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PETITIONER: I N SAKSENA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/01/1976

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1976 AIR 2250            1976 SCR  (3) 237  1976 SCC  (4) 750  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC2310  (14)

ACT:      Constitution  of   India-Articles  245  &  246-Schedule seven-List  11   entry  41-interpretation   of   legislative entries-subsidiary  or   ancillary  to  subject  covered  by entries-Judicial function  and legislative  function-Whether legislature can  overrule a judicial pronouncement by a bare declaration-Whether   can    remove   basis    of   judicial pronouncement,

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was a  District &  Sessions Judge.  By a Memorandum dated  28-2-1963, the State Government raised the age of  compulsory retirement  for Government servants to 58 years.  The   said  Memorandum,   however,   empowered   the Government to  retire a  Government servant after he attains the age  of 55 years. Thereafter, rules under the proviso to Article 309  of the Constitution were framed whereby the age of superannuation was raised to 58 years. However the clause empowering the  Government to  retire a  Government  servant after the  age of SS years, was not incorporated in the said rules. The  appellant was  retired  from  service  after  he completed SS  years and  before he  completed 58  years. The challenge  to   the  said  order  of  compulsory  retirement succeeded in  this Court.  This court  held on  23-1-1967 as under:           "The appellant will be deemed to have continued in      the service  of the  Government in spite of that order.      As. however.  the appellant  attained  the  age  of  58      years, in  August, 1966,  it is  not  possible  now  to      direct that he should be put in service. But he will be      entitled to  such benefits  as may accrue now to him by      virtue  of  the  success  of  the  writ  petition.  The      appellant  will   get  his   costs  from  the  State  -      throughout."      Thereafter. an ordinance was promulgated which later on became an  Act of  the Madhya  Pradesh Legislature. The said Act validated  the retirement of certain Government servants including the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.

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The act  was made  effective from  1st  March  1963  and  It empowered the  Government to  retire a Government servant on his attaining the age of 55 years.      The appellant  again filed  a Writ Petition in the High Court which was dismissed.      In an appeal the appellant contended before this Court:      1. The  Act has  been passed  to overrule a decision of this Court which the legislature has no power to do.      2. The  matter having  once been decided by the Supreme Court was barred by the principle of res judicata.      3. The  Act gives  naked power  to the  authorities  to retire any employee after he attains the age of 55 years and provides no guidelines for the exercise OF the power.      4. A  right of property being a judgment debt protected by Article  19(1)(f) of  the Constitution,  the impugned Act could  not  have  expropriated  without  providing  for  any compensation.  It  is  ultra  vires  Article  31(2)  of  the Constitution.      5. The  impugned, Act  is ultra  vires the Constitution since it  seeks to  validate the retirement of the appellant and others  like him  by changing  their service  conditions with retrospective  effect. In doing so, the Legislature has over-stepped the limits of legislative power.      6. Even  if the  impugned Act  is valid,  on  a  proper construction it does‘not vacate the decree of this Court. 238      Dismissing the  appeal  by  certificate  under  Article 132(1) and 133(1)(a) to ^      HELD: 1. The decree of this Court is not a money decree raising  a  judgement  debt.  It  is  a  declaratory  decree declaring that the order compulsorily retiring the appellant was invalid.  The  further  declaration  that  he  would  be entitled to  such benefits  as might accrue to him by virtue of the  success of the Writ Petition, was only incidental or anciliary, to  the main  relief and  will fall or stand with the same. [242 G-HI      2. The  distinction between  a Legislative  act  and  a Judicial act is well known though in some specific instances the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily  discernible. Adjudication  of the  rights of  the parties according  to law  enacted by  the Legislature  is a judicial function. It is for the Legislature to lay down the law, prescribing  norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions  and to require the court to give effect to that law.  The Legislature  cannot by  a  bare  declaration, without more,  directly  overrule,  reverse  or  override  a judicial decision.  It may  at any  time in  exercise of the plenary powers  conferred on  it by  Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution  render a  judicial decision ineffective by enacting a  valid law  on a  topic  within  its  legislative field, fundamentally altering or changing with retrospective curative or neutralising effect the conditions on which such decision is  based. Judgments  in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976]  2 S.C.R,  347 and  Hari  Singh  v.  Military Estate Officer[1973] 1 S.C.R. 516 followed. [243 A-D]      3. In  enacting the  impugned Act the State Legislature derives its  competence not  only from  Article 309 but also from Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It is well settled that  the entries  in these legislative lists are to be construed  in their  widest possible  amplitude and  each general word used in such entries must be held to comprehend anciliary  or   subsidiary  matters.   The  Legislature  has legislative  competence  not  only  to  change  the  service conditions of  Civil Servants  with retrospective effect but

