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PETITIONER: J.   K. COTTON SPINNING & WEAVINGMILLS Co., Ltd.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BADRI MALI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/05/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR  737            1964 SCR  (3) 724  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1969 SC 306  (18)  F          1972 SC1598  (5,6,16,17)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Definition  of  ’worker’-Malis   whether workers-Malis whether industrial employees-"Employed in  any industry--"Meaning-Principle of incidents relationship-Grant of  ’leave’  on  ground of fair  play  and  social  justics- Validity--Concept of social justice-Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes  Act,  1947  (U.P. 28  of  1947),  s.  2-Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), s. 2 (s).

HEADNOTE: An  industrial  dispute was referred by  the  Government  of Uttar  Pradesh for adjudication to the Adjudicator,  Kanpur. ,Me  Adjudicator held that the Malis were workmen under  the U.p.  Industrial Disputes Act but they were  not  Industrial employees  and  hence were not entitled to claim  dear  food allowance under the Government order dated December 6, 1948. The  claims of the Malis with regard to weekly holidays  and leave with wages were also rejected by the Adjudicator.  725 Two  crow  appeals  were filed -against  the  order  of  the Adjudicator  before  the  Labour  Appellate  Tribunal.   The appeal  of  the  appellant was dismissed.   As  regards  the appeal  of respondents, the Tribunal gave the Malis  benefit of  dear food allowance.  Their claim for leave  with  wages was also allowed on the ground of social justice.   However, their claim for weekly holiday was rejected. The  appellant filed a writ petition in the  Allahabad  High Court but that was dismissed as in fructuous.  The appellant came to this court by special leave. The  contentions raised by the appellant in this court  were that  the Malis were not workers within the meaning of s.  2 of  the  U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, that Malis  were  not industrial employees within the meaning of Government  order dated December 6, 1948, and hence were not entitled to  dear food allowance and that the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the demand of the respondents for leave  on ground of fair-play and social justice. Held that the Malis were workers within the meaning of s. 2,

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of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.  They were employed  by the  appellant,  were paid by it and were, subject,  to  its control  and  supervision and *discharged  the  function  of looking  after  the  properties  of  the  appellant.   Their conditions, of service were also determined by the appellant and the continuance of their service also depended upon  the pleasure  of  the appellant.  The bungalows and  gardens  on which  they  worked were a kind of amenity supplied  by  the appellant to its officers.  Hence, the Malis were engaged in operations  which were incidentally connected with the  main industry  carried on by the employers The case of the  Malis was similar to that of the bus drivers.  The relation of the work  carried  on  by the Malis with the  industry  was  not remote, indirect or far fetched.  The employee who is engaged in any work or operation  which is  incidentally,connected  with the main  industry  of  the employer is a workman, provided the other requirements of s. 2 (s) of the industrial Disputes Act are satisfied. Held  also, that the Malis were industrial employees  within the meaning of the Government order dated December 6,  1948, and  hence were entitled to claim the benefit of  dear  food allowance.  The Tribunal was in error in limiting the  scope of the expression, " Industrial , employees" by reference to the  definition  of  the  word  "worker"  as  given  in  the Factories Act, 726 Held  also, that the Tribunal was justified in granting  the demand of the respondents for leave on grounds of  fair-play and  social justice.  The concept of social justice has  now become  such an integral part of industrial law that  it  is idle  for any party to suggest that industrial  adjudication can or should ignore the claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes.  The concept of social justice  is not  narrow,  one-sided or pedantic and is not  confined  to industrial adjudication alone.  