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PETITIONER: INDU BHUSAN BOSE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RAMA SUNDARI DEVI & ANR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/1969

BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA BENCH: BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  228            1970 SCR  (1) 443  1969 SCC  (2) 289  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC 787  (6)  R          1976 SC1031  (5)  RF         1980 SC1201  (2,4)  R          1988 SC1708  (21)  R          1989 SC 406  (11)  F          1991 SC 855  (46)

ACT: Constitution  of  India, 7th Schedule, Entry 3,  List  I  If grants  exclusive power to Parliament to legislate  covering all  aspects  of house accommodation  in  contonment  areas, including on relationships of landlord and tenant.

HEADNOTE: The first respondent, who was the owner of certain  premises situated  within the cantonment area of Barrackpore filed  a suit for the appellant’s eviction from the premises.  In the plaint it was claimed that the appellant was not entitled to the protection of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 12 of 1956,  the  regulation  of  house  accommodation   including control of rents being a subject in Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, the State  Legislature could  not competently enact a law on the same  subject  for Cantonment  areas  and  the  extension of  the  Act  to  the cantonment  area was ultra vires and void.  Upon  the  Trial Court  making  a reference under s. 113 C.P.C. to  the  High Court  for a decision of the constitutional  question,  that court upheld the first respondents contention. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the High Court was  in  error  in holding that  the  field  of  legislation covered  by  the  Act, which  is  primarily  concerned  with control of rents and eviction of tenants, is included in the expression "regulation of house accommodation in  cantonment areas"  used  in  Entry  3  List  I,  regulation  of   house accommodation  will not include within it laws or  rules  on the  subject  of  relationship of  landlord  and  tenant  of buildings  situated in the cantonment areas.  On  the  other hand according to the appellant, legislation on this subject

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can be made either under entry 18 of List 11, or entries  6, 7  and  13  of  List III, so that  a  State  Legislature  is competent  to  legislate and regulate  relationship  between landlord  and  tenant in the cantonment  areas;  that  under Entry  3  List  I Parliament is empowered  to  legislate  in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment  areas only  to the extent that house accommodation is  needed  for military  purposes and laws are required for  requisitioning or otherwise obtaining possession of that accommodation  for such  purposes.   The alternative submission made  was  that regulation  of  house  accommodation  by  parliamentary  law should  be  confined to houses  acquired,  requisitioned  or allotted for military purposes.  Entry 3, List I,  according to  the appellant, should not be read as  giving  Parliament the  power to legislate on the relationship of landlord  and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas  if such houses are let out privately by a private owner to  his tenant  and have nothing at all to do with the  requirements of the military. HELD : Dismissing the appeal, When power is granted to Parliament under Entry 3 List I  to make  laws  for  the regulation of  house  accommodation  in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to  indicate that the house accommodation, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation 444 required  for  military purposes, or must  be  accommodation that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military.  [447B] When  legislating  in respect of  local  self-government  in cantonment areas, it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire cantonment area including  portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military officers. Similarly,  the powers of the cantonment authorities,  which could  be  granted by legislation by Parliament,  cannot  be confined  to  those areas or buildings which are  in  actual possession  of military authorities or officers and must  be in  respect  of the entire cantonment area  including  those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as  occupation of civilians.  In these circumstances,  there is  no  reason to narrow down the scope  of  legislation  on regulation  of house accommodation and confine it to  houses which are required or are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers. [447F-H] The  word "regulation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted  as to be confined to allotment only and not to other incidents, such  as termination of existing tenancies and  eviction  of persons  in Possession of the house accommodation.  Entry  3 List I gives power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house  accommodation in cantonment areas. [448 D] Prout  v.  Hunter, [1924] 2 K.B. 736, Property  Holding  Co. Ltd. v. Clark, [1948]  1 K.B. 630 and Curl v.  Angelo & Anr. [1948]  2  All E.R. 189, referred to. In the Constitution, the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect  to the  matters  contained in that Entry,  notwithstanding  the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry  in List  11  or  List 111.  Article  246  of  the  Constitution confers  exclusive  power on Parliament to  make  laws  with respect  to  and  of  the  matters  enumerated  in  List  1, notwithstanding  the concurrent power of Parliament and  the State  Legislature,  or  the exclusive power  of  the  State

