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PETITIONER: HARI NARAIN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BADRI DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/03/1963

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1558            1964 SCR  (2) 203  CITATOR INFO :  R          1964 SC 345  (9)  RF         1969 SC1273  (3)  R          1971 SC 281  (8)  F          1973 SC2056  (15)  F          1974 SC 950  (8)  R          1978 SC 765  (9)

ACT: Supreme  Court Practice-Revocation of Special Leave  granted earlier  by Supreme Court-Effect of inaccurate,  untrue  and misleading statements in_Petition for Special Leave.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent  filed  a  suit for  the  ejectment  of  the appellant.  That suit was dismissed by the trial Court.  The respondent  filed an appeal in the Court of  the  Additional Sessionsjudge,Jaipur City.  The appeal was accepted and  the claim   of  respondent  for  ejectment  was  allowed.    The appellant  filed an appeal in the Rajasthan High Court,  but that was dismissed.  The High Court also refused to grant  a certificate  of  fitness  to  appeal  to  this  Court.   The appellant  filed a petition for Special Leave to  appeal  to this Court and the same was allowed. 204 The respondent filed a petition in this Court with a  prayer that  Special Leave granted to the appellant be  revoked  on the  ground that the appellant had made  inaccurate,  untrue and misleading statements in the petition for Special Leave. This  Court also found that the appellant had  made  certain wholly untrue statements in the petition for Special Leave. Held,  that Special Leave granted to the appellant ought  to be  revoked and the appeal dismissed.  It was observed  that it  was  of  utmost  importance  that  in  making   material statements  and  setting forth grounds in  applications  for special leave, care must be taken not to make any statements which  are  inaccurate, untrue and misleading.   In  dealing with  applications  for  special  leave,  this  Court  takes statements  of  fact and grounds of fact  contained  in  the petitions  at  their face value and it would  be  unfair  to betray  the  confidence of this Court by  making  statements which are untrue and misleading.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION’ : Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1963. From  the  judgment and decree dated July 30, 1962,  of  the Rajasthan High Court in Civil Regular S.     A.  No. 223  of 1961. M.   C.  Setalvad,  S.  T.  Desai and  Naunit  Lal  for  the appellant. G.   S. Pathak and S. N. Andley, for the respondent. 1963.  March 4. The judgment of the court was delivered by GAJENDRAGADKAR  J.-It  is  not necessary to  deal  with  the merits  of  the points which the appellant wanted  to  raise before  us in this appeal because we are satisfied that  the respondent’s  prayer that the special leave granted  to  the appellant should be revoked, is well-founded.  The appellant is  a tenant of the premises in suit which are owned by  the respondent.  These premises were let out to the appellant 205 by the respondent under a rent-note executed on December  8, 1953.  The appellant was permitted to use the said  premises for his Oil Mill.  The terms of the lease provided that  the appellant was to pay to the respondent the agreed rent every month  and  in  case  of  default  for  three  months,   the respondent  was entitled to evict the appellant  before  the expiry of the stipulated period which was five years, and in that  case  he was entitled also to claim the rent  for  the remaining period. On  May  2,  1959, the respondent  sued  the  appellant  for ejectment  in  the Court of Munsif, East  Jaipur  City.   He alleged that he had received the rent from the appellant  up to  October 31, 1957 and that thereafter the  appellant  had defaulted  in  the  payment of rent  in  spite  of  repeated demands,  and  that even at the date of the suit he  was  in arrears  of  rent  and  had failed  to  pay  the  house  tax according   to  the  agreement.   His  case  was  that   the appellant’s  tenancy  had  expired on December  1,  1958  by efflux  of  time, but the appellant nevertheless  failed  to deliver  over possession of the premises to the  respondent. He,  however, purported to deposit a lump sum of Rs.  1053/- to  cover the period from November 1, 1957 to  November  30, 1958  which was due from him.  The respondent  pleaded  that the appellant had committed more than three defaults in  the payment  of rent of two months each during the period of  18 months  and that even -at the date of the suit, the rent  or mesne  profits for 5 months and 2 days still remained to  be paid.  That is the basis on which a decree for ejectment was claimed by the respondent against the appellant. The appellant denied the respondent’s claim and alleged that the  respondent was not entitled to claim ejectment  against him  by virtue of the provisions of section 13(1)(a) of  the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent arid Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act XVII 206 of 1950) (hereinafter called the Act).  He also pleaded that by virtue of the fact that the respondent had accepted  rent paid by the appellant, he had waived his right to evict him. In  other words, he denied that there was any  default,  and resisted the respondent’s prayer for his ejectment.  At  the date  of the first hearing of the suit in the  trial  Court, the appellant deposited Rs. 648/- on account of rent due  up to  the said date and the said payment was accepted  by  the respondent without prejudice. On  these  pleadings, the learned trial  judge  framed  four

