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PETITIONER: HINDUSTAN STEELS LTD., ROURKELA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: A. K. ROY & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/12/1969

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1401            1970 SCR  (3) 343  1969 SCC  (3) 513  CITATOR INFO :  R          1971 SC2171  (3,4,6)  RF         1972 SC1975  (15)  RF         1973 SC2650  (13)  RF         1978 SC1428  (18)  R          1981 SC1253  (17)  F          1983 SC 454  (15)  R          1985 SC 617  (3)  D          1985 SC1128  (9)  R          1990 SC1054  (21)

ACT: Industrial  Tribunal -Discretion-Termination of service  for reasons  of security-Tribunal ordering reinstatement-Duty of Tribunal  to  exercise discretion  properly-Constitution  of India Article 226-High Court’s duty to interfere in cases of improper exercise of discretion.

HEADNOTE: The  first  respondent was appointed in 1958  as  a  skilled workman by the appellant Company.  He had executed a bond to serve  the  Company for five years in consideration  of  the Company  having  borne.the  expenses of  his  training.   In accordance  with the practice of the Company a  verification report  about him was called for as was done in the case  of other  workmen  also.   On  a report  from  the  Police  the Security  Officer recommended that it was not  desirable  to retain  the respondent in the company’s service any  longer. The  respondent at the time was working as a fitter  in  the blast furnace of the works.  In December 1960 he was  served with  an  order by which his service  was  terminated.   The Industrial Tribunal, on a reference of the dispute, rejected the Union’s allegation as to victimisation or unfair  labour practice.  Nevertheless it held that it was improper on  the part of the Company not to have disclosed the report to  the respondent,  that  the  order of  termination  was  in  fact punitive  in  nature  and considering the  action  taken  as disproportionate the order was illegal and unjustified.  The Tribunal  therefore  directed reinstatement with  full  back wages.   On  a petition for a Writ of  Certiorari  the  High Court  upheld the Tribunal’s order.  It also held  that  the case was not one of those exceptions to the general rule  of

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reinstatement   and  the  Tribunal  having   exercised   its discretion it could not interfere with the Tribunal’s order. The  appeal to this Court was limited only to  the  question whether the relief to the first respondent should have  been reinstatement or compensation. HELD : (1) In the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was not justified in directing reinstatement and the High  Court erred  in  refusing  to  interfere with  the  order  of  the Tribunal merely on the ground that it could not do so as  it was a case where the Tribunal had exercised its Discretion. The  Tribunal  has  the  discretion  to  award  compensation instead   of  reinstatement  if  the  circumstances   of   a Particular  case  are unusual or exceptional so as  to  make reinstatement inexpedient or improper.  The Tribunal has  to exercise  its discretion judicially and in  accordance  with the  well  recognised principles in that regard and  has  to examine carefully the circumstances of each case and  decide whether  such  a  case is one of  those  exceptions  to  the general rule.  If the Tribunal were to exercise down by this Court it would be a case either of no exercise of discretion or  of one not legally exercised.  In either case  the  High Court  in  exercise of its jurisdiction  can  interfere  and cannot be content by simply saying, that since the  Tribunal has  exercised  its  discretion, it  will  not  examine  the circumstances  of the case to ascertain whether or not  such exercise 344 was properly and in accordance with settled principles made. If  the High Court were to do so, it would be a  refusal  on its part to exercise jurisdiction. [351 B-E] In  the present case the termination of service was  not  on account  of victimisation or unfair labour practice.  It  is clear that the Company terminated the service of the workman only because it felt that it was not desirable for reason of security to continue the workman in its service.   