REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3306            OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 9134 of 2006]

Haryana Vidyut, Parsaran Nigam Limited & Anr. …Appellants   

Versus

Gulshan Lal & Ors.  …Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3307, 3308, 3309 & 3310    OF 2009   [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 15174, 15204, 15372 and 18470 of 2006]

J U D G M E N T  

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Interpretation of a judgment of Civil Judge, Faridabad in Civil Suit  

No. 180 of 1999 dated 17-11-2000 is in question in these appeals.

3. Respondents  are  employees  of  the  appellant-Board,  a  successor  of  

Haryana State Electricity Board constituted and incorporated under Section  

5  and  12  of  the  Electricity  (Supply)  Act,  1948.   Respondents  were  

employees  of  a  Thermal  Power  Plant  at  Faridabad.   Indisputably  the  

appellant has another Thermal Power Plant at Panipat.  

Inter  alia  on the premise  that  the  employees similarly  situated and  

working at Panipat, Thermal Power Plant were receiving a higher salary, the  

aforementioned suit was filed praying inter alia for the following reliefs :

“(a)  a decree of declaration in favour of plaintiffs and  against the defendants, declaring the plaintiffs entitled  to receive the said higher pay scale of Rs.1400-2600/-  w.e.f.  24.10.1991,  and  of  Rs.5000-150-8000  w.e.f.  1.1.1996 alongwith interest @ 18% p.a. from the date  of  due  till  actual  payment,  as  given  to  their  co- employees as mentioned in para No. 2 above of the  plaint, on the basis of principle of ‘equal pay for equal  work,;

(b) a decree of mandatory injunction in favour of  plaintiff  and  against  the  defendants,  directing  the  defendants  to  release/pay  to  the  plaintiffs  the  said  higher  pay  scales  of  Rs.  1400-2600/-  w.e.f.  24.10.1991 and of Rs. 5000-150-8000/- w.e.f. 1.1.96  alongwith interest @ 18% p.a. from the date of due  till actual payment, forthwith;”

4. The issues which were framed in the aforementioned suit in terms of  

the pleadings of the parties were as under :

“(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to receive the  pay scales of Rs. 1400-2600 w.e.f. 24.10.1991 and of  Rs. 5000 to 8000/- w.e.f. 1.1.1996 alongwith interest  at the rate of 18% from the defendants?

(2) If issue No. 1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs  are entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for?”

2

The learned Trial Judge while determining the said issue Nos. 1 and 2,  

relying or on the basis of a Judgment and decree passed in the case of Anil  

Kapoor Vs. Haryana State Electricity Board being RSA No. 800 of 1992  

which was then pending in second appeal before the High Court of Haryana  

held as under :

“The  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  get  the  benefit  as  ordered  by  the  Hon’ble  High  Court  and  which  would  be  subject  to  the  decision  of  RSA  No.800/1992.  The plaintiffs have proved the legal  notice  served by them through counsel  which  is  placed on record as Ex. P1, as admitted by DW1 in  his cross examination, but no reply was given by  the defendants.”

It was directed :

“For the reasons recorded above, issues No. 1 and  2  are  decided  in  favour  of  the  plaintiffs  to  the  effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to receive pay  scale  of  Rs.  1400-2600  w.e.f.  24.10.1991  and  Rs.5000-8000 w.e.f.  1.1.1996 subject  to  decision  of RSA No.800/1992.”

On the aforementioned findings, the following relief was granted :

“In  sequel  of  my  aforesaid  discussion  on  the  aforesaid  issues,  the  suit  of  the  plaintiffs  for  declaration and mandatory injunction succeeds and  the same is hereby decreed to the effect that the  plaintiffs  are  entitled to  receive the  pay scale  of  Rs.1400-2600 w.e.f.24.10.1991 and Rs.5000-8000  w.e.f.  1.1.1996.   However,  the  plaintiffs  are  not  entitled  to  any  interest  as  claimed.   Keeping  in  view of circumstances of the case, both the parties  are left to bear their own costs.  Decree-sheet be  

3

prepared accordingly and file be consigned to the  record room.”