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Legislature  in Lists III and 11 respectively.  The  general power  of  legislating in respect  of  relationship  between landlord  and  tenant  exercisable by  a  State  Legislature either under Entry 18 of List 11 or Entries 6 and 7 of  List 111  is  subject to the overriding power  of  Parliament  in respect of matters in List 1, so that the effect of Entry  3 of  List I is that, on the subject of  relationship  between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislatures. [454E-G] A.C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chada, I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 434, F.E. Darukhanawalla  v.  Khemchand Lalchand, I.L.R.  [1954]  Bom. 544,  Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, I.L.R. [1956] Nag. 618  and Babu  Jagtanand v. Sri Satyanarayanji and Lakshmiji  through the  Sheba  it and Manager Jamuna Das, I.L.R. 40  Pit.  625, disapproved. Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal, I.L.R. 11 Raj. 421, approved.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 882 of 1968. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated July  1, 1966 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil  Reference No. 20 of 1963. 445 D.   N. Mukherjee and Sunil Kumar Ghosh, for the appellant. A.   K. Sen, Sukumar Ghose and Krishna Sen, for respondent No. 1. B.   Sen, Sukumar Basu and P. K. Chakravarti, for respondent No. 2. Niren  De,  Attorney-General, V. A. Seyid  Muhammad,  R.  H. Dhebar and S. P. Nayar, for the Union of India. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. Rama Sundari Debi, the first respondent in this appeal by special leave, instituted a suit for the ejectment of  Indu Bhusan Bose appellant who was a tenant in  premises No. 18, Riverside Road, owned by respondent No. 1,  situated within the cantonment area of Barrackpore.  The agreed  rent was Rs. 250/per mensem but there was a dispute as to whether the  owner or the tenant was liable to pay rates and  taxes. On  an  application  presented by the  appellant,  the  Rent Controller  fixed fair rent under s. 10 of the  West  Bengal Premises  Tenancy Act No. XII of 1956 (hereinafter  referred to  as  "the  Act") at Rs. 170/per month  inclusive  of  all cantonment taxes, and, in appeal, the amount was enhanced to Rs.  188/-  per  month inclusive of  all  cantonment  taxes. Respondent No. 1, in December, 1960, served a notice on  the appellant to quit and, on failing to get vacant  possession, filed  a  suit in the Court of the Munsif.  In  the  plaint, respondent   No.  1  claimed  that,  regulation   of   house accommodation including control of rents being a subject  in entry  No.  3  of  List I of the  Seventh  Schedule  to  the Constitution,  the State Legislature could  not  competently enact  a law on the same subject for cantonment  are-as,  so that the appellant was pot entitled to protection under  the Act  which  had  been extended to that  area  by  the  State Government.   It was urged that the extension of that  State Act  to the cantonment area was ultra vires and  void.   The Munsif, thereupon, made a reference under s. 113 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  to  the High  Court  of  Calcutta  for decision of this constitutional question raised in the  suit before him.  The High Court decided the reference by  making a  declaration  that  the notification,  whereby  the  State Government  had  extended the provisions of the Act  to  the

