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PETITIONER: J.PANDURANGARAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ANDHRA PRADESH  PUBLIC SERVICECOMMISSION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/1962

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1963 AIR  268            1963 SCR  (1) 707

ACT: State Judicial Service-Appointment-Notification laying  down conditions-Constitutional  validity-The High  Court  Meaning of-Andhra    State   Judicial   Service   Rules,    r.    12 (b)--Constitution of India, Arts.14, 16 (2).

HEADNOTE: In   January  1962,  the  Andhra  Pradesh   Public   Service Commission invited applications for selection for the  posts of  District  Munsifs in the State of Andhra  Pradesh.   The petitioner  applied but his application was rejected on  the ground  that he aid not fulfil the first condition  in  para 4A(1) of the Commission, notification which reads thus  :-4- A(1)-"that  at  the time when the petitioner applies  he  is practicing  as an Advocate of the High Court.  The  question is  whether  the  expression  "The  High  Court"  in   ’the- notification refers to the Andhra High Court alone or to all the  High  Courts  in India.  If the  expression  means  the Andhra High Court then the further question would be whether the Rule prescribing the said requirement is ultra vires  as being  discriminatory.   The Clause in the  notification  is based on r. 12(b) of the Andhra State Juducial Service Rules and reads that "no person shall be eligible for  appointment to  the post of District Munsiff by the method specified  in column  (1)  of  the  table  below  unless  he  possess  the qualifications  specified  in the corresponding  entries  in column (2.) thereof" and among the qualifications  specified is the same as in 4(A) (1) of the notification. Held,  that the subject matter of the rules is the  appoint- ment  of  subordinate judicial officers who  would  work  in courts subordinate to the Andhra High Court, and so, the use of  the definite pronoun "The" in the expression  "the  High Court" clearly indicates that it is not any High Court  that is  intended but it is the particular High Court  of  Andhra Pradesh that is in view.  Therefore the expression "The High Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court. 708 Held,  further,  that though Art. 14  forbids  class  Legis- lation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the

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purposes of legislation.  When any impugned rules or  statu- tory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Art.  14,  its validity can be sustained if ’two  tests  are satisfied.   The  first test is that the  classification  on which  it  is  founded  must be  based  on  an  intelligible differential  which distinguishes persons or things  grouped together  from others left out of the group; and the  second is that the differential in question must have a  reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule  or statutory  provision  in question.   The  classification  on which  the  statutory  provision  may  be  founded  may   be referable  to different considerations.  It may be based  on geographical  considerations  or it may  have  reference  to objects  or occupations or the like.  In every  case,  there must  be some nexus between the basis of the  classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute. The  plea that all the rules must be considered together  is entirely  misconceived.  It is quite clear that  in  testing the  validity of any one of these rules, the true scope  and effect  of  the  impugned  rule  itself  will  have  to   be considered and the decision of the question would have to be confined  to the relevant considerations in respect  of  the said  rule and no more. just as the presence of one  invalid rule  cannot invalidate the other rules which may be  valid, so the presence of a number of valid rules would not help to validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid. There is no rational basis for differentiating the advocates enrolled  into  the Andhra High Court from the rest  as  the impugned rule purports to do.  If the basis of the  impugned rule  is  that a person who applies for appointment  to  the post of a District Munsiff, should have been enrolled as  an Advocate  of a High Court, that basis can be satisfied  even if  the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the  Andhra High Court but of any other High Court.  All the High Courts have  the same status; all of them stand for the  same  high traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice. The  impugned rule has introduced a  classification  between one   class  of  Advocates  and  the  rest,  and  the   said classification  must  be said to be irrational  inasmuch  as there   is   no  nexus  between  the  basis  of   the   said classification and the object intended to be achieved by the relevant  scheme  of  rules.   The  impugned  rule  and  the corresponding  portion of the paragraph of the  notification based   on   it  must  be  held  to  be  ultra   vires   and unconstitutional.  709 Nallanthighal  Bhaktavatsalam  Iyengar v.  Secretary  Andhra Public   Service   Commission,  A.I.R.  1936.    Andh.   14, overruled. Shri  R., K. Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. B. Tendolkar,  [1959] S.C.R. 279, relied on.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 355 of 1961 and 1  of 1962. Petitions  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental rights. Sarjoo   Prasad,   A.  Yedavalli,  A.  V.  Rangam   and   T. Satyanarayan for the petitioner (in Petn.  No. 355/61). A.Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the petitioner (in Ptn. No. 1, 1962). C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India T.   V.      R. Tatachari and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.

