08 April 1996
Supreme Court
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HANIRAJ L. CHULANI Vs BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA & GOA

Bench: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-006876-006876 / 1996
Diary number: 89369 / 1993


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PETITIONER: (DR.) HANIRAJ L. CHULANI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA & GOA

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       08/04/1996

BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) BENCH: MAJMUDAR S.B. (J) AHMADI A.M. (CJ) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1708            1996 SCC  (3) 342  JT 1996 (4)   162        1996 SCALE  (3)354

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.B. Majmudar. J      Leave granted.      A  short   but  an   interesting  question   falls  for determination in the present case. It runs as under :      "Whether the  respondent-State  Bar      Council of  Maharashtra &  Goa  was      justified in refusing enrollment of      the appellant  as an advocate under      the Advocates  Act, 1961 as he is a      medical. practitioner  who does not      want  to   give  up   his   medical      practice but  wants  simultaneously      to practice law.      In order  to appreciate  the  contours  of  controversy centering round  this question, a few relevant facts leading to these proceedings are required to be noted at the outset.      The appellant  is a permanent resident of Bombay. He is a medical  practitioner  (colorectal  surgeon)  since  1970. During the  continuance of  his said profession as a medical practitioner, the  appellant joined  LL.B. Degree Course and obtained Degree  of Bachelor  of Laws  on  4th  March  1991. Thereafter the appellant applied to the respondent State Bar Council of  Maharashtra &  Goa  for  being  enrolled  as  an advocate under the Advocates Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to  as  ’the  Act’).  This  application  was  moved  by  the appellant on  26th July  1991. The  appellant insisted  that even though  he is  a medical practitioner he is entitled to simultaneously carry  on the  profession as an advocate. The Enrollment Committee  of the  respondent-State  Bar  Council rejected his  request for  being  enrolled  as  an  advocate simultaneously with  his carrying on his medical practice as a surgeon.  The appellant  was ultimately  informed on  16th November 1992  that his  application for  enrollment  as  an

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advocate was  rejected. He  was also  supplied a copy of the reasons for  ’refusal for  grant of  a sanad’. The appellant feeling aggrieved  by the  said refusal  filed writ petition No.2584 of  1992 in  the High Court of Bombay. After hearing the petitioner  a Division Bench of the High Court summarily dismissed his  writ petition  on 14th  December 1992.  It is thereafter that  the appellant moved the present proceedings by way  of special  leave petition.  By an  order dated 30th November 1993 delay in filing the special leave petition was condoned and  notice was  ordered to  be issued  to the  Bar Council of  Maharashtra &  Goa with  a  direction  that  the notice will state that the matter will be disposed of at the notice stage  itself. Subsequently after hearing the learned senior counsel  for the  appellant by  an order  dated  21st September 1995  notice was  ordered  to  be  issued  to  Bar Council of India as well as the Medical Council of India. Rival Contentions      We have  heard the  learned  senior  advocate  for  the appellant  as   well  as   the  learned  advocates  for  the respondents in  support of  their respective stands. Learned senior counsel  for the  appellant submitted  that Rule  (1) framed by  the respondent-Bar  Council of  Maharashtra under Sections 28(2)  and 24(1)(e)  of the Act was ultra vires and illegal. In  this connection she submitted that in so far as the said  rule prohibits a person who is otherwise qualified to be  admitted as  an advocate  from being  enrolled as  an advocate if  he is  carrying on  any other  profession  like medical profession  in the present case, it suffers from the vice of  excessive delegation  of legislative power and even otherwise the  said rule is unconstitutional being violative of Article  19(1)(9) of the Constitution and is not saved by sub-article  (6)   thereof  as   it   imposes   unreasonable restriction  on  the  right  of  a  citizen  to  pursue  any profession of  his choice  and  that  the  rule  is  equally violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as it  seeks to deprive right of livelihood to the appellant in a  most unreasonable  manner. It was contended that there was nothing  obnoxious of  illegal in  a  practising  doctor insisting on  being enrolled  as an advocate and in carrying on practice  both as  a medical  practitioner as  well as an advocate. As  the medical profession cannot be said to be in any way  less dignified profession and once the appellant is found to  be qualified  to be enrolled as an advocate as per the Act,  the State Bar Council by framing such a rule could not have restricted his entry to the profession of advocates especially  when   the  appellant   was  ready  to  give  an undertaking that  during court  hours he  would not carry on his medical  profession. Learned  counsel appearing  for the State Bar  Council on  the other hand supported the decision of the High Court and contended that the rule framed by the State Bar  Council does  not suffer from any vice nor was it violative of  any of  the fundamental rights invoked by the’ appellant for  getting it  voided on  that score.  It may be stated that  the Medical Council of India to whom notice was issued had  referred this  matter to  is Executive Committee which was  of the  view that Medical Council of India has no objection to  any medical  practitioner holding registerable recognized medical certificate who is also qualified in law, practising medicine and law simultaneously.      In the  light of  the aforesaid  rival contentions  the following points arise for our determination. 1. Whether impugned Rule (l) framed by the State Bar Council of Maharashtra  & Goa  suffers from  the vice  of  excessive delegation of  legislative  power  and  hence  is  void  and inoperative at law.