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issues, the principal issue being whether the appellant  had committed three defaults of two months within the period  of 18 months in the payment of rent ? The finding of the  trial Court  on  the  said issue as well as on  the  other  issues framed by it was in favour of the appellant.  In the result, the respondent’s suit was dismissed. The  respondent then preferred an appeal in the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Jaipur City.  The appellate Court held  that on the facts proved by the respondent, the  three defaults had been committed by the appellant, and so, he was entitled to a decree for ejectment.  On these findings,  the decree  passed  by  the trial Court was set  aside  and  the respondent’s claim for ejectment was allowed. The  appellant  challenged  this decision  by  preferring  a second appeal before the Rajasthan High Court.  This  appeal was  heard by a learned single judge of the said High  Court and  was  dismissed. The appellant’s request  for  leave  to prefer  an appeal under Letters Patent was rejected  by  the learned  Judge.  It is against the decision of  the  learned single judge in second appeal that the appellant applied for and obtained special leave to appeal to this Court.  207 The  main  point which the appellant wanted to  urge  before this  Court was in regard to the construction of section  13 (1) (a) of the Act read with section 13 (4), but as we  have already indicated, we do not reach the stage of dealing with the merits of this point, because we axe satisfied that  the material statements made by the appellant in his application for  special  leave are inaccurate and misleading,  and  the respondent  is  entitled to contend that the  appellant  may have obtained special leave from this Court on the  strength of  what  he characterises as  misrepresentations  of  facts contained  in the petition for special leave.  In  the  said petition,  the  appellant has taken six  grounds  of  appeal against the decision of the High Court.  The last ground  is that the respondent had claimed eviction in the trial  Court on the basis of alleged non-payment and nontender of payment of rent from December 2, 1958,     but  the First  Appellate Court and the High Court setup  a new case for the  landlord by taking into consideration  the alleged defaults prior  to December  2,  1958  and  not relied  upon  by  the  landlord himself.  This ground was presumably taken in support of the main  argument  that  the  High  Court  had  not   correctly interpreted the provisions of section 13 (1) (a) of the Act. The respondent contends that this is a complete misstatement of  the true position and in support of his argument he  has referred  us to paragraph 3 in the plaint.  It appears  that the  rent  due  from the appellant for  the  period  between November  1, 1957 to November 30, 1958, which had fallen  in default was deposited by him by cheque on December 2,  1958. Paragraph  3  of  the plaint specifically  refers  to  these defaults  and in fact, takes into account the said  defaults for the purpose of setting up the respondent’s case that the appellant  had  committed more than three  defaults  in  the payment  of rent of two months each during the period of  18 months.   Therefore, there is no doubt that the  unambiguous and categorical 208 statement  made  in  the  last  ground  of  the  appellant’s petition for special leave is wholly untrue. Similarly,  it appears that in another ground taken  in  the special  leave petition, the appellant has made  an  equally inaccurate   statement.   In  this  ground   the   appellant represented  that  by  reason of the payments  made  by  him towards rent due from him to the respondent he had become  a

