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PETITIONER: JAGANNATH PRASAD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/1962

BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. BENCH: KAPUR, J.L. GUPTA, K.C. DAS DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1963 AIR  416            1963 SCR  (2) 850  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC1154  (9,26,29)  R          1969 SC 724  (19)  R          1975 SC1039  (4)  R          1988 SC2267  (34)

ACT: Sales   Tax--Using   forged  documents  before   Sales   Tax Officer--Prosecution--If  complaint  of  sales  Tax  Officer necessary--Sales Tax Officer, whether a Court--Liability  to pay   tax--Notification  prescribing   single   point   for, taxation ineffective--Effect of Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.  P. 15 of 1948), ss. 3, 3A, 14(d)--Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act V of 1898), s. 195.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants who carry on the business in vegetable  ghee purchased  vegetable ghee from outside U. P. in the name  of four  fictitious firms.  In their return of sales  tax  they did  not include the sale proceeds of these transactions  on the  ground that they had purchased from the four firms  and that  under  a notification made under s. 3A of  the  U.  P. Sales  Tax Act, tax was leviable only at a  single-point  on the  sale by the outside suppliers to these four firms.   In support  of this the appellant No. 1 made a false  statement before  the Sales tax Officer and also filed  forged  bill,. before  him.   The  return was accepted  by  the  Sales  Tax Officer  with  the result that the sales  covered  by  these transactions were not taxed.  The appellants were tried  and convicted  for  offence under s. 471 Indian Penal  Code  for using  forged  documents and under s. 14(d) of the  Act  for fraudulently evading payment of tax due under the Act.   The appellants contended that the trial for the offence under s. 471  was illegal as no complaint had been made by the  Sales Fax Officer as required by s. 14 (d) of the Act was not made out   as  no  tax  was  payable  under’s.  3A  because   the notification issued thereunder was invalid. Held, that the Sales Tax Officer was not a Court within  the meaning of s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure and it was  not necessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of the Appellants under s. 471 Indian Penal Code.  A Sales  Tax Officer  was  merely  an instrumentality of  the  State  for

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purposes of assessment and collection of tax and even if  he was required to perform certain quasi-judicial functions, he was  not  a  part  of the  judiciary.   The  nature  of  the functions, of a Sales Tax Officer and the manner  prescribed for their 851 performance  showed  that  he could not be  equated  with  a Court.  Nor could he be said to be a Revenue Court.   Though the  definition of Court in s. 195 of the Code Was  enlarged by  the  substitution  of the word "include"  for  the  word "means"  by  the amendment of 1923, it did  not  change  the definition of "Revenue Court." Smt.  Ujjam Bai v. The State of U. P. (1963) 1 S.C.R.  778), Shell  Co.  of  Australia Ltd. v.  Federal  Commissioner  of Taxation  [1931]  A. C. 275 and Brajnandan  Sinha  v.  Jyoti Narain’ [1955] 2 S.C.R. 955, applied. Krishna v. Gocerdhanaiah, A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 822, approved. In  re: Punamchand Maneklal (1914) 1. L. R. 38 Bom. 642  and State  v. Nemchand Pashvir Patel, (1956) 7 S. T. C. 404  not approved. In re : R. Nataraja Iyer (1914) 1. L. R. 36 Mad. 72 and Shri Virender, Kumar Satyawadi v. The Sate of Punjab,[1955] 2  S. C. R. 1013 referred to. Held,  further  that the appellants were  rightly  convicted under s. 14 (d) of the Act.  Sales tax was payable under s.3 of  the Act in respect of all sales.  But under s.3A it  was leviable  only at a single point if the Government issued  a notification  declaring the point at which tax  was  payable and   it  was  so  prescribed  by  the  rules.   Under   the notification  issued by the Government tax was payable  only by  the  dealer who imported the goods and sold  them.   The appellants  having imported the ghee were liable to pay  the tax  on  the  sales of this  ghee  which  they  fraudulently evaded.  Though the notification was ineffective as no rules were made under the Act prescribing the single point, it did not help the appellants, as the only effect of this was that s. 3A did not come into play.  In trying to get the  benefit of the ineffective notification under s. 3-A the  appellants evaded  payment of tax under s. 3 which they were liable  to pay.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal   Appeal   No. 152/59., xi Appeal  by Special leave from the judgment and  Order  dated May  12,  1959  of  the Allahabad  High  Court  in  Criminal Revision No. 1182 of 1957. Nur-ud-din  Ahmed,  J.,B.  