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PETITIONER: HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: YASHWANT GAJANAN JOSHI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/12/1990

BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. BENCH: RANGNATHAN, S. KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  933            1990 SCR  Supl. (3) 434  1991 SCC  Supl.  (2) 592 JT 1991 (1)    38  1990 SCALE  (2)1208

ACT:     Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User In Land) Act,  1962--Sections 2(a), 7 to 10--’Competent Authority’  employee of contesting parties--Whether fit  for appointment--Whether  violative  of  principles  of  natural justice.

HEADNOTE:     The appellant corporation took steps under the Petroleum and Minerals Pipeline (Acquisition of Right of User in land) Act, 1962 for laying down pipelines for a project called the Bombay--Pune Pipeline Project. One Mrs. A.R. Gadre,  Special Land  Officer in the office of Competent Authority  was  ap- pointed  as competent authority by the Government of  India. One  of the duties of the Competent Authority was to  deter- mine the compensation which would be payable to those  whose proprietary rights were affected by laying down of pipes  by the Corporation.     The  respondent  who was claiming compensation  filed  a petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the  Consti- tution  challenging the appointment of Mrs. Gadre as  compe- tent authority on the ground that the principles of  natural justice required a feeling in both the parties that  justice would  be done as between them. The High Court  allowed  the writ  petition  and directed the Union of India  to  appoint another competent authority who shall not be an employee  of the corporation.     Two  special  leave  petitions were  flied  against  the judgment  of the High Court, one by the Corporation and  the other by the Union of India.     Before  this  Court it was contended  that  the  special leave  petition  filed by the Union of India was  barred  by limitation, and that the special leave petition flied by the Corporation  was not maintainable,stood  dismissed,  because Union of India alone was the interested party. On merits it was contended that (i) there was no question of the 435 violation of any principle of natural justice nor there  was any  question. of bias in case any employee of the  corpora-

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tion  was  appointed as competent authority under  the  Act; (ii)  that there was no personal interest of  the  Competent Authority in the subject matter of the litigation, namely in the determination of compensation, and as such the principle that  no  person could be a judge in his own cause  was  not applicable  in  the  present case;  (iii)  determination  of compensation  by  the Competent Authority in the  first  in- stance was purely an administrative act by which the  rights of the parties were not determined by the competent authori- ty;  and (iv) the provisions in this Act were  analogous  to those under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in which case the amount of compensation payable by the Government was, in the first instance, determined by the Officer of the  Government itself.     On  behalf of the respondent it was contended  that  (i) the determination of compensation by the competent authority was a quasijudicial act and not an administrative act;  (ii) the  persons  or authorities appointed under  various  other Acts  were appointed by virtue of their holding some  office or  post  and  their orders were appealable  to  the  higher authorities;  (iii)  where  a discretion was  given  to  the Central  Government for appointing the competent  authority, then such discretion should not be exercised by appointing a person  or  authority who  may be in the employment  of  the body or authority for whose benefit the pipelines were laid; (iv) while determining the question of bias the test was not whether in fact bias had affected the judgment but the test always  was and must be whether a litigant could  reasonably apprehend  that  a  bias might operate against  him  in  the decision of the subject matter of the dispute. Dismissing the appeal, this Court,     HELD:  (1) In view of the fact that the High  Court  had removed Mrs. Gadre from acting as competent authority on the ground  that  she  was an employee of  the  corporation  and further given direction that any suitable person be appoint- ed as competent authority but not an employee of the  corpo- ration,  there was an independent cause of grievance to  the corporation, and therefore the special leave petition  could be filed by the corporation. [438D]     (2)  No one shah be a judge in his own cause only  means that  he should not have personal interest in the  cause  he has to adjudicate. [441F] (3) There is no provision in the Act prohibiting the Central 436 Government  to  make an appointment of an  employee  of  the Corporation as competent authority. [444G]     (4) The scheme of the Act shows that a competent author- ity  has to discharge various and diverse duties  under  the Act. Such person becomes a better qualified and  experienced person  equipped  with  a proper background  to  decide  the amount of compensation also. [444H-445B]     (5)  A  party is entitled to raise the  ground  of  bias against  the appointment of an individual officer as  compe- tent  authority on sufficient material placed on  record  in this regard, but not merely because such competent authority was an employee of the Corporation. [445F]     (6)  It would be too broad a proposition to  extend  the theory  of  bias  to exclude a person only  because  such  a person  draws salary from the bodies like a public  corpora- tion,  State  Government  or Central  Government.  It  would altogether  be  a  different matter if it was a  case  of  a private employer and his employees. [445G-H]     Metropolitan  Properties  Co. Ltd. v. Lannon  and  Ors., [1968] 3 All England Reports 304; G. Sarana v. University of Lucknow  &  Ors., [1977] 1 SCR  64;  International  Airports

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Authority of India v. K.D. & Anr., [1988] 2 SCC 360, distin- guished.     (7) In this case, compensation was decided by the  Addi- tional District Judge in favour of the respondent. Mrs. A.R. Gadre in her own name flied a writ petition challenging  the legality  of  the award passed by  the  Additional  District Judge.     (8) Taking in view the entire facts and circumstances of the  case, the respondent was right in contending that  Mrs. A.R.  Gadre  may have bias while determining the  amount  of compensation  as she herself is a litigating party  in  this very  matter  in the High Court against the  respondent.  An apprehension  thus  in the mind of the  respondent  is  well rounded  and  on this ground there is  no  justification  to interfere with the order of the High Court holding that  the appointment  of Mrs. Gadre was not valid. However,  it  does not  mean an agreement with the general proposition  of  the High  Court  that an officer of the  corporation  cannot  be appointed  as  a  ’competent authority’ because  he  may  be biased in favour of the corporation by reason of his employ- ment. [446C, E-G]

JUDGMENT: