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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5982 of 2001

PETITIONER: J.P. Bansal                                              

RESPONDENT: State of Rajasthan & Anr.                                

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/03/2003

BENCH: SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT,J

       Appellant’s prayer for issuing a writ of mandamus to the State of  Rajasthan to pay compensation on cessation of functioning as Chairman of  the abolished Rajasthan Taxation and Tribunal (in short ’the Tribunal’)  having been turned down by learned Single Judge and Division Bench of  the Rajasthan High Court, this appeal has been preferred.  As the core  question involved is pristinely legal, it is unnecessary to enter into  the factual aspects in detail.

       Factual panorama in a nutshell is as follows:

       Appellant was appointed as Judicial Member of the Tribunal in  terms of notification dated 16.9.1995 issued by the Finance Department  (Taxation Division) of the Government of Rajasthan. Appointment of the  appellant was made by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred  by clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Rajasthan Taxes and  Tribunal Act 1995 (in short ’the Act’).  By the notification dated  16.9.1995 referred to above, Chairman and the technical member were also  appointed. Subsequently, he was appointed to discharge functions of  Chairman of the Tribunal till appointment of regular Chairman. This  contingency arose on the previous Chairman attaining the age of 65  years.  State Government vide notification dated 27.2.1999 issued an  Ordinance No.1/1999 styled The Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal (Repeal)  Ordinance, 1999 (in short ’the Ordinance’). The same became operative  w.e.f. the date of notification i.e. 27.2.1999. By the above Ordinance  under Section 5 matters and proceedings pending before Tribunal on the  date of commencement of the Ordinance stood automatically transferred to  the High Court for disposal. As a consequence of Tribunal being  abolished, continuance of appellant as Chairman automatically came to an  end. Appellant claimed compensation of Rs.5,35,648/- with interest @ 15%  per annum by filing a writ petition on the ground that his tenure  appointment was to continue up to 18.9.2000. Since there was a premature  termination of the tenure appointment, claim of compensation for the  balance period from the date of termination of the appointment till  18.9.2000 (which according to him was the last date of the period of  tenure appointment) was made. The writ application was filed before the  Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur Bench.  The stand of the appellant before  the learned Single Judge was that there was a Cabinet decision taken to  release salary to the appellant for the balance period which was to be  paid.  As the tenure of the appellant could not have been curtailed, he  was entitled to compensation.  By judgment dated 27.9.1999 in SB Civil  Writ Petition No.4379 of 1999 the writ petition was dismissed by learned  Single Judge.  It was noted that the validity of the Ordinance was not  challenged.  Since the Tribunal itself was abolished and all cases  pending before it have been transferred to the High Court, no  interference was called for.  It was noted that the exact amount of

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compensation can only be decided by a competent court after taking  evidence of the parties.  So far as implementation of the Cabinet  decision is concerned, it was noted that the same was a matter of  discretion of the Government and it was open to the appellant to make a  representation to the concerned authorities.  It was not open to the  High Court to enforce the Cabinet decision.  The matter was carried in  appeal before the Division Bench which dismissed the same holding that  the learned Single Judge has pronounced a well-reasoned judgment and no  interference is called for.   

       Learned counsel for the appellant primarily took three stands in  support of the appeal.  Firstly, it was submitted that the decision of  the Cabinet was enforceable.  In the meeting of the Cabinet four  decisions were taken.  They related to: (1) Promulgation of Ordinance,  (2) repatriation of the Technical Member to his parent department (3)  absorption of the members of the staff and (4) payment of compensation  to the appellant. While the first three decisions were implemented; only  the last one relating to payment of compensation was not implemented.   The stand taken by the State Government cannot partake the character of  Government order under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, 1950  (in short ’the Constitution’) is not tenable.  Secondly, clause (2) of  Article 310 of the Constitution deals with payment of compensation on  premature cessation of a tenure appointment on the basis of contract to  that effect. Even though there was no contractual prescription for  payment of compensation, that has to be taken as inbuilt requirement in  the spirit of clause (2) of Article 310. There has to be interpretation  of the provisions for giving effect to constitutional mandates. The  decision taken by the Cabinet was in line with the said provision and,  therefore, the High Court was not justified in refusing the grant of  compensation. Finally, since there has been violation of the legitimate  expectation of the appellant to continue till the end of tenure period,  by application of the principle of legitimate expectation the State  Government was bound to pay compensation irrespective of whether there  was any Cabinet decision earlier or not and that would not make any  difference. Section 4(b) of the Ordinance also has relevance in that  context. Any obligation or liability accrued or incurred under the Act  repealed are not be affected by the repeal.