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Barrackpore cantonment area, was ultra vires and void.  This is  the decision of the High Court that has been  challenged in this appeal. It  has been contended on behalf of the appellant  that  the High  Court  is  not correct in holding that  the  field  of legislation covered by the Act, which is primarily concerned with  control of rents and eviction of tenants, is  included within the expression 446               "regulation   of   house   accommodation    in               cantonment areas" used               in  entry  No. 3 of List I. That entry  is  as               follows :-               "3.  Delimitation of cantonment  areas,  local               self    government   in   such   areas,    the               constitution  and powers within such areas  of               cantonment  authorities and the regulation  of               house accommodation (including the control  of               rents) in such areas."               The  submission  made is  that  regulation  of               house accommodation will not include within it               laws  or rules on the subject of  relationship               of  landlord and tenant of buildings  situated               in  the cantonment areas.  On the other  hand,               according  to  the appellant,  legislation  on               this  subject can be made either  under  entry               No. 18 of List II, or entries Nos. 6, 7 and 13               of  List 111, so that a State ,Legislature  is               competent    to   legislate    and    regulate               relationship between landlord and tenant  even               in  cantonment areas.  These relevant  entries               are reproduced below               "List II               18.   Land, that is to say, rights in or  over               land, land tenures   including the relation of               landlord and tenant, and the   collection   of               rents; transfer and allenation of agricultural               land; land improvement and agricultural loans;               colonisation."               "List III               6.    Transfer   of   property   other    than               agricultural  land; registration of deeds  and               documents.               7.    Contracts,    including     partnership,               agency,  contracts  of  carriage,  and   other               special forms of contracts, but not including               contracts relating to agricultural land.               13.   Civil  procedure, including all  matters               included in the Code of Civil Procedure at the               commencement of this Constitution,  limitation               and arbitration." On the scope of entry 3 of List 1, the argument advanced  is that  Parliament  is empowered to legislate  in  respect  of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only to the extent that that house accommodation is needed for  military purposes  and  laws  are  required  for  requisitioning   or otherwise  obtaining  possession of that  accommodation  for such purposes.  In the alternative. the submission- made  is that regulation of house accommodation by parliamentary  law should  be  confined to houses acquired,.  requisitioned  or allotted for military purposes.  This -entry 3, according to the  appellant, should not be read as giving Parliament  the power to legislate, on the relationship of landlord                             447 and tenant in respect of houses situated in cantonment areas

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if  such houses are let out privately by a private owner  to his  tenant  and  have  nothing  at  all  to  do  with   the requirements of the military.  We are unable to accept  this submission.   The  language  of the entry  itself  does  not justify  any such interpretation.  In the entry, when  power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation  of house  accommodation  in  cantonment  areas,  there  are  no qualifying  words to indicate that the house  accommodation, which  is to be subject to such legislation, must be  accom- modation   required  for  military  purposes,  or  must   be accommodation that has already been acquired,  requisitioned or  allotted to the military.  In fact, if a legislation  in respect of any cantonment was to be undertaken by Parliament for the first time under this entry, there would be, at  the time of that legislation, no house in the cantonment already acquired,  requisitioned or allotted for military  purposes; and, if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant  were  accepted, the power of Parliament  to  pass laws  cannot be exercised by Parliament at all.  It is  also significant that, in the entry, various items, which can  be the   subject-matter  of  legislation  by  Parliament,   are mentioned separately, and these are :- (i)  Delimitation of cantonment areas; (ii) local self-government in such areas; (iii)     the  constitution and powers within such areas  of cantonment authorities; and (iv) the  regulation of house accommodation  (including  the control of rents) in such areas. In none of these clauses there is any specification that the legislation  is  to be confined to  areas  or  accommodation required for military purposes.  When legislating in respect of local self government in cantonment areas, it is  obvious that  Parliament  will  have to  legislate  for  the  entire cantonment  area  including portions of it which may  be  in possession  of  civilians and not  military  authorities  or military officers.  Similarly, the powers of the  cantonment authorities,  which  could  be  granted  by  legislation  by Parliament;  cannot be confined to those areas or  buildings which  are in actual possession of military  authorities  or officers  and  must be in respect of the  entire  cantonment area  including  those buildings and lands which may  be  in actual  ownership  as well as occupation of  civilians.   In these  circumstances, there is no reason to narrow down  the scope  of legislation on regulation of  house  accommodation and confine it to houses which are required or are  actually in possession of military authorities or military  officers. The power to regulate house accommodation by law must extend to all house accommodation in the cantonment area 448 irrespective of its being owned by, or in the possession of, civilians.  In fact, if a law were to be made for the  first time  under’  this  entry, all the houses  would  be  either vacant  or  occupied  by owners or occupied  by  tenants  of owners  under  private agreements and the  law,  when  first made,  will  have to govern such houses.  The scope  of  the expression "regulation of house accommodation" in this entry cannot,  therefore,  be confined as urged on behalf  of  the appellant. It  is,  in  the alternative, contended that,  even  if  the expression "regulation of house accommodation" in this entry includes  regulation  of houses in  private  occupation,  it should  not  be interpreted as giving Parliament  the  power even  to  legislate  for eviction of tenants  who  may  have occupied  the  houses  under private  arrangement  with  the owners.   It  should  be confined  to  legislation  for  the