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2. Whether  the said  rule is  violative of Article 19(1)(9) and is not saved by sub-article (6) thereof. 3. Whether  the aforesaid  rule is  violative of Articles 14 and 21 of The Constitution.      We shall  deal with  the aforesaid  points in  the same sequence in  which they  are noted.  However, before dealing with them  it is  necessary to have a glance at the relevant statutory settings  in the  light  of  which  the  aforesaid points will have to be considered. Statutory Provisions      The genesis  of the Advocates Act, 1961 is found in the felt need for providing a uniform and well-knit structure of legal profession  which plays  pivotal role in strengthening the system  of administrative  justice in the country. It is axiomatic that  a properly  equipped and  efficient Bar  can play a  pre-eminent role  not only  in the system of justice but also  in the  constitutional government and rule of law. Realizing the  importance of  an independent/integrated Bar, the Indian Bar Committee appointed by Government of India in 1951 recommended,  inter alia,  the constitution  of an  All India Bar  Council, State  Bar Councils,  a common  roll  of advocates and  complete  autonomy  to  the  Bar  in  matters relating to  qualification, administration, discipline, etc. of members  of the profession. In 1958 the Law Commission in its  fourteenth   report   on   the   Reform   of   Judicial Administration endorsed  the recommendation of the All India Bar Committee  and urged  the Government  to  implement  the same. In  1959, the  Legal Practitioners’ Bill incorporating the recommendations  was introduced  in Parliament which was later adopted with the changed name of Indian Advocates Act, 1961.      Though the demand for a unified All India Bar initially emerged mainly,  if not  wholly, as  a protest  against  the monopoly of the British Barristers on the ’Original Side’ of the Calcutta  and  Bombay  High  Courts  and  the  invidious distinctions  between  the  barristers  and  non-barristers, after independence  it assumed  the status of a professional claim and  a national  necessity in  the search  for  better delivery of  justice to  the people.  It was  assumed that a unified Bar  for the  whole country  with monopoly  in legal practice and  autonomy in matters of professional management would advance  the cause  of justice in society. The role of the profession in the national movement for Independence and the  professional  standards  displayed  by  native  lawyers including   Vakils,   Pleaders   and   Mukhtars,   convinced Parliament to adopt the Advocates Act giving a unique status and structure to the Indian Bar.      The Advocates Act amended and codified the law relating to legal  practitioners and provided for the constitution of an All  India Bar.  The complete  control  and  jurisdiction regarding enrollment  of  advocates  and  their  discipline, which had  all  along  been  with  the  High  Courts,  stood transferred to  the Bar  Council  of  India  and  State  Bar Councils. The  Bar Councils  have become complete autonomous bodies with elected representatives of advocates.      Every  State   Bar  Council   has  (a)   one  or   more Disciplinary  Committees;   (b)   an   Executive   Committee consisting of  five members;  (c)  an  Enrollment  Committee consisting of  three members;  and such  other committees as may be found necessary.      The Act came into force with effect from 19.5.1961. The dictionary of  the Act  is to  be found in Section 2, clause (a) whereof  defines an  advocate as a person entered in any roll under  the provisions  of the  Act as such and the term ’roll’ according  to clause  (k) means  a roll  of advocates

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prepared and  maintained under  the Act.  Section 3 provides that there  shall be a Bar Council for each of the States to be known  as the  Bar Council  of that State. Section 4 next provides for  a Bar Council for the territories to which the Act extends  to be  known as  the Bar  Council of India. The functions of  the State  Bar Council  and the Bar Council of India have  been set  out in  Sections 6 and 7 respectively. The functions  of the State Bar Council include admission of persons  as   advocates  on   its  roll,   preparation   and maintenance  of   such  roll,   safeguarding   the   rights, privileges and  interests of advocates on its roll and to do all things  necessary for  discharging the  above functions. The functions of the Bar Council of India include the laying down of  standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates and  for safeguarding their rights, privileges and interests. Chapter  III  which  deals  with  "Admission  and Enrollment of  Advocates comprises  of Sections  16  to  28. Section 16  provides that  there shall  be  two  classes  of advocates, senior  advocates and other advocates; Section 17 sets out  how every  State Bar  Council  shall  prepare  and maintain a  roll of  advocates; Section  18 deals  with  the transfer of  name of  an advocate from one State to another; Section 19 enjoins upon every State Bar Council to send copy of the  roll of  advocates to  the  Bar  Council  of  India; Section 20  makes special  provision for Enrollment of every advocate who  was entitled  to practise in the Supreme Court immediately before  the appointed  day and whose name is not entered in  the roll  of a  State Bar  Council;  Section  21 relates to  the fixation  of seniority;  Section 22 provides for issuance  of certificate  of Enrollment  and Section  23 confers the right of pre-audience on the Attorney General of India,  the  Solicitor  General  of  India,  the  Additional Solicitor General of India, etc. Section 24 to the extent it is relevant for our purpose provides as under :      "24. Persons who may be admitted as      advocates on a State roll.      (1) Subject  to the  provisions  of      this  Act,   and  the   rules  made      thereunder,  a   person  shall   be      qualified  to  be  admitted  as  an      advocate on  a State  roll,  if  he      fulfils the  following  conditions,      namely:      (a) he is a citizen of India;      (b) he  has completed  the  age  of      twenty-one years; and      (c) he  has obtained  a  degree  in      law-          ............      (d) ............      (e)   he    fulfils   such    other      conditions as  may be  specified in      the rules  made by  the  State  Bar      Council under this Chapter;      (f) ....... ...      Section 24-A  provides that no person shall be admitted as an  advocate on a State roll, for the period indicated in the proviso,  if he  is convicted  of an  offence  involving moral turpitude,  or if  he is convicted of an offence under the provisions  of Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 or if he is  dismissed or  removed from employment or office under the State  on any  charge involving moral turpitude; Section 25  indicates   the  authority   to  whom  applications  for Enrollment may be made;  Section   26  provides   for  the  disposal  of  such

