder and an act not  

amounting to murder has been brought out in the numerous decisions of this  

Court.

19. In the case of State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC  

382, this Court observed as follows at page 386:  

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“12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, “culpable homicides” is  genus  and  “murder”  its  specie.  All  “murder”  is  “culpable  homicide”  but  not  vice-versa.  Speaking  generally,  “culpable  homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”, is “culpable  homicide not amounting to murder”. For the purpose of fixing  punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence,  the  Code  practically  recognises  three  degrees  of  culpable  homicide. The first is, what may be called, “culpable homicide  of  the  first  degree”.  This  is  the  greatest  form  of  culpable  homicide,  which is  defined in Section 300 as “murder”.  The  second may be  termed as  “culpable  homicide  of  the  second  degree”. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304.  Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is  the  lowest  type  of  culpable  homicide  and  the  punishment  provided  for  it  is,  also,  the  lowest  among  the  punishments  provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree  is punishable under the second part of Section 304.”

20. Placing strong reliance  on the  aforesaid  decision,  this  Court  in  the  

case of Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P., (2002) 7 SCC 175, observed  

as follows at page 184:  

“13. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and  (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea  requisite  under clause (2)  is  the knowledge possessed by the  offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar  condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him  is  likely  to be fatal,  notwithstanding the fact  that  such harm  would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause  death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy  that  the  “intention  to  cause  death”  is  not  an  essential  requirement  of  clause  (2).  Only  the  intention  of  causing  the  bodily  injury  coupled  with  the  offender’s  knowledge  of  the  likelihood  of  such  injury  causing  the  death  of  the  particular  victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this  clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b)  appended to Section 300.

14. Clause  (b)  of  Section  299  does  not  postulate  any  such  knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling  

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under  clause  (2)  of  Section  300  can  be  where  the  assailant  causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the  victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or  diseased heart  and such blow is likely to cause death of that  particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen  or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant  had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of  the  victim,  nor  an  intention  to  cause  death  or  bodily  injury  sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the  offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the  death,  was  intentionally  given.  In  clause  (3)  of  Section  300,  instead of the words “likely to cause death” occurring in the  corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words “sufficient  in the ordinary course of nature” have been used. Obviously,  the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death  and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked,  may  result  in  miscarriage  of  justice.  The  difference  between  clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of  degree  of  probability  of  death  resulting  from  the  intended  bodily  injury.  To  put  it  more  broadly,  it  is  the  degree  of  probability  of  death  which  determines  whether  a  culpable  homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The  word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of  probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words  “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to  cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result  of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.

15. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the  offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues  from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause  death in the ordinary course of nature.  Rajwant Singh v.  State  of Kerala3 is an apt illustration of this point.

16. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab4 Vivian Bose, J. speaking  for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It  was  observed  that  the  prosecution  must  prove  the  following  facts  before it  can bring a  case under  Section 300 “thirdly”.  First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is  present;  secondly,  the  nature  of  the  injury  must  be  proved.  These are purely objective investigations.  Thirdly, it  must be  proved  that  there  was  an  intention  to  inflict  that  particular  injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional  or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three  elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further,  

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and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just  described  made  up  of  the  three  elements  set  out  above  was  sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This  part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has  nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

17. The ingredients of clause “thirdly” of Section 300 IPC were  brought  out  by the  illustrious Judge in his  terse  language as  follows: (AIR p. 467, para 12)

“12.  To  put  it  shortly,  the  prosecution  must  prove  the  following facts  before it  can bring a case under Section 300  ‘thirdly’;

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury  is present;

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are  purely objective investigations.

Thirdly,  it  must  be  proved  that  there  was  an  intention  to  inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not  accidental  or unintentional,  or that some other kind of injury  was intended.

Once  these  three  elements  are  proved  to  be  present,  the  enquiry proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just  described  made  up  of  the  three  elements  set  out  above  is  sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This  part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has  nothing to do with the intention of the offender.”