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1962.  April II.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR,  J.-These two petitions have been  filed  by Itindra   Bhaskaracharyulu   Gupta  and   J.   Pandurangarao respectively  under Article 32 of the Constitution  and,  in substance,  they challenge the validity of one of the  rules framed  by the Governor of Andhra in exercise of the  powers conferred on him by Art. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309  in respect of the Andhra Judicial Service.  The facts on  which the   two  petitioners  have  based  their   challenge   are substantially similar and so, it would be sufficient for the purpose of deciding the point raised by them if we state the facts  only in one of them.  We will accordingly  state  the facts  in petition No. 355 of 1961.  Our conclusion  on  the merits of the point raised by this petition will govern  the decision of the other petition No. 1 of 1962. 710 The  petitioner J. Pandurangarao belongs to a  family  which has been settled in the district of Guntur in Andhra Pradesh for  several generations past.  The petitioner  himself  was born,  brought  up and educated in the  said  district.   He passed  his  B.  A. examination from  the  Andhra  Christian College  at  Guntur 1950.  Thereafter, he  took  his  L.L.B. Degree from the Nagpur University in 1952 and in 1954 he got himself  enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore  High  Court. Having thus been enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore  High Court,  he  set up his practice in the Court  in  Tenali  in Guntur  district and has been practising there  ever  since. In  January, 1961, the respondent No. 1, the Andhra  Pradesh Public   Service   Commission,  invited   applications   for selection for the posts of District Munsifs in the State  of Andhra  Pradesh.  As the petitioner was qualified  for  this post.. he sent in his application on the 27th January, 1961. Respondent No. 1, however, rejected his applications on  the 25th  September, 1961 on the ground that he did  not  fulfil the   condition  set  out  in  paragraph  4-A  (1)  of   the Commission’s  notification published on the  17th  December, 1960,  by  which applications had been  invited.   The  said paragraph reads as follows :-               "That at the time when the petitioner  applies               :               (1)   he  is practising as an Advocate of  the               High Court:               (2)   he  has  been  actually  practising   in               Courts  of Civil or Criminal  jurisdiction  in               India for a period not less than three years." According to respondent No. 1, the petitioner satisfied  the second condition but did not satisfy the first since he  had not been practising as an 711 Advocate of the Andhra High Court.  In his present petition, the   petitioner   alleges  that  respondent   No’   1   has misconstrued the requirement prescribed by para. 4A (1) when it  assumed  that the expression ",the High Court"  in  that condition refers to the Andhra High Court and not to all the High Courts in India.  In the alternative’ the  petitioner’s contention is that if the expression "the High Court"  means the Andhra High Court, then the rule 1 prescribing the  said requirement is ultra vires in as much as it contravenes  the petitioner’s  fundamental rights guaranteed by  articles  14 and  16  (1)  of the Constitution.  It is on  these  to  two alternative  grounds  that  the  petitioner  challenges  the decision  of  respondent No. 1 and it is only if  the  first ground  fails that the petitioner questions the validity  of the impugned rule. To this petition, the petitioner has joined respondent No. 1

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and  respondent  No. 2, the Government  of  Andhra  Pradesh, represented  by  its  Chief Secretary.   On  behalf  of  the respondents, it is urged that the construction sought to  be placed  by  the  petitioner on the relevant  clause  in  the notification  is erroneous.  The expression the High  Court" in the Context means the Andhra High Court and no other.  It is also urged that even on that construction the requirement of the notification itself which is based on a corresponding rule is valid. It would thus be seen that though the petitioner technically did  not  challenge the validity of the rule  on  which  the relevant  clause  in the notification itself  is  based,  in substance, the dispute between the par. ties in the  present proceedings  ultimately  resolves into a dispute as  to  the validity  of  the basic rule framed by the Governor  of  the Andhra Pradesh under Art. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution.  The corresponding rule is Rule 12(b). The said rule provides special qualifications and says that  "no person shall be eligible for appointment 712 to  the post of District Munsif by the method  specified  in column  (1)  of  the table below  unless  he  possesses  the qualifications  specified  in the corresponding  entries  in column  (2)  thereof"  For direct  recruitment  as  District Munsif,  several qualifications are mentioned.  One of  them is  that the applicant must be practicing as an Advocate  of the  High Court, and the other is that he must  be  actually practising  in Courts of Civil or criminal  jurisdiction  in India for a period not less than three years.  It would thus be  seen that the relevant clauses in the notification,  the validity of one of which is challenged before us, are  based on these provisions in the statutory rules. The  first  question which calls for our decision  is:  what does  the  expression ’,the High Court" mean when  the  rule requires  that  the  applicant  must  be  practising  as  an Advocate  of  the  High Court?  It is urged  by  Mr.  Sarjoo Prasad  that  the expression ’,’the High  Court?’  need  not receive  the  narrow construction as contended  for  by  the respondents.   He suggests that the expression  ’,,the  High Court"  really  means any High Court.  In other  words’  his argument  is that as soon as it is shown that the  applicant has  been  practising as an Advocate is any  High  Court  in India,  that  should be deemed to meet  the  requirement  in question.   We  do  not think that this  argument  is  well- founded.   In the context, the expression "the  High  Court" must,  we think, mean the Andhra High Court.  In  construing the  expression "the High Court", we must bear in  mind  the fact that the subject-matter of the rules is the appointment of  subordinate judicial officers who would work  in  courts subordinate to the Andhra High Court; and so, the use of the definite pronoun "the" clearly indicates that it is not  any or  a High Court that is intended but it is  the  particular High Court of Andhra Pradesh that is in view. 713 Besides, the scheme of the notification issued by respondent No.  1  clearly  indicates that a person  practising  as  an Advocate of the High Court to whom the impugned rule refers, must  be a person practising in the Andhra High  Court.   In that  connection,  it is significant that  the  notification requires  that the applications should be submitted  to  the Commission  through the High Court of Andhra Pradesh if  the candidates are practicing in the High court and through  the District  Judge  concerned  and the  High  Court  of  Andhra Pradesh  if they are practising in the  subordinate  Courts. There  can be no doubt that the High Court mentioned in  the