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applications; Section  26-A confers  power on  the State Bar Council to  remove  any  name  from  its  roll;  Section  27 provides  that   where  a  State  Bar  Council  has  refused application of  any person  for admission as an advocate, no other State  Bar Council shall entertain his/her application for admission  on its  roll except with the previous consent of the  former and  of the  Bar Council of India. Section 28 confers power  on a State Bar Council to make rules to carry out the  purposes of  the Chapter  which may  in particular, inter alia,  provide for  the conditions  subject to which a person may  be admitted  as an advocate on its roll. Chapter IV deals  with the  Right to Practise". Section 29 says that subject to  the provisions  of the  Act and  any  rule  made thereunder there  shall, as  from the appointed day, be only one class  of persons entitled to practise the profession of law,  namely,  advocates.  According  to  Section  30  every advocate whose  name is  entered in  the State roll shall be entitled as  of right to practise throughout the cerritories to which the Act extends in all courts including the Supreme Court of  India,  before  any  Tribunal  or  person  legally authorized to  take evidence  and before  any  authority  or person before whom such advocate is, by or under any law for the time  being in  force, entitled  to practise. Section 33 further provides  that no  person shall,  on  or  after  the appointed day,  be entitled  to practise  is  any  court  or before any  authority or  person unless he is enrolled as an advocate under  the Act.  Chapter V  deals with  "Conduct of Advocates". Under Section 35 where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise  a State Bar Council has reason to believe that any advocate  on its roll has been guilty of professional or other misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its disciplinary committee. Section 37 provides for an appeal to the Bar  Council of  India against  an  order  made  by  the disciplinary committee  of a  State Bar  Council. Section 36 provides that  where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise, the Bar  Council cf  India has  reason to  believe that  any advocate whose  name is  any entered  on any  State roll has been guilt  of professional  or other  misconduct, it  shall refer the  case to  the disciplinary  committee. Any  person aggrieved by  an order made by the disciplinary committee of the Bar  Council of  India under Section 36 or 37 may prefer an appeal  to the Supreme Court of India under Section 38 of the Act.  The powers of the disciplinary committee have been enumerated  in   Section   42.   Chapter   VI   deals   with ’Miscellaneous’ matters.      Having noted the relevant provisions of the Act it will be apposite  to consider the scheme underlying the Act. This Court had  an occasion  to consider  this very scheme in the case of  Indian Council  of Legal Aid & Advice & Ors. v. Bar Council of  India &  Anr. 1995)  1 SCC  732. A  three member Bench of  this Court presided over by one of us A.M. Ahmadi, C.J. had  to consider whether Rule (9) framed by Bar Council of India  barring enrollment to persons who had completed 45 years of age was Violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India  being discriminatory,  unreasonable and arbitrary. While considering  the said question the following pertinent observations were made on the scheme of the Act in para 6 of the Report :           We have  briefly  noticed  the      relevant provisions  of the  Act in      the earlier  part of this judgment.      We may  now  briefly  indicate  the      scheme. Before  we do so it may not      be out of place to mention that the      profession of  law is  one  of  the

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    oldest profession and was practised      in one  form cr  the other  in  the      hoary past. After the advent of the      British in  India, certain rules in      regard to  the practise of law were      introduced.   Before   independence      there were  Mukhtars and Vakils who      were permitted  to practise  law in      moffusil courts even though not all      of   them   were   Law   graduates.      However, slowly  and gradually they      were allowed  to  wither  away  and      their place  was taken  by Pleaders      who were,  after securing  a degree      in Law,  permitted to  practise  at      the district  level. Those who were      enrolled   as    advocates    could      practise in  any court  subordinate      to the  High  Court  including  the      High Court.  The difference between      a  Pleader   and  an  Advocate  was      merely  on   account  of   the  fee      charged   for   enrollment.   After      independence, came  the  Act  which      was   enacted    "to   amend    and      consolidate  the  law  relating  to      legal practitioners  and to provide      for   the   constitution   of   Bar      Councils and an all-India Bar . The      Act creates  an all-India  Bar with      only    one    class    of    legal      practitioners,  namely,  advocates,      who of  course  are  classified  as      senior    advocates    and    other      advocates (Section 16). The general      superintendence   of   ethics   and      etiquette of  the profession is the      responsibility of  the Bar Councils      created under the Act and they have      been  charged   with  the  duty  to      punish    their     members     for      misconduct. The  Act envisages  the      existence  of  a  Bar  Council  for      every  State.   The   function   of      admission of  persons as  advocates      is entrusted  to  every  State  Bar      Council  which   is   required   to      prepare and  maintain  a  roll  for      that  purpose.  While  disciplinary      jurisdiction is  conferred  on  the      state Bar  Councils to  punish  its      members for  misconduct. it  is  at      the same time charged with the duty      to    safeguard    their    rights,      privileges and interests. They must      perform all the functions conferred      on them  by or under the Act and do      everything  that  is  necessary  to      discharge the  functions set out in      Section  6.   So  far  as  the  Bar      Council of  India is concerned, its      functions are  of  a  more  general      nature, e.g., to lay down standards      of   professional    conduct    and      etiquette   for    advocates,    to

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    safeguard their  rights, privileges      and  interests,  to  supervise  and      control the  working of  the  State      Bar  Council,   to  promote   legal      education,       to       recognize      universities, to organize legal aid      to the  poor  and  to  perform  all      other  functions  conferred  by  or      under the  Act  and  do  everything      that may  be necessary to discharge      the functions enumerated in Section      7. Besides  the  above  it  too  is      required to exercise discipline and      control over  the  members  of  the      profession. Thus  the functions are      divided  between   the  State   Bar      Councils and  the  Bar  Council  of      India, although for obvious reasons      overlaps are unavoidable. The rule-      making power  has been conferred on      the  State   Bar   Councils   under      Sections 15  and 28  and on the Bar      Council of  India under  Section 49      of the Act. While considering  the  relevant  roles  of  the  State  Bar Councils and  the Bar  Council of India as envisaged by  the Act the  following pertinent  observations were  made     in paragraph 11 of the Report :           It  seems   Parliament   while      enacting the  Act created  agencies      at the  State level  as well  as at      the Central  level in  the form  of      State Bar  Councils and Bar Council      of India  and  invested  them  with      rule-making   powers   on   diverse      matters    touching    the    legal      profession, presumably  because  it      must  have  realized  that  matters      pertaining to  the  profession  are      best  left   to   informed   bodies      comprising of  members of  the said      profession. However, while doing so      it provided  for basic  substantive      matters,  e.g.,   eligibility   for      entry into  the profession (Section      24),      disqualification      for      enrollment     (Section      24-A),      authority   entitled    to    grant      admission (Sections 25 and 26), the      authority which can remove any name      from the roll (Section 26-A), etc.,      and placed  them within  the domain      of a  State Bar Council. Thus it is      the State  bar Council  which alone      must   decide   the   question   of      enrollment of  an applicant  on its      roll. Under Section 24 a person who      is a citizen of India and possesses      a degree  in Law  becomes qualified      to be admitted as an advocate if he      has completed  twenty-one years  of      age, subject of course to the other      provisions of  the Act. No doubt he      must fulfil  the  other  conditions      specified in  the rules made by the

