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PETITIONER: HARINAGAR CANE FARM AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/03/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS

CITATION:  1964 AIR  903            1964 SCR  (2) 458  CITATOR INFO :  E          1968 SC 554  (15,21)  R          1971 SC2422  (25)  R          1972 SC 763  (12)

ACT: Industrial  Dispute-Agricultural operation,  if  constitutes "Industry"-Indusrial Disutes Act 1947 (14 of 1947) s. 2(j).

HEADNOTE: The  appellant in appeal C. A. No. 31 of 1961 is  a  private limited  company registered under the Indian Companies  Act. It mainly produces sugarance.  It also produces wheat, paddy etc.,  for  sale  in  the  market.   Further  it  undertakes contract  works  for maintaining tram lines,  weigh  bridge, etc.   The appellant in the other appeal has been  purchased by Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. and since then is  functioning as a department of the said Mills.  459 An   industrial  dispute  raised  by  the  workmen  of   the respective appellants had been referred by respondent No.  1 the   State   of  Bihar  to  an  industrial   tribunal   for adjudication.   The  appellants moved the Patna  High  Court under Art. 226 on the ground  that     the      agricultural operations carried on by the appellantsdid  not  constitute art industry and therefore respondent No. 1had          no jurisdiction  to  refer the dispute for  adjudication.   The High  Court  repelled  this  contention  and  rejected   the petition.   The  present appeals have been filed by  way  of special leave granted by this Court. It was contented on behalf of the appellant that the  legis- lative  history  for  the  past 50  year-  in  this  country including  Art.  43  of the Constitution  and  the  relevant entries in the constitution show that a sharp distinction is drawn  between industry on the one hand and  agriculture  on the  other and that where, the legislature wants to  include agriculture  within tile scope of industrial legislation  it makes a specific and express provisions on that behalf. The respondents relying on s. 2(g) of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, contended that this important statutory enactment  for the benefit of workers expressly includes within its purview workmen employed in agriculture.  It was con. tended on  the

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other side that the word ,industry’ in s. 2(j) in its  broad connotation  would include agriculture and  the  legislature had  intended to exclude agriculture from the scope of s.  2 (j) it would have expressly done so. Held  that  in dealing with  industrial  matters  industrial adjudication  should referain from enunciating  any  general principles  or adopting any doctrinaire  considerations  and therefore the large question as to whether all  agricultural operations are included within the definition of s. 2 (j) is not decided in this case. On examination of the facts of these cases before the  court it is found that the appellants are limited companies  which have  been  formed, inter alia, for the express  purpose  of carrying  on trade or business, they have invested  a  large amount  of  capital  for  carrying  on  their   agricultural operations in order to make profit and the workmen  employed by   the   appellants  contribute  to  the   production   of agricultural  commodities which bring in profit.   In  these circumstances  even the narrow concept of trade or  business is  satisfied and the agricultural operations carried on  by the  appellants fall within the definition of "industry"  in s. 2 (j). 460 Case Law reviewed. D.N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, [1953] S. C. R. 302. The State  of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, [1960] 2  S. C.   R.   866,  The  Ahmedabad  Textile   Industry   Reseach Association  v. The State of Bombay, [1961] 2 S. C. R.  480, National  Union  of  Commercial Employees v.  M.  R.  Meher, Industrial  Tribunal, Bombay, [1962] Supp. 3 S. C.  R.  157, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 349 of  1962 and 31 of 1961. Appeals  by special leave from the judgment and order  dated November  18, 1959, of the Patna High Court in  Misc.  judl. Cases No. 287 and 498 of 1958. Ganpat Rai and Lalit Kumar, for the appellant (in C. A.  No. 349 of 1962). M.C.  Setalvad, and Naunit Lal, for the appellant (in  C. A. No. 31 of 1961). D.  Goburdhun, for respondent (in C. A. No. 349 of 62). M.   K.  Ramamurthi,  S. C. Agarwala, D. P. Singh  and  R.K. Gary, for respondent No. 3 (in C. A. No. 349 of 1962). S.P. Varma, for respondent No. 1 (in C. A. No. 31 of 1961). P.   K. Chatterjee, for respondent No. 3 (in C.   A. No.  31 of 1961). 1963.  March 21.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-The short question which arises in  these appeals is whether the agricultural operations carried on by the  two  appellants  respectively  constitute  an  industry within the meaning  461 of  s. 2 (j) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (No. 14  of 1947) (hereinafter called ’the Act’).  An industrial dispute raised  by the workmen of the two respective appellants  had been  referred  for adjudication by respondent  No.  1,  the State of Bihar, to an Industrial Tribunal under s. 10 (1) of the  Act.   Both the appellants then moved  the  Patna  High Court  for  an  appropriate  writ  under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution on the ground that the agricultural  operations carried on by them did not constitute an industry under  the