Its sweep is  comprehensive. It  is founded on the basic ideal of socioeconomic  equality and  its  aim  is to assist  the  removal  of  socioeconomic disparities  and inequalities.  In dealing  with  industrial matters,  it  does  not adopt  a  doctrinaire  approach  and refuses  to yield blindly to abstract notions, but adopts  a realistic  and pragmatic approach.  It endeavors to  resolve the competing claims of employers and employees by finding a solution  which  is just and fair to both parties  with  the object  of establishing harmony between capita i labour  and relationship. Shri Bhikari, Kanpur v. Messrs.  Cooper Allen & Co., Kanpur, 1952 L.A.C. 298 ; The Upper India Chini Mills Mazdoor  Union v.  The Upper India Sugar Mills 1953 L.A.C. 870 ;  The  Suti Mill  Mazdoor  Sabha, Kanpur v. Messrs.  The  British  India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur, 1956 L.A.C. 549 ; J.K. Iron& Steel Co. Lid, Kanpur v. The Iron and Steel Masdoor Union, Kanpur, [1953]  2  S.C.R. 1315 ; Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v.  Suti  Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, [1955] 1 S. C.R. 991; Messrs.   Crown Aluminium Works v. Their Workmen, [1958] S.C.R. 651 and  The State of Mysore v. The Workers of Gold Mines, [1959]  S.C.R. 895, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 480 &  481 of 1962. Appeals by special leave from the order dated March 10, 1958 of’  the Allahabad High Court in Writ Nos. 1006 and 1007  of 1955,  and  from  the decision dated July 15,  1955  of  the

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Labour  Appellate Tribunal of India, Lucknow, III  Bench  in Appeal Nos.  III-274 and 300 of 1954. G.   S. Pathak and G. C. Mathur, for the appellants. K.   S.  Hajela and C.P. Lai, for respondent No. 2 (In  C.A. No, 480 of 1962).  727 J.P. Goyal, for respondents Nos. 3 to 12 (in C.A. No. 480 of 1962) and the respondents (in C.A. No. 481 of 1962). 1963.  May 9. The judgment of the court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR I.-An Industrial dispute which arose  between the  appellant, J,K.  Cotton Spinning & Weaving  Mills  Co., Ltd,,  and the respondents, its employees, was  referred  by the  Government  of Uttar Pradesh for  adjudication  to  the Adjudicator,  Kanpur,  on November,  30,  1953.This  dispute covered  two  items of claim made by the  respondents.   The first  item  was in regard to the dismissal  of  a  gardener (Mali)  Badri by name.  The respondents urged that the  said dismissal   was   unlawful  and  Badri   was   entitled   to reinstatement  with all the wages during the period  of  his enforced  unemployment.  The second item of dispute  was  in regard  to  the claim made by the 10 Malis employed  by  the appellant  to receive dear food allowance,  weekly  holidays and leave with: wages. Before  the  Adjudicator, the appellant contended  that  the Malis  were  not  workmen within the  meaning  of  the  U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 28 of 1947), and so,  the reference  was invalid.  It was also urged by the  appellant that  the  claim  made  by the  respondents  for  dear  food allowance  could  not be sustained, because  G.O.  No.  3754 (LL)/XVIII-894  (L)- 1948 issued by the U. P. Government  on December 6, 1948, was inapplicable to the Malis inasmuch  as the  said  Government  order  applied  only  to   industrial employees and the Malis are not industrial employees  within the meaning of the said order.  The other claims made by the respondents  for weekly holidays and leave with  wages  were also resisted on the ground that the Malis were not  workmen under 728 the  Act,  and so, they were entitled to, no relief  in  the present proceedings. The  Adjudicator held that the Malis were workmen under  the Act, and so, he rejected the appellant’s contention that the reference  was  bad.   On  the merits,  he  found  that  the dismissal of Badri was without justification, and so, he was entitled  to  reinstatement.   He  also  ordered  that   the appellant  should pay Badri half his wages at Rs. 45/-  p.m. as  compensation from the date of his dismissal to the  date of his reinstatement.  That is how the first item of dispute was  decided  by  the Adjudicator.  On the  second  item  of dispute..  the  Adjudicator found that the  Malis  were  not industrial  employees,  and so, they were  not  entitled  to claim  dear  food allowance under  the  relevant  Government order.   The other claims made by the Malis With  regard  to weekly holidays and leave with wages were likewise  rejected by  the  Adjudicator.  In other words, the  second  item  of dispute was decided against the respondents.  This award was pronounced on May, 31 1954. The  decision  of the Adjudicator gave rise to  two  appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.  The appellant by  its appeal  No.  300 of 1954 disputed, the  correctness  of  the Adjudicator’s  conclusion that Badri was a workman and  that his   dismissal  was  unjustified.   The  Labour   Appellate Tribunal  has rejected this contention and  the  appellant’s appeal  was dismissed.  The respondents by their appeal  No. 274/1954  contended  that the Adjudicator was  in  error  in