Therefore what  was  relevant at the stage when the Tribunal  came  to decide  what  relief  the workman was entitled  to  was  the question  whether the management genuinely apprehended as  a result  of the report that it would be risky to  retain  the workman in the company’s service.  If, on an examination, of the  circumstances  of  the case the Tribunal  came  to  the conclusion  that  the  apprehensions of  the  employer  were genuine and the employer truly felt that it was hazardous or prejudicial  to the interests of the industry to retain  the workman in his service on grounds of security the case would be properly one where , compensation would meet the ends  of justice.   The  present  case is  one  such.   The  Tribunal exercised its discretion mechanically without weighing,  the circumstances of the case and the refusal by the High  Court to interfere was equally mechanical and amounted to  refusal to exercise jurisdiction. [351 F; 352 A-GI Western India’ Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal [1949] F.C.R. 321, 348; United Commercial Bank Ltd. v.  U.P. Bank  Employees Union, [19521 2 L.L.J. 577; Punjab  National Bank  Ltd.  v. Workmen, [1959] 2 L.L.J. 669; Assam  Oil  Co. Ltd.  v. Workmen, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 457; Working of  Charottar Gramodhar  Sahakari  Mandali  Ltd.  v.  Charottar  Gramodhar Sahakari Mandali Ltd., C.A. 382 of 1966, dec. on August  14, 1967; Deomur Dulung Tea Estate v. Workmen, C.A. 516 of 1966, dec.  on  October 26, 1967; and Ruby General  Insurance  Co. Ltd.  v. P.P. Chopra, C.A. 1735 of 1969, dec.  on  September 12, 1969, -referred to. (ii)In the circumstances of the case it would be proper for this   Court  to  determine  the  amount  of   compensation. Compensation  for a period of two years at the rate  of  Rs.

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160  per  month,  that being the last salary  drawn  by  the concerned workman would meet the ends of justice. [353 DI Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, [19601 3 S.C.R. 457 and Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, [1966] 2 S.C.R. 434, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2127 of 1969. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated January 27, 1969 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No.  280 of 1965. H.R.  Gokhale, Govind Das and G. S. Chatterjee,  for  the appellant. R.K.  Garg, S. C. Agarwala, and Sumitra  Chakravarty  for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat,  J. Respondent 1 was, in 1955, admitted as  a  trade apprentice  by  the  appellant-company in’  its  works,  the company 345 agreeing   to  bear  the  cost  of  his  training  as   such apprentice,  which  it  did for a period  of  3  years.   On completion  of his training, he was appointed  in  September 1958 as a skilled workman, i.e., as a fitter.  The letter of appointment  under which he was engaged contained  a  clause which  required him to execute a bond to serve  the  company for  five  years  at  least.   The  object  of  that  clause evidently was to ensure that he served the company at  least for five years in consideration of the company having  borne the expenses.of his training. The  evidence produced before the Industrial Tribunal  shows that the practice of the company, set up at the instance  of the   Government  of  India  and  the  Company’s  Board   of Directors, was to have a confidential inquiry made to verify the  antecedents of its employees.  ’Such  verification  not being  practicable  at the time of the appointment  of  each employee, it used to be done after a workman was  appointed. The object of such verification was to ascertain whether  it was  desirable  or not in the interests of  the  company  to continue the service of the employee in respect of whom such verification  was  made.  The inquiry was made  through  the police.   On  receipt  of a  verification  report  from  the police,  the  Senior Security Officer of the  company  would make his recommendation and the company would terminate  the service of an employee where it was considered desirable  in the company’s interests not to continue such an employee  in service  after  giving 3 months’ notice or salary  for  that period in lieu thereof. Throughout  the period of his service commencing  from  Sep- tember’  1958 no action was ever taken against respondent  1 although he had at one time joined a strike in the company’; works and although he was an active member and the secretary of the workmen’s union.  