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Act,  and so, respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction  to  make the  impugned  orders of reference under s. 10 of  the  Act. The  High  Court has repelled this contention and  has  held that   the  agricultural  operations  carried  on   by   the appellants respectively constitute an industry, and so,  the two  impugned orders of reference are perfectly valid  under s. 10.  It is against these orders passed by the Patna  High Court  in the two petitions filed by the respective  appell- nts that they have come to this Court by special leave;  and the short question which falls for our decision is in regard to  the  applicability  of  s.  2 (j)  of  the  Act  to  the appellant’s operations in question. M/s.   Motipur  Zamindari  Co. (Pvt.)  Ltd.,  which  is  the appellant  in  C.  A. No. 31 of 1961 is  a  private  limited company  registered  under  the Indian  Companies  Act.   It mainly produces sugarcane for sale to Motipur Sugar  Factory Private  Ltd.,  Motipur,  Muffarpur,  in  pursuance  of   an agreement under the provisions of the Bihar Sugar  Factories Control Act, 1937, and the rules framed thereunder.  It also produces  wheat,  paddy and other articles for sale  in  the market  either  to the consumers or  to  wholesale  dealers. Besides,  it undertakes contract work of the  Motipur  Sugar Factory,  such as maintaining tramlines,  maintaining  weigh bridge  at  Paharchak,  operating  lake-pumps,  loading  and unloading of canes and letting buildings on hire. 462 M/s.   Harinagar Cane Farm which is the appellant in  C.  A. No. 349 of 1962), had been purchased by the Harinagar  Sugar Mills Ltd., in March, 1956, and since then is functioning as a department of the said Mills.  It is a subsidiary  concern of  the  Mills and a part of the Organisation of  the  Mills itself.  Thus, the Mills through this section produces sugar for  its  own  purpose,  It is in  the  background  of  this character  of  the respective appellants that  the  question raised by the present appeals has to be determined. Mr. Setalvad for the appellants contends that in determining the  question  as to whether s. 2 (j) of  the  Act  includes agricultural  operations, it would be necessary to  bear  in mind  certain general considerations.  He concedes that  the words  used in s. 2 (j), if they are liberally construed  in their  fullest  amplitude,  may perhaps be  wide  enough  to include  agriculture  and agricultural  operations;  but  he emphasises  the fact that the legislative history  for  more than  (50  )  years  in this  country  shows  that  a  sharp distinction  is drawn between industry on the one  hand  and agriculture on the other.  In this connection, lie relies on the  provisions of Art. 43 of the Constitution which  refers to workers classified as agricultural, industrial, or other- wise  when  it provides that the State  shall  endeavour  to secure, by suitable legislation or economic organisation  or in  any  other way, to all worker a living  wage  and  other amenities  specified in the said Article.  The argument  is, when referring to workers, the Con stitution has  recognised a  difference between agricultural workers on the  one  hand and industrial workers on the other.  It is also pointed out that the same distinction is made in the relevant entries in the different Lists of the Seventh Schedule.  Entries 14 and 18  in the State List, for instance, refer  respectively  to agriculture, including- agricultural education and research, projection  against pests and prevention of plant  diseases, and land, that is to say, rights in or  463 over  land, land tenures including the relation of  landlord and  tenant,  and  the collection  of  rents;  transfer  and alienation  of  agricultural  land;  land  improvement   and