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holding that the Malis were not industrial employees and  as such, were not entitled to dear food allowance.  The  Labour Appellate  Tribunal has upheld this plea and has  given  the Malis the benefit of the provision contained in the relevant Government  order  in respect of dear food  allowance.   The claim of the respondents for a weekly holiday was,  however, rejected by the Labour Appellate  729 Tribunal,  while  their  claim  for  leave  with  wages  was allowed,  and  a  direction was issued  that  the  Malis  in question  should be given leave in the manner prescribed  by section  79  of  the Factories Act (No. 63  of  1948).   The Labour Appellate Tribunal held that though the said Act was, in  terms,  not applicable to the Malis,  the  principle  on which the statutory provision for leave prescribed by s.  79 was  based  was a principle of social justice, and  so,  the Malis  were  entitled  to  have  a  similar  benefit.    The respondents had also claimed that Badri should be given  the full  wages  for  the period of  his  enforced  unemployment instead of Rs. 45/-p.m. as allowed by the Adjudicator.  This plea has also been upheld by the Labour Appellate  Tribunal. In   the  result,  the  respondents   appeal   substantially succeeded.   The decision, of the Labour Appellate  Tribunal was pronounced on 15.7.1955. This  decision  was challenged by the appellant  before  the Allahabad  High  Court  by preferring a  writ  petition  No. 1006/1955.   It  was  urged by  the    appellant  that,  the decision  of  the  Labour Appellate  Tribunal  was  patently erroneous  and illegal, and so,, it should be quashed  under Art. 226 of the Constitution.  Whilst the writ petition  was pending  in  the said High Court, the Bench  of  the  Labour Appellate Tribunal that sat at Lucknow ceased to exist,  and so, the High Court took the view that it had no jurisdiction to  entertain a writ petition in respect of the decision  of the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal which  was  not  functioning within  the limits of its territorial juridiction.  That  is why  the said writ petition was dismissed as  having  become in  fructuous.   This decision was pronounced on  March  10, 1958. The  two  present  appeals Nos. 480  &  481/1962  have  been brought to this Court by the appellant by special leave  and they  are directed, against the decision of the  High  Court dismissing the appellant’s 730 writ  petition  and  against  the  decision  of  the  Labour Appellate  Tribunal respectively.  Mr. Pathak  who  appeared before  us for the appellant stated that he did not  propose to  argue  Civil Appeal No. 480/1962, because  this  Court’s decision  in Civil Appeal No. 481/1962 would  determine  the dispute between the parties.  Civil Appeal No. 480/1962  has in that dense become unnecessary, because the merits of  the main  dispute are raised by the appellant in its appeal  No. 481/1962  which  is  directed against the  decision  of  the Labour  Appellate Tribunal.  We would, therefore, deal  with Civil Appeal No. 481/1962 only. In this appeal, Mr. Pathak has not disputed the  correctness or  propriety  of  the  decision  of  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal  in regard to the claim made by the respondents  in respect of Badri’s dismissal.  So, that part of the  dispute need  not  detain us in the present appeal.   The  principal contention which has been seriously pressed before us by Mr. Pathak is that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in holding  that the Malis are workmen under section 2  of  the Act.   Section  2 of the Act, as it stood  at  the  relevant time, provided, inter alia , that in this Act the expression