18. The  learned  Judge  explained  the  third  ingredient  in  the  following words (at p. 468): (AIR para 16) “The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a  serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict  the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he  did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an  inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is  not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the  fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is  that  he  intended  to  inflict  it.  Whether  he  knew  of  its  seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here  nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is  not  whether  he  intended  to  kill,  or  to  inflict  an  injury  of  a  particular  degree  of  seriousness,  but  whether  he  intended  to  inflict  the  injury  in  question;  and  once  the  existence  of  the  

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injury  is  proved  the  intention  to  cause  it  will  be  presumed  unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite  conclusion.”

19. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus  classicus.  The  test  laid  down  by  Virsa  Singh  case4 for  the  applicability of clause “thirdly” is now ingrained in our legal  system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause  thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both  the following conditions are satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which  causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is  done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that  the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary  course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was  an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the  ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that  the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended  to be inflicted.

20. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case4  even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction  of  a  bodily  injury  sufficient  to  cause  death  in  the  ordinary  course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing  death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to  Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

21. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both  require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It  is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on  the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be  sufficient  to  say  that  clause  (4)  of  Section  300  would  be  applicable  where  the  knowledge  of  the  offender  as  to  the  probability  of  death  of  a  person  or  persons  in  general  as  distinguished  from  a  particular  person  or  persons  —  being  caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a  practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender  must  be  of  the  highest  degree  of  probability,  the  act  having  been  committed  by  the  offender  without  any  excuse  for  incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

22. The  above  are  only  broad  guidelines  and  not  cast-iron  imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the  task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and  the second and the third stages so telescoped into each, that it  

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may  not  be  convenient  to  give  a  separate  treatment  to  the  matters involved in the second and third stages.”

21. The aforesaid principles have been consistently applied by this Court  

in several decisions. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of  

this Court in Ruli Ram v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 691; Augustine  

Saldanha v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC 472;  State of U. P. v.  

Virendra Prasad, (2004) 9 SCC 37; Chacko v. State of Kerala, (2004) 12  

SCC 269; and S. N. Bhadolkar v. State of Maharasthra, (2005) 9 SCC 71.

22. That  being  the  well  settled  legal  position,  when  the  factual  

background of the present case is tested on the principles laid down by this  

Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are unable to agree with the views taken  

by the trial court as also by the High Court. As already noted, it is quite clear  

from  the  record  that  there  was  an  altercation  preceding  the  incident  of  

murder in which the accused-appellant was insulted by the deceased and by  

doing so the deceased provoked the accused-appellant.  The deceased also  

took out  the  ‘Khukri’  which  was under  the  pillow with  the  intention  of  

assaulting the accused-appellant and the accused-appellant in order to save  

herself grappled with the deceased and during that process she also received  

injuries. The prosecution has failed to give any explanation with regard to  

those  injuries  received  by  the  accused-appellant.  Further,  it  is  also  

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established in evidence that the ‘Khukri’ used in the commission of offence  

was kept by the deceased under her pillow while she was sleeping in the  

veranda outside the house. Clearly, there was no intention on the part of the  

accused-appellant to kill the deceased. That being the position, we are of the  

considered  view that  the  present  case  cannot  be said to  be a  case  under  

Section 302 IPC but it is a case falling under Section 304 Part II IPC. It is  

trite law that Section 304 Part II comes into play when the death is caused  

by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no  

intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such  

bodily injury as is likely to cause death.  

23. We,  therefore,  hold  the  accused-appellant  to  be  guilty  for  offence  

under Section 304 Part  II IPC. Her conviction under Section 302 IPC is,  

therefore,  set  aside.  The  accused-appellant  has  already  undergone  about  

seven years of imprisonment. We therefore, alter the sentence to the period  

already undergone by the accused-appellant.  So far as the punishment of  

fine is  concerned,  the same stands set  aside.    The accused-appellant   is  

already on bail.  The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

24. The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.    

  …..………………………J.

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       [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

   .…..........………………..J.                      [Dr. B.S. Chauhan]

New Delhi, July 6, 2009

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