In support of the stands reliance was placed on following  decisions: (L.G. Chaudhari, vs. The Secretary, L.S.G. Dept., Govt. of  Bihar and Others AIR 1980 SC 383, State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. vs.  Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351, R. Rajendran and  Ors. etc. etc. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1107, State  of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada Suryanarayana and Ors. 1997 (6) SCC  258, Dr. L.P. Agarwal vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1992 SC 1872, Sri  Justice S.K. Ray, vs. State of Orissa and Ors. JT 2003 (1) SC 166).

       In response, learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan submitted  that there was no Cabinet decision in the line submitted by the  appellant. Even if there would have been any such Cabinet decision, it  cannot meet the requirement of Government order, as envisaged under  Article 166 of the Constitution. Further the termination of the  appointment came to be effectuated on the basis of legislative action.   Therefore, there is no scope for grant of any compensation.  The  decisions relied upon have no application as there were specific  provisions for payment of compensation in the concerned statutes. The  principles of legitimate expectation have no application to the facts of  the case, as are the provisions of Section 4(b) of the Ordinance.           There is no dispute that under sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the  Act, a Judicial Member was to hold office for a term of five years from  the date on which he enters upon the office or till he attains the age  of sixty two years, whichever is later.  In view of this undisputed  position, the controversy lies within the very narrow compass.   

Article 166 of the Constitution deals with the conduct of

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Government business.  The said provision reads as follows:

"166. Conduct of business of the Government of a  State.  (1) All executive action of the Government  of a State shall be expressed to be taken in the name  of the Governor.

(2) Orders and other instruments made and executed in  the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in  such manner as may be specified in rules to be made  by the Governor, and the validity of an order or  instrument which is so authenticated shall not be  called in question on the ground that it is not an  order or instrument made or executed by the Governor.

(3)     The Governor shall make rules for the more  convenient transaction of the business of the  Government of the State, and for the allocation among  Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not  business with respect to which the Governor is by or  under this Constitution required to act in his  discretion."

Clause (1) requires that all executive action of the State Government  shall have to be taken in the name of the Governor. Further there is no  particular formula of words required for compliance with Article 166(1).  What the Court has to see is whether the substance of its requirement  has been complied with.  A Constitution Bench in R. Chitralekha etc. vs.  State of Mysore and Ors. (AIR 1964 1823) held that the provisions of the  Article were only directory and not mandatory in character and if they  were not complied with it could still be established as a question of  fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government  or the Governor. Clause (1) does not prescribe how an executive action  of the Government is to be performed, it only prescribes the mode under  which such act is to be expressed. While clause (1) in relation to the  mode of expression, clause (2) lays down the ways in which the order is  to be authenticated. Whether there is any Government order in terms of  Article 166, has to be adjudicated from the factual background of each  case.  Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant  on L.G. Chaudhari (supra) to contend that for all practicable purposes  the decision of Cabinet has to be construed as a Government order,  because three of the decisions taken by the Cabinet have been  implemented.  As noted above, learned counsel for the State took the  stand that neither in the writ petition nor before the High Court, the  Cabinet decision itself was produced.  In fact, the Cabinet memorandum  and the order of the Cabinet show that no decision was taken to pay any  compensation.  In this connection reference is made to the Cabinet  memorandum dated 18.3.1993 and the decision No. 57 of 1999.  It was  further submitted that even if it is conceded for the sake of argument  that such decision was taken, the same cannot be enforced by a writ  petition.