A criminal case in relation to  the said strike was filed against him but had been  subsequently withdrawn.  Prima facie, the fact that no action  was  taken against him indicated that the company did not consider  his active  participation in the union activities  objectionable so as to warrant any interference on its part. In  accordance with the practice of the company, however,  a verification report about him was called for as was done  in the  case of other workmen also.  On such a report from  the police, the Senior Security Officer recommended that it  was not  desirable  to retain him in the company’s  service  any longer.  Respondent I at the time was working as a fitter in

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the blast furnace of the works.  On December 9, 1960 he  was served with an order by which his service was terminated and was  informed that he would be entitled to 3 months’ pay  in lieu of a notice for that period. 346 On the union of which, as -aforesaid, he was the  secretary, having  raised a dispute, alleging that the  termination  of his  service  was  the result of  victimisation  and  unfair labour practice,, the dispute was referred by the Government of  Orissa to the Industrial Tribunal.  After inquairy,  the Tribunal rejected the union’s allegation as to victimisation or   unfair  labour  practice  on  account  of   any   union -activities  carried -on by respondent 1. Nevertheless,  the Tribunal  held  that  it was improper on  the  part  of  the company not to have disclosed the said report to  respondent 1  and not to have given him an opportunity to  contest  its contents  and  vindicate himself.  The  Tribunal  held  that though  the  said order was in form one  of  termination  of service,  it was in fact punitive in nature and  considering the  action taken against respondent I  as  disproportionate further  held  that  it was a case  of  victimisation,  that consequently  the,  order was illegal  and  unjustified  and directed reinstatement with full ’back wages. The  company  filed a writ petition in the  High  Court  for quashing the said order.  Before the High Court the  company urged (a) that the termination of the service of  respondent 1  was in bona fide exercise of the employer’s right  to  do so,  (b)  that it did so only because of  the  said  adverse report and (c) that even if it was held that the said  order was not legal or justified, the proper relief to be  granted to  the  respondent in the circumstances of.  the  case  was compensation  and not reinstatement, which meant  imposition of  a workman against whom there was an adverse  report  and whom the company did not consider it desirable to retain  in its service.  The High Court rejected these contentions  and held  that  the  Tribunal  was right  in  holding  that  the termination of service of respondent I was not in bona  fide exercise  of  the  power of the  employer  to  terminate  an employee’s  service, that it was punitive in  character  and was, therefore, not legal or justified.  The High Court also held that ordinarily the relief against an illegal  termina- tion  of service was reinstatement though in some  cases  it may  be  considered inexpedient to do so, in which  event  a suitable  compensation would be the proper relief.   Lastly, it  held  that  the  present  case  was  not  one  of  those exceptions  to  the general rule of  reinstatement  and  the Tribunal  having  exercised  its  discretion  it  could  not interfere with the Tribunal’s order. The  company thereupon applied for special leave  from  this Court.   Though it was granted, it was limited only  to  the question whether the relief to respondent I should have been reinstatement  or  compensation.   It  is,  therefore,   not possible for us to go into the question whether the Tribunal and  the High Court were right in their conclusion that  the termination  of the service of respondent I was not in  bona fide  exercise  of the company’s right  to  order  discharge simpliciter or whether the order was punitive in 347 nature  and  therefore was not legal in the absence  of  any domestic inquiry having been held.  Besides, this appeal  is one against the High Court’s order refusing certiorari under its writ jurisdiction and not a direct appeal under Art. 136 of  the  Constitution against the Tribunal’s  order.   These considerations  will  have to be kept in mind while  we  are considering this appeal.