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"workman"  shall have the meaning assigned to it in s. 2  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that takes us to s. 2 (s)  of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14  of  1947) which defines a workman.  Section 2 (s), inter alia,  provi- des  that  a  "Workman"  means  any  person  (including   an apprentice)  employed in any industry to do any  skilled  or unskilled  manual, supervisory, technical or  clerical  work for  hire  or reward., whether the terms  of  employment  be expressed or implied; and so, the question is whether the 10 Malis whose claims have given rise to the present  reference can be said to be workmen under s. 2 (s). For  deciding  this point, it is necessary to refer  to  the relevant facts, as they have been found by the  731 Tribunals  below.  The 10 Mails have been appointed  by  the appellant  for  the maintenance of gardens attached  to  the bungalows  of  some of the officers of the Mills  which  are situated  in  the compoun, of the Mills,  while  others  are employed  for  looking after the gardens attached  to  Kamla Niwas  which  is  a residential  building  allotted  to  the Governing  Director of the Mills and which is also  situated within the compound of the Mills.  Some of these Malis  have also  to  work in the gardens attached  to  the  residential building  of  the  Director-in-charge  of  the  Mills.   The gardens  which are looked after by these Malis are  not  the gardens  attached to the Mills as such.  It appears that  in the large and expensive colony of the Mills, the factory  of the  Mills is inside a compound.  Outside this  compound  of the  factory,  but  within  the colony  of  the  Mills,  are situated the bungalows occupied by the officers of the Mills and  the  Director.   It is the gardens  attached  to  these bungalows that arc looked after by the 10 Malis. It  is  also  clear  that the Malis  are  appointed  by  the appellant.     The  total  monthly wages of these  10  Malis come to  about  Rs. 450/-.  The appellant collects  a  small amount from. the officers as a contribution to the  salaries of  these Malis and the bulk of it approximating to  78%  is paid  by  the  appellant.  The  contributions  made  by  the officers  are credited to the revenue of the  appellant  and from  the funds of the appellant, the Malis are  paid  their wages and they are debited in the accounts of the appellant. The names of the Malis are borne on a register maintained by the clerk of the appellant who supervises their work.   This clerk  notes  their  attendance  from  day  to  day.   Their appointment  is  made  by  the  appellant,  their  work   is supervised  and  controlled by the appellant  and  they  are liable  to be dismissed by the appellant.  The officers  who are  allotted the bungalows have no control over  the  Malis and  can exercise no jurisdiction over them.  It is  in  the light 732 of  these  facts that the question raised by Mr.  Pathak  in regard to the status of the Malis has to be determined. Mr.  Pathak  contends  that the crucial words  used  in  the definition  prescribed  by s. 2 (s) are ",,employed  in  any industry".  He argues that before any person can claim to be a workman under s. 2 (s), it must be shown that he has  been employed  in the industry of the employer.  The industry  of the  appellant is spinning and weaving operations and,  says Mr.  Pathak, the Malis have obviously nothing to  do  either with  the spinning or weaving operations of  the  appellant; since  they  are  not  employed  in  the  industry  of   the appellant,  the  fact that they have been  employed  by  the appellant would not make them Workmen within the meaning  of the  Act.   Thus presented, the argument is no  doubt  prima

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facie attractive; but as soon as we begin to examine it more carefully,  it breaks down.  If the construction  for  which ’Mr.  Pathak contends is accepted without any  modification, clerks employed in the factory would not be workmen, because on  the test suggested by Mr. Pathak, they are not  employed in  the  spinning  or weaving operation carried  on  by  the appellant and yet, there is no doubt that clerks employed by the  appellant  to do clerical work are workmen under  s.  2 (s), and so. the literal construction of the clause employed in  any industry" cannot be accepted and that means  that  " employed  in  any industry" must take in employees  who  are employed  in  connection with operations incidental  to  the main  industry, and once we are compelled to introduce  this concept of incidental Connection with the     main industry, the  literal construction for which the  appellant  contends has to be rejected. It is, of course, not very easy to decide what is the  field of  employment  included  by  the  principle  of  incidental relationship, and what would be the limitations of the  said principle?  