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    State    Bar    Council    [Section      24(1)(8)]. Every  person whose name      is entered in the list of advocates      has a  right  to  practise  in  all      courts including the Supreme Court,      before  any   tribunal   or   other      authority. It is, therefore, within      the exclusive  domain of  the State      Bar Councils  to admit  persons  as      advocates  on  their  rolls  or  to      remove their names from the rolls."      In the  light of  the aforesaid  statutory settings it, therefore, becomes  clear that it is for the concerned State Bar Councils  by promulgating  appropriate rules to regulate the entry  of persons  seeking to join legal profession. The respondent-State  Bar   Council  of  Maharashtra  &  Goa  in exercise of  its powers  under Section  28(2)(d)  read  with Section 24(1)(e)  of  the  Act  has  framed  rules  in  this connection. Rule  (1) with  which we  are concerned reads as under :      1.  A   person  who   is  otherwise      qualified  to  be  admitted  as  an      Advocate but  is either  in full or      part time  service or employment or      is engaged  in any  trade, business      or profession shall not be admitted      as an Advocate.           Provided  however   that  this      rule shall nor apply to :      (i) Any person who is a Law Officer      of the  Central Government  or  the      Government of  a State  or  of  any      Public    corporation    or    body      constituted by Statute.           For the purpose of this clause      a "Law  Officer shall mean a person      who is  so designated  by the terms      of his  appointment and  who by the      said  terms   is  required  to  act      and/or plead  in Court on behalf of      his employer.      (ii) Any  person who is an Articled      Clerk of an Attorney;      (iii)  Any   person   who   is   an      assistant to  an Advocate  or to an      Attorney who is an Advocate;      (iv) Any person who is in part-time      service as a Professor, Lecturer or      Teacher-in-Law;      (v) Any  person who  by  virtue  of      being a  member of  a  Joint  Hindu      Family has  an interest  in a joint      Hindu Family  business, provided he      does   not   take   part   in   the      management thereof; and      (vi)  Any   person   who   is   not      personally engaged  in any business      but is a sleeping partner in a firm      doing business,  provided  that  in      the opinion  of the  Bar Council of      Maharashtra  the   nature  of   the      business is  not inconsistent  with      the dignity of the profession.      (vii) Any  person who is a Director      or  Chairman   of  the   Board   of

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    Directors  of  a  company  with  or      without any  ordinary sitting fees,      provided none  of his duties are of      an Executive  character and  he  is      not  a   Managing  Director   or  a      Secretary of  the said  company, or      of any other company.      (viii) Any person who has inherited      or succeeded  by survivorship  to a      family  business  but  who  is  not      personally  participating   in  the      management thereof.      (ix) Any person who either prior to      or  after   his   application   for      enrollment under  Section 24  holds      or continues  to hold  a share with      others  in   any   business   which      descended to him by survivorship or      inheritance or  by Will provided he      does not  personally participate in      the management thereof.      (x)   Any    person   who   reviews      Parliamentary    Bills     for    a      remuneration,  edits   legal  text-      books  at  a  salary,  does  "press      Vetting" for  news-papers, sets and      examines question  papers or  is  a      part-time teacher or lecturer or an      assistant to  an editor  of  a  Law      journal provided  his hours or work      and/or engagement  do not  conflict      with  the   hours  of   court,  and      subject  to   the   rules   against      advertising      and      full-time      employment  to  which  an  Advocate      after enrollment  is subject to, is      engaged      in       broadcasting,      journalism, lecturing  and teaching      subjects, both legal and non-legal.      (xi) Any  other person  or class of      persons as the Bar Council may from      time to time exempt." The said  rule which  is impugned in the present proceedings clearly  bars  an  otherwise  qualified  person  from  being enrolled as  an advocate  if he  is  engaged  in  any  other profession. It is based on the premise that an advocate must devote his  full time and attention to the legal profession. It is  because of  the aforesaid  provision in the rule that appellant’s entry  to the  legal profession is denied by the respondent-State Bar  Council as the appellant is already an active medical  practitioner carrying on his profession as a surgeon  and  which  professional  activity  he  insists  on continuing simultaneously  with being  an advocate though as submitted by  his learned  senior counsel  the appellant  is willing to  stagger the  time during which he would carry on either of  the two  professions in the course of the day. At this stage also it is necessary to note that the Bar Council of India  has also  framed rules called Bar Council of India Rules in exercise of its powers under Section 49 of the Act. In Chapter  III of  Part VI  of the  Rules dealing  with the ’Conditions   for right  to practice’, are found rules frame under Section  49(1)(ah) of  the Act  which deals  with  the conditions subject  to which  an advocate  shall  have  the- right to  practise’, and  the circumstances  under  which  a person shall  be deemed  to practise  as an  advocate  in  a