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also to  validate with  retroactive force  invalid executive orders  retiring   the  servants   because  such  validating legislation must  be regarded  as subsidiary or anciliary to the power of legislation on the subject covered by Entry 41. [245 A-D]      4. The  impugned Act  by introducing a legal fiction on giving the said memorandum statutory status with effect from its inception, effectively cures the defects from which this Memorandum and  the orders  of retirement  made there  under were suffering.  Thus the  said legislation removes or cures the defect  which this  Court found  in the Memorandum which was the  basis of the impugned orders of retirement. [246 A- B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeals Nos. 131 of 1971 and 350 of 1971.      (From the  Judgments and  orders dated  2-5-1970 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos. 504 and 92 of 1967 respectively).      G. L. Sanghi, Bishamber Lal and M. Iyngar for the Appe llant (In CA 131/71).      M. N.  Phadke, S.  S. Khanduja for the Appellant (In CA 350/71).      I. N. Shroff for the Respondent (In both appeals).      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKARIA, J.  This appeal  on certificate  is  directed against  a   judgment  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court dismissing the  Appellant’s writ  petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 239      The  appellant   joined  the   service  of   the  State Government as  a A  subordinate Judge  in the  year 1936. On promotion, he  was confirmed  as District and Sessions Judge with effect  from December  2, 1957.  The appellant attained the age  of 55 years on August 22, 1965 which was the age of superannuation according  to Fundamental  Rule  56  (Ch  IX) governing the Civil Services of the State. But prior to that on February  28, 1963,  by a  memorandum No. 433-259-1 (iii) /63, the  State Government  raised  the  age  of  compulsory retirement for  government servants  to 58  years subject to certain exceptions.  The material  part  of  the  memorandum dated February 28, 1963, read as follows:           "5.  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  the      foregoing  paragraphs   the  appointing  authority  may      require a Government servant to retire after he attains      the  age  of  SS  years  on  3  months  notice  without      assigning any reasons           A Government  servant may also after attaining the      age of  55 years  voluntarily  retire  after  giving  3      months notice to the appointing authority.           6. These  orders will  have effect  from  the  1st      March 1963 .           7. Necessary amendments to the State Civil Service      Regulations will be issued in due course."      Thereafter, by  Government Notification  dated November 29, 1963,  F. R.  56 was  amended on  December  6,  1963  in exercise of  the power  under the  Proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution,  raising the  age of compulsory retirement of the  State Civil  Servants to  58 years  with effect from March 1,  1963 but  the clause  in the aforesaid Memorandum, empowering the  Government to  retire servants above the age of 55  years by  giving them  three months’  notice was  not

