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PETITIONER: HARSHAD SINGH @ BABA PAHALVAN SINGH THAKURA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/09/1976

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BHAGWATI, P.N. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1977 AIR  710            1977 SCR  (1) 626  1976 SCC  (4) 640  CITATOR INFO :  C          1991 SC 318  (9)

ACT:             Indian Penal Code, S. 34--Specific evidence for  inflic-         tion of fatal wound not required---Community of intent  with         participatory presence fixes constructive liability.             Practice  and procedure--Interference with  findings  on         reliability of evidence only in exceptional circumstances.

HEADNOTE:             Four  persons were tried by the Sessions COurt  for  of-         fences punishable under s. 302 read with s. 34 I.P.C. and s.         135  of  the  Bombay Police Act.  Two of  the  accused  were         acquitted  by the Sessions Court and one by the High  Court,         having been given the benefit of doubt of identity.             The appellant contended before this Court that there was         no specific evidence of his having inflicted the fatal stab,         and  also  that  since three out of the  four  accused  were         acquitted  the invocation of s. 34 was  impermissible.   The         findings  on  the reliability of evidence  were  also  ques-         tioned.         Dismissing the appeal, the Court             HELD:  (1) When a murderous assault by many  bands  with         many  knives has ended fatally, it is legally  impermissible         to  dissect  the serious ones from the others  and  seek  to         salvage  those whose stabs have not proved fatal.  The  cir-         cumstance  that one man’s stab fails on a less or more  vul-         nerable  part  of the person of the victim is of  no  conse-         quence  to  fix  the guilt for murder. S.  34  I.P.C.  fixes         constructive  liability in case of community of intent  cou-         pled  with participatory presence or operation, and even  if         some of several accused are acquitted but the  participating         presence  of a plurality of assailants is proved,  the  con-         joint culpability for the crime is inescapable.  [629B-D, F]             Amir  Hussain  v. State of U.P.A.I.R.  1975  S.C.  2211,         Maina  Singh  v. Stare of Rajasthan, A.ER. 1976  S.C.  1084.         Classic legal sbortband for  constructive criminal liability         by Lord Sumner referred to.             (2) Only if there is perversity, miscarriage of justice,         shocking  misreading or gross-misapplication of  the  rules,         procedural  and  substantive, or other  exceptional  circum-

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       stances, the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be         invoked. [627A-C]

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 254         of 1976         (Appeal  by Special Leave from the Judgment  and       Order         dated  8-12-1975  of the Gujarat High Court in  Crl   Appeal         No.  557 of 1976).         L.C. Goyal for the Appellant.         G.A. Shah and Miss Radha Rangaswamy for the Respondent.  The         Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KRISHNA IYER, J.  Judicial summitry, when the subject of         dispute is re-appraisal of evidence even on the sophisticat-         ed  ground of misappreciation, has to submit itself to  cer-         tain self-restraining rules of         627         processual  symmetry.  The trial Court directly   sees   the         witnesses testify and tests their veracity in the raw.   The         appellate Court, enjoying co-extensive power of examination,         exercises  it  circumspectly, looks for errors of  probative         appraisal, oversight or omission  in the record and makes  a         better judgment on the totality of materials in the light of         established  rules of criminal jurisprudence.  As  the  case         ascends  higher,  forensic review is  more  rarefied.   Such         being the restrictive approach, the Supreme Court cannot  be         persuaded, without stultifying the system of our judicature,         to go over the ground of reading the evidence and interpret-         ing  it anew so as to uphold that which appeals to it  among         possible  alternative  views.    If  there  is   perversity,         miscarriage of justice, shocking misreading or  gross-misap-         plication  of  the rules, procedural  and  substantive,   we         interfere without hesitation.   Of course, other exceptional         circumstances  also may invoke  our   review   jurisdiction.         These   prefatory observations have become necessary  since,         usually appellants,  hopefully slurring over these jurisdic-         tional limitations, argue the whole way before us as if  the         entire evidence is at large for de novo ’examination.   Such         a procedure has been attempted in the present  case and, for         reasons  just mentioned, we arc disinclined to rip open  the         depositions to re-discover whether the evidence is  reliable         or not.         A  single survivor figures as the appellant before us,  from         among  four  persons who were tried by the  Sessions  Court,         Baroda, for .offences punishable under ss. 302 read with  s.         34 IPC and s. 135 of the Bombay Police Act.   Accused 3  and         4 secured acquittal before the Sessions Court and accused  2         won his appeal before the High Court.   Concurrent  findings         of  guilt  notwithstanding, the first  accused  has  secured         special leave by jail appeal.             Shri  L.C. Goyal, appearing as amicus curiae, has  urged         before  us that the appellant is entitled to acquittal  like         the re.st of the accused.  The few facts, to explain why  we         make  short  shrift  of  this case, may be  narrated.    The         murderous  episode, preceded  some days earlier by  a  minor         incident, which took place on February 7, 1974at about 10.30         p.m.   The  deceased Vasant and his friends  were  returning         from the side of a cinema house, Krishna Talkies.    Sitting         on the footpath and in keeping with the hour and the  compa-         ny, the group took hot drinks, the deceased having  consumed         considerable  potions.   The drunk was led by  his  comrades         towards  his  house  when  a  bunch  of  persons   including         the  .four  accused  confronted them.  A  tipsy  altercation