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Counsel for the appellant-company argued that even though he could  not challenge, in view of the limited  special  leave granted to the company, the finding that the impugned  order was not termination simpliciter in bona fide exercise of the employer’s  right to terminate the service of -an  employee, he  was entitled to agitate the question whether or not  the High  Court,  on  the  facts  of  this  case,  should   have interfered   and   ordered   compensation   in   place    of reinstatement,  particularly  because :  (a)  the  concerned employee was posted in the blast furnace, -a crucial part of the  company’s works, in respect of which the company  could not hazard any risk, (b) the Tribunal had given a clear  and firm  finding  against the case that the  workman  had  been victimised  on account of his union activities, and (c)  the Tribunal and the High Court had both set aside the company’s order only because of their finding that it was punitive  in nature and that the punishment was so disproportionate, that it  amounted  to victimisation.  The proper  order,  counsel submitted,)  was to award compensation instead  of  imposing the service of an employee whom the company considered risky to  retain  in its service.  Mr. Garg, on  the  other  hand, argued  that  the  company’s action  involved  an  important principle,  in  that,  an  employer  cannot  be  allowed  to terminate  the services of his employees on  police  reports which  are  not  disclosed  to the  workmen  or  before  the Tribunal,  and  therefore, are not open to  the  workmen  to challenge.   Such  a  course, he  argued,  would  enable  an employer  to  put  an end to the service of  a  workman  not because  he is in fact a danger to the establishment but  is merely a member of a party or an association whose views and policies such an employer does not like.  In such a case, he submitted, the termination of service would be in  violation of the constitutional right of association of an  individual and  would be clearly unjustified, -and therefore, it  would not  be a case for departure from the  ordinary  consequence flowing from an illegal order of termination of service. There  can  be  no doubt that the right of  an  employer  to discharge  or dismiss -an employee is no longer absolute  as it-  is subjected to severe restrictions.  In cases of  both termination    of   service   and   dismissal,    industrial adjudication  is  competent to grant relief, in  the  former case on the ground that the exercise of power was mala  fide or  colourable  and  in the latter case  if  it  amounts  to victimisation or unfair labour practice or is in violation 348 of  the principles of natural justice or is,  otherwise  not legal or justified.’ In such cases, a tribunal can award  by way of relief to the concerned employee either reinstatement or compensation.  In the earlier stages the question whether one  or the other of the two reliefs should be  granted  was held  to  be a matter of discretion for the  tribunal.  (see Western   India   Automobile   Association   v.   Industrial Tribunal(’),  United  Commercial  Bank  Ltd.  v.  U.P.  Bank Employees  Union(’).  The view then was that to lay  down  a general rule of reinstatement being the remedy in such cases would itself fetter the discretion of the tribunal which has to  act in the interests of industrial harmony .  and  peace and  that it might well be that in some cases imposition  of the service of a workman on an unwilling employer might  not be conducive to such harmony and peace.  Later on,  however, the earlier flexibility appears to have been abandoned  -and it  was ruled that although no hard and fast rule  could  be laid down and the Tribunal would have to consider each  case on  its own merits and attempt to reconcile the  conflicting interests  of  the employer and the employee,  the  employee

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being entitled to security of service and protection Against wrongful dismissal, the normal rule in such cases should  be reinstatement. (sea Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen(’). This  conclusion was adhered to, in some of  the  subsequent decisions.  But in the case of Punjab National Bank  Ltd.(’) itself,  as  also in other subsequent cases,  the  rule  was qualified to mean that in unusual or exceptional cases where it  is  not expedient to grant the normal  relief  of  rein- statement, the proper relief would be compensation and  that that   would  meet  the  ends  of  justice.    The   problem confronting  industrial adjudication is to promote  its  two objectives,  the  security  of  employment  and   protection against wrongful discharge or dismissal on the one hand  and industrial  peace  and harmony on the  other,  both  leading ultimately to the goal of maximum possible production. As  exceptions to the general rule of  reinstatement,  there have been cases where reinstatement has not been  considered as  either  desirable or expedient.  