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purpose  of  obtaining  possession  and  allotment  of  such accommodation to military authorities or military  officers. We  cannot  accept  that the, word "regulation"  can  be  so narrowly interpreted as to be confined to allotment only and not  to  other incidents, such as  termination  of  existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of the house accommodation.    The   dictionary  meaning  of   the   word "regulation" in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is "the act of regulating"  and the word "regulate... is Given the  meaning "to control, govern or direct by rule or regulation".   This entry,   thus,  gives  the  power  to  Parliament  to   pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling  all house  accommodation  in cantonment  areas.   Clearly,  this power  to  direct  or control will  include  within  it  all aspects  as to who is to make the constructions  under  what conditions  the  constructions  can be altered,  who  is  to occupy the accommodation and for how long, on what terms  it is  to  be occupied, when and under what  circumstances  the occupant  is to cease to occupy it, and the manner in  which the  accommodation is to be utilised.  All these are  ingre- dients  of regulation of house accommodation and we  see  no reason to hold that this word "regulation" has not been used in this wide sense in this entry. It  appears that, in the Government of India Act, 1935,  the corresponding entry No. 2 in List I of the Seventh  Scheiule to that Act was similar to this entry No. 3 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule to the, Constitution, but  the  expression "including centrol of rents" which is now in entry No. 3  of List  I  within  brackets did not exist.   An  argument  was sought   to  be  built  on  it  that  regulation  of   house accommodation  was  not intended to cover control  of  rents when that expression was used in the corresponding entry  in the  Government of India Act, and that this expression  used in the Constitution should also be interpreted to cover  the same  field,  so  that, but for  the  addition  made  within brackets, Parliament                             449 could  not  have legislated for control of  rents  of  house accommodation within cantonment areas.  It is further  urged that, if the expression "regulation of house  accommodation" is  interpreted  as not including within  it  regulation  or control  or rents, it should also be held that it  will  not include  regulation  of eviction of private  tenants.   This argument  is based on the premise that the words  "including control of rents" was introduced in entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for the purpose of  en- larging   the  scope,  of  the  legislative   authority   of Parliament  and  making it wider than that  of  the  Federal Legislature  under  the Government of India  Act.   Such  an assumption is not necessarily justified.  It may be that the words  "including the control of rents" were  introduced  by way of abundant caution or to clarify that the regulation of house  accommodation  is wide enough to include  control  of rents.  The addition may have been made so as to concentrate attention  on  the  fact that  legislation  was  needed  for control  of rents in the situation that existed at the  time when   the  Constitution  was  passed  by  the   Constituent Assembly.   It  has to be remembered  that  cantonments  are intended  to  be  and are, in fact,  military  enclaves  and regulation  of  occupation  of house  accommodation  in  the cantonment areas by parliamentary law is necessary from  the point  of  view  of security of  military  installations  in cantoriments  and requirements of military  authorities  and personnel for accommodation in such areas.  Such a  purpose’ could  only  be  served by ensuring  that  Parliament  could