Dadachanji,  O.  C.  Mathur,  and Ravindar Narain for the Appellants. 852 G. C. Mathur and C.A. Lal for the Respondent. 1962.  May 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KAPUR,  J.-The  appellants  are father and  son  carring  on business  in  vegetable ghee at Aligarh.   They  along  with Romesh,  the second son of appellant Jagannath  Prasad  were prosecuted under s. 14 (d) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act,  1948 (U.P. 15 of    1948) hereinafter called the ’Act’ and under s.   471  read  with s. 468 and s. 417 of the  Indian  Penal Code.   They were all acquitted of the charge under s.  468. Jagannath  Prasad was convicted under s. 471 and 417 of  the Indian Penal Code and a. 14 (d) of the Act and was sentenced to  two  years’ rigorous imprisonment under a. 471,  to  one

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years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- under s.  417  and to a fine of Rs. 1,000 under s. 14 (d)  of  the Act.   Bhagwan Das was convicted under s. 14 (d) of the  Act and  sentenced  to  a  fine of Rs.  1,  000/-.   Romesh  was acquitted.   The sentences passed on Jagannath Prasad  were. concurrent.   Their  ’appeal  to  the  Sessions  Judge   was dismissed and in revision to the High Court Jagannath Prasad was  acquitted  of the offence under a. 417  of  the  Indian Penal  Code  but the other convictions  and  sentences  were upheld.   Against this judgment and order of the High  Court of  Allahabad  the  appellants have come to  this  court  by special leave. The  facts leading to the appeal are these: In 1950-51,  the firm  of the appellants purchased vegetable ghee  valued  at about  Rs. 3 lacs from places outside the State of U. P.  in the name of four fictitious firm.  The firm made its  return for  that year to the Sales Tax Officer Aligarh and did  not include  the  sale  proceeds of these  transactions  on  the ground  that they had purchased them from these  four  firms who were supposed to be carrying 853 on  business in Hathras, Aligarh, and other places in U.  P. By  thus  not including the proceeds of the sales  of  these transactions  the firm evaded payment of sales tax for  that year on those transactions.  The return of sales tax made by the  firm  was accepted by the Sales Tax  Officer  with  the consequence  that  the  sale  of  goods  covered  by   those transactions  was not taxed.  A complaint was  made  against the  Sales Tax Officer in regard to these  transactions;  an enquiry  was  held with the result that the  appellants  and Romesh  were prosecuted and convicted as above  stated.   In the  High Court there was no controversy about the facts  i. e. the finding of the courts below that the appellants’ firm purchased vegetable ghee from outside U. P. and did not show the  sale proceeds of the sale of those goods on the  ground that  they had been purchased from inside the State of’  (J. P. when in reality they had been purchased from outside  the State,  that the statements made by the appellant  Jagannath Prasad before the Sales Tax Officer were false and that  the bills  produced  by him before the Sales  Tax  officer  were forged.   The  conviction was challenged on grounds  of  law alone. Before us five points were raised: (1) that no sales tax was exigible  on  these transactions under a. 3A of the  Act  in 1950-51  and liability arose by the amendment of the Act  in 1952  which  gave retroactive operation to the  section  and became  applicable to sales in dispute and  therefore  there could  be no prosecution under an ex post  facto  amendment; (2) the trial of the appellants was illegal because of’ want of  complaint by the Sales Tax Officer under a. 195  of  the Criminal  Procedure Code; (3) there was no offence under  s. 14  (d)  of the Act; (4) forged invoices  were  produced  by appellant  Jagannath Prasad because they were called for  by the Sales Tax Officer and therefore it cannot be said.  that they  were  used  by the appellant and  (5)  the  Sales  Tax Officer having accepted 854 he  invoices as genuine no prosecution could be  Entertained in regard to those invoices. Now the appellants cannot be prosecuted- on the basis of any amendment  subsequent  to the date of  the  alleged  offence committed  by  them.  Both parties are agreed  on  that  and therefore  we  have to see the Act as it stood on  the  date when  the  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been   committed. According  to  the charge the offence was  committed  on  or