5. Indisputably the said decree has attained finality as the same has been  

upheld upto this court.

6. An execution petition was filed.   

Appellants  herein  filed  an  objection  to  the  said  execution  petition  

raising a contention that a mere declaratory relief having been passed in the  

favour of the decree holder,  they were not  entitled to the arrears of pay,  

stating :

“In  view  of  the  judgment  dated  9.10.2001  of  Hon’ble  High Court  in  RSA-800/92,  the  present  D.Hs are not entitled for any relief and in case they  are  paid  the  arrears  it  will  further  multiply  the  litigation  as  their  pay  scale  shall  become  higher  than their functional cadre post and will adversely  effect  the  entire  policy  of  various  categories  of  staff of the erstwhile Board now Corporation.

The said objection petition was dismissed by a reason of an Order  

dated 23-08-2005 passed by the learned Executing Court upon considering  

the findings of the Trial Court in the suit, stating :

“It  is  apparent  from  the  bare  reading  of  the  aforesaid findings that the grant of pay scales of  Rs.1400-2600/-  w.e.f.  24.10.1991  and  Rs.5000- 8000 w.e.f. 1.1.1996 was subject to the decision of  RSA No.800/1992.  It is not disputed that the said  RSA titled as Haryana State Electricity Board vs.  

4

Anil  Kapoor  and  others,  was  disposed  of  along  with civil writ petition No. 1632 of 1999 titled as  Anil  Kapoor  and  others  Vs.  Haryana  Power  Generation  Corporation  and  the  Hon’ble  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  vide  judgment  dated  9.10.2001  allowed  the  said  writ  petition  and  dismissed  appeal  no.800  of  1992.   Aggrieved  against  the  aforesaid  judgment  dated  9.10.2001,  the JD had preferred a Special Leave Petition No.  14609-14610/2002 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court  which  was  also  dismissed  on  that  20.1.2003.  Learned counsel for the JD has failed to bring on  record the fact that the judgment and decree dated  17.11.2000 was ever challenged in any competent  court of law, wherein the same was set aside or the  operation  of  the  said  judgment  was  ever  stayed.  Hence, the judgment and decree dated 17.11.2000  must be held to have attained finality.  Moreover,  JD has not claimed any lack of jurisdiction or legal  infirmity making the judgment  in question to  be  unexecutable.”  

7. A  revision  application  was  filed  thereagainst  which  by  reason  the  

impugned judgment has been dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the  

High Court.

8. Mr. Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants would  

submit  that  a mere declaratory decree  having been passed,  the  execution  

petition was not maintainable.

In any event, the learned counsel urged, no arrears of pay could have  

been granted for a period of more than three years.

9. Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  

respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment.

5

10. Indisputably, respondents herein in terms of judgment of the Punjab  

and Haryana High Court passed in RSA No.800 of 1992 titled as Haryana  

State Electricity Board Vs. Anil Kapoor and Ors. were said to be similarly  

situated and were granted the following higher grade/pay scales:

a) Rs.950-20-1150/25-1500 w.e.f. 1.1.1986

b) Rs.1200-30-1560/40-2040 w.e.f.1.5.1990

c) Rs.1400-2600 w.e.f.24.10.1991

d) Rs.5000-150-8000 w.e.f.1.1.1996.

11. Learned Subordinate Judge decreed the said suit inter alia holding that  

it was admitted that the respondents had been getting lesser pay as compared  

to other co-employees and thus on the basis of the principle of equal pay for  

equal work and being senior to the other employees cannot be deprived of  

the scales of pay allowed to their juniors.  

12. It was furthermore directed that plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to  

derive the benefit as ordered by the High Court which would be subject to  

the decision of RSA No.800 of 1992.  Indisputably RSA No. 88 of 1992 was  

dismissed by the High Court by a Judgment and Order dated 9-10-2001 and  

Special Leave Petition preferred thereagainst had also been dismissed.  