       We need not delve into the disputed question as to whether there  was any Cabinet decision, as it has not been established that there was  any Government order in terms of Article 166 of the Constitution. The  Constitution requires that action must be taken by the authority  concerned in the name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is  observed that the action can be regarded as that of the State.   Constitutionally speaking the Council of Ministers are advisors and as  the head of the State, the Governor is to act with the aid or advice of  the Council of Ministers.  Therefore, till the advice is accepted by the  Governor, views of the Council of Ministers does not get crystalised  into action of the State. (See: The State of Punjab vs. Sodhi Sukhdev

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Singh AIR 1961 SC 493, Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab and Anr. AIR  1963 SC 395).  That being so, the first plea of the appellant is  rejected.

Coming to the plea relating to clause (2) of Article 310, it has  to be noted that compensation is payable for premature termination of  contractual service. The clause is only an enabling provision which  empowers the Governor to enter into the contract with specially  qualified person(s) providing for payment of compensation where no  compensation is payable under the doctrine "service at the pleasure of  the State".  In the absence of any specific term regarding  compensation, it cannot be countenanced that the intention was to pay  it.  Had there been an inbuilt requirement to pay compensation as  contended by the appellant, there was no necessity for specifically  incorporating a provision in that regard.  A bare reading of clause (2)  makes it clear that there can be a stipulation for payment of  compensation in the contract to a person who is holding a civil post  under the Union or a State, if before the expiry of an agreed period  that post is abolished or he is, for reasons not connected with any  misconduct on his part, required to vacate the post.  Being an enabling  provision in the matter of payment of compensation on the basis of a  contractual obligation, it cannot be said that even when there is no  stipulation in a contract of employment, the same is implicit.  

Submission of learned counsel that such a provision is inbuilt and  has to be read into the Act and the Ordinance is clearly unacceptable.                                    

       It is said that a statute is an edict of the legislature. The  elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to  gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature.  

       Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the  words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a  particular thought. The task is not easy as the "language" is often  misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The  tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation  the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be  approached for clarification, the legislature cannot be approached as  the legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so  far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret  it. No doubt, the legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the  law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only  by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of  law-making.  

       Statute being an edict of the legislature, it is necessary that it  is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In spite of Courts  saying so, the draftsmen have paid little attention and they still boast  of the old British jingle "I am the parliamentary draftsman. I compose  the country’s laws. And of half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the  cause", which was referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v.  Rama Varma Bharathan  Thampuran (AIR 1980 SC 1187 at. P.1195). In Kirby  v. Leather (1965 (2) All ER 441) the draftsmen were severely criticized  in regard to Section 22(2)(b) of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939, as it  was said that the section was so obscure that the draftsmen must have  been of unsound mind.  

       Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there  is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly  conveyed, there is no scope for the court to innovate or take upon  itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In  that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the  role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They  have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates

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adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or  erased. This can be vouchsafed by "an alert recognition of the  necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance  to do so". (See: Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of  Statutes in "Essays on Jurisprudence", Columbia Law Review, P.51.)           It is true that this Court in interpreting the Constitution enjoys  a freedom which is not available in interpreting a statute and,  therefore, it will be useful at this stage to reproduce what Lord  Diplock said in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs (1980 (1) ALL ER 529, at p.  542):

       "It endangers continued public confidence in  the political impartiality of the judiciary, which is  essential to the continuance of the rule of law, if  Judges, under the guise of interpretation, provide  their own preferred amendments to statutes which  experience of their operation has shown to have had  consequences that members of the court before whom  the matter comes consider to be injurious to public  interest."

