27 September 1968
Supreme Court
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HARDEODAS JAGANNATH Vs STATE OF ASSAM & ORS.

Bench: SHAH, J.C.,RAMASWAMI, V.,MITTER, G.K.,HEGDE, K.S.,GROVER, A.N.
Case number: Appeal (civil) 2403 of 1966


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PETITIONER: HARDEODAS JAGANNATH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF ASSAM & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1968

BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  724            1969 SCR  (2) 261

ACT:      Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act  (47 of 1947),  ss. 4 and  6--Jurisdiction of Central Government to  extend  State Act to former  Indian Princely States--Answers submitted  by Central   Government  to  questions   by   Court--Conclusive evidence.       Assam  Sales Tax Act (17 of 1947) as amended by Act  6 of  1958    s.  30--Whether properly  extended  to  Shillong Administered Area--Appeal by assessee without paying tax  or penalty--Prayer   for   acceptance  of  security--Power   of Appellate Authority to accept security in lieu of cash.

HEADNOTE:     By  a notification dated April 15, 1948 .the  Government of  India  extended  the Assam Sales Tax Act,  1947  to  the Administered  Area  in  Shillong under s.  4  of  the  Extra Provincial  Jurisdiction.  Act,  1947.   The  instrument  of accession by which the administration of the Indian Princely State,  of  Mylliem in the Shillong  Administered  Area  was transferred  to the Central Government was accepted  by  the Governor-General  of India on August 17, 1948.  Under s.  30 of  the Assam Sales Tax Act, as amended by Act 6 of 1958,  a dealer may appeal against an order of assessment or penalty, but  the  appeal shall not be entertained by  the  appellate authority  unless  he was satisfied that the amount  of  tax assessed  or  penalty levied, if not otherwise  directed  by him, had been paid.       The  sales ’tax authorities assessed the appellant  to sales-tax and imposed penalties for Various periods.  Though some  of the; assessment periods were before April  1,  1958 when  the  Amending Act 6 of 1958 came into force,  all  the orders of assessment and penalty were passed after April  1, 1958.   The  appellant did not pay the tax assessed  or  the penalty  but filed petitions along with its appeals  praying that  it  may  be allowed to furnish  security  in  lieu  of payment of cash on account of its financial condition.   The petitions  were rejected and the appeals  were  consequently dismissed.   Writ petitions flied by the ’appellant  in  the High Court, to quash the orders of dismissal of the appeals,

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were also dismissed.       In  appeal to this Court, it was contended  that;  (1) After  August  15,  1947  the State  of  Mylliem  became  an independent  State  and since the Central  Government  could exercise  extra  provincial  jurisdiction  under  the  Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, only if the Central  Government exercised’  such jurisdiction under a treaty, agreement,  or by  other   lawful  means, the  Central  Government  in  the present  case,  could not exercise  such  jurisdiction  till August  17,  1948  when  the  instrument  of  accession  was acCepted;  and therefore, the notification dated  April  15, 1948  was not validly issued and hence the Assam  sales  Tax Act was not operative in the Shillong Administered Area; (2) As  the Amending Act of 1958    came into force on April  1, 1958  it could not be  given retrospective effect so  as  to apply to assessment periods anterior to that date; and  (3.) The authorities were not right in holding that there was  no provision  in the Act empowering them to accept security  in lieu of cash payment. 262 As  the material on the record was not sufficient to  enable the Court to determine the question whether the Dominion  of India was entitled to exercise extra provincial jurisdiction over  the Shillong Administered Area on April 15, 1948  this Court  under s. 6 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction  Act, forwarded to the Union Government the questions: (a) whether the  Dominion of India exercised such jurisdiction on  April 15,  1948,  and (b) whether the Dominion of India  had  such jurisdiction to extend the Assam Sales Tax Act to, the  Area After receiving the answers, HELD:  (1) The  answers submitted by  the Union   Government showed that prior to April 15, 1948, the British  Government had  exercised jurisdiction over the Area under  the  Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council, 1902, as amended by the  Order-in-Council  of  1937 that on  the  withdrawal  of British rule the jurisdiction continued to be exercised with the  consent  of the Siem (ruler) of Mylliem  State  by  the Dominion  of  India,  that  the  Jurisdiction  was  retained thereafter  by  the instrument of accession  signed  by  the Siem,  and  that  the exercise of the  jurisdiction  by  the British  Government and the Dominion of India  several  Acts were  extended  to the Shillong  Administered  Area.   Since under  s. 6(2) of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act  the answer of the Central Government is conclusive  evidence  of the  matter  therein the Union Government  was  entitled  to exercise  such jurisdiction over the  Shillong  Administered Area  on April 15, 1948 and therefore, the Assam  Sales  Tax Act was properly extended to the Area. [269 F-H, 270 B-C] (2)  The assessments for periods anterior to April  1,  1958 were  completed after the Amending Act came into  force  and the  appeals  were  also filed  thereafter.   Therefore  the Amending  Act of 1958 was applicable to the  appeals  before the  appellate  authority and was  not  given  retrospective effect. [271 C-D] (3) The expression ’otherwise directed’ only means that  the appellate  authority  can  ask the  assessee  to  deposit  a portion  of  the amount and not the whole  but  the  section gives  no  power to the appellate authority  to  permit  the assessed  to furnish security in lieu of the cash amount  of tax.                                               [271 D-E]