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about  July 16, 1951, when forged invoices produced  by  the appellants before the Sales Tax Officer.  So what we have to see  is the law as it stood on that day.  Section 3  of  the Act deals with liability to tax under the Act and s. 3A with single point taxation.  Under s. 3 every dealer was required to pay on his turnover of each assessment year a tax at  the rate  of  three pies a rupee.  Thus the tax was  payable  in regard to all sales but under s. 3A (1) the tax was leviable only at a single point.  That section provided.               S. 3A (1) "Notwithstanding anything  contained               in  section  3, the State Government  may,  by               notification in the official Gazette,  declare               that  the turnover in respect of any goods  or               class  of  goods shall not be  liable  to  tax               except  at such single point in the series  of               sales   by  successive  dealers  as   may   be               prescribed". The  Government  could declare the tax to be  payable  at  a single  point but there were two requirements; there had  to be  a  notification in the Official  Gazette  declaring  the point  at  which the tax was payable and in  the  series  of sales  by  successive  dealers  it had  to  be  "as  may  be prescribed" i. e. as may be prescribed by rules.  Section 3A was   amended   in  1952  with  retrospective   effect   but retroactive  provision  is  not applicable  to  the  present proceedings.   Under  s.  3A a notification No.  1  (3)  was issued on 855 June  8,  1948,  declaring that the  proceeds  of  sales  of vegetable  ghee imported from outside shall not be  included in  the  turnover  of the dealer  other  than  the  importer himself.  The effect of the notification thus was that if  a dealer  imported vegetable ghee from outside U. P. and  sold it  he  was  required to include the sale  proceeds  in  his turnover  but  the other dealers who bought  vegetable  ghee from the importer in U. P. and sold it were not so required. The appellants having thus imported the vegetable ghee  from outside  U. P. were required by the notification to  include the proceeds in their turnover and it was to avoid this that they   falsely  produced  forged  invoices  that  they   had purchased  the vegetable ghee from those fictitious  dealers within  the State of U. P. and thus if the notification  was an effective notification the appellants successfully evaded the  payment  of  sales tax which under the  law  they  were required  to pay.  But it was agreed that  the  notification was ineffective in view of the words "as may be  prescribed" because  that could only be done by rules and no  rules  bad been  made  under s. 3A which made every  dealer  liable  to sales tax if he was an importer from outside U. P. To  this, extent the contention of the appellants is well founded  and therefore under a. 3A merely by notification the  Government could  not prescribe a single point taxation as was done  by the notification but that does not help the appellants  very much.   Under s. 3 every dealer was liable to pay sales  tax on every transaction and s. 3A only gave relief in regard to sales   at  every  point  and  thus  prevented   multi-point taxation.  If the notification under s. 3A was  ineffective, as indeed it was, the appellants were required to pay tax on all their sales and in order to escape multi point  taxation they took advantage of an ineffective notification and tried the  false  plea  of  the  goods  having  been  imported  by fictitious  persons and their having purchased  those  goods from those 856 fictitious dealers and in this manner the appellants escapes

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payment  of sales tax under s. 3. In other words they  tried to take advantage of s. 3A by producing false documents  and thereby evaded payment of tax under s. 3 which every  dealer was  required to pay on his turnover.  In trying to get  the benefit  under the ineffective notification issued under  s. 3A  the  appellants evaded payment of tax under s.  3  which they  were  in any case liable to pay.  It  cannot  be  said therefore  that no offence was committed under s. 14 (d)  of the Act which provides:- Section 14. ,Offences and penalties.-Any person who-               (a)................               (b)...............               (c)...............               (d) fraudulently evades the payment of any tax               due under this Act,               shall,  without  prejudice to  this  liability               under  any  other law for the  time  being  in               force,  on conviction by a Magistrate  of  the               first  class,  be liable to a fine  which  may               extend  to one thousand rupees, and where  the               breach  is a continuing breach, to  a  further               fine  which  may extend to  fifty  rupees  for               every  day  after the first during  which  the               breach continues". It  is no defence to say that the appellants were  asked  by the Sale,% Tax Officer to produce invoices.  