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legislate  in respect of house accommodation  in  cantonment areas  in all its aspects, including regulation of grant  of leases,   ejectment  of  lessees,  and  ensuring  that   the accommodation is available on proper terms as to rents.   On an  interpretation  of  the contents of  the  entry  itself, therefore, we are led to the conclusion that Parliament  was given  the exclusive power to legislate in respect of  house accommodation   in  cantonment  areas  for  regulating   the accommodation in all its aspects. In  this connection, we may refer to three  decisions  which explain  the  object of legislation on the subject  of  rent control.   In  Prout v. Hunter(1), Scrutton,  L.J.,  dealing with the legislation during the war in England, held:-               "Great  public  feeling  was  aroused  by  the               exorbitant demands for rent that were made and               the ejectments for nonpayment of it, with  the               result   that  Parliament  passed   the   Rent               Restriction Acts with the two-fold object, (1)               of preventing the rent from being raised above               the  prewar  standard, and (2)  of  preventing               tenants from being turned out of their  houses               even if the term for which they had originally               taken them had expired."               (1)   [1924] 2 K.B. 736.               450               In   Property  Holding  Company   Limited   v.               Clark(1), it was held :-               "There are certain fundamental features of all               the  Rent Restriction legislation, or  at  any               rate  of  the legislation from 1920  to  1939.               The  two  most  important  objects  of  policy               expressed in it are (1) to protect the  tenant               from  eviction  from  the house  where  he  is               living,  except  for  defined-reasons  and  on               defined  conditions; (2) to protect  him  from               having  to  pay more than a  fair  rent.   The               latter  object is achieved by  the  provisions               for standard rent with (a) only permitted  in-               creases,  (b) the provisions  about  furniture               and attendant liabilities from the landlord to               the  tenant which would undermine  or  nullify               the standard rent provisions.  The result  has               been  held to be that the Acts operate in  rem               upon the house and confer on the house  itself               the quality of ensuring to the tenant a status               of irremovability.  In this description of the               distinguishing  characteristics  conferred  by               statute  upon the clouse, the most salient  is               the tenant’s security of tenure-his protection               against  eviction; although the scope  of  the               statutory  policy about a fair rent must  also               be borne in mind especially in connexion  with               the   provisions   relating   to    furniture,               attendance, services and board."               In Curl v. Angelo and Another(2), Lord Greene,               M.R., dealing with Rent Restrictions Act, held               :-               "The  courts  have had to  consider  what  the               over-riding purpose and intention of the  Acts               are,  and I cannot put it in a more  clear  or               authoritative  way than by using the words  of               Scrutton,  L.J., in Skinner v. Geary (1931)  2               K.B., 546,560), that the object was to protect               the  person residing in a dwelling-house  from               being turned out of his home."

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All  these  three  cases  clearly  show  that  whenever  any legislation  is  passed relating to control of  rents,  that legislation can be effective and can serve its purpose  only if  it  also regulates eviction of  tenants.   Consequently, when in entry 3 of List I the power is granted to Parliament specifically  to legislate on control of rents,  that  power cannot  be  effectively  exercised unless it  is  held  that Parliament  also  has  the power  to  regulate  eviction  of tenants whose rents are to be controlled.  Such power  must, therefore, be necessarily read in the expression "regulation of house accommodation".  Of course, it has to be remembered that this power (1) [1948] 1 K.B. 630.    (2) [1948] 2 All E.R. 189. 451 reserved  for  Parliament is to be exercised in  respect  of house  accommodation situated in cantonment areas  only  and not other areas the legislative power in respect of which is governed by entries either in List II or in List III. This  view  that  we are taking is also  borne  out  by  the historical  background provided by the legislation  relating to  cantonments  and house accommodation in  cantonments  in India.  Carnduff in his book on "Military and Cantonment Law in  India" has indicated how the need for  legislating  with the   object  of  overcoming  difficulties  experienced   by military  officers  in obtaining suitable  accommodation  in cantonments came under consideration, and has stated :               "In the early days of the British dominion  in               India,  the camps, stations, and posts of  the               field    army   gradually    developed    into               cantonments,   where  troops  were   regularly               garrisoned.   The  areas so occupied  were  at               first  set apart exclusively for the  military               and intended for occupation by them only; but,               by degrees, non-military persons were admitted               land  was  taken possession of  by  them,  and               houses  were built under conditions laid  down               by  the Government from time to  time.   These               conditions  were undoubtedly framed  with  the               main object of rendering accommodation  always               primarily available for the military  officers               whose  duties  necessitated  their   residence               within cantonment limits." (p. clxii). He goes on to relate that a Bill which ultimately became the Contonments  Act,  1889,  originally  contained  a  set   of provisions  on the subject, insisting on the prior claim  of military  officers  to  occupy  houses  in  cantonments  and proposing  that disputes as to the rent to be paid  and  the repairs  to be executed should be referred to,  and  settled by,  committees of arbitration.  That part of the Bill  was, however, omitted as it evoked considerable opposition and  a separate  measure was, consequently, taken up, but not  till after many years of discussion.  The new Bill was introduced in  the Governor-General’s Council in 1898, and  was  passed into law as the Cantonments (House-Accommodation) Act II  of 1902.   The main provision in this Act was that, on the  Act being  applied  to  any  cantonment,  every  house  situated therein  became  liable  to appropriation at  any  time  for occupation  by  a  military  officer.   It  recognised   the paramount  claim of the military authorities to insist  upon houses in cantonments being, where necessary, made primarily available for occupation by the military officers  stationed therein.  In addition, a provision was made in s. 10 that no house  in any cantonment or part of a cantonment was  to  be occupied  for the purposes of a hospital, bank, hotel,  shop or  school,  or  by a railway  administration,  without  the

