ITEM NO.207                 COURT NO.4               SECTION IVA

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS                      Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).10656/2007

(From the judgement and order dated 31/05/2007  and 11/06/2007 in  CCC No.341/2006  of The HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE)

JAGADGURU ANNADANISHWARA MAHA SWAMIJI                Petitioner(s)

                     VERSUS

V.C.ALLIPUR & ANR.                                   Respondent(s)

[With prayer for interim relief and office report][For final disposal]

Date: 20/03/2009  This Petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. SINHA         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P. SATHASIVAM

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shankar Divate, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Shanth Kr. V.Mahale, Adv.for Mr. Rajesh Mahale, Adv.

Mr. R.J. Goulay, Adv.for Mrs. S. Usha Reddy, Adv.

          UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following                                O R D E R  

Leave granted.

The Appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.  No costs.

(Parveen Kr. Chawla) Court Master

(Pushap Lata Bhardwaj) Court Master

[Signed Order is placed on the File]

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1798 OF 2009         (Arising out of SLP(C) No.10656 of 2007)

Jagadguru Annadanishwara Maha Swamiji ..Appellant

versus

V.C.Allipur & Another ..Respondents

O R D E R

Leave granted.

Appellant is before us, aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order dated

31st May,  2007 passed by  a  Division  Bench  of the  High Court of Karnataka at

Bangalore in CCC No.341 of 2006 and also the order dated 11th June, 2007.

Respondent No.1 was working as an Assistant Teacher  in a school run by

the  appellant.   In  relation  to  his  claim for  promotion  as  a  lecturer  as  he  had

obtained  M.A.  degree,  he  approached  the  school  authorities.   The management

declined his request.  Respondent No.1 then made a representation to the Deputy

Director, Education who in turn asked the management to consider the case of the

respondent No.1 for promotion.  The Director, Pre-University, Education passed an

order on 25th July, 2005 in his favour.   

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Appellant preferred an appeal before the appropriate authority which is

still pending.

Respondent No.1,  however, filed an application purported to be under

Sections 11 & 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act') before

the Karnataka High Court praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

“WHEREFORE,  the  Complainant  prays  that  this  Hon'ble Court  be  pleased  to  call  for  relevant  records  and  initiate contempt proceedings against the respondents for disobedience of the order of the Director, P.U. Education made in Appeal PUAP-51/2005 dated 25.7.2005 as per Annexure-A and to pass any other appropriate and suitable orders as deemed fit by this Hon'ble Court in the interest of justice and equity.”

The  said  application  was  entertained  by  reason  of  the  impugned

judgment and furthermore charges have also been directed to be framed.

The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to

whether  the  Director  of  the  Pre-University,  Education  is  a  Court  within  the

meaning of the provisions of the Act or not.

Indisputably,  the  Director  of  Pre-University,  Education  is  a  statutory

authority.  Contempt has been defined in Section 2(a) of the Act to mean a civil

contempt or criminal contempt.  Indisputably, the contempt  

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proceedings initiated  by  the first  respondent  before the  High Court was civil  in

nature.  Civil contempt has been defined in Section 2(b) of the Act to mean wilful

disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a

court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court.

It is now well settled principle of law and having regard to the definition

of  the  Court  contained  in  various  statutes  like Code  of  Civil  Procedure or the

Evidence Act would mean a Tribunal, whose decision shall be final and/or would  be

entitled to take evidence in terms of the provisions of the Evidence Act. It is also

well settled that although a Tribunal may exercise some of its powers in terms of the

Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal procedure and have all the trappings

of a  Court  but  still  would not  be  treated  as  a  Court.   In  Bharat  Bank Ltd. v.

Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [AIR 1950 SC 188 : 1950 SCR 459] this court

opined:-

“7. Now there can be no doubt that the Industrial Tribunal has, to  use  a  well-known expression,  “all  the  trappings  of  a  court”  and performs functions which cannot but be regarded as judicial. […]    27.[…] There can be no doubt that to be a Court, the person or persons

who constitute it must be entrusted with judicial functions, that is, of -4-

deciding litigated questions according to law. However, by agreement between  parties  arbitrators  may  be  called  upon  to  exercise  judicial powers and to decide a dispute according to law but  that  would not make the arbitrators a Court. It appears to me that before a person or persons can be  said to  constitute  a  Court it  must be held that  they derive  their  powers  from  the  State  and  are  exercising  the  judicial powers of the State. In R. v.  London County Council [[1931] 2 K.B. 215], Saville L.J. gave the following meaning to the word "Court" or "judicial authority" :-  

‘It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense that this Court is a Court, it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition;  and it  is not necessary to be strictly a Court if it is a tribunal which has to decide rightly after hearing evidence and opposition.’

28.  As pointed out  in picturesque language by  Lord Sankey L.C.  in Shell  Co.  of  Australia  v.  Federal Commissioner of  Taxation,  [[1931] A.C. 275], there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court which,  nevertheless,  are  not  Courts  in  the  strict  sense  of  exercising

judicial power. […] It was pointed out in the above case that a tribunal is not  necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it  gives a final decision,  nor because it  hears witnesses on oath,  nor because two or more  contending  parties  appear  before  it  between  whom  it  has  to decide, nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects nor because there is an appeal to a Court, nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body […].”   

In  the  context  of  Section  29(2)  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963  the  term

‘court’ must be held to be of wide import.  However, again there exists a distinction

between a court and the civil court.   

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In P. Sarathy v. State Bank of India, [ (2000) 5 SCC 355 ] this Court has

held :-  

“12. It will be noticed that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not speak of a “civil court” but speaks only of a “court”. It is not necessary that the court spoken of in Section 14 should be  a  “civil  court”.  Any  authority  or  tribunal  having  the trappings of a court would be a “court” within the meaning of this section.

13. … in order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have, apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.”

We may, however, notice that in the context of applicability of Section 5

of the Limitation Act in regard to Arbitration Tribunal which was constituted in

terms of a statutory provision, the matter has been referred to a three Judge Bench

in State of Madhya Pradesh and another v.  Anshuman Shukla [(2008) 7 SCC 487].

Be that as it may, the word ‘civil court’ vis-à-vis a court must be construed having

regard to the text and context of the statute.   

As indisputably the Director of Pre-University, Education is an authority

created under a statute and not a Court, by no stretch of imagination, it can not be

described  

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as a Court so as to enable the first respondent to file an application for initiation of

proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act  against  the appellant  herein for

wilful  disobedience  of  the  order  of  the  Director,  Pre-University,  Education,

especially when an appeal against the said order is still pending.  The order of the

statutory  authority,  thus,  would  not  alleviate  the  provisions  of  the  Contemt  of

Courts  Act.  The  impugned  orders,  thus,  are  wholly  illegal.  The  High  Court,

therefore, in our opinion, had no jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding under the

said Act.  Learned counsel for the first respondent,  however, submits that such a

contention had not been raised before the High Court.

Since,  the Director, Pre-University,  Education was not functioning as a

Court within the provisions of the Act, in our opinion, the impugned order of the

High Court  taking congnizance of the said application as also directing to frame

charge is wholly without jurisdiction and non est in the eyes of law and therefore is

unsustainable. It was Coram-non-judice.  Such a contention can be raised at any

stage.  

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned orders cannot be sustained

and  they  are  set  aside  accordingly.   The  Contempt  Petition  filed  by  the  first

respondent before the  

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High  Court  is  dismissed.   However,  we  make  it  clear  that  the  other  remedies

available to the first respondent under any other law for the time being inforce shall

remain open for redressal of his grievance.

The Appeal is allowed. No costs.

.........................J. [S.B.SINHA]

NEW DELHI; ..........................J. MARCH 20, 2009. [P.SATHASIVAM]