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PETITIONER: HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAYTHROUGH ITS REGISTRAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHRI UDAYSINGH S/O GANPATRAO NAIKNIMBALKAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/04/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, D.P. WADHWA

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      This appeal  by certificate arises from the judgment of the Division  Bench of  the High  Court  of  Bombay,  Nagpur Bench, made  on April  26, 1996  in Writ Petition No.2210 of 1993.      While the  respondent was  working as  Civil Judge, Jr. Division at  Nasik, an  allegation was made against him that on October  21, 1989, he had sent a word through a messenger to one  Smt.  Kundanben,  defendant  in  a  civil  suit  for eviction,  demanding   a  sum   of  Rs.10,000/-  as  illegal gratification to  deliver judgment in her favour. On receipt of the  information, she  appears to  have complained to Mr. Sathe, her  advocate; who in turn appears to have complained to one Mr. Parakh, Assistant Government Pleader; who in turn alleged to  have complained  to  one  Shri  N.A.  Gite,  the District Government Pleader. The District Government Pleader informed  the  District  Judge  of  the  demand  of  illegal gratification made  by the respondent. On the bases thereof, the  District   Judge  made   adverse  remarks  against  the respondent in his Confidential Report for 1989-90. On coming to know  of the  same, the  respondent made an appeal to the High Court  to expunge  the said  remarks. The High Court to expunge the  said remarks.  The  High  Court,  thereon,  has directed the  District Judge  to  substantiate  the  adverse remarks  after  recording  the  evidence  of  the  aforesaid advocates.  Subsequently,   their  statements   came  to  be recorded. It  is relevant  to note,  at this stage, that the respondent  by   then  was   transferred   from   Nasik   by notification dated April 26, 1990, but has not been relieved by the  date when  a letter  was sent  by Mr. Gite, District Government Pleader  to the District Judge on May 4, 1990. On the basis  of the  statements recorded  from  the  aforesaid three persons  and also Smt. Kundanben, the complainant, the High  Court   initiated  disciplinary  enquiry  against  the respondent. The  Enquiry  Officer  after  giving  reasonable opportunity  to   the  respondent   conducted  enquiry   and submitted  his   report.  The   charge  framed  against  the respondent is as under:      "That on  Sunday, the 22nd October,      1989, at  about 10.00 a.m. you made

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    a demand  of illegal  gratification      of   Rs.10,000/-    through    your      messengers, for  Smt. Kundan Kishor      Somayya  (Thakkar),   resident   of      house   No.4518,   Sardar   Chowki,      opposite Panchavati  Police Chowki,      Nasik, defendant  in regular  Civil      Suit No.581/81,  for  deciding  the      said suit  in her  favour and  that      you  thereby  indulged  in  corrupt      practice   amounting    to    gross      misconduct."      The High  Court after receipt of the enquiry report and consideration thereof, disagreed with the conclusion reached by  the   Enquiry  Officer  and  recorded  its  prima  facie conclusions indicating  as  to  how  it  differed  from  the finding reached by the Enquiry Officer and stated as under:      "Taking  the   cumulative  view  of      these statements  recorded  by  the      Enquiry Officer,  Nasik, we  are of      the view that the same are adequate      enough  to  hold  the  delinquent’s      culpability in the matter of demand      of   illegal    gratification   for      delivering a  favourable  judgment.      The integrity is, therefore, thrown      in  doubt   and  penal   action  is      required to  be taken  to  maintain      judicial discipline.      For the reasons stated hereinabove,      we disagree with the finding of the      Enquiry   Officer   who   has   not      analysed   the    appreciated   the      evidence and  material on record in      right perspective."      Accordingly, opportunity  was given  to the  delinquent officer, the  respondent, to  submit  his  explanation.  The respondent submitted  his explanation  and on  consideration thereof, the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court by its proceedings dated  July 31,  1993 recommended  for dismissed and the  Government on  consideration of  the record and the recommendation of  the  High  Court  reached  the  following conclusion:      "And Whereas, the Chief Justice and      the Judges  of the  High  Court  of      Judicature  at  Bombay,  being  the      Disciplinary     Authority,      on      considering the  said report of the      Enquiry  Officer  and  evidence  on      record, decided  not to  agree with      the finding of the Enquiry Officer;      And Whereas,  thereupon, the  Chief      Justice and  the Judges of the High      Court  of   Judicature  at  Bombay,      being the  Disciplinary  Authority,      has served  a show  cause notice on      the   said    Shri   Naiknimbalkar,      calling upon  him to show cause why      the punishment  of  dismissal  from      service should  not be imposed upon      him;      And Whereas,  after considering the      cause  shown   by  the   said  Shri      Naiknimbalkar,   the   Disciplinary      Authority   have   recommended   to