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previous sanc- 452 tion  of the General Officer of the Command, given with  the concurrence of the Local Government.  This provision,  thus, clearly regulated the letting out of houses in a  cantonment even  for some of the civilian purposes, such  as  hospital, bank, etc.  The reason obviously was that it was  considered inappropriate  that  a  house occupied for  such  a  purpose should be required to be vacated in order to make the  house available  -for  military  officers.   Keeping  the  primary object  of facilitating availability of house  accommodation for military officers in view, even private letting out was, thus,  regulated at that earliest stage.  Subsequently  came the  Cantonments (House-Accommodation) Act VI of 1923  which was  in force when the Government of India Act was  enacted, as  well  as at the time when the  Constitution  came  in-to force.   This  Act also contained similar  provisions  which permitted  military authorities to direct an owner to  lease out  a  house  to the Central  Government,  to  require  the existing  occupier to vacate the house and to  refrain  from letting  out any house for purposes of a  hospital,  school, school  hostel,  bank,  hotel,  or shop,  or  by  a  railway administration.  a  company  or firm  engaged  in  trade  or business  or  a club, without the previous sanction  of  the Officer  Commanding the District given with the  concurrence of  the  Commissioner or, in a Province where there  are  no Commissioners,  of  the  Collector.  This  Act  also,  thus, interfered   with  and  regulated  letting  out   of   house accommodation  by owners for civilian purposes even  though, at  the time of letting, the house was not required for  any military  purpose.   It  was  in  the  background  of   this legislative   history  that  provision  was  made   in   the Government of India Act in entry 2 of List I of the  Seventh Schedule reserving for the Federal Legislature the power  to legislate   so  as  to  regulate  house   accommodation   in cantonment   areas.   and  the  same  power   with   further clarification was reserved for Parliament in entry 3 of List I  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.   Obviously, it could not be intended that Parliament should not be  able to   pass  a  law  containing  provisions  similar  to   the provisions  in these earlier Acts which did  interfere  with private  letting  out of house accommodation  in  cantonment areas by owners for certain purposes. Another aspect that strengthens our view is that if we  were to  accept the interpretation sought to be put on behalf  of the  appellant that the power of Parliament is  confined  to legislation for the purpose of obtaining house accommodation in  cantonment  areas  for military  purposes  and  excludes legislation   in   respect  of   house   accommodation   not immediately   required  for  military  purposes,  all   that Parliament will be able to do will be to make provision  for acquisition  or requisition of house accommodation.  On  the house accommodation being acquired or requisitioned, it will be  available for use by military authorities.  Such  power, obviously, could riot be intended to be conferred by entry 3 in List I when 453 the same power is specifically granted concurrently to  both Parliament and the State Legislatures under entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. On  behalf  of the appellant, reliance was  placed  on  some decisions  of  some  of the High Courts in  support  of  the proposition  that the power of Parliament under entry  3  of List  I  does  not extend  to  regulating  the  relationship between  landlord and tenant which power vests in the  State