Where, therefore, the "language" is clear, the intention of the  legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be  borne in mind is as to what has been said in the statute as also what  has not been said. A construction which requires, for its support,  addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of  words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception,  including that of necessity, which is not the case here. (See: Gwalior  Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests (AIR  1990 SC 1747 at p. 1752); Shyam Kishori Devi v. Patna Municipal Corpn.  (AIR 1966 SC 1678 at p. 1682); A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak  (1984 (2) SCC 500, at pp. 518, 519)]. Indeed, the Court cannot reframe  the legislation as it has no power to legislate. [See State of Kerala v.  Mathai Verghese (1986 (4) SCC 746, at p. 749); Union of India v. Deoki  Nandan Aggarwal (AIR 1992 SC 96 at p.101)

The decision in Dr. L.P. Agarwal  (supra) is also of no assistance  to the appellant because the issues involved was whether in respect of  tenure post concept of superannuation is applicable and the consequences  of premature retirement. In that context direction was given for payment  of arrears of salary etc.  The issues were entirely different and,  therefore, that decision has no application.   

       The decision in R. Rajendran and Ors. etc. etc. (supra) revolves  around altogether different controversy.  That related to doctrine of  pleasure incorporated under Article 310. It was, inter alia, observed in  the said case that the power to abolish a civil post is inherent in the  right to create it.  The Government has power subject of course to the  constitutional provisions to reorganize a department to provide  efficiencies and to bring about economy. It can abolish an office in  good faith.  It was further held in that case that the abolition of the  post of village officers was sought to be achieved by a piece of  legislation passed by the State legislature.  Want of good faith or  modalities cannot be attributed to a legislature.  The only question to  be considered was whether the legislature is a colorable one lacking in  legislative competence or whether it transgresses any of the  constitutional limitations. The plea that there was violation of Article  19(1)(g) of the Constitution was negatived as the Act did not affect  right of any of the incumbent of the posts to carry on any occupation of  their choice, even though they may not be able to stick on to the post  which they were holding.   

       So far as Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (supra) is concerned,  there was a specific provision regarding payment of compensation in the

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said case.  That makes a great deal of difference.   

       The decision in State of A.P. and Ors. vs. Bollapragada  Suryanarayana and Ors. (supra) does not in any way assist the appellant  and, in fact, is one which goes against him. That case related to  abolition of posts by legislation.  In the said case also there was a  provision for compensation specifically indicated in Section 5 of the  A.P. Abolition of Posts of Part-time Village Officers Act, 1985. As  indicated in the case of Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. (supra) clear  stipulation in the Act makes a difference.  There is no specific  provision for payment of compensation in the present case.   

       The relevant observations appeared at paragraph 5 of the judgment  in Bollapragada’s case  reads as follows:

       "It is contended by the State that the  respondents are not entitled to gratuity or the  benefit of the Family Benefit Scheme because the  posts of part-time Village Officers have been  abolished under the said Act. The Gratuity Scheme  under GOMs dated 18.4.1980 provides, inter alia, for  payment of gratuity to the Village Officer at the  time of demitting office after attaining the age of  58 years after giving notice to the appointing  authority. Therefore, the Gratuity Scheme expressly  provides for the manner of demitting office on  attaining the age of 58 years, or 60 years, as the  case may be. It is only when the office is demitted  in the manner set out in the Scheme that gratuity  under the said GOMs becomes payable. The office is  required to be demitted by the holder concerned after  giving a notice to the appointing authority. This  clearly contemplates a voluntary relinguishment of  office on attaining the specified age. There is no  retirement age for this office. This provision would  not apply when, by legislation, the posts are  abolished. In such a situation there is no question  of voluntary demitting of office after notice. The  provisions of the said GOMs, therefore, cannot be  attracted when the posts are abolished by  legislation. This is precisely the reason why under  Section 5 of the said Act, a provision for  compensation has been made, which the respondents  have received."