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    Government    to     inflict    the      punishment   of    dismissal   from      service   on    the    said    Shri      Naiknimbalkar;      And  Whereas,  on  considering  the      report  and   the  finding  of  the      Enquiry Officer, the cause shown by      the said Shri Naiknimbalkar and the      recommendation of the Chief Justice      and the Judges of the High Court of      Judicature    at     Bombay,    the      Government   of   Maharashtra   has      decided   to    accept   the   said      recommendation of the Chief Justice      and the Judges of the High Court of      Judicature at  Bombay,  to  inflict      the punishment  of  dismissal  from      service   on    the    said    Shri      Naiknimbalkar;"      Calling  in  question  this  order  of  dismissal  from service, the  respondent filed  a writ  petition in the High Court. The  Division Bench  after noticing various decisions of this Court came to the conclusion that the District Judge was biased  against the  respondent;  and  he  recorded  the evidence of  three witnesses, advocates and the complainant. That formed the foundation for laying the action against the respondent. The circumstance available on record do indicate that no  reasonable man  would reach the conclusion that the respondent was  actuated with  a corrupt  motive  to  demand illegal gratification  to deliver  favourable judgment.  The decision of  the High  Court dismissing  the respondent  is, therefore, vitiated  by manifest  error  of  law  warranting interference. Accordingly, the order of dismissal came to be set aside. Thus, this appeal by certificate.      Shri Harish Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant  contends that  the view taken by the Division Bench is  not correct  in law.  Under judicial  review court cannot reappreciate  the evidence of witnesses and reach its own conclusion.  The Court  could have  seen on the basis of evidence on  record whether a reasonable man would reach the conclusion that the respondent was actuated with the corrupt motive  in  making  demand  for  illegal  gratification  for discharge of  official duty;  the High Court, therefore, has over-stepped  its   limits  of   judicial  review   and  the conclusion reached  cannot be  supported either by principle of law  or any  of the  law laid  down by  this Court.  Shri Lambat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand,  contends that  on  the  basis  of  evidence  on record, no  reasonable man  would reach  the conclusion that the respondent  has committed  any act  of misconduct, i.e., demand of  illegal gratification.  The subsequent statements of the advocates and of the complainant show that it is only face  saving   attempt  made   by  the   District  Judge  to substantiate the adverse remarks made by the District Judge; when the  respondent brought  these  facts  on  record,  the Disciplinary Committee  did not  consider the same from this perspective. So  they cannot  form as  foundation for taking disciplinary action against the respondent.      Having  regard   to  the  respective  contentions,  the question that  arises for consideration is: whether the view taken by  the Division  Bench  is  sustainable  in  law?  As regards the  nature  of  the  judicial  review,  it  is  not necessary to  trace the  entire case  law. A  Bench of three Judge of  this Court  has considered  its  scope  in  recent judgment in  B.C. Chaturvedi  vs.  Union  of  India  &  ors.