If sweepers arc  733 employed  by  the  appellant to clean the  premises  of  the Mills,  that  clearly would be work incidental to  the  main industry itself, because though the work of the sweepers has no  direct relation either with the spinning or weaving,  it is so manifestly necessary for the efficient functioning  of the  industry itself that it would be irrational to  exclude sweepers  from the purview of s. 2 (s).  If buses are  owned by  the  industry for transporting the  workmen,  would  the drivers  of  such  buses be workmen or  not?   It  would  be noticed  that  the  incidental connection  in’  the  present illustration  is one degree removed from the main  industry; the  workmen  who work in the industry are  intended  to  be brought  to the factory by the buses and it is  these  buses that  the  drivers run.  Even so, it would not  be  easy  to exclude  drivers of buses engaged by the factory solely  for the purpose of transporting its employees to the Mills  from their respective homes and back, on the basis that they  are not workmen under s. 2 (s).  Mr. Pathak was unable to resist the  extension  of  the  definition  to  such  cases;   but, nevertheless, he attempted to argue that though sweepers who sweep  the  premises of the factory may be  called  workmen, sweepers  who sweep the area around the factory may  not  be included  under  s. 2 (s).  Sweeping the  area  outside  the factory,  it is argued, may be incidentally  connected  with the main industry, but the incidental connection is indirect and remote, and so, this class of employees must be excluded from  the  definition.  We are not prepared to  accept  this argument.  In our opinion, an employee who is engaged in any work  or operation which is incidentally connected with  the main  industry of the employer would be a workman,  provided the other requirements of s. 2 (s) are satisfied. In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise that in  the  modern  world  industrial  operations  have  become complex and complicated and for the efficient and successful functioning of 734 any industry, several incidental operations are called    in aid  and  it is the totality of all  these  operations  that ultimately constitutes the industry as a whole.  Wherever it is  shown  that  the industry has employed  an  employee  to assist  one  or the other operation incidental to  the  main industrial operation, it would be unreasonable to deny  such an  employee the status of a workman on the ground that  his work  is  not  directly  concerned with  the  main  work  or

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operation of the industry.  Reverting to the illustration of the  buses  owned by the factory for the purpose  of  trans- porting its workmen, if the bus drivers can legitimately  be held  to assist an operation incidental to the main work  of the  industry,  we do not see why a Mali, should  not  claim that he is also engaged in an operation which is  incidental to the main industry. While  we  are dealing with this point, it is  necessary  to bear  in mind that the bungalows are owned by the  appellant and  they  are allotted to the officers as required  by  the terms and conditions of the officers’ employment.  Since the bungalows  are allotted to the officers, it is the  duty  of the  appellant to look after the bungalows and take tare  of the  gardens attached to them.  If the terms and  conditions of  service  require  that  the  officers  should  be  given bungalows and gardens are attached to such bungalows, it  is difficult  to see why in the case of Malis who are  employed by  the appellant, are paid by it, and who work  subject  to its  control and supervision and discharge the  function  of looking  after the appellant’s property, it should  be  said that the work done by them has no relation with the industry carried  on  by  the appellant.  The employment  is  by  the appellant, the ’conditions of service. are determined by the appellant,  the payment is substantially by  the  appellant, the continuance of service depends upon the pleasure of  the appellant, subject, of course, to the Standing  735 Orders  prescribed in that behalf, and the work assigned  to the Malis is the work of looking after the properties  which have  been allotted to the officers of the appellant.   