These  were  the  cases where  there ad en strained relations between  the  employer and  the  employee,  where the post held  by  the  aggrieved employee  had  been  one of trust  and  confidence-or  where though  dismissal  or discharge was unsustainable  owing  to some infirmity in the impugned order, the employee was found to have been guilty of an activity subversive of prejudicial to  the  interests of the industry.  These cases are  to  be found  in  Assam Oil Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (4  )   Workmen  of Charottar  Gramodhar  Sahakari  Mandali  Ltd.  v.  Charottar Gramo- (1)  [19491 F.C.R. 321, 348. (2)  (19521 2 L.L.J. 577. (3)  [1959] 2 L.L.J. 669. (4)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 457. 349 dhar  Sahakari Mandali Ltd.(’), Doomur Dulung Tea Estate  v. Workmen  (2 ) and Ruby  General Insurance.Co. Ltd. v. P.  P. Chopra(3).  These are, however, illustrative cases where  an exception  was made to the general rule.  No hard  and  fast rule  as  to  which  circumstances would  in  a  given  case constitute, an exception to the general rule can possibly be laid  down  as:  the  Tribunal in  each  case,  keeping  the objectives  of  industrial adjudication in mind, must  in  a spirit of fairness and justice confront the question whether the  circumstances  of the case require  that  an  exception should  be  made  and compensation would meet  the  ends  of justice. In  the  present  case  the  facts  are  fairly  clear.   As aforesaid, the concerned workman Was trained for a period of 3  years at the cost of the company.  On completion  of  his training  the company engaged him as a skilled  worker.   He worked as such from September 1958 to December 1960.  At the time of the termination of his service, he was working as  a fitter  in the blast furnace, a vital part of the  company’s works,  where both efficiency and trust would matter.   Even though  he was said to have joined an illegal strike  and  a criminal  case  had been filed against him, no  steps,  even departmentally, were taken against him.  Prima facie, there- fore, this was not -a case where, the employer could be said to  be  anxious to wantonly or  unreasonably  terminate  his service.   Even  though  he was an  active  member  and  the secretary  of  the  union,  the  Tribunal  found  that   the termination  of his service was not due to victimisation  or any  unfair labour practice.  There can also be  no  dispute that the company ordered the termination of his service only because  of the, adverse report of the police  against  him. The report was called for ’by the company in accordance with

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its  practice of verifying the workman’s  antecedents.   The evidence was that such verification was made in the case  of all  workmen after they were engaged and that  such  verifi- cation  was  not made before appointing them as it  was  not practicable  to  do  so.  The practice was  adopted  at  the instance  of  the  Government and  in  accordance  with  the directions  to that effect of the Board of  Directors.   The letter   of   the  Deputy  Inspector   General   of   Police communicating  the report made on the investigation  by  the police was produced but neither the report nor the source of information on which it was based nor the name of the person who conducted the investigation was disclosed either to  the workman  or the, Tribunal.  The ground urged for  such  non- disclosure  was  that  the report was  confidential  and  if disclosed  it would not be possible for the company to  have such  investigations  in future.  The reason appears  to  be that if the person conduct- (1) C.A. 382 of 1966, dec. on August 14, 1967. (2) C.A. 516 of 1966 dec. on October 26, 1967. (3)  C.A. 1735 of 1969,dec. on September 12, 1969. 350 ing  such investigation were produced for  cross-examination by  the workman or if his report were to be  disclosed,  the name  or  names of the informants would come  out  with  the result  that  no  informant in  future  would  readily  come forward  to give information about other workmen.   Even  in criminal cases -an investigating officer is not compelled to disclose the name of his informant. But  the  Tribunal  appears to have been  impressed  by  the company’s  refusal  to disclose the report although  it  was clearly  a confidential report.  The Tribunal  thought  that such a report might have been made by a person who was not a responsible police officer or that it might be based on mere rumour  or  hearsay  evidence and might not  be  of  a  very convincing nature.  The High Court went one step further and observed  that it might be "as contended  by  opposite-party No.  I that the report is based entirely on the trade  union activities   of  the  opposite-party  in  which   case   the -discharge  would itself be improper." This observation  was not  warranted in view of the Tribunal’s clear finding  that this  was  not  a case of  victimisation  or  unfair  labour practice on account of the union activities of the  workman. The  High  Court further was of the view that "even  if  the Management terminated the services of Sri A. K. Ray,  simply on  the  ground that it received an adverse  report  against him,  the  order  of such termination  of  services  in  the circumstances  cannot be treated as legal or justified."  