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statutory  tenant and "admittedly did not make  any  default after  December 1, 1958." This statement must be read  along with and in the light of the material averments contained in paragraph  6 of the petition where the appellant has  stated that on the first hearing he deposited Rs. 648/- on  account of rent due up to that date and the respondent accepted  it. Both  these  statements omit to refer to the  material  fact that  the  deposit  made  in  Court  was  accepted  by   the respondent  without prejudice, and so, the statement in  the ground  that  the  appellant admittedly  did  not  make  any default  after  December 1, 1958, is  equally  untrue.   Mr’ Pathak  for  the  respondent urges that  in  view  of  these serious misstatements contained in the petition for  special leave,  his  client is justified in  assuming  that  special leave may have been granted to the appellant as a result  of the  agreements urged by him on the strength of  these  mis- statements,  and  so, he has pressed his petition  that  the special leave granted to the appellant should be revoked. On  the  other  hand, Mr. Setalvad  contended  that  he  had appeared  at the time when special leave was granted and  to the  best of his recollection he had not referred  to  these grounds,  but had merely urged his contention that the  High Court bad misconstrued s. 13 (1) (a) of the Act.  We have no hesitation  in accepting Mr. Setalvad’s statement ; but,  in our  opinion, in dealing with the respondent’s  prayer  that special leave granted to the appellant should be  209 revoked, what was actually urged before the Court cannot  be decisive  of the matter and may not even be  very  material. It  is  true  that in the present case,  special  leave  was granted  on  September 26, 1962 and it is possible  for  Mr. Setalvad  to  recall what he argued before  the  Court  when special  leave was granted.  But it is necessary to bear  in mind  that  the appeal may come on for  hearing  long  after special  leave  is granted, that counsel  appearing  at  the stage of admission may not be same as at the stage of  final hearing,  and the Bench that granted special leave  may  not necessarily  deal  with  the  appeal  at  the  final  stage. Therefore,  it is no answer to the  respondent’s  contention that  though  the material statements in-the  special  leave petition may be substantially inaccurate, though not  wholly untrue,  those statements may not have influenced the  Court in  granting special leave.  Mr. Setalvad has  also  invited our  attention to the fact that the impugned statements  and grounds are substantially copied from the averments made  in the  appeal before the High Court.  That may be so, but  the fact  still remains that two important statements which,  if true,  may  have  been of  considerable  assistance  to  the appellant  in invoking the protection of s. 13 (1) (a)  even on the construction placed by the High Court on that section are found to be untrue, and that, in our opinion, is a  very serious  infirmity in the petition itself.  It is of  utmost importance  that in making material statements  and  setting forth  grounds in applications for special leave, care  must be  taken not to make any statements which  are  inaccurate, untrue  or  misleading.  In dealing  with  applications  for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of  fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and  misleading. That  is  why  we have come to the conclusion  that  in  the present  case, special leave granted to the appellant  ought to be 210 revoked.   Accordingly,  special leave is revoked  and  tile

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appeal  is dismissed.  The appellant will pay the  costs  of the respondent. Mr. Setalvad requested us to give the appellant some time to vacate  tile.  premises.  He invited our attention  to  the- fact  that  the  appellant has  invested  large  amounts  in setting up machinery of the Oil Mill which he is running  in the premises in question.  Mr. Andley for the respondent has fairly  conceded  that  on  condition  that  the   appellant unconditionally  undertakes  to deliver  possession  of  the premises  to the respondent within six months from the  date of  this  judgment  he  would not  execute  the  decree  for ejectment.    Mr.   Setalvad   offered   all   unconditional undertaking on behalf of the appellant as suggested  by  Mr. Andley.   We  acccordingly direct that  on  the  appellant’s undertaking,  the respondent should not execute  the  decree for six months from today. Special leave revoked. Appeal dismissed. 211