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Legislature  under entry 18 of List II.  The first of  these cases is A. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chada(1) where the Bombay High Court was dealing with entry 2 of List I of the Seventh Schedule  to the Government of India Act, 1935 and entry  21 of  List 11 of that Act.  The Court was concerned  with  the applicability  of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act No. 57  of 1947 to cantonment areas.  Opinion was first expressed  that the  Rent Restriction Act had been passed by the  Provincial Legislature  under  Entry  21 of List II  and  reliance  was placed  on the English interpretation Act to hold that  land in  that  entry  would include buildings so  -as  to  confer jurisdiction  on the Provincial Legislature to legislate  in respect  of house accommodation.  Then, in  considering  the effect of Act 57 of 1947, the Court said :-               "As the preamble of the Act sets out, the  Act               was passed with a view to the control of rents               and  repairs of certain premises, of rates  of               hotels  and lodging houses, and (A  evictions.               Therefore, the pith and substance of Act  LVII               of  1947 is to regulate the  relation  between               landlord and tenant by controlling rents which               the tenant has got to pay to the landlord  and               by  controlling the right of the  landlord  to               evict  his tenant.  Can it be said  that  when               the  Provincial Legislature was  dealing  with               these  relations between landlord and  tenant,               it  was  regulating  house  accommodation   in               cantonment   areas  ?  In  our  opinion,   the               regulation  contemplated by Entry 2 in List  I               is   regulation  by  the  State  or   by   the               Government.    Requisitioning   of   property,               acquiring of property, allocation of property,               all   that  would  be  regulation   of   house               accommodation, but when the Legislature merely               deals  with relations of landlord and  tenant,               it  is not in any way legislating with  regard               to    house    accommodation.     The    house               accommodation remains the same, but the tenant               is protected quae his landlord." We  have  felt  considerable  doubt  whether  the  power  of legislating  on relationship between landlord and tenant  in respect   of   house  accommodation   or   buildings   would -appropriately  fall in Entry 21 of List II of  the  Seventh Schedule to the Government of India (1) I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 434. 3SupCI69- 15 454 Act,  1935, or in the corresponding Entry 18 of List  II  of the  Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution.   These  Entries permit legislation in respect of land and explain the  scope by  equating  it with rights in or over land,  land  tenures including  the  relation  of landlord and  tenant,  and  the collection of rents.  It is to be noted that the relation of landlord  and tenant is mentioned as being included in  land tenures and the expression "land tenures" would not, in  our opinion,  appropriately  cover tenancy of  buildings  or  of house  accommodation.   That expression is  only  used  with reference  to  relationship between landlord and  tenant  in respect of vacant lands.  In fact, leases in respect of non- agricultural  property  are dealt with in  the  Transfer  of Property  Act and would much more appropriately fall  within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the seventh Schedule  to the  Government of India Act read with Entry 10 in the  same List,  or  within the scope of Entry 6 of List  III  in  the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry  7  in

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the  same List.  Leases and all rights governed  by  leases, including  the termination of leases and eviction from  pro- perty  leased, would be covered by the field of transfer  of property and contracts relating thereto.  However, it is not necessary  for  us to express any definite opinion  in  this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of  landlord  and tenant in respect of  house  accommodation situated  in  cantonment  areas is clearly  covered  by  the Entries in List I. In the Constitution, the effect of  Entry 3  of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to  make laws  with respect to the matters contained in  that  Entry, notwithstanding  the fact that a similar power may  also  be found  in any Entry in List 11 or List III.  Article 246  of the  Constitution confers exclusive power on  Parliament  to make  laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated  in List  1, notwithstanding the concurrent power of  Parliament and  the  State Legislature, or the exclusive power  of  the State  Legislature  in Lists III and 11  respectively.   The general  power  of legislating in  respect  of  relationship between   landlord  and  tenant  exercisable  by   a   State Legislature  either under Entry 18 of List II or  Entries  6 -and  7  of List III is subject to the overriding  power  of Parliament  in  respect of matters in List 1,  so  that  the effect  of  Entry  3 of List I is that, on  the  subject  of relationship  between  landlord  and tenant  insofar  as  it arises  in  respect  of  house  accommodation  situated   in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State   Legislatures.    The  submission  made   that   this interpretation  will lead to a conflict between  the  powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I, II and III has  also  no force, because the reservation  of  power  for Parliament  for  the  limited  purpose  of  legislating   in ’respect  of  cantonment area only amounts to  exclusion  of this  part of the legislative power from the general  powers conferred  on  State Legislatures in the  other  two  Lists. This  kind of exclusion is not confined only to  legislation in respect of house accommodation in 455 cantonment   areas.    The  same  Entry   gives   Parliament jurisdiction  to  make provision by  legislation  for  local self-government  in  cantonment  areas which  is  clearly  a curtailment  of the general power of the State  Legislatures to make provision for local self government in all areas  of the  State  under Entry 5 of List R. That Entry 5  does  not specifically  exclude cantonment areas and, but for Entry  3 of List I, the State Legislature would be competent to  make provision  for  local government even in  cantonment  areas. Similarly,  power of the State Legislature to  legislate  in respect  of : (i) education, including  universities,  under Entry  1 1 of List 11 is made subject to the  provisions  of Entries  63,  64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25  of  List III;  (ii)  regulation of mines and mineral  development  in Entry  23  of List II is made subject to the  provisions  of List I with respect to regulation and development under  the control  of the Union; (iii) industries in Entry 24 of  List 11 is made subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52  of List 1; (iv) trade and commerce within the State in Entry 26 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33  of List  III; (v) production, supply and distribution of  goods under Entry 27 of List 11 is made subject to the  provisions of  Entry  33 of List III; and (vi)  theatres  and  dramatic performances; cinemas in Entry 33 of List 11 is made subject to  the  provisions  of  Entry  60  of  List  I.  Thus,  the Constitution  itself  has specifically put down  entries  in List II in which the power is expressed in general terms but