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agricultural loans; colonization, whereas Entry 24 refers to industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and 52  of List  1.  Reliance  is  also  placed  on  Entry  22  in  the Concurrent  List which relates to Trade  Unions;  industrial and  labour disputes.  The argument is that agriculture  has been  left,  in the main, to the jurisdiction of  the  State Legislatures  and  in  doing  so,  a  distinction  has  been recognised between agriculture on the one hand and  industry on  the  other.   It is further  suggested  that  where  the legislature wants to include agriculture within the scope of its industrial legislation, it makes a specific and  express provision  in that behalf; and in support of this  argument, reliance  is  placed on the provisions of s.  3(19)  of  the Bombay  Industrial  Relations Act, 1946 (No.  XI  of  1994). Section  3(19)  which  defines an  industry,  provides  that ’industry’  means, inter alia, agriculture and  agricultural operations.   Mr. Setalvad, therefore, argues that  if  this broad distinction between agriculture and industry is  borne in mind, it should not be difficult to exclude  agricultural operations  from  t purview of s. 2(j) of the Act.   He  has also askes us to take into account the fact that if we  were to  hold  that all agriculture and  agricultural  operations fell  within  s. 2 (j), it may have an  incalculable  impact upon the agricultural economy of this country.  There is, no doubt, considerable force in this argument. On the other hand, it has been urged by the respondents that it  would  be erroneous to suggest that the  industrial  law enacted  by the Act intends to exclude from  application  of its  beneficient  provisions  agriculture  and  agricultural operations.  In support of this argument, reliance is placed on the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act (No. 11 of 1948). Section 2 (g) of this Act defines "scheduled employment" 464 as  meaning an employment specified in the Sehedule, or  any process  or branch of work forming part of such  employment; and  when we turn to part 11 of the Schedule,  it  expressly provides:  employment in agriculture, that is to say,  inter alia,  in any form of farming including the cultivation  and tillage   of  the  soil,  dairy  farming   the   production, Cultivation,  growing and harvesting of any agricultural  or hortiCultural  commodity.   This  shows  that  one  of   the important  statutory  enactments Passed for the  benefit  of workers  expressly  includes  with in  its  purview  workers employed  in  agriculture  as  defined in  part  II  of  the Schedule. Similarly,  it is urged that where the legislature wants  to exclude   agriculture   from   the   scope   of   industrial legislation,  it  sometimes takes care to  make  a  specific provision in that behalf; and this argument is sought to  be supported   by   reference  to  s.  4  of   the   Australian Commonwealth  Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1901,  which defines  an  "’industrial dispute" as meaning a  dispute  in relation                    to                    industrial matters..................................  extending  beyond the  limits of any one State including disputes in  relation to  employment  upon  State  railway  or  to  employment  in industries  carried  on  by  or under  the  control  of  the Commonwealth or a State or any public authority  constituted under the Commonwealth or a St ate; but it does not  include dispute relating to employment in any agricultural, viticul- tural, horticultural, or dairying persuitt.  The argument is that  the word ’industry, in its broadest connotation  which is intended by s. 2(j) would include agriculture, and if the Legislature had intended that agriculture should be excluded from the scope of the said definition, it would have adopted