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impugned  rule  is  the  Andhra  High  Court  through  which applications  are  required  to be  sent  by  the  Advocates practising  in  that  Court.  It would  be  unreasonable  to assume  that an Advocate practising in any other High  Court should  cave been required to send his  application  through the  Andhra High Court; but that would be the result if  the expression "the High Court" in this rule is read as  meaning any High Court.  Therefore, it is clear that the  expression "the High Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court. That  immediately raises the question about the validity  of the   impugned   rule.   The  petitioner  argues   that   by prescribing  the  limitation that the applicant must  be  an Advocate of the Andhra High Court, the rule has violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(i) of the Constitution.  As a result of the rule, persons who  are not  practising as Advocates of the Andhra High,  Court  are disqualified   and   that   amounts   to    unconstitutional discrimination.  Art. 14 which provides that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the  equal protection  of  the laws within the territory of  India,  as well  as Article 16 (1) which provides that there  shall  be equality of opportunity for all citizens in 714 matters relating to employment or appointment to any  office under  the  State, have been frequently considered  by  this Court.  The scope and effect of the provisions of Article 14 can no longer be the subject-matter of any doubt or dispute. It  is  well  settled  that though  Art.  14  forbids  class legislation,  it does not forbid  reasonable  classification for the purposes of legislation.  When any impugned rule  or statutory  provision  is  assailed on  the  ground  that  it contravenes  Art. 14, its validity can be sustained  if  two tests   are   satisfied.   The  first  test  is   that   the classification  on which It is founded must be based  on  an intelligible  differentia  which  distinguishes  persons  or things  grouped together from others left out of the  group; and the second is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the  rule  or  statutory  provision  in  question.   As  the decisions  of this Court show, the classification  on  which the  statutory provision may be founded may be referable  to different  considerations.  It may be based on  geographical considerations  or  it  may have  reference  to  objects  or occupations or the like.  In every case,, there must be some nexus between the basis of the classification and the object intended  to  be  achieved by the  statute,  vide  Shri  Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1) It is  in the  light of these principles that we must now  proceed  to examine  the  problem  raised by  the  petitioners  for  our decision in the present proceedings. The  object  of the rule is to recruit suitable  and  proper persons to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra  with a  view  to  secure fair  and  efficient  administration  of justice,  and  so, there can be no doubt that  it  would  be perfectly competent to the authority concerned to  prescribe qualifications  for eligibility for appointment to the  said Service.   Knowledge of local laws as well as  knowledge  of the regional language and adequate (1)  [1959] S. C. R. 279. 715 experience  at the bar may be prescribed  as  qualifications which the applicants must satisfy before they apply for  the post.  In that connection, practice in subordinate Courts or in the High Court may also be a relevant test to  prescribe. The  respondents contend that the impugned rule seeks to  do

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nothing  more  than  to require  the  applicant  to  possess knowledge  of local laws and that being so, the validity  of the   rule   cannot   be  impeached   on   the   ground   of discrimination.   In support of this argument., reliance  is placed  on  the  decision  of  the  Andhra  High  Court   in Nallanthighal  Bhaktavatsalam Iyenger v.  Secretary,  Andhra Public Service Commission, Kurnool (1) in which the validity of the impugned rule has been upheld. It is also contended that in considering the validity of the impugned  rule,  we  must  have  regard  to  all  the  rules considered  together.  The argument is that it would not  be fair or reasonable to pick out one rule for challenge and in that  sense,  to ignore the context in which the  said  rule along with others has been framed.  In this connection,  our attention   has  been  drawn  to  the  fact   that   several qualifications  have  been prescribed by the  rules.   These relate to the educational qualifications, to the requirement as  to age, to the knowledge of the local language and  some other   factors  which  undoubtedly  are  relevant  to   the appointment   to  the  judicial  post  in  question.    Thus considered,  it is urged, the validity of the impugned  rule cannot be successfully challenged. Dealing with this latter argument first, it seems to us that the  plea that all the rules must be considered together  is entirely  misconceived.  It is quite clear that  in  testing the  validity  of any one of these rules, we  will  have  to consider  the  true scope and effect of  the  impugned  rule itself and the decision of the question would have to be (1)  A. 1. R. 1956 Andhra 14, 716 confined  to the relevant considerations in respect  of  the said rule and no more.  Just as the presence of one  invalid rule  cannot invalidate the other rules which may be  valid, so the presence of a number of valid rules would not help to validate  an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid.   If, while prescribing relevant tests which must be satisfied  by an applicant, the rule had stated that the applicant  should satisfy  the  test  of a particular  height  or  colour  for instance,-which factors are irrelevant for judicial service- the  respondents could not be heard to say that because  the other  rules  are  valid,  the  irrelevant  rule  about  the requirement of the applicant’s height or colour must also be treated as valid.  If the height or colour of the  applicant is wholly irrelevant in making an appointment to a  judicial post, it must be treated as irrelevant and invalid though it may have been placed in a code of rules and the rest of  the rules  may be perfectly valid.  Therefore, we cannot  accept the argument urged by the learned Solicitor-General that the impugned  rule cannot and need not be considered  by  itself but  must be treated as a part of a bigger scheme  of  rules and since the other rules are valid, the impugned rule  must also be treated as valid. Does  the  impugned rule serve the object of  requiring  the applicant  to possess knowledge of local laws ? That is  the next question to consider.  It if; urged by the  respondents that  since  actual practice for three years  which  is  the other  condition prescribed, is practice in Courts of  Civil or  Criminal  jurisdiction in India, it  follows  that  even lawyers  practising  in courts outside the State  of  Andhra Prades  would  satisfy  that test and that  means  that  the satisfaction of the said test would not meet the requirement that  the  applicant should have knowledge  of  local  laws. That  is why, it is urged, the impugned  condition  requires that the applicant must be practising as an Advocate of  the Andhra High Court.  An Advocate of the

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717 Andhra  High Court would generally have had the  benefit  of apprenticeship  for  one year in the Chambers  of  a  senior Advocate and may have passed the apprenticeship  examination in  different subjects prescribed by the ’ Bar Council.   It is in that way that he would have acquired the knowledge  of local  laws  which  he would have to  administer  if  he  is appointed to the post of a District Munsif. It is not clear that the impugned rule can effectively  meet the alleged requirement of the knowledge of local laws.   If the  object  intended to be achieved is that  the  applicant should have adequate knowledge of local laws, the usual  and proper  course  to adopt in that behalf is  to  prescribe  a suitable examination which candidates should pass, or  adopt some  other effective method.  No material has  been  placed before  us  to show that the alleged requirement  about  the knowledge  of  local  laws can be met  on  the  two  grounds suggested in support of the validity of the rule.   Besides, study of general laws prevailing in the country as a  whole, and the study of important local laws are generally included in  the  curriculum  prescribed  for  the  law  Degree,  and obtaining  a Law Degree which would entitle a person  to  be enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement of the knowledge of important local laws. There  is  another  aspect  of the  problem  which  is  very important.  It is common ground that under rule 1(ii) of the Andhra Bar Council Rules, an advocate entered on the roll of Advocates of a High Court established by law in India, other than the High Court of Andhra, is entitled to practice as an Advocate  of  the  Andhra  High  Court,  provided  there  is reciprocity  between the Andhra High Court on whose roll  he has  been entered as an Advocate.  This rule is  subject  to the further proviso that where any person had been admitted      718 as  an  advocate  of such High Court  without  undergoing  a course of study in the chambers of a practising advocate for a period of one year, he shall     be  of not less than  one year’s standing as an    advocate of such High Court.  It is thus clear     that  an Advocate enrolled in any other  High Court who is entitled to the benefit of rule 1(ii) would  be eligible  to practies in the Andhra High Court and as  such, would satisfy the test of the impugned rule ; and in such  a case,  the theory that the impugned rule serves the  purpose of  requiring  the applicant to possess knowledge  of  local laws  completely  break down.  By operation  of  rule  1(ii) which   is,  doubt,  based  on  the  health  convention   of reciprocity  between  the  different  High  Court  in   this country,  Advocste who can have no know. ledge of the  local laws  prevailing  in Andhra would satisfy the  test  of  the impugned rule, therefore, the main argument that the  object intended  to  be achieved by the impugned rule is  that  the applicant should possess knowledge of local laws, cannot  be sustained. Then  it is urged that a person who has been enrolled as  an Advocate  of  the Andhra High Court would have  feelings  of attachment for the institution of the Andhra High Court  and would  be  subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction  of  the said  High Court and that would afford a rational basis  for differentiating  the class of advocates of the  Andhra  High Court  from the rest of the Advocates in this  country.   In our opinion, neither of the two grounds can be said to  have any  nexus  with the object intended to be achieved  by  the rule.  What is relevant and more important in the matter  of recruiting  persons  to  judicial service is  not  only  the applicant?’  Loyalty and attachment to the institution of  a