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2403  &

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2404 of 1966.     Appeals from the judgment and order dated April 4,  1963 of  the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Civil Rule Nos.  90 of 1960 and 382 of 1961.     D.N. Mukherjee, for the appellant.     Naunit Lal and B.P. Singh, for the respondents.     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Ramaswami,  J. These appeals are brought by  certificate from  the judgment of the High Court of Assam  and  Nagaland dated April 4, 1963, in Civil Rule No. 90 of 1960 and  Civil Rule  No. 382 of 1961, whereby the High Court dismissed  the petitions under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution  filed by the appellant.     Messrs. Hardeo Das Jagan Nath  (hereinafter  called  the ’appellant’)  is a partnership firm carrying on business  at Mawk- 263 har,  Shillong in the District of United Khasi  and  Jaintia Hills.  By a notification issued under Rule 6 of  the  Assam Sales Tax Rules 1947, the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam fixed May  20, 1948 as the date by which the dealers  of  Shillong administered area had to make applications for  registration under  the  Assam  Sales  Tax Act, 1947  (  17  of  1947  ), hereinafter  called the ’Act’. By notification  dated  April 15,   1948,  the  Government  of  India  had  extended   the provisions  of  the  Act with slight  modifications  to  the administered  area  in  Shillong under s.  4  of  the  Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947.  The appellant got itself registered  under  the  Act.  Upto the  half  yearly  return periods  ending  September  30,  1957,  the  appellant   was assessed to sales-tax and the tax was realised by the  Sales Tax Authorities.  On  March  6, 1959, the Superintendent  of Taxes,  Shillong,    respondent No. 4 raided  the   business premises  of the appellant  and  seized  the  account  books etc.   The appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of  the Constitution in the High Court.  By its order dated June  3, 1960,  the  High Court directed the Deputy  Commissioner  of Taxes, Assam to return the seized books and documents within three  weeks of the date of the order to. the appellant.  As directed  by the High Court, the documents were returned  to the  appellant but on the basis of the information  received from  the account books the Superintendent of  Taxes  issued notices  dated  April 4, 1959 under s. 19A of  the  Act  for reassessment of the appellant in respect of the half  yearly return periods ending on September 30, 1956, March 31,  1957 and  September 30, 1957.  Thereafter, ex parte  reassessment was made for the return period ending September 30, 1956  by an  order dated July 8, 1959 and for return  periods  ending March  31, 1957 and September 30, 1957 by orders dated  July 24, 1959 and tax amounting to Rs. 1,22,933/- was levied  for these  three  periods.  A further sum of Rs.  47,504.70  was levied in respect of the return period ending March 31, 1958 by  an ex parte assessment order dated March 23, 1959.   For the other return period ending September  30,  1958;  a  sum of Rs. 49,427.90 was levied by an ex parte assessment  order dated  April  8,  1959.  For these two  return   periods   a penalty   of Rs. 1,000/- in respect of each return was  also levied by two separate orders dated June 27, 1959.  Thus the total  amount  of  salestax and  penalty  amounting  to  Rs. 2,19,865.60  in  respect  of the  five  return  periods  was levied.   The  appellant paid Rs. 20,074.68 at the  time  of original  assessments  in respect of the periods  ending  on September  30,  1956, March 31, 1957   and   September   30, 1957.     The appellant  thereafter  filed appeals against all the