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incorporated in the Rule.      Tn view  of this  memorandum, the appellant was allowed to continue  in office  after he  had attained the age of 55 years.      On September  11, 1963,  the respondent passed an order retiring  the   appellant  from  service  with  effect  from December 31, 1963. To impugn this order, the appellant filed a Writ  Petition in  the High  Court under  Art. 226  of the Constitution on  the ground  that F. R. 56 as it stood after the amendment of November 29, 1963, (published on 6-12-1963) did not  contain any provision authorising the respondent to retire the appellant after the attainment of 55 years of age and that his retirement was contrary to Art. 311(2) and Art. 14 of  the Constitution.  The High  Court dismissed the writ petition by its judgment dated April 30, 1964.      The appellant  came up  in appeal to this Court. During the pendency  of that  appeal Saksena attained the age of 58 years. By  its judgment  dated January  23, 1967, this Court quashed the impugned order of retirement holding that:           "The appellant will be deemed to have continued in      the service  of the  Government in spite of that order.      As, how  ever, the  appellant attained  the age  of  58      years, in August, 240      1966 it is not possible now to direct that he should be      put back  in service.  But he  will be entitled to such      benefits as  may accrue  now to  him by  virtue of  the      success of  the writ  petition. The  appellant will get      his costs from the State throughout."      Before the  decision of  that appeal  (Civil Appeal No. 670 of  1965) however,  the  Governor  had  promulgated  the Madhya Pradesh  (Age of  Compulsory Retirement)  Rules, 1965 under  Art.  309  of  the  Constitution.  These  Rules  were published in  the Government  Gazette of July 17, 1965. By a deeming clause,  these Rules  were made effective from March 1, 1963.  The age  of retirement  was thereby  raised to  58 years and  under r.  6 thereof, the appointing authority was empowered to  retire a  Government Servant  on his attaining the age  of 55  years on  3 months’ notice without assigning any  reason.  By  r.  8,  the  aforesaid  memorandum,  dated February 28,  1963, was  cancelled, and it was provided that notwithstanding the cancellation of that memorandum anything done or  any action  taken in  pursuance of  the  directions contained in  that memorandum  shall be  and shall always be deemed to  have been  done or  to have  been taken under the relevant provisions of these Rules.      At the  hearing of the earlier appeal, these Rules were not brought to the notice of this Court.      On February 10, 1967, after the judgment by this Court, the State  promulgated an  ordinance which  was replaced  on April 20, 1963 by the Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Sevak Anivarya Sevanivitrika Vidhi-  manyatakaran Vidyayaktakaran  Vidyeyak Adhiniyam 1967  (Act 5 of 1967) validating the retirement of certain  Government   servants,  including   that   of   the appellant, despite the judgment of this Court.      By virtue of this Act, the State is vested with a right not to  pay the  dues of  the appellant from the date of his retirement (December 3, 1963 onwards.      Sections 2 and 5 of the Act, which are material for our purpose, read as follows:           "2. (1)  The Madhya  Pradesh  (Age  of  Compulsory      Retirement Rules,  1965 replacing the provisions of the      , Government  of Madhya  Pradesh General Administration      Department Memorandum No. 1433-258-l(iii)/63, dated the      28th February  1963 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the

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    Memorandum) shall  be deemed  to have  come into  force      with effect  from the 1st March 1963.           (2) Anything done or any action taken in pursuance      of the  directions contained in the memorandum shall be      and shall  always be  deemed to have been done or taken      under corresponding  provisions of  the aforesaid rules      as if  the aforesaid rules were in force on the date on      which such thing was done or action was taken and shall      now be called into 241      question in any court on the ground that the provisions      of the  A memorandum  were not  issued in  the form  of      rules made by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh under Art.      309  of   the  Constitution  and  could  not  therefore      regulate  the   conditions  of  service  of  Government      servants serving in connection  with the affairs of the      State."           "5. Notwithstanding  any judgment, decree or order      of  any  Court,  all  Government  servants  serving  in      connection with  the affairs  of  the  State  who  were      compulsorily  retired   or  purported   to  have   been      compulsorily retired  in accordance with the memorandum      as replaced  by the  Madhya Pradesh  (Age of Compulsory      Retirement) Rules, 1965 referred to in Section 2 during      the period beginning with 1st March, 1965 and ending on      15th July,  1965 shall be and shall always be deemed to      have  been  validly  retired  in  accordance  with  the      condition of service applicable to them at the relevant      time as  if the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 had been      in force  at all material time when such retirement was      ordered, as accordingly:           (a)  all  notices   served  on   such   Government                servants’ after their completion of age of 55                years shall  be deemed to be and to have been                issued in accordance with the rules governing                their conditions of service;           (b)  no  suit   or  other   proceedings  shall  be                maintained or  continued in any Court for any                amount whatsoever as a payment towards salary                for the  period beginning  with the  date  on                which   a   Government   servant   had   been                compulsorily retired  and ending  on the date                of his attainment of age of 58 years.           c)   no court  shall enforce  any decree  or order                directing the  payment  of  any  such  amount                referred to in clause (b) above."      In substance,  and effect, this Act has made provisions of the  Compulsorily Retirement  Rules, 1965 applicable from March 1, 1963.      On November  10, 1967,  the appellant  again moved  the High Court  by a  writ petition  out of  which  the  present appeal has  arisen, challenging  the validity  of this  Act, particularly of sections 2 and S extracted above.      Four contentions  were raised  by him  before the  High Court: (1)  that the  Act has  been passed  to over-rule the decision of  the Supreme  Court which the legislature has no power to  do, (2)  that the statement of objects and Reasons attached to  the Bill when it was introduced, indicates that its main  object was  to avoid  financial burden which would fall on the State on account of its having to pay arrears of pension etc.  to a  large number  of officers  who had  been retired under  the said memorandum which was treated to be a rule and  which the  Supreme Court held was not an effective rule but  merely an  executive  instruction:  (3)  that  the matter having  once been  decided by  the Supreme Court, was

