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PETITIONER: H. H. SHRI SWAMIJI OF SHRI ADMAR MUTT, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE COMMISSIONER, HINDU RELIGIOUS & CHARITABLE ENDOWMENTSDEP

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/08/1979

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) KRISHNAIYER, V.R. UNTWALIA, N.L. SHINGAL, P.N. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR    1            1980 SCR  (1) 368  1979 SCC  (4) 642  CITATOR INFO :  R          1983 SC 617  (7)  F          1983 SC1246  (30)  R          1984 SC 121  (18,23)  R          1985 SC 218  (9)  RF         1989 SC 317  (34)  D          1989 SC1624  (11)  RF         1992 SC1383  (14)

ACT:      States Reorganisation  Act, 1956-A district transferred from one  State to  another-Continued application of the law applicable in  the former State even after transfer-Validity of.      Section 109-Commissioner of Religious Endowments-A body corporate-Commissioner, if  could exercise  powers under the Act creating  him as  body corporate if no directions issued by the Central Government.      Fees and Tax-Nature of.

HEADNOTE:      The religious  Mutts,  of  which  the  appellants  were Mathadhipatis, were situated in the District of South Kanara which formerly  was in the State of Madras. Section 76(1) of the Madras  Hindu Religious  and Charitable  Endowments Act, 1951, the  law applicable  to the  Mutts, provides  that  in respect of  services rendered  by the  Government and  their officers and  for defraying the expenses incurred on account of such  services, every  religious institution  shall, from the income  derived by  it, pay to the Commissioner annually such contribution  not exceeding 5%  of its income as may be prescribed. Consequent  upon the reorganisation of States in 1956 the  District of  South Kanara  was transferred  to the State of  Mysore. By  reason of the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act the Madras Act of 1951 continued to apply to the  Mutts in  the district  even after their transfer to the State  of Mysore.  The Government  of  Mysore  issued  a notification authorising the Commissioner for Settlement and Charitable Endowments  for Mysore  to exercise the functions of the Commissioner under the Madras Act.

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    In April, 1964 when the Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable  Endowments, Mysore  issued a  notice to  the appellants demanding  payment of  certain contributions  for the years 1957 to 1960 the appellants denied their liability to pay  the amounts  on the ground that (1) the Commissioner had no  power to  demand payment  of contributions  for  the period subsequent  to November,  1956 (when the District was transferred from  the former State of Madras to the State of Mysore); (2)  that the  demands were  excessive and  bore no relationship with  the services  rendered by  the department and (3)  that the expenditure incurred on the maintenance of staff and  officers of  the Commissioner’s  office could not wholly or in part be recovered from the appellants by way of contributions under s.76(1) of the Madras Act of 1951.      All the  contentions were rejected by the Commissioner. The appellants  thereupon filed  writ petitions  in the High Court impugning  the Commissioner’s  orders. The  High Court dismissed the writ petitions. 369      On appeal  to this  Court it was contended on behalf of the appellants  that (1)  the  notification  issued  by  the Mysore Government  authorising the  Commissioner to exercise the functions  of the  Commissioner under the Madras Act was invalid because  the Commissioner  being a  Corporation Sole the only authority competent to issue a notification in this behalf under s. 109(1) of the States Reorganisation Act 1956 was the Central Government; (2) that the demands made by the Commissioner  for  payment  of  fees  were  illegal  because considering  the   services  rendered   to  them  they  were excessive; (3) that the application of the Madras Act to one district only  offends against  the  guarantee  of  equality contained in  Art. 14 because the Mutts were required to pay fees which  similar institutions  situated in other areas of the State  were not  required to pay and (4) that though the initial application  of  the  Madras  Act  of  1951  to  the District  was   not  violative,  its  continued  application offends against the guarantee of equality.      Dismissing the appeals, ^      HELD :  1. The  provisions of  s.109(1) of  the  States Reorganisation Act  do not  support the  argument  that  the Commissioner being  a Corporation  Sole the  only  authority competent to  issue the  notification under  s. 122  was the Central  Government.   Though  the  body  corporate  has  to function within  the scope  of and  in accordance  with  the directions issued  by the  Central Government  from time  to time, its  power to  function under  the parent  Act is  not conditional on  the issuance  of directions  by the  Central Government.  If   directions  are   issued  by  the  Central Government they  have to  be complied  with by it. If on the other hand no directions are issued the powers and functions of the  authority remain  unimpaired and can nevertheless be exercised as  contemplated by the Act which creates the body corporate. [375C-D]      2.(a)  Information   on  matters   like  the   date  of constitution of  the Religious Endowment Fund, annual salary budget of  the  Commissioner’s  establishment  at  different places  and  the  total  number  of  institutions  to  which services were  rendered sought  by the  appellants would  be within the  knowledge of the respondents and could have been supplied. For  the purposes  of finding  whether there was a correlationship between  the services  rendered to  the  fee payers and the fees charged it is necessary to know the cost incurred for  organising and  rendering  the  services.  But matters involving  consideration of such correlationship are