       One of the pleas of the appellant was with reference to Section  4(b) of the Ordinance, which reads as under:

"4. Savings  The repeal made under Section 3 shall  not affect  

(a) the previous operation of the Act so repealed or  anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(b) any obligation or liability accrued or incurred  under the Act so repealed; or

       xxx                     xxx                     xxx"   

                                The said provision also does not in any way assist the appellant  because there is no obligation or liability accrued or incurred under  the repealed Act to pay compensation. There was no obligation or

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liability fixed under the Act for payment of compensation.

The decision in Sri Justice S.K.Ray vs. State of Orissa and Ors.  (JT 2003 (1) SC 166) is also distinguishable on facts.  In that case  under the scheme of the enactment under which the appellant was  appointed, there was a bar on the appointee to hold any office of trust  or profit and also there was bar on his acting as a member of the  legislature, Central or State or any other position which may come in  conflict with the office of Lokpal. There was provision also that he  cannot hold any office even after he ceases to hold the office of  Lokpal. There were these disabilities attached to him for all time to  come after ceasing to hold office.  In the instant case there is no such  provision, and on the contrary in the Ordinance Section 6 provides as  follows:

"6. FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OF CHAIRMAN AND MEMBER,  -  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (7)  of Section 3 of the repealed Act, the Chairman or any  other member of the Tribunal shall not be ineligible  for further employment under the State Government or  under any local authority or under any corporation  owned or controlled by the State Government."     

                What remains to be considered is the plea of legitimate  expectation. The principle of ’legitimate expectation’ is still at a  stage of evolution as pointed out in De Smith Administrative Law (5th  Edn. Para 8.038). The principle is at the root of the rule of law and  requires regularity, predictability and certainty in governments’  dealings with the public. Adverting to the basis of legitimate  expectation its procedural and substantive aspects, Lord Steyn in  Pierson v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1997 (3) All ER  577, at p.606)(HL) goes back to Dicey’s description of the rule of law  in his "Introduction to the study of the Law of the Constitution" (10th  Edn. 1968 p.203) as containing principles of enduring value in the work  of a great jurist. Dicey said that the constitutional rights have roots  in the common law. He said:

       "The ’rule of law’, lastly, may be used as a  formula for expressing the fact that with us, the law  of constitution, the rules which in foreign countries  naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not  the source but the consequence of the rights of  individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts;  that, in short, the principles of private law have  with us been by the action of the courts and  Parliament so extended as to determine the position of  the Crown and its servants; thus the constitution is  the result of the ordinary law of the land".  

This, says Lord Steyn, is the pivot of Dicey’s discussion of rights to  personal freedom and to freedom of association and of public meeting and  that it is clear that Dicey regards the rule of law as having both  procedural and substantive effects. "The rule of law enforces minimum  standards of fairness, both substantive and procedural". On the facts  in Pierson, the majority held that the Secretary of State could not have  maintained a higher tariff of sentence that recommended by the judiciary  when admittedly no aggravating circumstances existed. The State could  not also increase the tariff with retrospective effect.

       The basic principles in this branch relating to ’legitimate  expectation’ were enunciated by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service  Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985 AC 374 (408-409)

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(Commonly known as CCSU case). It was observed in that case that for a  legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative  authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or  advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the  decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be  permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him  some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an  opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the  decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first  an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not  be withdrawn. The procedural part of it relates to a representation that  a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the  decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a  representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be  granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit that it  will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could  be enforced.  In the above case, Lord Fraser accepted that the civil  servants had a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted  before their trade union membership was withdrawn because prior  consultation in the past was the standard practice whenever conditions  of service were significantly altered.  Lord Diplock went a little  further, when he said that they had a legitimate expectation that they  would continue to enjoy the benefits of the trade union membership, the  interest in regard to which was protectable.  An expectation could be  based on an express promise or representation or by established past  action or settled conduct. The representation must be clear and  unambiguous.  It could be a representation to the individual or  generally to class of persons.   