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court’. The  relevant rule  is Rule  2 which  states that an advocate shall  not enter  into a  partnership or  any other arrangement for  sharing remuneration  with  any  person  of legal practitioner who is not an Advocate. Our attention was also invited  to Rule  47 found in Section VII of Chapter II of Part  VI of  the said  Rules dealing  with ’Standards  of Professional Conduct   and  Etiquette’ which  contains rules framed by the Bar Council of India under Section 49(1)(c) of the Act  read with  the proviso thereto. The aforesaid rule- making power  pertains to  standards of professional conduct and etiquette  to be  observed by  the advocates.  This rule states that  an advocate  shall not personally engage in any business; but  he may  be a sleeping partner in a firm doing business provided  that, in  the opinion  of the appropriate State Bar  Council,  the  nature  of  the  business  is  not inconsistent with  the dignity  of the profession. This rule framed by  the  Bar  Council  of  India  was  sought  to  be contrasted with  the impugned rule framed by the respondent- State Bar  Council. It  was submitted  that as  per Rule  47 framed by  the Bar  Council of  India  an  advocate  is  not allowed to  personally engage in any business. The said rule does not  prohibit him from carrying on any other profession while  the   impugned  rule   bars  the   entry  of  even  a professional carrying  on  any  other  profession  which  is equally dignified from being enrolled as an advocate.      It is  in the  background of  the  aforesaid  statutory provisions and  the relevant  rules that  we now  proceed to deal with  the points for determination that have fallen for our consideration. Point No.1      So far  as the  question  of  excessive  delegation  of legislative power  is concerned  we must  note at the outset that the  Act has been enacted, as seen earlier, with a view to regulate  the right  of advocates  to practise  law.  The rules framed by the Bar Council of India especially relating to standards  of professional  conduct and etiquette clearly aim at  securing  high  standards  of  competence  in  legal services and  seek to  strengthen professional relationships among its  members and promote the welfare of the society as a whole.  Specific norms  have been  laid down in respect of conduct of  the persons  practising the profession vis-a-vis the public,  the court,  the client, the opposite lawyer and professional brethren.  Lawyer’s duty  to train  juniors and impart free  legal aid  to poor  is part  of the ethics. The code  thus   provides  standards   for  identification   and measurement of  professional deviance.  As noted earlier the Act besides  highlighting the  essential  functions  of  Bar Council of  India provides  for enforcement  of the same and sets  up   disciplinary  authorities  to  chastise  and,  if necessary, punish  members of the profession for misconduct. The punishment  may include suspension from practice as well as removal  of the  name from the roll of advocates. Section 49(1) confers  power on  the Bar  Council of  India to  make rules, inter  alia, for  discharging its functions under the Act. Section  49(1)(ag) when read with Section 24 of the Act confers wide  powers on the Bar Council of India to indicate the class  or category  of persons  who may  be enrolled  as advocates which  power would  include the  power  to  refuse enrollment  in  certain  circumstances.  The  obligation  to maintain the  dignity and  purity of  the profession  and to punish  ensuring  members  carries  with  it  the  power  to regulate entry  into the  profession with a view to ensuring that only  profession-oriented and  service-oriented  people join the  Bar and  those not  so oriented  are kept out. The role of  an advocate  is essentially different from the role

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of any  other profession  an advocate is said to belong to a noble profession.  The Act  itself envisages  the State  Bar Councils who  are the  elected peers of advocates themselves to lay  down the  standards for the professional conduct and etiquette. That  would naturally bring in its wake the power to regulate  entry to  such a  noble profession.  It is said that law  is a  jealous mistress  that calls  for  undivided loyalty and  unflinching attention  from her  devotees.  Dry drudgery of desks’ dead wood is the essential requirement of an advocate  aspiring to  win laurels in the profession. The attack on  the impugned  rule on  the  ground  of  excessive delegation of  legislative power will have to be examined in the light of scheme of the Act which has entrusted the power and the  duty to  elected representatives  of the profession constituting the  State Bar  Councils to  lay down  the high standards of  professional  etiquette  as  expected  of  the advocates enrolled  by it.  It is pertinent to note that the Act has  entrusted to  the Bar  Council  of  India,  amongst others, the  functions to promote legal education and to lay down standards  of such  education in  consultation with the Universities in India imparting such education and the State Bar Councils. The Bar Council of India is entrusted with the function to recognize Universities whose degree in law shall be a  qualification for  enrollments as  an advocate and for that purpose  to visit and inspect Universities or cause the State Bar  Councils to  visit and  inspect Universities with such directions  as it  may give in this behalf. It conducts seminars and  organize talks  on  legal  topics  by  eminent jurists and publishes journals and papers of legal interest. In this  connection, it  also exercises  general supervision and  control  over  the  State  bar  Councils.  It  is  also entrusted with  the task  of promoting  and  supporting  law reform. All  these provisions  as laid  down by Section 7 of the Act  leave no  room for  doubt that  even prior  to  the enrollment as  advocate the  teaching of law and laying down of the  curriculum  for  law  courses  are  also  the  tasks entrusted to  the Bar  Council of  India, which  is the apex body  of   professionals   monitoring   these   matters   in conjunction with  the State  Bar Councils. Thus even at pre- entry stage  of an advocate to the profession his equipments as a  student of  law and  the requirement  of  basic  legal education with which he should be armed before he can aspire to be  enrolled as  an advocate are also looked after by the Bar Council  of India  and the  concerned Stats  Bar Council which works under the general supervision and control of the apex body,  namely, the  Bar Council  of India. Thus the Bar Council of  India is  cast with  the duty  to take  all such steps as  it considers  necessary to  filter students at the entry stage  to the law course e.g. by providing an entrance test, as  well as at the entry point to the profession, e.g. by providing  an examination  or a  training  course  before enrollment as an advocate. The Act also deals with the topic of regulation  of professional conduct of advocates from the entry point itself.      The concerned  State Bar  Councils have  to monitor the role of  advocates so  long as they continue to practise law after initial  entry. As  the enrollment  by the  State  Bar Council entitles  an advocate after entry to the profession, to practise  the noble profession of law and who becomes, by such enrollment,  an officer  of the court, the said entrant can be validly subjected by the concerned Bar Council to the strict requirements  of the  profession for enabling such an aspirant to  effectively cater  to the  needs of  the  legal profession. The  power and  the duty  entrusted to the State Bar Councils  to monitor  such entry,  in the  light of  the