13. We  may  notice  that  a  first  appeal  preferred  against  the  original  

judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by the respondent was filed by  

the appellant only on 24-03-2005 which was dismissed on the ground of  

6

delay.   A  civil  revision  application  filed  thereagainst  had  also  been  

dismissed.

14. Concededly the decree passed by the civil court has attained finality.  

The only question which arises for consideration is as to whether having  

regard to the nature of the decree passed, it is executable.

A  decree,  as  is  well-known,  should  ordinarily  be  confined  to  the  

prayer  made  in  the  plaint.   We  have  noticed  hereinbefore,  that  the  

respondents  herein  not  only  prayed  for  a  declaration  in  regard  to  their  

entitlement  to  receive  a  higher  scale  of  pay  but  also  for  a  decree  of  

mandatory injunction in their favour directing them to release/pay the said  

higher  scales  of  pay.   They  had  prayed  for  grant  of  interest  on  the  

aforementioned amount.

15. The  entitlement  of  the  plaintiffs-respondents  to  receive  the  

emoluments in the scales of pay mentioned therein and the date from which  

they had been working was specified.

16. The learned Judge in no uncertain terms held that no interest shall be  

payable  thereupon.   Denial  of  payment  of  interest,  in  our  opinion,  is  

significant and the same leads to the conclusion that the court was conscious  

of the fact that not only plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to a declaration  

but also to a mandatory injunction.   

7

 But for the purpose of construction of a judgment, it must be read as a  

whole.  The issues framed in that  behalf  assumes  great  significance.   We  

have noticed, hereinbefore, that both the issues framed by the learned Trial  

Judge had correlation with the reliefs claimed for.   

In  U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v.  Assistant Commnr. Of  

Police (Traffic) Delhi [2009 (2) SCALE 526], this Court held:

“A decision is an authority, it is trite, for which it  decides  and  not  what  can  logically  be  deduced  therefrom.  This  wholesome  principle  is  equally  applicable  in  the  matter  of  construction  of  a  judgment. A judgment is not to be construed as a  statute. It must be construed upon reading the same  as  a  whole.  For  the  said  purpose,  the  attending  circumstances  may  also  be  taken  into  consideration.”  

17. Thus, when a relief had been granted upon taking into consideration  

not only the declaratory relief prayed for but also the relief for mandatory  

injunction,  we  are  of  the  opinion,  that  the  learned  trial  judge  and  

consequently the High Court were correct in their views.

18. Furthermore it  is  beyond any doubt or  dispute  that  the decree was  

passed having regard to the decision of the court in Anil Kapoor’s case.  In  

the  said  case,  Anil  Kapoor  not  only  filed  the  suit  but  also  filed  a  writ  

petition.

8

Once the decision in Anil Kapoor’s case was followed that not only  

they would be entitled to scale of pay but also the other reliefs prayed for by  

them, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the fact  

that  Anil  Kapoor and various other  persons being junior  to the plaintiffs  

having been held to be entitled to a relief, respondents were also held to be  

entitled to the same relief.

This court furthermore in State of M.P. v. Mangilal Sharma [(1998) 2  

SCC 510] categorically held as under :

“6. A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the  decree holder vis-a-vis the judgment debtor and does not  in terms direct the judgment-debtor to do or refrain from  doing  any particular  act  or  thing.  Since  in  the  present  case decree does not direct reinstatement or payment of  arrears of salary the executing court could not issue any  process for the purpose as that would be going outside or  beyond the decree.  Respondent as a decree holder was  free to seek his remedy for arrears of salary in the suit for  declaration.  The  executing  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  direct payment of salary or grant any other consequential  relief which does not flow directly and necessarily from  the  declaratory  decree.  It  is  not  that  if  in  a  suit  for  declaration  where  the  plaintiff  is  able  to  seek  further  relief he must seek that relief though he may not be in  need of that further relief. In the present suit the plaintiff  while seeking relief of declaration would certainly have  asked for other reliefs like the reinstatement,  arrears of  salary  and  consequential  benefits.  He  was  however,  satisfied  with  a  relief  of  declaration  knowing  that  the  Government  would  honour  the  decree  and  would  reinstate him. We will therefore assume that the suit for  mere  declaration  filed  by  the  respondent-plaintiff  was  

9

maintainable,  as  the  question  of  maintainability  of  the  suit is not in issue before us.”