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[(1995) 6  SCC 749]  in which the entire case law was summed up in paragraphs 12, 14 and 15 thus:      "12.  Judicial  review  is  not  an      appeal from a decision but a review      of the manner in which the decision      is made.  Power of  judicial review      is  meant   to  ensure   that   the      individual receives  fair treatment      and  not   to   ensure   that   the      conclusion  which   the   authority      reaches is  necessarily correct  in      the  eye  of  the  court.  When  an      inquiry is  conducted on charges of      misconduct by a public servant, the      Court/Tribunal  is   concerned   to      determine whether  the inquiry  was      held  by   a  competent  office  or      whether rules  of  natural  justice      are  complied   with.  Whether  the      findings or  conclusions are  based      on  some  evidence,  the  authority      entrusted with  the power  to  hold      inquiry has jurisdiction, power and      authority to  reach  a  finding  to      fact  or   conclusion.   But   that      finding  must   be  based  on  some      evidence.  Neither   the  technical      rules of  Evidence Act nor of proof      of  fact  or  evidence  as  defined      therein,  apply   to   disciplinary      therein,  apply   to   disciplinary      proceeding.  When   the   authority      accepts    that     evidence    and      conclusion     receives     support      therefrom,     the     disciplinary      authority is  entitled to hold that      the delinquent officer is guilty of      the charge.  The Court/Tribunal  in      its power  of judicial  review does      not act  as appellate  authority to      reappreciate the  evidence  and  to      arrive  at   its  own   independent      findings  on   the  evidence.   The      Court/Tribunal may  interfere where      the authority  held the  proceeding      against the delinquent officer in a      manner inconsistent  with the rules      of natural  justice or in violation      of statutory  rules prescribing the      mode  of   inquiry  or   where  the      conclusion or  finding  reached  by      the disciplinary authority is based      on no  evidence. If  the conclusion      or finding be such as no reasonable      person would have ever reached, the      Court/Tribunal may  interfere  with      the conclusion  or the findings and      mould the  relief so  as to make it      appropriate to  the facts  of  each      case.      14. In  Union  of  India  vs.  S.L.      Abbas [(1993)  4 SCC  357] when the      order of  transfer  was  interfered      with by  the Tribunal,  this  Court      held that  the Tribunal  was not an

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    appellate  authority   which  could      substitute its own judgment to that      bona fide  order of  transfer.  The      Tribunal   could   not,   in   such      circumstances,    interfere    with      orders of  transfer of a government      servant. In  Administrator of Dadra      & Nagar  Haveli vs. H.P. Vora [1993      Supp. (1) SCC 551] it was held that      the Administrative Tribunal was not      an appellate authority and it could      not   substitute    the   role   of      authorities to clear the efficiency      bare of  a public servant. Recently      in  State   Bank   of   India   vs.      Samarandra Kishore  Endow [(1994) 2      SCC 537]  a  Bench  of  this  Court      which two us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy and      B.L. Hansaria,  JJ.) were  members,      considered   the   order   of   the      Tribunal which  quashed the charges      as based  on no  evidence, went  in      detail  into  the  question  as  to      whether the  Tribunal had  power to      appreciate   the   evidence   while      exercising power of judicial review      and held  that a tribunal could not      appreciate   the    evidence    and      substitute its  own  conclusion  to      that of the disciplinary authority.      It would,  therefore, be clear that      the  Tribunal  cannot  embark  upon      appreciation   of    evidence    to      substitute its own findings of fact      to that of a disciplinary/appellate      authority.      15. It  is, therefore, difficult to      go into  the question  whether  the      appellant  was   in  possession  of      property  disproportionate  to  the      known sources  of his  income.  The      findings   of    the   disciplinary      authority and  that of  the Enquiry      Officer  are   based  on   evidence      collected during  the inquiry. They      reached  the   findings  that   the      appellant was  in possession of Rs.      30,000/-   in    excess   of    his      satisfactorily accounted for assets      from his  known source  of  income.      The alleged  gifts to  his wife  as      Stridhana and  to his  children  on      their birthdays  were  disbelieved.      It is  within the  exclusive domain      of the  disciplinary  authority  to      reach  that  conclusion.  There  is      evidence in that behalf."      Law on  the nature  of the imposition of the penalties, it has been summed up on paragraph 18 thus:      "A  review   of  the   above  legal      position would established that the      disciplinary  authority,   and   on      appeal  the   appellate  authority,      being fact-finding authorities have      exclusive  power  to  consider  the