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is made subject to the provisions of entries in either  List I  or List III.  In these circumstances, no -anomaly  arises in  holding  that  the exclusive  power  of  Parliament  for regulation of house accommodation including control of rents in cantonment areas has the effect of making the legislative powers  conferred by Lists 11 and III subject to this  power of  Parliament.  In this view, we are unable to  affirm  the decision  of the Bombay High Court in A. C. Patel’s  case(1) which is based on the interpretation that Entry 2 in List  I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act  only permitted  laws to be made for requisitioning  of  property, acquiring of property and allocation of property only.   The same   High   Court,  in  a  subsequent  case   in   F.   E. Darukhanawalla  v.  Khemchand Lalchand(2), placed  the  same interpretation on Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh  Schedule to  the Constitution.  That decision was also based  on  the same  interpretation  of the scope of regulation   of  house accommodation  as was accepted by that Court in the  earlier case. The  Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal(3)  pro- ceeded on the assumption that the decision in the case of A. C. Patel v. Vishwanath Chada(1) correctly defined the  scope of Entry (1) I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 434.    (2) I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 544. (3) I.L.R. [1956] Nag. 618. 3 Sup.  CI 69-16. 456 2  in  List I of the Seventh Schedule to the  Government  of India  Act, and considered the narrow question  whether  the relationship  of landlord and tenant specifically  mentioned in  Entry 21 in List It of that Act covered the  requirement of  permission to serve a notice for eviction in  regulating the  relation  of landlord and tenant and  fell  within  the scope of Entry 21 in List II or in Entry 2 in List I of that Act.  The Court held that it-substantially fell in Entry  21 in List II and not in Entry 2 in List I. That Court did  not consider  it  necessary  to  express  -any  opinion  on  the question   whether  the  expression  "regulating  of   house accommodation" included something besides what Chagla, C.J., had  said  was  its  ambit in the case of  A.  C.  Patel  v. Vishwanath  Chada(1),  but expressed the  opinion  that  the expression  could not be stretched to include the aspect  of the  -relation  of  landlord and  tenant  involved  in  that particular  case.  It is clear that, in, that case  also,  a narrow interpretation of the expression "regulation of house accommodation"  was accepted, because it appears that  there was  no  detailed  discussion  of the  full  scope  of  that expression.  Similar is the decision of the Patna High Court in  Babu  Jagtanand  v.  Sri  Satyanarayanji  and  Lakshmiji Through  the Shebait and Manager Jamuna Das (2) .  In  fact, this  last  case merely followed the decision a  the  Bombay High Court in the case of F. E. Darukhanawalla v.  Khemchand Lalchand(3).  On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal  Mal v. Nathu Lal(4) held that the power of the  State Legislature  to legislate in respect of landlord and  tenant of  buildings is to be found in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of  List III  of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not  in Entry  18 of List 11, and that that power was  circumscribed by  the  exclusive power of Parliament to legislate  on  the same_subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the  view which  the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment  in appeal  before us.  We think that the decision given by  the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld. The  appeal  fails and is dismissed with  costs  payable  to plaintiff respondent only.

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R.K.P.S. (1)  I.L. R. 1954 Bom. 434. (2)  I.L.R. 40 Patna 625. (3)  I.L.R. [1954] Bom. 544. (4)  I.L.R. 11 Raj. 421. R.K.P.S       Appeal dismissed. 457