However in that case as the decree for reinstatement and back wages  

had not been granted, the court opined that the Executing Court cannot grant  

a further relief.  Herein, however, as noticed, the respondents not only had  

prayed for a declaratory decree but also decree for mandatory injunction.

19. Mr.  Jain  has  relied  upon  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  Bhawarlal  

Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises [(1999) 1 SCC  

558].  Therein the decree was passed by a court lacking inherent jurisdiction  

and in that situation this court considered as to whether a decree passed by a  

court wholly without jurisdiction would be a nullity to hold:

“10. The aforesaid decision of this Court squarely  applies to the facts of the present case. This is not a  case in which the award decree on the face of it  was shown to be without jurisdiction. Even if the  decree was passed beyond the period of limitation,  it  would  be  an  error  of  law or  at  the  highest  a  wrong decision which can be corrected in appellate  proceedings and not by the executing court which  was bound by such decree. It is not the case of the  respondent that the Court which passed the decree  was  lacking  inherent  jurisdiction  to  pass  such  a  decree.  This  becomes  all  the  more  so  when  the  respondent  did  not  think  it  fit  to  file  objection  against  the  award which was sought  to be made  rule of the court.”

It is on that premise the question which has been raised by Mr. Jain  

that the court could not have passed a decree for back wages for a period of  

10

more than three years assumes importance.  Whether by reason of the decree  

the respondents would be getting some amount by way of backwages for a  

period of more than three years would depend upon the facts of each case.  It  

would also depend upon the date on which the cause of action of suit arose.  

20. As indicated hereinbefore, for the purpose of allowing an objection  

filed on behalf of a judgment debtor under Section 47 of the Code of Civil  

Procedure, it was incumbent on him to show that the decree was ex facie  

nullity.  For the said purpose, the court is precluded from making an indepth  

scrutiny as regards the entitlement of the plaintiff with reference to not only  

his claim made in the plaint but also the defence set up by the judgment -  

debtor.  As the judgment of the Trial Court could not have been reopened,  

the correctness thereof could not have been put to question.   

It is also well-known that an Executing Court cannot go behind the  

decree.  If on a fair interpretation of the judgment, Order and decree passed  

by a court having appropriate jurisdiction in that behalf, the reliefs  sought  

for by the plaintiff appear to have been granted, there is no reason as to why  

the  Executing  Court  shall  deprive  him  from  obtaining  the  fruits  of  the  

decree.   

In Deepa Bhargava v. Mahesh Bhargava [2008 (16) SCALE 305], this  

Court held as under:

11

“11…An executing court, it is well known, cannot  go  behind  the  decree.   It  has  no  jurisdiction  to  modify a decree.  It must execute the decree as it  is.   A default  clause contained  in  a  compromise  decree even otherwise would not be considered to  be penal in nature so as to attract the provisions of  Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act.”

21. It is also not a case where this Court can exercise its jurisdiction under  

Article  142 of  the  Constitution of  India  to  mould  an order.   The decree  

passed by the learned Trial Court has attained finality.  Whether rightly or  

wrongly, the judgment of the learned Trial Judge has been affirmed by this  

Court.  It is one thing to say that no right having crystalised in favour of a  

party to the lis, this Court can mould the relief appropriately, but it is another  

thing to say that despite the decree being found to be an executable one, this  

Court will refuse to direct execution thereof.

22. We are not oblivious of the fact that the respondents legally would not  

have been entitled to the reliefs prayed for by them.  However, as a decree  

has been passed, we do not intend to go behind the same.  The Executing  

Court  shall,  it  goes  without  saying,  execute  the  decree  strictly  in  terms  

thereof.

12

23. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this case.  The  

appeal is dismissed.  However, in the facts and circumstances of the case,  

there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………J.     [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; May 06, 2009             

13