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nature of  the profession to which such entry is given would themselves supply the necessary yardstick and guidelines for the exercise  of such power by the elected body of advocates constituting the  concerned Bar  Councils. The scheme of the Act thus  lays down a complete code for regulating the legal education and professional equipments of an aspirant seeking entry to  legal profession from the grassroot level where he is student  of law  till he  equips himself  with  essential legal knowledge  and seeks  enrollment and  even  thereafter till he  practices law and completes his professional career as  advocate.  Thus,  from  the  pre-entry  point  to  legal Profession till  the exit  point from  the legal profession, the Bar  Council of India and the State Bar Councils monitor the career  of the legal practioner. It is the entire scheme of the Act when considered in the light of the nature of the legal profession  to which  such entry is given which has to be kept  in view while considering the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the power given to the State Bar Councils to regulate such entries by framing rules is a  piece of excessive delegation of legislative power. It cannot be  gainsaid that  law is universally described as an honourable profession.  An advocate is an officer of justice and friend  of the  court. A  conduct, therefore,  which  is unworthy of him as an officer of justice cannot be justified by stating  that he  did it  as the agent of his client. His status as  an officer  of justice  does not  mean that he is subordinate to  the Judge.  It only  means  that  he  is  an integral part  for  the  Administration  of  justice.  Legal profession is  monopolistic in  character and  this monopoly itself inheres certain high traditions which its members are expected to  upkeep and  uphold. Members  of the  profession claimed that  they are  the leaders  of thought and society. The central  function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice.      The  aforesaid   well  established   connotations   and contours of  the requirements of legal profession themselves supply  the   necessary  guideline  for  the  concerned  Bar Councils to  frame  rules  for  regulating  the  entries  of persons to  the profession.  As noted  earlier, the impugned rule has been framed by the Maharashtra State Bar Council in the exercise of its rule-making power under Section 24(1)(e) read with  Section 28(2)  of the  Act. Section 24 deals with ’Persons who  may be admitted as advocates on a State roll’. Sub-section  (1)   thereof  provides  that  subject  to  the provisions of  this Act,  and the  rules made  thereunder, a person shall be qualified to be admitted as an advocate on a State roll,  if he  fulfils the  conditions laid down in the Section. Amongst other conditions are found conditions which the entrant  has to  fulfil as may be specified by the Rules made by the State Bar Council under Chapter III dealing with ’Admission and  Enrollment of  Advocates’. Section  28  sub- section (2)  similarly gives  power to the State Bad Council to make  rules for  carrying out the purposes of the Act and in particular  such rules may provide the conditions subject to which a person may be admitted as an advocate. Such rule- making power  flows from  Section 28(2)(d).  Even though the aforesaid rule  making power  is couched  in wide  terms the said power entrusted to the Stats Bar Council cannot be said to be  unfettered or  unhedged. The  said rule-making  power draws its  sustenance from  the guidelines  laid down by the Act itself  which entrusts  the duty  to the concerned State Bar Council  to regulate entry to the legal profession which has  the   aforesaid  well   established  connotations   and attributes. The  concerned Bar Councils are entrusted by the legislature itself  with  the  aforesaid  rule-making  power

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enabling them to determine the requirements of the concerned State Courts  where the new entrants have to practise and to lay down  appropriate conditions regulating such entries. As the power  to make  rules is entrusted by legislature to the chosen representatives of legal practitioners themselves who would be  alive to  the requirements  of the concerned State where the  Bar  Council  functions  and  the  needs  of  the litigating public  residing in the Stats in the light of the set-up of  courts in the States concerned, it cannot be said that the power is in any way unfettered or uncanalised so as to amount  to  total  effacement  of  legislatives  control. Sufficient guidelines  are  laid  down  by  the  legislature itself  while  conferring  such  powers  on  the  State  Bar Councils.  The   guideline  flow  from  the  nature  of  the profession  to   which  admissions  are  to  be  given,  the selection of the chosen representatives of the profession to be the  recipients of such power and the requirements of the Statute itself  laying down  the conditions  for  regulating professional  conduct   of  advocates  as  discernible  from various provisions  of the  Act and  the rules  framed by  a Central Bar Council itself for the guidance of all State Bar Councils functioning in the country which entrusted with the task  of   regulating  the   conduct  of   legal  profession throughout the  country under  supervision and  guidance  of Central Bar  Council. The  entire edifice of the Act in this connection has  to be  kept in  view  for  finding  out  the relevant guidelines  for enlightening  the path of State Bar Councils entrusted with the task of framing rules regulating entries of  new aspirants  who are  to be permitted to enter the fold of legal profession.      In this  connection the  learned senior counsel for the the appellant  invited our attention to the decision of this Court in  A.N. Parasuraman  & Ors.  v. State  of Tamil  Nadu (1989) 4 SCC 683 and Ajoy Kumar Banerjee & Ors. etc. etc. v. Union of  India &  Ors. (1984) 3 SCC 127 for buttressing her submission  that   legislature  cannot   delegate  essential legislative functions  to its  delegate. There cannot be any dispute about  the settled  legal position  on this  aspect. However, as  discussed by  us earlier,  in the set-up of the entire scheme of the Act and the rules framed by the Central Bar Council  and in  the light  of the  nature of  the power entrusted to  the elected  body of  advocates themselves  it cannot be  said that while regulating the entry to the legal profession the  Bar Councils  would find  themselves without any  yardstick   or  guideline   and  would  be  trading  an unchartered sea  and consequently  the rules  of  enrollment framed by  them would  fall foul on the altar of permissible delegation of  legislative  power.  It  is,  therefore,  not possible to  agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for  the appellant  that the  impugned rule  suffers from the  vice of  excessive delegation of legislative power or by  providing rule-making power to the State Bar Councils for regulating  entries of new advocates seeking to join the profession the  legislature has  effaced itself.  The  power conferred on  the State  Bar Councils  to lay  down  further conditions  for   controlling  the   entries  to  the  legal profession cannot  be said to be an unguided power conferred on them. The conditions which the State Bar Councils can lay down by  rules must  be conditions which would be germane to the high  and exacting standards of advocacy expected of the new entrants  to the fold of the profession. Implicit in the conferment of  such rule-making  power is the guideline laid down by  the legislature  itself that the conditions must be commensurate with  the fructification of the very purpose of the Act  of putting  the profession  of advocates on a sound