It also  observed  that "it was not admitted  by  the  opposite party  that  there was any -adverse  police  report  against him."  But  the management had examined P. B.  Kanungo,  the Senior  Personnel Officer, who had  categorically  testified that the management had received such an adverse report -and on  the basis of that report the company’s Security  Officer had recommended the termination of service of the  workman,. There was no cross-examination on this part of his evidence. The  High Court, therefore, was not entitled to  proceed  on the  basis  as if the fact of such adverse  report  was  any longer  in- doubt.  Indeed, the grievance was ’not  relating to the factum of such report, but its non-disclosure and the Tribunal  in  consequence  not  being  able  to  weigh   its veracity.   The fact of the Management having  received  the police report which was adverse was no more in dispute;  nor the fact that the company’s Security Officer on the strength of that report had recommended that it was not desirable  to retain  the  workman  in service.  The  termination  of  his

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service was by no means singular in any way, for, the  evid- ence  was  that verification of antecedents of  all  workmen used  to  be  similarly made and  whenever  the  report  was adverse an order of discharge used to be made. Since  the special leave granted to the company  is  limited only  to  the  question  of the kind  of,  relief  that  the Tribunal ought to have given, we arenot in a position to  go into  the  question whether the termination of  service  was legal or justified.  We have, therefore, 351 to  proceed  on the footing that the  Tribunal’s  conclusion that it was not legal was right. The question, however, still is whether the Tribunal was, in the  circumstances  of  the  case,  justified  in  directing reinstatement.   It  is true that some of the  decisions  of this  Court  have  laid down that  where  the  discharge  or dismissal of a workman is not legal or justified, the relief which  would ordinarily follow would be reinstatement.   The Tribunal  however, has the discretion to award  compensation instead   of  reinstatement  if  the  circumstances   of   a particular  case  are unusual or exceptional so as  to  make reinstatement  inexpedient or improper.  The  Tribunal  has, therefore,  to  exercise its discretion  Judicially  and  in accordance  with well recognised principles in  that  regard and has to examine carefully the circumstances of each  case and decide whether such a case is one of those exceptions to the  general  rule.  If the Tribunal were  to  exercise  its discretion  in  disregard  of  such  circumstances  or   the principles laid down by this Court it would be a case either of  no  exercise  of  discretion  or  of  one  riot  legally exercised.  In either case the High Court in exercise of its writ  jurisdiction  can interfere and cannot be  content  by simply  saying  that since the Tribunal  has  exercised  its discretion it will not examine the circumstances of the case to  ascertain whether or not such exercise was properly  and in accordance with the well-settled principles made.  If the High Court were to do so, it would be ’a refusal on its part to exercise jurisdiction. In  the  present case, there could be no  dispute  that  the company,  in  accordance  with its practice,  called  for  a verification report about the concerned workman.  The report was made by the police after investigation and on that being adverse,  the company’s security officer recommended to  the company  that it was not in the interests of the company  to retain  the workman’s services.  There can be no doubt  that the  company  terminated  the service of  the  workman  only because  it  felt that it was not desirable for  reasons  of security,  to continue the workman in its service.  This  is clear from the fact that it was otherwise not interested  in terminating  the workman’s service and had in fact  insisted that  the workman should bind himself to serve it  at  least for  five  years.   The termination of service  was  not  on account,of  victimisation or unfair labour practice  as  was clearly found by the Tribunal.  It is, therefore -abundantly clear  that  the  company  passed  the  impugned  order   of termination  of  service ’ on account of  the  said  adverse report,  the recommendation of its own security officer  and on  being  satisfied that it would not be in  the  company’s interests to continue him in its service. The  Tribunal  no  doubt felt that it  was  not  established -whether the investigation and the report following it  were properly done 352 and made, that the company ought to have disclosed it to the workman  and given him an opportunity to  vindicate  himself