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       often sparks the plug of tantrums   and violence.   Here the         prosecution  version  is  that accused No. 1  Baba  and  the         deceased  Vasant  began the brawl with a heated  verbal  ex-         change, followed by mutual fisting but climaxed by the l  st         accused planting his knife on the left chest of the  victim.         The  others too joined in the attack, accused 2  with  knife         and accused 3 with fist. The last man only shouted to incite         them  into  giving  blows.   Hardly had  the  victim  Vasant         fallen  when the accused  assailants  took to  their  heels.         The  injured was shortly hospitalised but soon succumbed  to         his wounds.   Eye-witnesses testified, medical evidence  was         adduced and the homicide brought beyond reasonable doubt.         628             The  trial court had framed charges with offences  under         s.  302  read with s. 34 IPC.  The  post-mortem  certificate         revealed two transverse incised wounds penetrating the chest         cavity.     There were quite a few other incised  wounds  in         less lethal parts of the anatomy. However, in the opinion of         the  doctor all the injuries were antemortal and  the  chest         wounds  were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to         cause  death.    The deceased passed away due to  shock  and         haemorrhage  caused  by the stab wounds, especially  on  the         chest.             Both  the  courts below have affirmed in  substance  the         case  set  forth by the prosecution  about  the  occurrence.         Concurrent findings of fact carry considerable weight at the         Supreme  Court  level  that to shake  our  credence  is  too         demanding  a forensic  exercise.   Shri  Goyal  persistently         drew us into the details of testimony to persuade us into  a         contrary  conclusion from that recorded by the  trial  Court         and, after due examination, approved by the High Court.             While  the murder is the tragedy, the discovery  of  the         murderer  beyond doubt is the judicial function.    So  much         so,  the essential enquiry turned on who the culprits  were.         The  learned  Sessions Judge absolved accused nos. 3 and  ’4         of the offences on the score of absence of reliable evidence         on  record as regards any part played by accused nos. 3  and         4’.    Nevertheless,  he held accused nos. 1 and  2   to  be         guilty of jointly murdering Vasant taking the view that they         ’had taken under and unfair advantage of  the fact that  the         deceased  was  unarmed, and had acted in a cruel  manner  by         inflicting  7  or ’8 injuries with knives’.    The  sentence         that followed however was rigorous imprisonment for life  on         the  ameliorative circumstance that the attackers had  acted         in the heat of passion.   The High Court,. in fair discharge         of  its appellate function, sedulously studied the  evidence         bearing  on the murder and the murderers.   Hardly any  flaw         in appreciation has emerged from the argument of the counsel         for the appellant, in regard to the truth of the  occurrence         and  nothing short of grave mistakes or  palpable  omissions         can  induce us to dissent from this finding.   Even  so  the         High  Court has been at great pains to screen the  testimony         with  reference to their credibility, motivation and  proba-         bility so that their finding may not be faulty on the  score         of  insufficient evidence of involvement of any of  the  two         accused.  Such a searching scrutiny yielded fruitful  result         for the second accused and he drew the dividend of acquittal         at;  the High Court level on account    of mistakes  of  the         ’might-have-been’  category.   We express no opinion  as  to         whether  every dubious ’maybe’ or passing hesitancy  can  be         exalted  to  the  level of ’reasonable  doubt’  in  criminal         jurisprudence. The conviction of the guilty is as much  part         of  the  administration of justice as the acquittal  of  the         innocent.   The judicial art takes no sides where the  truth         is  in fair measure manifest.  Anyway, accused no. 2  having

