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PETITIONER: HUKAM RAJ KHINVSARA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       17/03/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Delay condoned. Leave granted.      We have heard learned counsel on both sides.      This appeal, by special leave, arises from the order of the Central  Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur, made on April 16,1996 in O.A No. 466/94.      The  appellant was initially suspended and charge sheet was laid  against him  on  April  29,  1974,  His  order  of dismissal was  ultimately set  aside and  thereafter he  was reinstated into  the service  by the  Tribunal’s order dated March 13,  1992 in  O.A. No.  261/91. It  would appear  that while setting  aside the order of dismissal the Tribunal had passed the  order that  the appellant  was entitled  to  all consequential benefits  which he  could have  earned had  he been in  service. since  in spite of his representations, he was not  given consequential  benefits,  he  filed  contempt application of December 11, 1992, which was dismissed by the Tribunal on  July 29,  1993. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present  O.A. for  a direction  to implement  the  order dated March 13, 1992. The Tribunal dismissed the same by the impugned order  dated April  16,1996 on  the ground that the application of  the appellant was barred by limitation. Thus this appeal by special leave.      The only  question is : whether the application seeking implementation of  the earlier  order of  the  Tribunal  was barred by  limitation of  the earlier  order of the Tribunal was barred  by limitation?  section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, ’the Act’) envisages thus:      "27. Execution of orders of a      Tribunal.      Subject to  the other provisions of      this Act  and the  rules, the order      of a  Tribunal finally disposing of      an application  or an  appeal shall      be final and shall not be called in      question in  any court (including a      High court) and such order shall be      executed  in  the  same  manner  in      which any final order of the nature      referred to  in clause  (a) of  sub

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    section (2) of Section 20 ( whether      or  not   such  final   order   had      actually been  made) in  respect of      the   grievance    to   which   the      application relates would have been      executed.      Relevant part  to sub  section (2) of Section 20 of the Act postulates that:      "(2) for  the   purposes   of   sub      section (1) of Section 20, a person      shall be  deemed to have availed of      all the  remedies  availed  to  him      under the relevant service rules as      to redressal of grievances,      (a)  if a final order has been made      by Government or other authority or      officer or  other person  competent      to  pass   such  order  under  such      rules,   rejecting    any    appeal      preferred or representation made by      such person  in connection with the      grievance;      Section 21  prescribes limitation  in that  behalf. Sub section (1) (a) of Section 21 postulates that:      "(1) A Tribunal  shall not admit an      application.      (a)  in a  case where a final order      such as  is mentioned in clause (a)      of sub  section (2)  of Section  20      has been  made in  connection  whit      the    grievance     unless     the      application is made within one year      from the  date on  which such final      order has been kame."      Thus it  could be  seen that  the final order passed by the Tribunal  is executable  under Section  27  of  the  Act within one  year  from  the  date  of  its  becoming  final. Admittedly, the final order was passed on March 13,1992 Consequently,  the   appellant  was  required  to  file  the execution application  within one  year from  the said  date unless the order of the Tribunal was suspended by this Court in a  special leave  petition/appeal which  is not  the case herein. Admittedly,  the application came to be filed by the appellant on  December 13,  1994 which  is well  beyond  one year. Under  these circumstances,  the Tribunal was right in its  conclusion   that  the   application  was   barred   by limitation.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant contends  that  the Tribunal  would  have  condoned  the  delay  in  filing  the application. It  is not his case that he made an application for condonation  of delay  and the Tribunal had rejected the application without  examining the  grounds  for  the  delay occasioned by him. Under these circumstances, we need not go into further question of refusal to condone the delay by the Tribunal.      The appeal is accordingly dismissed, No costs.