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barred by the principle of res judicata and (4) 242 that the Rules give naked power to the authorities to retire any employee  after he  has attained  the age of 55 years by giving him  three months’  notice, and provide no guidelines for the exercise of this power.      The High  Court negatived  these contentions, dismissed the writ  ,, petition  but granted  a certificate under Art. 132 (1) and 133(1)(a) to (c) of the Constitution.      Hence this appeal.      The contentions  advanced before  the High  Court  have been repeated before us with amplification and addition.      It is  argued on  behalf of  the appellant:  (i) that a right of  property,  being  a  judgment-debt,  protected  by Article 19(1)(f)  of the  Constitution, had  been created by this Court’s  decree dated January 30, 1967 in favour of the appellant and  against the  State. Since the impugned Act in effect, seeks  to expropriate  the appellant  of that  right without providing  for any  compensation, it  is ultra vires Article 31(2)  of the Constitution, (ii) The impugned Act is ultra  vires  the  Constitution  inasmuch  as  it  seeks  to validate the  retirement of  the appellant,  and others like him, by changing their service conditions with retrospective effect. In  so doing,  the State legislature has overstepped the limits  of legislative powers conferred on it by Article 309 of  the Constitution.  Reliance has  been placed  on the decision  of   this  Court   in  The   State  of  Mysore  v. Padamanabhacharya etc.(1) (iii) The impugn ed Act encroaches upon the  judicial field inasmuch as it over-rules and makes unenforceable the  decision, dated  January 30, 1967 of this Court in  Civil Appeal  No. 670  of 1963 and in so doing, it offends Article  141, 142  and 144 of the Constitution, (iv) Even if  the impugned Act is valid, cls. (b) and (c) of s. 5 of the  Act, on  a proper  construction, do  not vacate  the decree of this Court, requiring the respondent to pay to the appellant the  pecuniary benefits resulting from the success of his  earlier appeal  (C. A. 670/65) in this Court. Clause (b) of  s. S  merely bars the maintenance or continuation of any proceeding  for any  amount as a payment towards salary. The appellant  is not  seeking to  maintain or  continue any execution proceeding  in court,  for  the  recovery  of  any amount towards salary, the decree being a declaratory one.      None of these contentions appears to be tenable.      A perusal  of this  Court’s decree,  dated January  30, 1967, (extracted  above) would  show that  it is not a money decree, raising a judgment-debt. It is a declaratory decree, declaring that  the respondents’  order, dated September 11, 1963, compulsorily retiring the appellant r was invalid, and consequently the appellant would be deemed to have continued in service till he attained the age of 58 years. The further declaration that  "he will  be entitled  to such benefits as may accrue  to him  by virtue  of the  success of  the  writ petition" was  only incidental  or  ancillary  to  the  main relief and  will fall or stand with the same. This being the position, the decree did not create an indefeasible right -.      [1966] 1 S.C.R. 494. 243 of properly  in favour of the appellant. We therefore do not find any  A substance  in the argument that the impugned Act seeks to  acquire without  payment of  compensation property vesting   in    the   appellant    and    is    consequently unconstitutional.      The distinction  between  a  "legislative"  act  and  a "judicial" act  is  well  known,  though  in  some  specific instances the  line which  separates one  category from  the