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the precedent of the Australian law while enacting s.  2(i). According  to this argument, the provisions of s.  3(19)  of the  Bombay Act are merely clarificatory and  they  indicate that the legislature made an 465 express  provision  for including agriculture  in  order  to avoid any doubt in the matter.  The respondents,  therefore, contend  that there is no reason why the Court should  limit or  circumscribe  the  broad and wide meaning  of  the  word ’industry’ as defined in s. 2 (j). The  respondents also relied on the provisions contained  in cl.  (iii)  of  the explanation to s. 25 A  of  the  Act  in support  of the argument that agriculture must be deemed  to be  included  within the meaning of s. 2 (j).   Section  25A occurs   in  Chapter  V-A  which  deals  with  lay-off   and retrenchment.  It lays down that the provisions contained in ss.  25C  to 25E in the said Chapter will not apply  to  the industrial  establishments specified by cls. (a) and (b)  of s.  25A  (1)  and the explanation  defines  what  industrial establishment  means in ss. 25A, 25C, 25D and  25E.   Clause (iii)   of  this  explanation  shows  that  the   expression "industrial establishment" in the relevant provisions  means a  plantation  as  defined  in  cl.  (f)  of  s.  2  of  the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 (69 of 1951).  When we turn  to the  provisions of this section we find that a  "plantation’ means  any plantation to which the said Act  applies  either wholly  or in part, and includes other establishments  which it  is  unnecessary  to  refer-.   Section  1,  sub-s.   (4) indicates  to what plantations the said Act applies.  It  is thus  clear  that the plantations to which  the  Plantations Labour  Act, 1951 applies are expressly included within  the expression ",industrial establishments as explained -by  the explanation to s. 25A of the Act.  The argument is that this explanation indicates that agriculture of which  plantations are  a  part,  is  not intended  to  be  excluded  from  the operation of the Act. In  dealing with the present appeals, we do not  propose  to decide the large question as to whether ;ill agriculture and operations connected with it are 466 included  within  the definition of s. 2 (j).   As  we  have repeatedly  emphasised, in dealing with industrial  matters, industrial adjudication should refrain from enunciating  any general    principles    or   adopting    any    doctrinaire considerations.     It   is   desirable   that    industrial adjudication  should  deal with problems as  and  when  they arise and confine its decisions to the points which strictly arise on the pleadings between the parties.  If in  reaching any  conclusion while dealing with the narrow aspect  raised by  the  parties before it, industrial adjudication  has  to evolve some principle, it should and must, no doubt, attempt to  do  so, but in evolving the principle,  care  should  be taken not to lay down an unduly general or broad proposition which  may  affect  facts and circumstances  which  arc  not before  industrial adjudication in the particular case  with which  it is concerned.  Bearing in mind the  importance  of adopting  this approach in dealing with industrial  matters, we  propose to deal with the narrow question as  to  whether agricultural  operations  carried on by the  two  appellants constitute an industry under s. 2 (j) or not. appellate here is  no  doubt  that  for  carrying  ,  on  the  agricultural operations,  the appellants have invested a large amount  of capital,  and  it is not disputed that the  appellants  have invested   capital  for  carrying  on   their   agricultural operations  for the purpose of making profits.  It  is  also

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common ground that the workmen employed by the appellants in their respective operations contribute to the production  of agricultural  commodities  which  bring  in  profit  to  the appellants.    Therefore,   even  the   narrow   traditional requirements  of  the concept of trade or business  are,  in that sense, satisfied by the agricultural operations of  the appellants. What  is more important in the present appeals is  that  the appellants  are  limited companies which have  been  formed, inter alia, for the express purpose  467 of  carrying  on agricultural trade or  business.   We  have noticed  how the agricultural operations carried on  by  the appellants  are within their objects, and so, there  is  no- difficulty whatever in holding that the said operations  are organised  by  the appellants and carried on by  them  as  a trade  or  business  would be carried on by  any  trader  or businessman.   When a company is formed for the  purpose  of carrying  on  an agricultural operation, it is  carrying  on trade  or  business  and  a plea  raised  by  it  that  this organised  trade or business does not fall within s.  2  (j) simply and solely for the reason that it is an  agricultural operation,  cannot  be sustained.  Incidentally, it  may  be relevant to refer to the fact that in resisting the argument urged by its workmen against the competence of Mr. Sinha  to appear  for it, the appellant Motipur Zamindari  Co.,  Ltd., stated before the Tribunal that the Sugar Mills  Association of  which  Mr.  Sinha  happens to  be  an  office-bearer  is connected ’With the industry in which the Zamindari Co.,  is engaged,  and  so, Mr. Sinha had a right  to  represent  the management  of the appellant in the proceedings  before  the Tribunal.   In  other  words, it  is  significant  that  the appellant  expressly  admitted  that it was a  part  of  the industry, the Association of which had employed Mr. Sinha as its office-bearer.  Apart from this aspect, however, we have no  hesitation in holding that the High Court was  right  in coming  to the conclusion that the  agricultural  operations carried on by the two respective appellants are an  industry under s. 2 (j). Before  we  part with these appeals, we may  refer  to  four decisions  of  this  Court  where  this  question  has  been considered.  In D. N. Baneerji v. P. -B. Mukherjee (1), this Court had occasion to examine the  full   significance   and import of the words "industy’and   industrial  dispute’   as defined by s. 2 (j) and (k)   of the Act.  It has been urged by  the  respondents  that  this  decision  supports   their argument that (1) [1953] S.C.R.302,307. 468 s.2  (j)  includes all agriculture and  agricaltural  opera- tions, and in support of this proposition, they have invited our attention to the statement in the judgment delivered  by Chandrasekhara  Aiyar  J.,  where it is  observed  that  the concept  of  industry  in the  ordinary  nontechnical  sense applies even to agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture  and so on and so forth.  We are not impressed by this  argument. The  context  in which this sentence occurs shows  that  the Court was there dealing with the ordinary nontechnical sense according to what is understood by the man in the street  as the  denotation of the word ’industry’ or business, and  so, the observations made in that connection cannot be taken  to amount  to  the  broad  and  unqualified  proposition   that agriculture  of  all  kinds is included in S.  2  (j).   The decision  in  that case was that disputes that  might  arise between  municipalities and their employees in  branches  of