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    evidence with  a view  to  maintain      discipline. They  are invested with      the    discretion     to     impose      appropriate punishment  keeping  in      view the  magnitude or  gravity  of      the    misconduct.     The     High      Court/Tribunal,  while   exercising      the power of judicial review cannot      normally   substitute    its    own      conclusion on  penalty  and  impose      some   other    penalty.   If   the      punishment    imposed     by    the      disciplinary   authority   or   the      appellate  authority   shocks   the      conscience     of      the     High      Court/Tribunal,      it       would      appropriately  mould   the  relief,      either        directing         the      disciplinary/appellate authority to      reconsider the  penalty imposed, or      to shorten  the litigation,  it may      itself,  in  exceptional  and  rate      cases,      impose      appropriate      punishment with  cogent reasons  in      support thereof."      Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal in reversing the imposition of the penalty was set aside. In another judgment in State  of Tamil  Nadu vs.  S. Subaramaniam  [(1996) 7 SCC 509], this  Court has  considered the  scope of the power of judicial review  vis-a-vis re-appreciation  of evidence  and concluded as under:      "The   Tribunal   appreciated   the      evidence  of  the  complainant  and      according to it the evidence of the      complainant was discrepant and held      that   the    appellant   had   not      satisfactorily  proved   that   the      respondent   has    demanded    and      accepted illegal gratification. The      Tribunal trenched upon appreciation      of evidence of the complainant, did      not rely  on it  to prove the above      charges.  On  that  basis,  it  set      aside the  order of  removal.  Thus      this appeal by special leave.      The only  question is:  whether the      Tribunal   was    right   in    its      conclusion   to    appreciate   the      evidence  and   to  reach  its  own      finding that  the  charge  has  not      been proved.  The Tribunal is not a      court  of   appeal.  The  power  of      judicial review  of the  High Court      under   Article    226    of    the      Constitution  of  India  was  taken      away by  the  power  under  Article      323-A and  invested the same in the      Tribunal by  Central Administrative      Tribunal Act.  It  is  settled  law      that the Tribunal has only power of      judicial     review      of     the      administrative   action    of   the      appellate on complaints relating to      service conditions of employees. It      is  the  exclusive  domain  of  the

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    disciplinary authority  to consider      the  evidence   on  record  and  to      record findings  whether the charge      has  been  proved  or  not.  It  is      equally settled  law that technical      rules   of    evidence   have    no      application  for  the  disciplinary      proceedings and the authority is to      consider the material on record. In      judicial review,  it is settled law      that the  Court or the Tribunal has      no   power   to   trench   on   the      jurisdiction  to   appreciate   the      evidence and  to arrive  at its own      conclusion. Judicial  review is not      an appeal  from a  decision  but  a      review of  the manner  in which the      decision is  made. It  is meant  to      ensure that the delinquent receives      fair treatment  and not  to  ensure      that  the   conclusion  which   the      authority  reaches  is  necessarily      correct in the view of the Court or      Tribunal.   When   the   conclusion      reached by  the authority  is based      on evidence,  Tribunal is devoid of      power to  reappreciate the evidence      and would  (sic) come  to  its  own      conclusion  on  the  proof  of  the      charge. The  only consideration the      Court/Tribunal has  in its judicial      review is  to consider  whether the      conclusion is  based on evidence on      record and  supports the finding or      whether the  conclusion is based on      no evidence. This is the consistent      view  of   this  Court   vide  B.C.      Chaturvedi  vs.   Union  of   India      [(1995) 6  SCC 749], State of Tamil      Nadu vs. T.V. Venugopalan [(1994) 6      SCC 302]  (SCC para  7),  Union  of      India vs.  Upendra Singh  [(1994) 3      SCC 357]  (SCC para  6), Government      of Tamil  Nadu vs.  A.  Rajapandian      [(1995) 1 SCC 216] (SCC para 4) and      B.C. Chaturvedi  vs. Union of India      (at pp.  759-60). In  view  of  the      settled   legal    position,    the      Tribunal  has   committed   serious      error of law in appreciation of the      evidence and  in coming  to its own      conclusion that  the charge has not      been proved.  Thus we hold that the      view of  the Tribunal  is ex  facie      illegal. The  order is  accordingly      set    aside.    OA/TP/WP    stands      dismissed."      These two  judgments squarely  cover the controversy in this case.      It is  seen that  the  evidence  came  to  be  recorded pursuant to  the complaint made by Smt. Kundanben, defendant in the  suit for  eviction. It  is true that due to time lag between the  date of the complaint and the date of recording of evidence  in 1992  by the Enquiry Officer, there is bound to be  some discrepancies  in evidence. But the Disciplinary

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proceeding are not a criminal trial. Therefore, the scope of enquiry is entirely different from that of criminal trial in which the  charge is required to be proved beyond doubt. But in the  case of disciplinary enquiry, the technical rules of evidence have  no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has  no application.  Preponderance of  probabilities and some  material on  record would  be necessary to reach a conclusion whether  or  not  the  delinquent  has  committed misconduct. The  test laid down by various judgments of this Court is to see whether there is evidence on record to reach the conclusion  that the delinquent has committed misconduct and whether  as a reasonable man, in the circumstance, would be justified  in reaching  that  conclusion.  The  question, therefore, is:  whether on  the basis  of  the  evidence  on record, the  charge of  misconduct of  demanding an  illegal gratification for  rendering a  judgement  favourable  to  a party has been proved? In that behalf, since the evidence by Kundanben, the aggrieved defendant against whom a decree for eviction was  passed by  the respondent  alone is on record, perhaps it  would be  difficult to reach the safe conclusion that  the   charge  has   been  proved.   But  there   is  a contemporaneous  conduct   on  her   part,  who   complained immediately to  her advocate,  who  in  turn  complained  to Assistant Government  Pleader and  the Assistant  Government Pleader  in  turn  complained  to  the  District  Government Pleader, who  in turn  informed the District Judge. The fact that the District Judge made adverse remarks on the basis of the complaint  was established and cannot be disputed. It is true that  the High Court has directed the District Judge to substantiate the  adverse remarks made by the District Judge on the  basis of  the statements  to be  recorded  from  the advocates and  the complaint.  At that stage, the respondent was not  working at  that station  since he has already been transferred. But  one important factor to be take note of is that he  admitted in  the cross-examination  that Shri Gite, District Government  Pleader, Nasik has no hostility against the respondent.  Under these circumstance, contemporaneously when Gite has written a letter to the District Judge stating that he  got  information  about  the  respondent  demanding illegal gratification  from  some  parties,  there  is  some foundation for  the District  Judge to  form an opinion that the  respondent  was  actuated  with  proclivity  to  commit corruption; co  of the  respondent needs  to  be  condemned. Under these  circumstances, he  appears to  have reached the conclusion that  the  conduct  of  the  respondent  required adverse comments.  But when enquiry was done, the statements of the  aforesaid persons  were recorded;  supplied  to  the respondent;  and  were  duly  cross-examined,  the  question arises: whether their evidence is acceptable or not? In view of the  admitted position  that the  respondent himself  did admit that  Gite has  no axe  to grind  against him  and the District Judge  having acted  upon  that  statement,  it  is difficult to  accept the  contention that the District Judge was biased  against the  respondent and  that he  fabricated false evidence against the respondent of the three advocates and the complainant. When that evidence was available before the disciplinary  authority,  namely,  the  High  Court,  it cannot be  said that  it is  not a  case of no evidence; nor could it b said that no reasonable person like the Committee of five Judges and thereafter the Government could reach the conclusion that  the charge  was proved.  So, the conclusion reached by the High Court on reconsideration of the evidence that  the  charges  prima  facie  were  proved  against  the respondent and  opportunity was  given to him to explain why disciplinary action  of dismissal  from service could not be

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taken, is well justified.      Under these  circumstance, the question arises: whether the view  taken by  the High Court could be supported by the evidence on  record or whether it is based on no evidence at all ?  From the  narration of  the above  facts, it would be difficult to  reach a conclusion that the finding reached by the High Court is based on no evidence at all. The necessary conclusion  is  that  the  misconduct  alleged  against  the respondent stands  proved. The  question then is: what would be  the   nature  of   punishment  to   be  imposed  in  the circumstances? Since  the respondent  is a  judicial officer and the maintenance of discipline in the judicial service is a paramount  matter  and  since  the  acceptability  of  the judgment  depends  upon  the  credibility  of  the  conduct, honesty, integrity and character of the office and since the confidence of the litigant public gets affected or shaken by the lack of integrity and character of the judicial officer, we think  that the  imposition of  penalty of dismissal from service is well justified. It does not warrant interference.      The appeal  is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the Division Bench  of the  High Court stands set aside and that of the  High Court  dismissing the  respondent from  service stand upheld. No costs.