Even so, it has been held under English law that the decision  maker’s freedom to change the policy in public interest, cannot be  fettered by the application of the principle of substantive legitimate  expectation.  Observations in earlier cases project a more inflexible  rule than is in vogue presently.  In R. v. IRC, ex p Preston (1985 AC  835) the House of Lords rejected the plea that the altered policy  relating to parole for certain categories of prisoners required prior  consultation with the prisoner, Lord Scarman observed:

       "But what was their legitimate expectation.  Given the substance and purpose of the legislative  provisions governing parole, the most that a convicted  prisoner can legitimately expect is that his case be  examined individually in the light of whatever policy  the Secretary of State sees fit to adopt provided  always that the adopted policy is a lawful exercise of  the discretion conferred upon him by the statute.  Any  other view would entail the conclusion that the  unfettered discretion conferred by statute upon the  minister can in some cases by restricted so as to  hamper or even to prevent changes of policy."

To a like effect are the observations of Lord Diplock in Hughes  vs. Department of Health and Social Security (HL) 1985 AC 776 (788):

"Administrative policies may change with changing  circumstances, including changes in the political  complexion of governments.  The liberty to make such  changes is something that is inherent in our  constitutional form of government."

Before we do so, we shall refer to some of the important decisions

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of this Court to find out the extent to which the principle of  substantive legitimate expectation is accepted in our country.  In  Navjyoti Co-op. Group Housing Society vs. Union of India (1992 (4) SCC  477), the principle of procedural fairness was applied. In that case the  seniority as per the existence list of co-operative housing societies  for allotment of land was altered by subsequent decision. The previous  policy was that the seniority amongst housing societies in regard to  allotment of land was to be based on the date of registration of the  society with the Registrar. But on 20.1.1990, the policy was changed by  reckoning seniority as based upon the date of approval of the final list  by the Registrar. This altered the existing seniority of the societies  for allotment of land. This Court held that the societies were entitled  to a ’legitimate expectation’ that the past consistent practice in the  matter of allotment will be followed even if there was no right in  private law for such allotment.  The authority was not entitled to  defeat the legitimate expectation of the societies as per the previous  seniority list without some overriding reason of public policy as to  justify change in the criterion.  No such overriding public interest was  shown. According to the principle of ’legitimate expectation’, if the  authority proposed to defeat a person’s legitimate expectation, it  should afford him an opportunity to make a representation in the matter.   Reference was made to Halsbury’s Laws of England (p.151, Vol.1 (1) (4th  Ed. re-issue) and to the CCSU case. It was held that the doctrine  imposed, in essence, a duty on public authority to act fairly by taking  into consideration all relevant factors, relating to such legitimate  expectation.  Within the contours of fair dealing, the reasonable  opportunity to make representation against change of policy came in.

Lastly we come to the three-judge Bench judgment in National  Building Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan & Others. (1998 (7)  SCC 66). This case has more relevance to the present case, as it was  also a service matter.  The respondents were appointed in CPWD and they  went on deputation to the NBCC in Iraq and they opted to draw, while on  deputation, their grade pay in CPWD plus deputation allowance. Besides  that, the NBCC granted them Foreign Allowance at 125% of the basic pay.   Meanwhile their Basic Pay in CPWD was revised w.e.f. 1.1.1986 on the  recommendation of the 4th Pay Commission.  They contended that the above- said increase of 125% should be given by NBCC on their revised scales.   This was not accepted by NBCC by orders dated 15.10.1990.  The  contention of the respondents based on legitimate expectation was  rejected in view of the peculiar conditions under which NBCC was working  in Iraq.  It was observed that the doctrine of ’legitimate expectation’  had both substantive and procedural aspects.  This Court laid down a  clear principle that claims on legitimate expectation required reliance  on representation and resultant detriment in the same way as claims  based on promissory estoppel.  The principle was developed in the  context of ’reasonableness’ and in the context of ’natural justice’.   

       The principles of legitimate expectation have no application to  the facts of the present case.

       Looking at from any angle the appeal is devoid of any merit and  deserves dismissal, which we direct.