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work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying on  of a  trade or business, fall under s. 2(k) of the Act.  It  is in the light of this decision that the observations on which the respondents rely must be read. In  the State of Bombay v. The Hosptial Mazdoor  Sabha  (1), this  Court  has  had occasion to  examine  elaborately  the implications  of the concept of industry as defined by s.  2 (j).    But  it  may  be  pointed  out  that  one   of   the considerations which weighed with this Court in dealing with the dispute raised by the appellant in that case was that in the  first Schedule to the Act which  enumerates  industries which  may be declared as public utility service under s.  2 (a)  (vi), three entries had been added by Act 36  of  1956. One of these was services in hospitals and dispensaries, and so,  it  was clear that after the addition of  the  relevant entry  in the First Schedule it would not have been open  to anybody  to suggest that service in hospitals does not  fall under s. 2 (j). In The Ahmedabad Textile Industry’s Research Association  v. The State of Bombay (2), this Court (1) [1960] 2 S.C.R. 866, 880. (2) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 480,  469 held  that  the  activities  of  the  Research   Association amounted  to  an industry, because the manner in  which  the Association  had been organised showed that the  undertaking as a whole was in the nature of business and trade organised with  the  object  of discovering ways and  means  by  which member-mills  may obtain larger profits in  connection  with their  industries.  In other words, though the work was  one of  research and in that sense, of an intellectual type,  it had been so organised as to form part of or a department  of the  textile industry itself.  That is why it was held  that the appellant in that case was an employer and his  activity was an industrial activity within the meaning of s. 2 (j). On  the  other hand, the decision in the  case  of  National Union  of  Commercial Employees v. M. R.  Mehar,  Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1), was cited, where this Court was called upon  to consider whether the office of a  solicitor’s  firm was  an  employer and the work carried on in his  office  an industry  under s. 2 (j) : it was held that though the  work of Solicitor is, in a loose sense, business, it could not be treated as an industry under s. 2 (j) because the  essential attribute of an industrial dispute was lacking in such case; the  essential  basis  of  an  industrial  dispute,  it  was observed,  is that it is a dispute arising  between  capital and  labour in enterprises where capital and labour  combine to produce commodities or to render service, and that  could hardly be predicated about a liberal profession like that of a Solicitor.  A person following a liberal profession cannot be  said  to carry on his profession in any  rational  sense with the active co-operation of his employees, because it is well-known that the main capital which a person following  a liberal  profession contributes is his special  or  peculiar intellectual  and  educational equipment.  It  is  on  these grounds  that  the  Act was held to  be  inapplicable  to  a solicitor’s firm.  We have referred to these decisions  only to emphasise the point that this (1)  [1962] Supp. 3 S.C,R. 157. 470 Court  has  consistently refrained from laying  down  unduly broad  or  categorical  propositions  in  dealing  with  the somewhat  difficult disputes which the definition  contained in  s. 2 (j) raises before industrial adjudication.  In  the present  case,  the  dispute raised  lies  within  a  narrow

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compass and it is on that narrow basis that we have  decided it. In  the  result,  the appeals fail and  are  dismissed  with costs.                           Appeals dismissed.