Like the   transport  amenity  provided  by  a  factory  to   its employees, bungalows and gardens are also a kind of  amenity supplied by the employer to his    officers and the  drivers who look after the buses and    the    Malis    who     look after the gardens   must,  therefore, be held to be  engaged in operations which are incidentally connected with the main industry  carried  on by the employer.  It is true  that  in matters  of this kind it is not easy to draw a line, and  it may  also be conceded that in dealing with the  question  of incidental relationship with      the   main      industrial operation, a limit has to be prescribed so   as  to  exclude operations or activities whose relation with    the     main industrial activity may be remote, indirect and far-fetched. We  arc not prepared to hold that the relation of  the  work carried  on  by  the  Malis  in  the  present  case  can  be characterised  as remote, indirect or far-fetched.   That-is why we think that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was right in coming  to the conclusion that Malis are workmen  under  the Act. Before  we part with this point, we would like to  add  that industrial  adjudication appears consistently to have  taken the  view that Malis looking after the gardens  attached  to the bungalows occupied by officers of any industrial concern are workmen under s. 2 (s).  Our attention has been drawn to two decisions of the Labour Appellate Tribunal dealing  with this  question.  In Shri Bhikari, Kanpur v. Messrs.   Cooper Allen & Co., Kanpur, (1) the Labour Appellate Tribunal while dealing  with  the  case of Bhikari who  was  engaged  as  a gardener  by  the  Company and was on the  pay-roll  of  the Company  observed that the Tribunal failed to see why he  is not  to be regarded as a workman within the meaning of s.  2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act which (1)  [1952] L. A. C. 298. 736 definition has been adopted by the U.P. Industrial  Disputes

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Act  under  which the case was started.  The same  view  was taken  by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case  of  The Upper  India  Chini Mazdoor Union v. The Upper  India  Sugar Mills  (1).   Dealing, with the case of Rati  Rama  Who  was engaged  as  a Mali, the Tribunal  rejected  the  employer’s contention  that  the said Mali was a domestic  servant  and observed that merely because the Company chooses to put Rati Ram  on  the work of a gardener with the  Managing  Director which  the A Company is admittedly required to  provide  for and  pay  for,  it does not follow that Rati  Ram  became  a domestic   servant.   It  is  remarkable  that  both   these decisions  which are directly in point, were under s.  2  of the  Act  with  which we are  concerned.   In  dealing  with industrial  dispute we are reluctant to interfere  with  the well   established  and  consistent  course   of   decisions pronounced by the Labour Appellate Court unless, of  course, it is shown that the said decisions are plainly erroneous. The  next question which calls for our decision  is  whether the Malis are industrial employees within the meaning of the relevant  G.  O.  The said G. O. opens  with  two  operative paragraphs which are followed by the table of minimum  basic wages  prescribed by it and other paragraphs.   These  first two paragraphs read thus :               "(1)  This order shall he deemed to have  come               into force with effect from December, 1,  1948               and  shall, in respect of the matters  covered               by  it,  bind  all  the  industries   affected               thereby and the workmen employed therein.               (2)   The   minimum  basic  wage  payable   to               employees  (industrial  or  clerical)  in  the               various industries and undertakings  specified               in  column 1 of, Table I hereunder  shall,  so               long as this               (1)   1953 L. C. 870.                737.               order remains in force, be the amounts  menti-               oned against them in column 2 or 3 thereof, as               the case may be," Paragraph 3 prescribes the dear food allowance, and it is in respect  of  this  claim made by the  respondents  that  the appellant has raised the contention that this paragraph does not  apply, because the Malis are not industrial  employees. It  will  be  noticed  that the  first  Paragraph  makes  it perfectly  clear  that the order binds  all  the  industries affected by it and the workmen employed therein ; so that as soon as it is held that the Malis are workmen under s. 2  of the  Act, it would follow that the order would apply to  the Malis.  In considering the present point. it is necessary to bear in mind that this order has been issued in exercise  of the powers conferred by clauses (b) and (g) of section 3  of the Act, and that clearly means that persons who are workmen under  s.  2 of the Act are referred to by paragraph  I  and there would be no escape from the conclusion that the  order would apply to such workmen and the Industries that employed them. It is, however, urged that in paragraph 2 the minimum  basic wage is specified as being payable to employees, industrial, or clerical, in the various industries and the suggestion is that  it  is  only employees who are  either  industrial  or clerical  to whom the order applies.   Industrial  employees are  not  defined;  but it is assumed by  the  appellant  in urging this argument that the class of industrial  employees would be narrower than the class of workmen covered by s.  2 of  the  Act.   In  our opinion,  this  argument  is  wholly fallacious.  It is clear that the second paragraph refers to

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industrial   or  clerical  employees,  because   the   table prescribing  the minimum basic wages divides  the  employees into  two categories, industrial and clerical.  It  is  only because his division is made by the table that for the 738 purpose of clarification, paragraph 2 mentions industrial or clerical  in  bracket  after  referring  to  the  employees. Besides  it  would be unreasonable to assume that  when  the order  prescribed  minimum basic wages for workmen  to  whom paragraph  I expressly refers, it could have  been  intended that the said minimum basic wages should not be extended  to some  workmen falling under paragraph I because they do  not fall under the category of industrial employees or  clerical employees.  The scheme of the order is plain and unambiguous ;  to  all workmen failing under s. 2 the  benefits  of  the order are intended to be extended.  That is the view  -taken by  the Labour Appellate Tribunal and, in our opinion,  that view is obviously right.  If that be so, the validity of the order  passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal awarding  the respondents’ claim for dear food allowance under paragraph 3 of the G.O. cannot be questioned. It  is  true that in The Suti Mill Mazdoor Sabha  Kanpur  v. Messrs.   The British Indian Corporation Ltd.   Kanpur  (1), the Labour Appellate Tribunal appears to have taken the view that  the expression "’industrial employees" is  limited  to the  class  of  employees  who  are  employed  directly   or indirectly for the purpose of manufacturing process  carried on   by  the  factory.  In coming to  this  conclusion,  the Labour   Appellate  Tribunal  noticed  the  fact  that   the expression "’industrial employees" had not been defined, but it  was disposed to drive assistance from the definition  of the  word "worker" in the Factories Act in  determining  the scope  of the expression "industrial employees".  No  doubt, it was urged before the Tribunal that expression "industrial employees"  should be understood in the  same  comprehensive sense  as the word "industry" as defined in  the  industrial Disputes  Act,  but  this contention  was  rejected  by  the Tribunal.  It seems to us that the Tribunal was in error  in limiting the, scope of (1) 1956 L.A.C. 549  739 the expression.  "’industrial employees" by reference to the definition of the word "worker" prescribed by the  Factories Act.  Indeed, it would be relevant and appropriate     to refer to the definition of the word workman" under s. 2  (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, because the G.O. in question has been issued under the Act and the definition of a "work- man"  prescribed  by  s. 2 of the Act as s.  2  (s)  of  the Industrial Disputes Act would determine the true  denotation of   the  expression  "industrials  employees".    We   must accordingly  hold that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was  in error  in  accepting  the very narrow  construction  of  the expression  "industrial  employees" used in  the  Government order. The next point which has been urged before us by Mr.  Pathak is  in  regard  to  the decision  of  the  Labour  Appellate Tribunal awarding the benefit of leave to the respondents on the  same lines as s. 79 of the Factories Act.   Mr.  Pathak attempted  to argue that the claim for leave had  been  made specifically on the basis of provisions of the Factories Act and the U.P. shops and Commercial Establishments Act, and he suggested  that as soon as it was found that these two  Acts were  inapplicable to the Malis the said claim  should  have been rejected.  The Labour Appellate Tribunal has,  however, held that though the said two Acts do not apply, a claim for