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and   that  the  non-disclosure  of  the  report  made   the termination illegal and unjustified.  That may or may not be right.   But  what  was  relevant, at  the  stage  when  the Tribunal came to decide what relief the workman was entitled to,,  was  the  question whether  the  management  genuinely apprehended  as  a result of. the report that  it  would  be risky to retain the workman in the- company’s service.  They may  have  gone  wrong  in the  manner  of  terminating  the workman’s  service  -as held by the Tribunal.  But,  if  the management truly believed that it was not possible to retain the workman in the company’s service on grounds of  security and  consequently  could  not place confidence  in  him  any longer, that present case would be one of those  exceptional cases  where the general rule as to reinstatement could  not properly  be applied.  Thus of courie does not mean that  in every  case  where  the  employer  says  that  he  has  lost confidence in the workman, and therefore, has terminated his service  that  reinstatement  cannot  be  granted  and   the Tribunal  has to award compensation.  On the other hand,  it on an examination of all the circumstances of the case,  the Tribunal  comes to the conclusion that the apprehensions  of the  employer were genuine and the employer truly felt  that it  was  hazardous or prejudicial to the  interests  of  the industry to retain the workman in his service on grounds  of security, the case would be properly one where  compensation would meet the ends of justice. On  a  consideration of all the circumstances,  the  present case,  in  our  view,  was  one  such  case.   The  Tribunal exercised  its discretion mechanically without weighing  the circumstances  of  the  case.   That  was  no  exercise   of discretion -at all.  There is ample authority to the  effect that if a statutory tribunal exercises its discretion on the basis  of  irrelevant considerations or  without  regard  to relevant  considerations, certiorari may properly  issue  to quash  its  order. [See S.A. de Smith,  Judicial  Review  of Administrative   Action,  (2nd  ed.)  324-325].   One   such relevant consideration, the disregard of which would  render its  order  amenable  to interference, would  be  the  well- settled  principles  laid down in decisions binding  on  the tribunal  to whom the discretion is entrusted.  The  refusal by  the High Court to interfere was equally  mechanical  and amounted  to  refusal to exercise,  its  jurisdiction.   Its order, therefore, becomes liable to interference. There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that the order of  reinstatement  passed by the Tribunal was liable  to  be quashed  and  that  the  High Court  erred  in  refusing  to interfere  with it merely . on the ground that it could  not do so as it was a case where the Tribunal had exercised  its discretion.   The  question next is’, having held  that  the order of reinstatement was not a proper order, in that,                             353 it  was  not  in consonance with the decided  cases,  do  we simply quash the order of the Tribunal and that of the  High Court and leave the concerned workman to pursue his  further remedy  ? The other alternative would be to remand the  case to the, Tribunal to pass a suitable order.  In either  case, in  view  of this judgment, no other order  except  that  of compensation  can  be  obtained  by him.   If  the  case  is remanded and the Tribunal on such remand passes an order  of compensation and fixes the amount, such a course would  mean further  proceedings  and a I possible appeal.   That  would mean  prolonging the dispute, which would hardly be fair  to or  conducive  to the interests of the  parties.   In  these circumstances  we decided that it would be more proper  that we  ourselves  should determine the amount  of  compensation

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which  would meet the ends of justice.  Having come to  that conclusion,  we heard counsel for both the  parties.   After doing  so and taking into consideration all the  facts  -and circumstances  of  the  present case we  have  come  to  the conclusion in the light also of the decisions of this  Court such  as  Assam Oil Co. v. Its Workmen(’),  Utkal  Machinery Ltd.  v.  Workmen(’)  and the recent case  of  Ruby  General Insurance  Co. Ltd. v. P. P. Chopra(3)  that  compensation’, for  a  period  of two years at the rate of  Rs.  160/-  per month,  that  being the last salary drawn by  the  concerned workman, would meet, the ends of justice. We  accordingly  allow the appeal, quash the  order  of  the Tribunal   and  the  High  Court  and  instead  direct   the appellant  company to pay to the 1st respondent Rs. 3840  as and  by  way  of compensation.  There will be  no  order  of costs. R.K.P.S.                                              Appeal allowed. (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 457. (2) [1966] 2 S.C.R. 434. (3)  C.A. 1735 of 1969 decided on September 12, 1969. 354