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other may  not be  easily discernible.  Adjudication of  the rights of  the parties  according  to  law  enacted  by  the legislature is  a judicial  function. In  the performance of this function,  the court interprets and gives effect to the intent and  mandate of  the legislature  as embodied  in the statute. On the other hand, it is for the legislature to lay down the law, prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and  transactions and  to require  the court to give effect to that law.      While, in  view of this distinction between legislative and judicial  functions, the  legislature cannot  by a  bare declaration, without  more, directly  over-rule, reverse  or over-ride a  judicial decision,  it  may,  at  any  time  in exercise of  the plenary  powers conferred  on it by Article 245 and  246 of  the Constitution render a judicial decision ineffective by  enacting a  valid law  on a topic within its legislative field  fundamentally altering  or changing  with retrospective,   curative   or   neutralising   effect   the conditions on  which such  decision is based. As pointed out by Ray  C.J. in  Indira Nehru  Gandhi v.  Raj Narain,(1) the rendering ineffective  of judgments  or orders  of competent courts and  tribunals by changing their basis by legislative enactment is  a well-known  pattern of  all validating Acts. Such validating  legislation which  removes the  causes  for ineffectiveness or  invalidity of  actions or proceedings is not an encroachment on judicial power.      In Hari Singh v. Military Estate officer,(2) a Bench of seven learned  Judges of  this  Court  laid  down  that  the validity of  a validating  law is to be judged by two tests. Firstly, whether  the legislature  possesses competence over the  subject  matter, and,  secondly, whether  by validation the legislature  has removed the defect which the courts had found in  the previous  law. To  these we  may add a third . Whether it  is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.      We have  noticed already,  that the impugned provisions do not  offened Articles  19 and 31 or anything else in Part III of the Constitution.      We may  now see  whether  the  provisions  in  question satisfy the first two tests. G      Mr. Sanghi’s  argument is  that by  virtue of the power conferred by  Article 309,  the  State  Legislature  is  not competent  to  pass  a  law  validating  retrospectively  an invalid order  of retirement  of a State civil servant, made by the  State Government,  or render ineffective a decree of this Court declaring invalid such an order. The point sought to be  made out  is that  the legislative power conferred on the  State  legislature  by  Article  309,  is  confined  to regulating the  recruitment and  conditions of service of me persons appointed to public services of the      (1) [1976 2 S.C.R. 347.       (2) [1973] 1 S.C.R. 5-16. 244 State, and  that the  impugned  provisions  not  being  such regulatory provisions, are ultra vires Article 309.      In Padmanabhacharya’s  case (supra), which is the sheet anchor of  this contention,  the Court  was considering  the scope of  Article 309  in the context of Rule 294(a) Note 4, of the Mysore Service Regulations. There, the respondent was a teacher  in a  Government School.  He was  ordered  to  be retired from  service with  effect from  February 3, 1958 on attaining the age of 55 years. He challenged the validity of the order  by a  writ petition under Article 226 in the High Court and contended that rule 294 (a) having been amended in April 1955, the normal age of superannuation was fixed at 58 years, instead  of 55  years. On behalf of the State, it was

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canvassed that  a notification of the Governor under Article 309 of  the Constitution,  issued  on  March  25,  1959  had validated the  action taken  in retiring the respondent, and others upon their attaining the age of 55 years.      Wanchoo J.  (as he  then was),  speaking for this Court held that  such a  rule cannot  be made under the proviso to Article 309  of the Constitution, but was cautious enough to add: ’           ‘We are  expressing no  opinion as to the power of      the legislature to make a retrospective provision under      Article 309 of the Constitution wherein the appropriate      legislature has  been given  the power  to regulate the      recruitment  and   conditions  of  service  of  persons      appointed to  public service  and posts  in  connection      with the  affairs of  the Union  or  of  any  State  by      passing Acts  under Art.  309 of  the Constitution read      with item  70 of List I of the Seventh Schedule or item      41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The present rule      has been made by the Governor under the proviso to Art.      309. That  proviso lays down that it shall be competent      for the Governor or such person as he may direct in the      - case  of services  and posts  in connection  with the      affairs of  the State  to  make  rules  regulating  the      recruitment, and  the conditions  of service of persons      appointed, to  such services  and posts until provision      in that  behalf is  made by  or under  an  Act  by  the      appropriate legislature. Under the proviso the Governor      has the  power to make rules regulating the recruitment      and conditions  of service of persons appointed to such      services and  posts in  connection with  the affairs of      the State.  The question is whether the notification of      March 25, 1959 can be said to be such a rule. We are of      opinion that  this notification  cannot be said to be a      rule  regulating  the  recruitment  and  conditions  of      service of  persons appointed to the services and posts      in connection with the affairs of the State."      From what  has been quoted above, it is clear that this Court advisedly  did  not  express  any  opinion  about  the competency  of   the  appropriate   legislature   to   enact validating provisions  of this  type concerning  the  public servants serving in connection with the affairs of the State or the Central Government, as the case may be. 245      It is noteworthy that in enacting the impugned Act, the State A  legislature derives  its competence  not only  from Article 309,  but also  from Entry  41 of  List  II  of  the Seventh Schedule.  Indeed, within  its allotted sphere, that is, with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule the State legislature has, by virtue of Art. 246(3), exclusive, plenary powers of legislation.      Entry 41, List II, reads as under: B           "41. State  public services;  State Public Service      Commission."      It  is   well  settled   that  the   entries  in  these legislative lists  in Schedule  VII are  to be  construed in their widest  possible amplitude, and each general word used in such  Entries must  be held  to comprehend  ancillary  or subsidiary matters.  Thus considered,  it is  clear that the scope of Entry 41 is wider than the matter of regulating the recruitment and  conditions of  service of  public  servants under  Article  309.  The  area  of  legislative  competence defined by  Entry 41  is far  more comprehensive  than  that covered by the proviso to Article 309. By virtue of Articles 246, 309  and read  with Entry  41, List  II, therefore, the State legislature  had legislative  competence not  only  to