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footing so  that the  concerned new entrant can well justify his role  as an officer of the Court admitted to the fold of the noble  profession to  which he  seeks his admission. Any conditions  laid   down  by   the  State  Bar  Councils  for fructifying this laudable object of legislature would remain germane to  the exercise  of this power and can well be said to be  logically flowing  from it.  It cannot, therefore, be said that  any unguided and unchartered power is handed over on a  platter  by  the  legislature  to  the  concerned  Bar Councils for regulating entry to the legal profession. Rule- making  power   conferred  on  the  State  Bar  Councils  is inherently hedged  in with the obligation to frame only such rule, regarding  enrollment which would fructify the purpose of having  efficient members  of the Bar who can stand up to the expection  of the  noble and learned profession to which they are  to be given entry. Any rule which effectuates this purpose will  he within  the permissible  field and will not fall foul  on the  altar of  Article 14 and Article 19(1)(9) read with  Article 19(6).  Any rule  framed  for  enrollment which does not meet this yardstick will be a taboo. Hence it cannot be  said that  the rule making power entrusted to the State Bar Councils suffers from absence of any guidelines or exhibits effacement  of legislative  power. The  first point for determination, therefore, is answered in the negative by holding that  the impugned rule does not suffer from vice of any excessive delegation of legislative power. That takes us to the consideration of Point No.2. Point No.2.      It is  no doubt true that under Article 19, sub-Article (1)(g) all citizens have a right to practise any profession, or to  carry on  any occupation,  trade or  business and any profession  may   include  even  plurality  of  professions. However, this  is not  an absolute  right. It  is subject to sub-Article (6)  of Article  19 which lays down that nothing in sub-clause  (g) of  the  said  clause  shall  affect  the operation of  any existing  law in  so far as it imposes, or prevent the  State from  making any  law  imposing,  in  the interests of  the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise  of the  right   conferred  by  the  said  sub- clause.   It   cannot  be gainsaid that  litigants are  also members of  general public  and if   in  their  interest any rule imposes  a  restriction  on  the  entry  to  the  legal profession  and   if  such  restriction  is  found  to    be reasonable   Article   19(1)(g)  would  not  get stultified. It   is true   that  the   appellant as  a citizen  of India having   obtained the    qualification  required  for  being enrolled as  an  advocate  can  legitimately  aspire  to  be enrolled as  an advocate but his aforesaid right is fettered by the  impugned rule  framed by  the State  Bar Council. We have to consider whether the said restriction imposed by the rule is in any way unreasonable. We have to keep in view the fact that  the impugned rule restricts entry of a person who is otherwise  qualified for being enrolled as an advocate if he is  already carrying on any other profession. Question is whether such  a person  carrying on  other profession can be validly told  off the  gates by  the State  Bar  Council  by resorting to  the impugned  rule. In our view looking to the nature of  the  legal  profession  to  which  we  have  made detailed reference  earlier the  State Bar  Council would be justified in  framing such a rule prohibiting the entry of a professional who  insists on  carrying on  other  profession simultaneously with  the legal  profession. As  we have seen earlier legal  profession requires  full time  attention and would not  countenance an advocate riding two horses or more at a  time. He  has to  be full time advocate or not at all.

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Learned senior  counsel for  the appellant  submitted  that, even  though  the  appellant  is  a  practising  surgeon  he undertaking, if  given entry to the legal profession, not to piactisa medicine  during the  court hours.  This is neither here nor  there. It  is obvious  that  even  though  medical profession also  may be  a  dignified  profession  a  person cannot insist that he will be a practising doctor as well as a practising  advocate simultaneously. Such an insistence on his part  itself would  create an awkward situation not only for him  but for  his own clients as well as patients. It is easy  to  visualize  that  a  practising  surgeon  like  the appellant may  be required  to attend  emergency  operation, even beyond  court hours  either in  the morning  or in  the evening. On  the  other  hand  the  dictates  of  his  legal profession May  require him  to study  the cases  for  being argued the  next day in the court. Under these circumstances his attention  would be divided. We would naturally be. in a dilemma as  to whether  to attend  to  his  patient  on  the operation table  in the  evening or  to attend  to his legal profession and work for preparing cases fur the next day and to   take instructions   from  his   clients  for  efficient conduct of  the cases  next day  in the  court. If  he is an original side  advocate he  may be  required  to  spend  his evenings and even late nights for making witnesses ready for examination in the court next day. Under these circumstances as a  practising advocate  if  he  gives  attention  to  his clients in  his chamber  after court hours and if he is also required to attend an emergency operation at that very time, it would  be very  difficult for  him to  choose whether  to leave his  clients and  go to  attend  his  patient  in  the operation theater or to refuse to attend to his patients. If he selects  the first alternative his clients would clamour, his preparation  as advocate  would suffer  and naturally it would reflect upon his performance in the court next day. If on the  other hand  he chooses  to cater to the needs of his clients and  his legal work, his patients may suffer and may in given  contingency even stand to lose their lives without the aid  of his  expert hand  as a surgeon. Thus he would be torn between  two  conflicting  loyalties,  loyalty  to  his clients on  the one  hand and loyalty to his patients on the other. In  a way  he will instead of having the best of both the worlds,  have worst  of both  the worlds.  Such a person aspiring to  have simultaneous  enrollment both  as a lawyer and as a medical practioner will thus be like ’trishanku’ of yore who  will neither  be in  heaven nor  on earth.  It  is axiomatic that  an advocates  has to  burn midnight  oil for preparing his  cases for being argued in the court next day. Advocate face  examination every  day when  they  appear  in courts. It  is not as if that after court hours advocate has not to  put in   hard work on his study table in his chamber with or  without the  presence of  his clients  who  may  be available  for   consultation.  To   put  forward  his  best performance as  an advocate  he is  required to  give whole- hearted and  full time  attention  to  his  profession.  Any flinching  from   such  unstinted  attention  to  his  legal profession  would   certainly  have   an   impact   on   his professional ability  and expertise.  If he  is permitted to simultaneously  practise as a doctor then the requirement of his full  time attention to the legal profession is bound to be  adversely   affected.   Consequently   however   equally dignified may  be the  profession  of  a  doctor  he  cannot simultaneously be  permitted to practise law which is a full time occupation.  It is for ensuring the full time attention of legal  practitioners towards  their profession and with a view to  bringing out  their best  so that  they can  fulfil