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seven ex parte orders before the Assistant  Commissioner  of Taxes,  Assam.  Along with the memoranda of appeals for  the periods  ending March 31, 1958 and September 30,  1958,  two separate  applications were made by the  appellant  alleging that it was not 264 necessary to pay the assessed tax since the provisions of s. 30  of the Act as amended did not apply to the case  and  it was  prayed that appeals should be admitted without  payment of  the assessed tax.  The contention of the  appellant  was rejected  by the Assist.ant Commissioner though  he  reduced the amount of deposit for the periods ending March 31,  1958 and   September   30,  1958.  The   .appellant   moved   the Commissioner  of  Taxes in revision, but the  order  of  the Assistant  Commissioner was affirmed by the Commissioner  of Taxes  though  he  reduced  the  amount  further.   On   the application of the appellant the matter was referred to  the High Court which held that the amended s. 30 of the Act  was intravires.  In the meantime, the appellant also applied  in respect  of  the  appeals relating  to  the  periods  ending September 30, 1956, March 31, 1957 and September 30, 1957 as well  as the penalty appeals of periods ending on March  31, 1958  and  September 30, 1958 and prayed  for  admission  of these appeals without payment of the assessed tax.  In  this case   also  the  amount  was  reduced  by   the   Assistant Commissioner of Taxes but the matter  was  kept pending till the disposal of the reference by the High Court.  On May 21, 1960,  the  appellant filed separate  petitions  before  the Assistant   Commissioner  praying  that  as  the   financial condition of the appellant was not good the appellant may be allowed  to furnish reasonable security in lieu of cash  and the appeals may be admitted on such security.  By his  order dated May 23, 1960 the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes fixed June  8,  1960  f, or payment of  the  amount  required  for admission  of  the appeals, failing which the  appeals  were ordered  to  be  dismissed.  The appellant  then  moved  the Commissioner   praying  that  in  view  of   his   financial difficulty  he  should  be .allowed  to  furnish  reasonable security  in lieu of cash to be paid.  The  application  was rejected  by the Commissioner on June 21, 1960.   Thereafter all  the five appeals were rejected by a common order  dated June 22, 1960 and the two appeals against the imposition  of penalty were also summarily rejected by an order dated  June 22,  1960.  The appellant was further asked to  show   cause why  penalty should not have been imposed in respect of  the periods  ending  September  30,  1956, March  31,  1957  and September  30, 1957.  The appellant filed a petition to  the High  Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, being  Civil Rule No. 90 of 1960 praying for a writ to quash the order of the  Commissioner dismissing the appeals in respect  of  the five  periods and for further reliefs.  The  appellant  also filed another petition under Art. 226, being Civil Rule  No. 382  of 1961 asking for similar reliefs with regard  to  the periods ending March 31, 1959, September 30, 1959, March 31, 1960,  September  30,  1960 and March 31,  1961.   The  writ petitions  were  dismissed  by the High Court  by  a  common judgment dated April 4, 1963.     The first question to be considered in these appeals  is whether  the provisions of the Act were validly extended  to the Shillong 265 Administered Areas.  By a notification dated April 15,  1948 the Central Government extended the provisions of the Act to the  Shillong  Administered Areas including  Bara  Bazar  in exercise of powers conferred by s. 4 of the Extra Provincial