The  appellants were trying to get exclusion from their turnover of the sale of  goods worth about 3 lacs and had made statements  before the  Sales Tax Officer in regard to it on July 9, 1951,  and in order to prove that the goods 857 were  not  required  to be included .,in  the  turnover  the invoices were produced by appellant Jagannath Prasad.   When a fact has to be proved before a court or a tribunal and the court  or the tribunal calls upon the person who is  relying upon  a  fact to prove it by best evidence it can not  be  a defence  as to the offence of forgery if that best  evidence which, in this case, was the invoices turn out to be  forged documents.  A person who produced those documents cannot  be heard  to say that he was required to prove his case by  the best  evidence  and because be was so required  be  produced forged documents. It was then submitted that the Sales Tax Officer was a court within  a.  195 of the Criminal Procedure Code  and  in  the absence  of  a complaint in writing by such  an  officer  no cognizance could be taken of any offence punishable under s. 471  of the Indian Penal Code.  This, in our opinion, is  an equally  erroneous submission.  The Sales Tax  Officers  are the instrumentalities of the State for collection of certain taxes.  Under the Act and the Rules made thereunder  certain officers  are  appointed  as Sales  Tax  Officers  who  have certain  duties  assigned  to them for  the  imposition  and collection of taxes land ID the process they have to perform many duties which are of a quasijudicial nature and  certain other  duties,  which  are  administrative  duties.   Merely because certain instrumentalities of state employed for  the purpose of taxation have, in the discharge of their  duties, to  perform  certain quasi-judicial functions they  are  not converted into courts thereby.  In a recent judgment of this Court  in Shrimati Ujjam Bai v. The State of U.P. (1),   all the  opinions  were  unanimous on  this  point  that  taxing authorities are  not courts   even   though   they   perform quasi-judicial functions.     The  following observation  of Lord (1)  (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.

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858 Sankey  L.    C. in Shell Co. of Australia Ltd.  v.  Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1)was quoted      with approval :- The authorities are clear to show that there               "The authorities are clear to show that  there               are tribunals with many of the trappings of  a               court  which, nevertheless are not  courts  in               the   strict  sense  of  exercising   judicial               power". Lord Sankey also enumerated some negative propositions as to when a tribunal is not a court.  At p. 297 his lordship said :-               "In  that  connection  it  may  be  useful  to               enumerate  some negative propositions on  this               subject  : 1. A tribunal is not necessarily  a               Court in this strict sense because it gives  a               final  decision.  2.  Nor  because  it   hears               witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or  more               contending  parties appear before  it  between               whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives               decisions which affect the rights of subjects.               5. Nor because there is an appeal to a  Court.               6. Nor because it is a body to which a  matter               is  referred  by  another body.   See  Rex  v.               Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 K.B. 171". Hidayatullah  J., ’in Shrimati Ujjam Bhai(2) case  described Sales tax authorities thus :-               "The taxing authorities are  instrumentalities               of  the  State.  They are not a  part  of  the               legislature,  nor  are  they  a-part  of   the               judiciary.  Their functions are the assessment               and collection of taxes and in the process  of               assessing  taxes,  they follow  a  pattern  of               action which is considered Judicial.  They are               not  thereby  converted into Courts  of  Civil               judicature.  They still               (1) [1931] A.C. 775, 283.               (2) (1963) 1 S.C R. 778.               859               remain the instrumentalities of the State  and               are  within, the definition of State" in  Art.               12". No  doubt the Sales Tax officers have certain powers  which, are  similar to the powers exercised by courts.-  but  still they are not courts as understood ’in s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  In sub-section 2 of B. 195 it is provided:-               S.    195(2)  "In clauses (b) and (e) of  sub-               section. (1)               the  term "Court" includes a Civil Revenue  or               Criminal   Court,  but  does  not  include   a               Registrar  or Sub-Registrar under  the  Indian               Registration Act, 1877". It  cannot be, mid that a Sales Tax Officer, is a I  Revenue Court.   