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particular                High Court but their loyalty and a sense of dedication to the cases of judicial  administration and  this; feeling and sense of dedication would be  present in the minds of persons                             719 enrolled  as Advocates in the Andhra High Court as  much  in the  minds  of  other                 persons  enrolled   as Advocates  in other High Courts.  The test  of  disciplinary jurisdiction  is hardly relevant because advocates of  other High  Courts would likewise be subject to  the  disciplinary jurisdiction  of  their  High Courts; and if  a  person  who continues to be on the roll of the Andhra High Court can  be presumed  to be a person worthy to belong to the  profession of  law  and so, eligible for the judicial post,  so  can  a person who continues on the roll of any other High Court  be entitled  to  claim  the same  status.   Therefore,  in  our opinion, there does not appear to be any rational basis  for differentiating  the advocates belonged to the  Andhra  High Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do. In this connection, it may be permissible to point out  that the  second  condition  in regard  to  three  years’  actual practice  might  more appropriately have required  that  the said  three  years’  practice  should be  in  the  Civil  or Criminal  Courts  subordinate  to the  jurisdiction  of  the Andhra High Court.  That would have more effectively secured the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge  of local  laws  and  to have experience in the  matter  of  the administration  of the said laws.  As it happens,  the  said condition   under  the  relevant  rule   enables   advocates practising  in  Civil or Criminal Courts all over  India  to apply, and so, the requirement about the knowledge of  local laws  cannot invariably be satisfied by the said  condition. But as we have just pointed out, he said test cannot be said to be satisfied by the impugned rule as well. If  the  basis  of the impugned rule is that  a  person  who applies  for appointment to the post of a  District  Munsif, should  have been enrolled as an Advocate of a  High  Court, that  basis can be satisfied even if the person is  enrolled as an Advocate 720 not  of the Andhra High Court but of any other  High  Court. All the High Courts have the same status; all of them  stand for   the   same  high  traditions  of  the  Bar   and   the administration of justice, and advocates enrolled in all  of them  are  presumed  to follow the  same  standards  and  to subscribe  to  the same spirit of serving the cause  of  the administration  of justice.  Therefore, in our opinion,  the impugned  rule  has introduced  classification  between  one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no  nexus between the basis of the said classification and the  object intended  to  be achieved by the relevant scheme  of  rules. That  being  so, it must be held that the  decision  of  the Andhra   High   Court   in   the   case   of   Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar is not correct. In  the  result,  the impugned rule  and  the  corresponding portion  of  the paragraph of the notification based  on  it must  be  held to be ultra vires and  unconstitutional.   In that  view of the matter, we issue a direction calling  upon the first respondent to entertain theapplications of  the petitioners and to deal with  them  in accordance with  law. We were toldby  the  learned Solicitor-General  that  the Public Service Commission has already conducted the test  in respect  of a large number of candidates and  amongst  them, the  petitioners’ cases have also been considered.  If  that

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be  so, our present decision will not affect  the  procedure followed  by the Commission.  The effect of our decision  is that applications of the persons like the petitioners cannot be  rejected  on the preliminary ground that  they  are  not persons practising as Advocates in the Andhra High Court and that  they should be considered on the merit its along  with the rest of the applications.  The petitions are accordingly allowed With costs. Petitions allowed. 721