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Jurisdiction  Act,  1947.  It was argued on  behalf  of  the appellant  that on April 15, 1948 when the notification  was issued,  the  Extra  Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947  (Act XLVII   of  1947)  was  not  applicable  to   the   Shillong Administered  Areas as the instrument of accession by  which the  administration of the State of Mylliem was  transferred to   the   Central   Government   was   accepted   by    the GovernorGeneral  of India on August 17, 1948.  The  preamble to  the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act of 1947) provides:                   "Whereas  by  treaty,  agreement,   grant,               usage, sufferance and other lawful means,  the               Central  Government  has, and   may  hereafter               acquire,  jurisdiction in and in  relation  to               areas outside the Provinces of India;      It is hereby enacted as follows :--" The  expression   "extra provincial jurisdiction"  has  been defined  under  s.  2 of the Act of  1947  as  meaning  "any jurisdiction  which  by  treaty,  agreement,  grant,  usage, sufferance  or  other  lawful means the  Central  Government has for the time being in or in relation to any area outside the Provinces".  Section 3 states:               "3.  (1)  It shall be lawful for  the  Central               Government   to  exercise   extra   provincial               jurisdiction in such manner as it thinks fit.               (2) The Central Government may  delegate   any               such jurisdiction as aforesaid to any  officer               or authority in such manner and to such extent               as  it  thinks  fit." Section  4  provides  as               follows:               "4.   (1)  The  Central  Government  may,   by               notification  in  the official  Gazette,  make               such  orders, as may seem to it expedient  for               the effective exercise of any extra provincial               jurisdiction  of the Central Government.                (2) Without prejudice  to the generality   of               the powers conferred by sub-section (1 ),  any               order   made   under  that   sub-section   may               provide--                (a) for determining the law and  procedure to               be  observed,  whether  by  applying  with  or               without  modifications  all  or  any  of   the               provisions  of any enactment in force  in  any               Province or otherwise;                (b)  for determining the persons who  are  to               exercise jurisdiction, either generally or  in               particular 2 Sup. C1/69---18 266               cases  or classes of cases, and the powers  to               be exercised by them;               (c)   for  determining  the  courts,   judges,               magistrates  and authorities by whom, and  for               regulating   the   manner   in   which,    any               jurisdiction  auxiliary  or incidental  to  or               consequential  on the  jurisdiction  exercised               under  this Act is to be exercised within  any                             Province; and               (d) for  regulating  the  amount,   collection               and application of fees."               Section 5 is to the following effect:                   "Every act and thing done, whether  before               or  after  the commencement  of this  Act,  in               pursuance of any extra provincial jurisdiction               of the Central  Government in an area  outside