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leave can be justified on the ground of social justice.  Mr. Pathak  objects  to this decision on the  technical  ground. that  the  claim itself was based on the provisions  of  the said  two Acts and no other.  This contention is  not  well- founded.  It does appear that in paragraph 10 of the written statement  filed on behalf of the respondents  reference  is made to the said two Acts but in the prayer clause the claim is made in general terms without reference to the Acts,  and the  reference  itself  is in general  terms  and  makes  no mention  of  the said two Acts.   Therefore,  the  technical ground urged by Mr. Pathak that the, 640 relevant  claim  was  made  on the  provisions  of  the  two specified  Acts and should be rejected solely on the  ground that  the said Acts do not apply, cannot be  sustained.   It was  a  general reference which the Adjudicator  was  called upon  to decide and the fact that the said two Acts did  not apply, cannot be said to rule out the said claim as to leave in limine. Then  Mr.  Pathak was driven to contend that the  ground  of social  justice  given by the Labour Appellate  Tribunal  in support  of  its award is really not sound in  law,  and  he referred  us to the observations made by this Court on  some occasions  that the-considerations of social  justice  ’were "not  only irrelevant but untenable" vide J.K. Iron &  Steel Co.,  Ltd.   Kanpur  v. The Iron and  Steel  Mazdoor  Union, Kanpur  (1), and Muir Mills Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mills  Mazdoor Union,  Kanpur. (2), In our opinion, the argument  that  the considerations   of  -social  justice  are  irrelevant   and untenable  in  dealing with industrial disputes, has  to  be rejected   without  any  hesitation.   The  development   of industrial law during the last decade and several  decisions of  this  Court  in dealing  with  industrial  matters  have emphasised  the relevance, validity and significance of  the doctrine  of  social justice, vide Messrs.   Crown  Aluminum Works  v. Their Workmen, (s) and The State of Mysore v.  The Workers  of  Gold  Mines (4) Indeed the  concept  of  social justice  has now become such an integral part of  industrial law  that  it would be idle for any party  to  suggest  that industrial  adjudication can or should ignore the claims  of social  justice  in dealing with industrial  disputes.   The concept  of  social  justice is not  narrow,  one-sided,  or pedantic,  and  is not confined to  industrial  adjudication alone.   Its sweep is comprehensive.  It is founded  on  the basic  ideal  of socioeconomic equality and its aim  is  to- assist   the  removal  of  socioeconomic   disparities   and inequalities  ;  nevertheless, in  dealing  with  industrial matters, it does not adopt a doctrinaire (1)[1955] 2 S.C.R. 1315. (2)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 991. (3)[1958]S.C.R. 651. (4) [1959] S.C.R. 895  741 approach  and refuses to yield blindly to abstract  notions, but   adopts  a  realistic  and  pragmatic  approach.    It, therefore,  endeavours  to resolve the competing  claims  of employers and employees by finding a solution which is  just and  fair  to both parties with the object  of  establishing harmony  between capital and Labour, and good  relationship. The  ultimate object of industrial adjudication is  to  help the  growth and progress of national economy and it is  with that  ultimate object in view, that industrial disputes  are settled  by industrial adjudication on principles  of  fair- play  and  justice.   That  is the  reason  why  on  several occasions,  industrial  adjudication has thought it  fit  to

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make  reasonable  provision  for leave  in  respect  of  the workmen, who may not strictly fall within the purview of the Factories  Act  or the Shops and  Commercial  Establishments Act.   We  are,  therefore,  satisfied  that  there  is   no substance  in  the  grievance made by Mr.  Pathak  that  the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the demand of  the  respondents for leave on grounds of  fair-play  and social justice. The  result  is,  Civil Appeal No.  481/1962  fails  and  is dismissed with costs.  Civil Appeal No. 480 of 1962 has  not been  pressed and is, therefore, dismissed.  There would  be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed. 742