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their role  as an  officer of  the court  and can give their best in  the administration,  of justice,  that the impugned rule  has   been  enacted  by  the  State  legislature.  It, therefore, cannot be said that it is in any way arbitrary or that it  imposes an  unreasonable  restriction  on  the  new entrant to  the profession  who is  told  not  to  practise, simultaneously any  other profession  and if  he does  so to deny to  him entry  to the  legal profession.  It is true as submitted by  learned senior  counsel for the appellant that the rule  of Central  Bar Council  does not  countenance  an advocate simultaneously carrying on any business and it does not expressly  frawn upon  any simultaneous  profession. But these are  general rules  of professional conduct. So far as regulating enrollment,  to the profession is concerned it is the task  entrusted solely  to the  State Bar Council by the Legislature as  seen earlier while considering the scheme of the Act.  While carrying  on that  task if  the entry to the profession  is  restricted  by  the  State  Bar  Council  by enacting the  impugned  rule  for  not  allowing  any  other professional to enter the Bar. When he does not want to give up the  other profession  but wants  to carry  on  the  same simultaneously with  legal practice,  it cannot be said that the Bar  Council has  by enacting  such a  rule imposed  any unreasonable restriction  on the  fundamental right  of  the prospective  practitioner  who  wants  to  enter  the  legal profession.      Learned senior  advocate for  the appellant  vehemently contended that  such a rule is not found to have been framed by other State Bar Councils. In our view that would not make any difference.  We are  called upon  to decide the question whether the impugned rule framed by the respondent-State Bar Council stands  the test  of Article  19(1)(9) or not. While deciding that  question whether  other  State  Bar  Councils permit by  their rules  entry of  other professional  to the legal profession,  would be  an aspect  which would  not  be strictly relevant.  In our  view the  impugned rule does not impose any  unreasonable restriction  on the  right  of  the professional carrying  on any  other avocation and insisting on  continuing   to  carry  on  such  profession,  while  it prohibits entry of such a person to the legal profession. If the  contention  of  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant is  countenanced and  any  person  professing  any other profession  is permitted  to join the legal profession having obtained  the Degree  of Law and having fulfilled the other  requirements  of  Section  24,  then  even  chartered accountants,   engineers    and   architects    would   also legitimately say  that during court hours they will practise law and  they  will  simultaneously  carry  on  their  other profession  beyond   court  hours.   If  such   simultaneous practices of  professionals who  want to  carry on more than one profession  at a  time are  permitted,  the  unflinching devotion expected  by the  legal profession from its members is bound to be adversely affected. If the peers being chosen representatives of  the legal  profession  constituting  the State Bar  Council, in  their wisdom, had thought it fit not to permit  such entries  of dual  practitioners to the legal profession it  cannot be  said that  they have done anything unreasonable or  have framed  an arbitrary  or  unreasonable rule. Point No. 3      So far  as the  challenge to  the impugned  rule on the touchstone of Article 14 is concerned it cannot be said that the rule  is unreasonable,  arbitrary or capricious from any angle. On  the same ground on which the rule is found not to have fallen  foul on  the anvil  of Article  19(1(g) as  the

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impugned rule  has to  be treated  as imposing  a reasonable restriction  on   the  said   fundamental  right   it  also, therefore,  has   to  be   held  not   to  be  arbitrary  or unreasonable from  any viewpoint. The rule carves out a well defined class of professionals carrying on other professions and denies  to members  of this  well defined class entry to the legal  profession so  long as they insist on carrying on any  other   profession  simultaneously   with   the   legal profession. The  said classification  has a reasonable nexus to the  object sought to be achieved, namely, the efficiency of advocates  belonging to  the  legal  profession  and  the better  administration   of  justice  for  which  the  legal profession is  a partner  with the  judiciary. The challenge mounted on  the rule  in the light of Article 14, therefore, has to fail.      That leaves  out the challenge to the rule in the light of Article 21. It is difficult to appreciate this challenge. It is  no doubt  true that  right to  live includes right to livelihood. However the appellant is not denied his right to livelihood. He  is already  a professional  carrying on  the profession of  a medical  practitioner. He  wants to  have a second string  to his  bow. He  wants simultaneously  to  be permitted to  practise law with a view to earn additional or more livelihood. So far as his aforesaid demand is concerned the impugned  rule requires  that unless  he gives  up  that other practice and joins wholeheartedly the legal profession he cannot  be permitted  to enter the legal profession. That rule cannot  be said  to be  laying  down  a  procedure  not established by  law. On the contrary that procedure has been found to  be well sustained under Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6).  Once that conclusion is reached the absolute requirement of Article 21 would be out of the way. Appellant cannot be  said to  have  peen  deprived  of  his  right  to livelihood by  pursuing two  professions,  contrary  to  any established procedure of law. Consequently the impugned rule cannot be  faulted on  the touchstone  of Articles  21.  The third point  for determination  also, therefore,  is decided against the appellant.      Before  parting   we   may   mention   one   submission highlighted by learned senior counsel tor the appellant. She submitted that  under rule-making  power of  the  State  Bar Council condition  for enrollment can be imposed. But in the guise of  imposing such  conditions, the  impugned rule  has travelled further  and has  laid down a disqualification for enrollment which  is beyond the scope of Section 24-A. It is true  is   submitted  by  learned  senior  counsel  for  the appellant that in a way the enactment of this rule imposes a disqualification for  enrollment. However  once it  is found that the  rule falls  within the  parameters of  rule-making power as  entrusted by  the legislature  to  the  State  be, Councils as  per Section 24(1)(e) read with Section 28(2)(d) it cannot  be said  that such  disqualification could not be legitimately imposed  by the  State Bar  Council.  She  next submitted that the Medical Council of India has no objection to the  appellant’s simultaneously practising law along with his practising  law along  with his practising as a surgeon. She also  submitted that in foreign countries in some of the States such  simultaneously practice  is permitted.  In  our view all  this is  besides the  point. Whether  the  Medical Council  of   India  has  no  objection  to  their  members’ practising law or whether in foreign countries under certain circumstances   other   professionals   Are   permitted   to simultaneously practise  law would  not be strictly relevant in deciding  the short question with which we are concerned, namely, whether  the State  Bar Council  had  undertaken  an

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impermissible  exercise   in  enacting   the  impugned  rule restricting entries  of other  professionals  to  the  legal profession while  they are  not prepared  to give  up  their other  professions   and   on   the   contrary   insist   on simultaneously practising  more than  one professions. While deciding this  question the wider question whether there can be a  better rule  than one  framed by the State Bar Council would be  besides the point and cannot be of any assistance. Such  a contention, therefore, cannot be of any avail to the learned senior counsel for the appellant.      The aforesaid  were the  only contentions  canvassed on behalf of  the appellant  and as  they fail  the appeal also fails  and   will  stand   dismissed.  In   the  facts   and circumstances of  the case  there will  be no  order  as  to costs.