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             the  Provinces shall be as valid as if it  had               been  done according to the local law then  in               force in that area."     The  argument  was stressed on behalf of  the  appellant that  the  extra  provincial  jurisdiction  could  only   be exercised by the Central Government if by treaty, agreement, grant,  usage, sufferance or other lawful means the  Central Government  has  for  the  time ’being in or in relation  to any area outside. the provinces exercised such jurisdiction. It was contended that after the declaration  independence on August  15,  1947 the paramountcy lapsed and  the  State  of Mylliem   became  an  independent  State  and  the   Central Government    could  not  exercise  any   extra   provincial jurisdiction till  the  instrument  of accession was  signed by  the  GovernorGeneral.   It  was  pointed  out  that  the notification  by  which  the Act  was  applied  to  Shillong Administered Areas was issued after the lapse of paramountcy and  before  the instrument of accession was signed  by  the Governor-General.    It  was  therefore  argued   that   the notification dated April 15, 1948 was not validly issued and the provisions of the Act were not operative in the Shillong Administered  Areas.  It was said that before the  State  of Mylliem became an independent State on August 15, 1947 there was  no  treaty,  grant, usage or  arrangement  whereby  the British  Crown enjoyed any rights to levy taxes on the  sale of goods within the Mylliem State or any right to extend  to that  area  any  such Act without  the  express  consent  or approval of the ruler of that State. The opposite view-point was put  forward on behalf of the respondents.  It was  said that  before  August  15, 1947 the relations  of  the  Crown Representative  with  Khasi  Hills  States  were   conducted through   the   Governor   of  Assam.    In   practice   the administration  of  the  Hill States was  in  great  measure assimilated  to that of the Province of Assam partly by  the application  of  the British Indian Laws  under  the  Indian (Foreign Jurisdiction) Order in Council 267 and  partly by administrative measures.  It was argued  that by  virtue  of  the instrument  of  accession  all  previous existing  arrangements  between Khasi Hills States  and  the Government of India in the Assam Province were continued and the  Central  Government could  therefore  exercise   extra- provincial  jurisdiction  by usage.  To put it  differently, the  argument  of  the  respondents  was  that  though   the instrument   of  accession  was accepted  by  the  Governor- General  on  August 17, 1948, it recognised  the  fact  that there   was  a  certain  existing   arrangement   regulating relations between the Government of India and the Chiefs  of the  Khasi Hills States.  The Central  Government  therefore exercised  extra  provincial jurisdiction  by  agreement  or usage and it cannot therefore be said that the  notification of  the  Central   Government   dated  April  15,  1948  was invalid.       When  the appeals were originally heard we  considered that the material on the record was not sufficient to enable us  to determine the disputed question, namely  whether  the Dominion   of   India  was  entitled   to   exercise   extra provincial   .jurisdiction  over  the Shillong  Administered Areas  on April 15, 1948 which was the material  date.   The question  at  issue is not purely a question of fact  but  a question  relating to a "fact of State" which is  peculiarly within  the  cognizance  of  the  Central  Government   (For expression  "Fact of State" see Halsbury--Laws  of  England, 3rd  edn. Vol. 7, p. 285).  In view of the insufficiency  of material  we  thought it proper to avail  ourselves  of  the

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procedure indicated by s. 6 of the Act of 1947 which enacts:                   "6.  (1)  If in any proceeding,  civil  or               criminal in a Court established in India or by               the  authority  of   the  Central   Government               outside  India, any question arises as to  the               existence    or   extent   of   any    foreign               Jurisdiction  of the Central  Government,  the               Secretary  to the Government of India  in  the               appropriate    department   shall,   on    the               application  of the Court, send to  the  Court               the decision of the Central Government on  the               question,  and’  that decision shall  for  the               purposes of the proceeding be final.                   (2)  The  Court  shall send  to  the  said               Secretary,  in  a document under the  seal  of               the  Court or signed by a judge of the  Court,               questions  framed so as properly to raise  the               question,  and  sufficient  answers  to  those               questions  shall be returned to the  Court  by               the  Secretary  and  those  answers  shall  on               production  thereof be conclusive evidence  of               the matters therein contained."      By  an  order of this Court dated September  21,   1967 the  following two questions were forwarded to the Union  of India  under the seal of this Court for submission of  their answers: 268                   "(1)  Whether  the  Dominion   of    India               exercised  extra provincial jurisdiction  over               the Shillong Administered Area including  Bara               Bazar, which also included Mawkhar, a part  of               the   erstwhile  Mylliem State, on  April  15,               1948;                    (2)  Whether  the Dominion of  India  had               extra  provincial  jurisdiction on  April  15,               1948 to  extend  the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947               (Act 17 of 1947) to the Shillong  Administered               Area including Bara Bazar under s. 4 of  Extra               Provincial   Jurisdiction  Act   (Act  47   of               1947) ." In  compliance  of  that  order  the  Union  of  India  have submitted their answers on January 12, 1968 in the following terms:               "Ministry  of  Home Affairs.  Replies  to  the               questions   mentioned  in  the   order   dated               September 21,1967 passed  by the Supreme Court               of  India  in Civil  AppeaLs  Nos.   2403  and               2404/1966.                    (1)  The British Government in India  had               by treaty, grant. usage, sufferance and  other               means   acquired jurisdiction   over   certain               territories of the erstwhile State of Mylliem.               The  jurisdiction  was  exercised  under   the               Indian    (Foreign   Jurisdiction)   Order-in-               Council,   1902  as  amended  by  the   Indian               (Foreign   jurisdiction).    Order-in-Council,               1937.   Mawkhar was a part of the  territories               of  Mylliem jurisdiction over which  had  been               agreed  to be given by the Siem of Mylliem  to               the  British  Government. It was  included  in               those parts of Shillong which came, in  course               of   time,   to,  be   called   the   Shillong               Administered Area.  It has been reported  that               on actual survey the small area known as  Bara               Bazar  area comes partly under Mawkhar  proper