Under s. 2(a) of the Act an assessing authority  is defined to mean any person authorised by the State Government  to  make assessment under the Act and  under  R. 2(h) ’a Sales, Tax Officer means :-               "Sales Tax Officer" means a Sales Tax  Officer               of a circle appointed by the State  Government               to perform the duties and exercise the  powers               of an assessing authority in such circle". Thus  under the Act a Sales Tax Officer is only an  amassing authority.   Under  s.  7 of the Act,  if  the  Sale*.   Tax Officer, after making such enquiries,as he thinks  necessary is,  satisfied that a return made is correct and,  complete,

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he  shall  assess the tax on the basis thereof’  and  it  no return  is  submitted  he, can make  such  enquiries  as  he considers  necessary  and then determine the turnover  of  a dealer, Thus his determination depends upon enquiries he may make  and which he may, consider necessary.  Sections 9,  10 and 11 of the Act deal with Appeals, Revisions and Statement of the Case to the High court.  Under a. 13 power. is given 860 to  a  Sales Tax Officer to require the  production  of  all accounts,  documents  and  other  information  relating   to business  and  accounts  and registers  ,shall  be  open  to inspection of the Sales Tax Officer at all reasonable times. He has the power to enter any office, shop, godown,  vehicle or  any  other place in which business is done  which  is  a power  destructive of the- Sales Tax Officer being  a  Court which  is a place where justice is administered  as  between the  parties whether the parties are private persons or  one of the parties is the State.  Under s. 23 certain secrecy is attached to documents filed before the Sales Tax officer and information received by him.  Similarly under R. 43  certain power  is  given  to  the Sales  Tax  Officer  to  calculate turnover  when goods are sold for consideration  other  than money  and  this  is  after such  enquiry  as  he  considers necessary.   All  these provisions show that the  Sales  Tax Officer  cannot  be equated with a Court.   In  our  opinion therefore the Sales Tax Officer is not a Court.  In  Krishna v. Goverdhansiah(1), it was held that the Income Tax Officer is  not  law  court  within the meaning of  s.  195  of  the Criminal’s Procedure Code and this view was accepted by this court in Shrimati Ujjam Bai’s(2) case.  In Brajnandan  Sinha v.  Jyoti  Narain(3),  a Commissioner  appointed  under  the Public Enquiries Act 1950 was held not to be a court.  Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (4) was referred  to in that case.  At p. 967 the following  passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Hailisham Edition, Vol.  8, p. 526 was approved:-               "Many  bodies  are not courts,  although  they               have to decide questions, and in so doing have               to  act  judicially,  in the  sense  that  the               proceedings must be conducted with fairness               (1)  A.I.R. (1954) Mad. 822.   (2)   (1963)  1               S.C.R. 778.               (3) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 955.      (4) (1931)  A.C.               275,2B3.               861               and    impartiality,   such   as    assessment               committees, guardian committees, the Court  of               referee  constituted  under  the  Unemployment               Insurance  Acts to decide claims made  on  the               Insurance  funds the benchers of the  Inns  of               Courts when considering the conduct of one  of               their  members,  the General  Medical  Council               when   considering  questions  affecting   the               position of a medical man" That  passage is now contained in Vol. 9 of the 3rd  Edition at p. 343. But it was submitted that the Sales Tax officer while acting as  an assessing authority is a court within the meaning  of s. 195 (2) of the Procedure Code because by the amendment of 1923  the  definition  of  the  word  "court"  was  enlarged substituting  the  word  "includes" in  place  of  the  word "means" and the section now reads as has been set out above. Undoubtedly by this change the legislature did mean to  make the  definition of the word "court" wider but that does  not enlarge  the definition of the words "Revenue  Court".   The