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change the  service conditions  of State Civil Servants with retrospective effect but also to validate with retrospective force  invalid   executive  orders  retiring  the  servants, because such  validating legislation  must  be  regarded  as subsidiary or  ancillary to  the power of legislation on the subject covered by Entry 41.      Thus the  impugned provisions  satisfy the  first test. This takes  us to  the second  test,  whether  the  impugned legislation removes or cures the defect which this Court had found in  the Memorandum which was the basis of the impugned orders of retirement. For reasons that follow, the answer to this question also must be in the affirmative.      The basis  of this  Court’s decision  dated January 30, 1967 in  Civil Appeal  670 of  1965 was  that the Government Memorandum dated  February 28,  1963, in  pursuance of which the impugned  order on  retirement of I. N. Saksena had been passed on September 11, 1963, had not attained the status of a statutory  rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the  Constitution,   but  was   merely   an   administrative instruction. This provision in the Memorandum empowering the Government to  retire a  servant on his attaining the age of 55 years, after three months notice, was not incorporated in the statutory  rules. On  the other  hand the amendment made with effect  from March  1963 in  Fundamental  Rule  56,  in exercise of  its powers  under Article 309 by the Government under notification  dated December  6, 1963,  had raised the age of  retirement for  State Government servants from 55 to 58 years.  I. N.  Saksena had  therefore, by  virtue of this amended statutory  rule a  right to remain in service  up to the age  of 58  years. This right could not be taken away by mere executive instructions embodied in the Memorandum. H      Madhya Pradesh  Act 5 of 1963 gives the said Memorandum the statutory status with effect from its very inception. By introducing 246 a legal  fiction the  Act effectively  cures the defect from which this  Memorandum and  the orders  of  retirement  made thereunder were suffering.      Thus the second test was also satisfied. The conclusion is there  fore inescapable that the impugned provisions were valid. Hence,  the  order,  dated  September  11,  1963,  of Saksena’s compulsory retirement became valid as the basis of this Court’s judgment dated January 30, 1967 was removed.      There is  no force  in the  fourth  contention  of  Mr. Sanghi.  Section   5,  particularly  Clauses  (b)  and  (c), effectively vacate  the previous  decree of  this  Court  in favour  of  Saksena.  For  removing  doubts,  these  clauses declare that  this Court’s decree will not be enforceable by initiating proceedings in any court thereon, in future.      In the  light of the above discussion, it is abundantly clear  that   in  enacting   the  impugned  provisions,  the legislature has  not exceeded  the limits of its legislative powers nor  encroached on  the judicial field. We will close the discussion by noticing only one decision out of the many that had been cited at the bar.      In Piare  Dusada and  Ors. v.  The King Emperor,(1) the Governor  General by ordinance repealed the Special Criminal Courts ordinance  II of  1942. There  was a provision in the repealing-ordinance  for  confirmation  and  continuance  of sentences of Special Courts and retrial of pending case. The appellant  therein  had  been  convicted  and  sentenced  by Special  Criminal   Court  which   was  held   to  have   no jurisdiction to try the case by an order of a court. Section 3(1) of the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) ordinance, 1943 conferred  validity  and  full  effectiveness  on  sentences

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passed by Special Criminal Courts by conferring jurisdiction on them  with retrospective  effect. The  Federal Court held that by  promulgating the validating and repealing ordinance of 1943,  the legislative  authority had not attempted to do indirectly what  it could  not do  directly or  to  exercise judicial power  in the  guise of legislation. It was further held that  the ordinance  was not invalid on the ground that the legislative  authority had  validated  by  retrospective legislation proceedings  held in  courts which were void for want of  jurisdiction as  there was  nothing in  the  Indian Constitution which precluded the legislature from doing so.      The ratio  of the  above decision  applies with greater force to the present case.      For all  the foregoing  reasons, we  negative  all  the contentions canvassed  by Mr. Sanghi and dismiss this appeal leaving the parties to bear their own costs.                 Civil Appeal No. 350 of 1971      SARKARIA, J.  For the  reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 131  R of 1971 entitled I. N. Saksena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this  appeal fails  and is  dismissed  without  any order as to costs. 247