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                           and   partly  under  South  East  Mawk har   and               Garikhana.  Bara Bazar area was thus a part of               the area belonging  to  the  erstwhile Mylliem               State in which the British Government in India               exercised   jurisdiction  under   the   Indian               (Foreign  jurisdiction) Order-in-Council.   On               the    withdrawal   of   British   Rule    the               jurisdiction  over  the  territories  of   the               erstwhile   Mylliem  State  which   had   been               included  in  the Shillong  Administered  Area               continued to be exercised with the consent  of               the Siem and the jurisdiction which was  until               then  exercised in those areas by the  British               Government   in  India  was  assumed  by   the               Dominion   of  India  and  it   was   retained               thereafter  by  virtue of  the  instrument  of               accession signed by the Siem of Mylliem 269 and  the agreement annexed thereto.  The Dominion  of  India exercised  extra provincial jurisdiction over  the  Shillong Administered  Area  including  the Barra  Bazar  which  also included Mawkhar a part of the  Mylliem   State on April 15, 1948.      (2)   The   jurisdiction  exercised  by   the   British Government in India over the Shillong Administered Area  was quite  extensive.   In exercise of that   jurisdiction  that Government  had extended, with appropriate  reservations,  a number  of  Acts--Central  as  well  as  Provincial-to   the Shillong  Administered Area e.g. the Indian Income  Tax  Act and the Assam Municipal Act with the consent of the Siem  of Mylliem  where necessary. On the withdrawal of British  rule the  Dominion  of India acquired the same jurisdiction  over the   Shillong  Administered   Area   by   virtue   of   the instrument  of accession signed by the Siem of  Mylliem  and the  agreement  annexed  thereto.  The  Dominion  of   India therefore   had   on  April  15,   1948   extra   provincial jurisdiction  in terms of the Extra-Provincial  Jurisdiction Act,   1947 (Act 47 of 1947) to extend the Assam  Sales  Tax Act, 1947 (Act 17 of 1947) to the Shillong Administered Area including Barra Bazar. The Assam Sales Tax Act was  actually extended  to the Shillong Administered Area including  Barra Bazar, .after obtaining the consent of the Siem of  Mylliem, in the Ministry. of States Notification no. 186-IB dated the 15th April,1948.                                  Sd. L.P. SINGH,                            Secretary to the Govt. of India.  New Delhi, January 12, 1968."     It is clear from the letter of the Union Government that it  was entitled  to exercise extra provincial  jurisdiction over  Shillong  Administered Area on April  15,  1948.   The reason is that prior to that date the British Government had exercised  that  jurisdiction  under  the  Indian   (Foreign Jurisdiction)  Order-in-Council,  1902  as  amended  by  the Indian  .(Foreign Jurisdiction) Order-in-Council, 1937.   On the  withdrawal  of British rule the jurisdiction  over  the territory  of Mylliem State continued to be  exercised  with the  consent of the ruler by the Dominion of India  and  the jurisdiction  was  retained  thereafter  by  virtue  of  the instrument  of accession signed by the Siem of  Mylliem  and the agreement annexed thereto.  It is also manifest that the jurisdiction  exercised by the British Government  over  the Shillong Administered Area was quite exten- 270