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track  of  decision which was pressed on  our  attention  is based primarily on a full bench judgment of the Bombay  High Court  in  In re Punemchand Maneklal(1).  In  that  case  an Income-tax  Collector was held to be a Revenue Court  within the  meaning  of the word as used in s.  195.   The  learned Chief  Justice who gave the judgment of the court  proceeded on the basis that inquiries conducted according to the Forms of judicial procedure under Chapter IV of the Incometax  Act were proceedings in a Revenue Court.  This was on the ground that  under the law as it then stood revenue questions  were generally  removed from the cognizance of civil  courts  and the  officers  charged with the duty  of  deciding  disputed question relating to revenue between an individual and the (1)  (1914) I.L.R. 38, Bom. 642. 862 Government   would  be  invested  with  the   functions   of &,,Revenue  Court".   This view was followed by  the  Bombay High  Court  in  State  v.  Nemchand  Pashvir  Patel   After referring  to  the various powers which were  given  to  the Sales  Tax  Officers under the B " bay Sales  Tax  Act  that Court proceeded to say that the Sales Tax Officers under the Bombay  Sales Tax Act were Revenue Courts because’ they  had jurisdiction  to decide Questions relating to  revenue,  are exclusively  empowered  with the powers which  are  normally attributes  of a court or a tribunal land are authorised  to adjudicate upon a disputed question of law or fact  relating to the rights of the citizens.  The Madras High Court in  In re  B. Nataraja Iyer held that a Divisional Officer  hearing appeals;  under-the  Income tax Act was a court  within  the meaning  of  a.  476 of the Criminal Procedure  Code  but  a Tehsildar  who was the original assessing authority was  not because  there was no lis before him.  There is one  passage in   the  judgment  of  Sundara  Ayyar  J.,  which   is   of significance.  It was said:--               "I  may observe that I am prepared agree  with               Dr.   Swaminathan  that  more.  authority   to               receive  evidence would not make  the  officer               recording it a Court". At  page  84,  it was said that  the  determination  of  the assessment  in  the  first instance may not be  of  a  court although the assessing officer may have the power to  record statements.   But an appeal against the assessment is  dealt with  by the Collector in the manner in which an appeal  is’ disposed   of  by’  a  Civil  Court.   In  this   connection reference-  may  be;  made  to  the  statement  of  the  law contained  in the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar J., in  Shri Virinder Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab (2).  There, (1) (1956)7 S.C.R. 404. (2) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1013, 1018.  863 the,  distinction  between a quasi-judicial tribunal  and  a court,was given as follows               "It  may  be stated broadly that  what  disti-               nguished a Court from a quasi-judicial  tribu-               nal  is  that  it is charged with  a  duty  to               decide  disputes  in  a  judicial  manner  and               declare, the rights of parties in a definitive               judgment.  ,To  decide in  a  judicial  manner               involves  that the parties are entitled  as  a               matter  of  right to be heard  in  support  of               their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of               it.  And it also imports an obligation on  the               part of the authority to decide the matter  on               a consideration of the evidence adduced and in               accordance    with  law.   When   a   question

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             therefore  arisen as to whether  an  authority               created by an Act is a Court as, distinguished               from  a quasi-judicial-tribunal, what has  to:               be  decided.is  whether having regard  to  the               provisions  of  the Act it possesses  all  the               attributes of a Court". Dealing  with  quasi-judicial tribunals it was  observed  in Gullapelli Negeswara Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh(1) :               ",The concept of a quasi-judicial act, implies               that  the  act  is  not  wholly  judicial,  it               describes  only a duty cast on  the  executive               body or authority to,conform to the norms.  of               judicial  procedure in performing some act  in               the, ’exercise of its executive power". It  is  not necessary to refer to other cases  because  they were  decided  on their own facts and related  to  different tribunals.   In  our opinion a Sales Tax Officer  is  not  a Court within the meaning of.s. 195 of,the criminal Procedure Code  and there. fore it was not necessary for a  Sales  Tax Officer to (1)  (1959) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319, 353-4. 864 make  a  complaint  and  the  proceedings  without  such   a complaint are not without jurisdiction. In our opinion the appellants were rightly convicted and  we therefore  dismiss  this appeal.   The  appellant  Jagannath Prasad must surrender to his bail bonds. Appeal dismissed.