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       been  acquitted, we are concerned with the solitary,  appel-         lant before us.             Counsel Shri Goyal pressed upon us what he regarded as a         surefire  contention that if there was no specific  evidence         of  the  appellant having inflicted the fatal  stab  on  the         chest he was entitled to share the         629         acquittal with the rest even if there was abundant proof  of         several  persons including him having set upon the  deceased         and  killed him using lethal weapons.  In the  present  case         more than one knife was used, more than., one man was in the         attacking party and more than one incised wound was inflict-         ed.   While  we  can make short work of  the  submission  by         holding,  as we d9, that there is clear testimony  that  the         chest  stab which was fatal in the ordinary course  was  the         handiwork of the appellant, we make the legal position clear         that when a murderous assault by many hands with many knives         has  ended fatally, it is legally impermissible  to  dissect         the  serious ones from the others and seek to salvage  those         whose  stabs have not proved fatal. When people’  play  with         knives and lives, the circumstance that one man’s stab falls         on  a  less  or more vulnerable part of the  person  of  the         victim  is  of no consequence to fix the guilt  for  murder.         Conjoint complicity is the inevitable inference when a  gory         group  animated  by lethal intent accomplish  their  purpose         cumulatively.   Section 34 IPC fixing constructive liability         conclusively  silences such a refined plea  of  extrication.         (See Amir Hussain v. State of U.P. C), Maina Singh v.  State         of  Rajasthan(2).  Lord Sumner’s classic legal shothand  for         constructive criminal liability, expressed  in the  Miltonic         verse  ’They also serve who only stand and wait’ a  Jortiori         embraces cases of common intent instantly formed, triggering         a  plurality  of persons into an adventure  in  criminality,         some  hitting, some missing, some spletting  hostile  heads,         some spilling drops of blood.  Guilt goes with community  of         intent coupled with participatory presence or operation.  No         finer  juristic  niceties  can be pressed  into  service  to         nullify or jettison the plain punitive purpose of the  Penal         Code.         Counsel also argued that since three out of the four accused         have secured acquittal the invocation of s. 34 is  impermis-         sible.    The  flaw     this submission  is  obvious.    The         Courts have given the benefit of doubt of identity but  have         not  held that there was only one assailant in the  criminal         attack.   The proposition is plain that even if some out  of         several accused are acquitted but the participating presence         of a plurality of assailants is proved, the conjoint  culpa-         bility for the crime is inescapable.   Not that the story of         more  than one person having attacked the victim  is  false,         but that the identity of the absolved accused is not  firmly         fixed  as   criminal  participants.  Therefore   it  follows         that  such of them, even if the number dwindled to  one,  as         are  shown  by sure evidence to have  knifed  the  deceased,         deserve to be convicted for the principal offence read  with         the constructive provision.             We therefore hold that the appeal deserves to be and  is         hereby  dismissed.    We  appreciate  the  unsuccessful  but         industrious  enthusiasm of Shri L.C. Goyal who has served as         amicus curiae.             Before parting with this case we may draw attention to a         sociological  thought.    There is evidence in the  case  of         high  spirits   and consumption of  alcohol.    Intoxicating         beverages subvert sobriety and         (1) A.I.R. 1975 Sc7 2211.         (2) AIR 1976 SC 1084.

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       630         the drinking habit which begins with enjoyment of exuberance         escalates into consumption of intemperate potions by  tempt-         ing   degrees  ultimately holding  the  bacchanalian  votary         captive.   The deleterious nexus between alcohol and violent         crime  is  fairly  obvious  and  these  days,  when  drunken         delicts  and delinquencies are alarmingly on  the  increase,         the  State must be doubly concerned to control  intoxicating         liquors as part of the strategy of defusing crime  explosion         and as proof of bearing true faith and allegiance to Art. 47         of the Directive Principles of State Policy.         MR                                             Appeal   dis-         missed.         631