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sive  and  in  exercise of that  jurisdiction  a  number  of Acts--Central  & Provincial--were extended to  the  Shillong Administered  Area, for example, the Indian Income  Tax  Act and the Assam Municipal Act with the consent of the Siem  of Mylliem  where necessary. On the withdrawal of  the  British rule  the Dominion of India acquired the  same  jurisdiction which  included  the extension of the Act  to  the  Shillong Administered  Area.   Under s. 6(2) of the Act of  1947  the answers of the Central Government to the questions forwarded by this Court shall be treated as conclusive evidence of the matter  therein  contained.  We accordingly  hold  that  the argument  of  the  appellant on this aspect  of   the   case should  be rejected.     It was then contended on behalf of the appellant that s. 30 of the Act after the amendment was not applicable and the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes had no authority to ask  the appellant  to  deposit  the amount of  tax  assessed  before hearing   the   appeal.  Section  30  of  the  Act,  as   it originally stood, was to the following effect:                   "30. (1) Any dealer objecting to an  order               of assessment or penalty passed under this Act               may,  within thirty days from the date of  the               service   of   such  order,  appeal   to   the               prescribed  authority,  against  such  assess-               ment or penalty;                    Provided   that   no  appeal   shall   be               entertained by the said authority unless he is               satisfied  that  such  amount of  tax  as  the               appellant  may  admit to be due from  him  has               been paid;                    Provided   further  that  the   authority               before  whom the appeal is filed may admit  it               after  the expiration of thirty days, if  such               authority is satisfied that for reasons beyond               the control of the appellant or for any  other               sufficient cause it could not be filed  within               time.                     ................................." After the amending Act of 1958 the section reads as follows:      "30. (1) Any dealer objecting to an order of assessment or  penalty  passed under this Act may, within  thirty  days from  the date of the service of such order, appeal  to  the prescribed authority, against such assessment or penalty;’       Provided  that no appeal shall be entertained  by  the said authority unless he is satisfied that the amount of tax assessed or the penalty levied, if  not  otherwise  directed by him, has been paid; 271       Provided  further that the authority before  whom  the appeal is filed may admit it after the expiration of  thirty days, if such authority is satisfied that for reasons beyond the  control  of the appellant or for any  other  sufficient cause it could not be filed within time.       ..........................................."     It was contended that the amendment came into force with effect   from  April  1,  1958  and  it  cannot   be   given retrospective  effect so as to apply to  assessment  periods ending  on September 30, 1956, March 31, 1957 and  September 30,  1957. We are unable to accept this argument as  correct because  the  assessments  for  these  three  periods   were completed after the amending Act came into force i.e., after April  1,  1958.  The appeals against the  assessments  were also filed after the amendment.  It is therefore not correct to say that the amending Act has been given a  retrospective effect   and  the  Assistant  Commissioner  of   Taxes   was

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there.fore right in asking the appellant to comply with  the provisions  of the amended s. 30 of the Act  before  dealing with the appeals.     It was lastly contended on behalf of the appellant  that the  Sales  Tax Authorities were not right in  holding  that there  was no provision under the Act by which security  can be  accepted  in lieu of cash payment. Reliance  was  placed upon the phrase "otherwise directed" in the amended s. 30 of the  Act.   In our opinion, there is no  substance  in  this argument.   The  expression  "otherwise directed" only means that  the  appellate  authority can  ask   the  assessee  to deposit  a portion of the amount and not the whole, but  the section gives no power to the appellate authority to  permit the assessee to. furnish security in lieu of cash amount  of tax.  We accordingly reject the argument of the appellant on this point.     For  the reasons expressed we hold that the  High  Court was right in dismissing the writ petitions and these appeals must  be  dismissed  with costs--there will be  one  set  of hearing fees. V.P.S.                                    Appeals dismissed. 272