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PETITIONER: HARI KRISHNA PATEL & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF A.P. & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/11/1995

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (1) 706        JT 1995 (9)   561  1995 SCALE  (7)248

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The appeal  by special  leave arises  from the judgment and decree  dated July  16, 1985  made by  the High Court of A.P. in  C.A.C.A. Nos.142  and 152  of 1978.  The appellants laid the  suit for  declaration of  the title  in respect of Survey  No.6   of  Musheerabad   village,  Hyderabad,   A.P. admeasuring 12.958  sq. mtrs.  and for  perpetual injunction restraining  the   respondents  from  interfering  with  the appellant’ possession  over the  suit land  and for costs of the suit.  The trial  court though  decreed the suit on June 14, 1976,  on appeal  the High Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. Thus this appeal by special leave.      The only  question raised  in this  case is whether the appellants had  perfected title  by prescription. Though the appellants had  sought  declaration  of  title,  as  rightly pointed out  by the  High  Court,  the  appellants  had  not produced any  documentary evidence  except Ex. A-1 sale deed dated August  21, 1968  executed by  his  father  and  that, therefore, it  did not  conclude the  matter. The  claim was that the  property was  purchased from  one  Kulsum  Bi.  No documentary evidence  was produced  in proof  thereof. Under these circumstances,  there is no proof of title having been passed from Kulsuni Bi to the father to the appellants.      The  only  question  is  whether  the  appellants  have perfected title  by prescription. The High Court has decided the period  of prescription  prior to  1932 to 1963 and from 1963 to 1970 and thereafter. The evidence in support thereof was negatived  by the High Court relying upon entries in the revenue record.  Ex. A-13  is relevant  for the  period from 1928 to  1932. In column 10, the account-holder is described as ‘Government’  and in  column 12 the name of the possessor is described as "Kulsum Bi, w/o Ahmed, possessor Mizar Mehdi Khan-Khandi Bala  Kistaiah and  Laxminarayana". In column 25 it was  stated that  "In No.  13, old number 5 on account of unauthorisedly making  bricks, the  land is  being  rendered

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uncultivable during the previous year on account of the land being dry  penalty was imposed". In column 26, it was stated that "In  No.12 and  13, as  per the  8 monthly  statements, there are  brick-kilns and  bricks are  being made. The Land pertaining  to  No.13  is  included  in  the  boundaries  of Commerce and Industries Department but the same has not been delivered so  far". In  column 27  it was  stated  that  "On account of setting up brick kiln in the boundaries of No.13, unauthorisedly, breaches  are caused  in land remaining land follow". Column 30 clearly mentioned that the Government was the owner  of the land and it was laying penalty upon Kulsum Bi and the penalty was being collected. In Ex.A-1, similarly mentioned is  the name  of  the  appellant’s  father,  viz., Laxminarayan being  the unauthorised  occupatier and  making bricks kiln,  penalty was  imposed on  him. It would clearly conclude that Government has been asserting its title to the land. Imposition  of penalty  and payment  by  Laxminarayan, appellant’s father  and Kulsum  Bi amounts  to accepting the title of  the Government.  Their  possession  is  permissive possession. Thereby  the  appellants  had  acknowledged  the title of  the Government.  From the year 1932 to 1963, there was no  evidence as  to the  nature of  the  possession  and enjoyment  by  the  appellant’s  predecessor.  Therefore,  a presumption arises  and it  is a  settled law  that the same state of things continued from 1932 and would continue to be of the  same state  of affairs  till 1963.  The  presumption could, therefore,  be drawn both backward and forward of the continuance of  the same  state  of  affairs.  Once  such  a presumption has  been drawn,  same state  of  things  having continued from  1932 to  1963, the  Government asserted  its title and the appellant’s predecessors have acknowledged the title of the lands from 1932 till 1963. Admittedly, the suit having been  filed in  1975,  i.e.,  within  13  years,  the appellants had  not prefected  the title  by prescription as against the  Government. The  findings of  the  High  Court, therefore, do not warrant our inteference.      The appeal  is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.