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not required  to be proved by mathematical formula. What has to be seen is whether there is a fair correspondence between the fee charged and the cost of services rendered to the fee payers as a class. A vivisection of the amounts spent by the Commissioner’s establishment would have been speculative. It cannot be said that substantial prejudice had been caused to the  appellants   by  reason   of  the   non-supply  of  the information sought by them. [376 F-H]      (b) It  is well-established  that a  tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is for a special benefit or privilege.  Public  interest  is  at  the  basis  of  all impositions; but  in a  fee it is some special benefit which the individual  receives which is the basis of imposition. A fee being  a levy in consideration of rendering service to a particular type, correlation between the expenditure and the levy must  exist but  a levy  will not  be regarded as a tax merely because of the absence of uniformity in its incidence or because of compulsion 370 in  the   collection  thereof   or  because   some  of   the contributories did  not obtain the same degree of service as others may. [377F-H]      In the  instant case there were some institutions whose annual income  was over  Rs. 200  and a  large number  whose annual  income   was  less   than  Rs.   200.  The   smaller institutions  require   and  receive   services   from   the department as  much as  the bigger  class  and  the  amounts collected by  way of  fees were  just enough  to balance the bulk of  the expenditure  incurred for financing the conduct of affairs  of the department which is charged with the duty and obligation  of rendering  services to  the  institutions directly and  to the  public which patronises or visits them indirectly. [378G-H]      The Commissioner,  Hindu Religious Endowment, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra  Thirtha Swamiar  of Sri Shirur Mutt. [1954] SCR, 1005,  H. H.  Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar v. Commissioner for Hindu  Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore. [1963] Suppl. 2 SCR. 302, Kewal Krishan Puri and Anr. etc. v. State of Punjab  and ors.  etc. [1979]  3 SCR  1217, Hingir Rampur Coal Co.  Ltd. &  Ors. v.  State of Orissa and Ors. [1961] 2 SCR 537,  Indian Mica  and Micanite Industries Ltd. v. State of  Bihar   &  ors.   [1971]  Suppl.  SCR.  319,  Secretary, Government of  Madras, Home  Department and  Anr. v.  Zenith Lamp & Electrical Ltd. [1973] 2 SCR 973 referred to.      (c) In  the absence  of any acceptable evidence showing that the  department had  built up  large  accumulations  or reserves  out   of  the  fees  collected  from  the  various institutions and  considering that services were required to be rendered  to a  large class of institutions consisting of major and  minor institutions  it cannot  be said that there was no  approximation or  correspondence  between  the  fees levied on  the appellants  and the  services rendered to the class to which they belonged. [379C-D]      3. The  Madras Act  of 1951  in its  application to the district of  South Kanara  (now in  the State  of Karnataka) does not  infringe Art.  14 of  the Constitution.  By a long line of  decisions this  Court has laid down that dissimilar treatment does  not necessarily offend against the guarantee of equality contained in Art. 14 so long as there is a valid basis for  classification and  the  classification  bears  a nexus with the object of the impugned provisions. In matters arising  out   of  reorganisation   of   States,   continued application of  laws of  a State  to territories  which were within that  State but which became a part of another State, is  not   discriminatory  since   classification  rests   on

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geographical considerations founded on historical reasons.      Bhaiyalal Shukla  v. State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  [1962] Supp. 2  SCR 257, Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of M.P. [1959] SCR 427, Anant Prasad Lakshminivas Ganeriwal v. State of Andhra  Pradesh and  other [1963]  Suppl. 1  SCR 844, The State of  Madhya Pradesh  v. Bhopal  Sugar  Industries  Ltd. [1964] 6  SCR 846, Vishwesha Thirtha Swamiar & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr. [1972] 1 SCR 137 referred to.      State of  Rajasthan v.  Rao Manohar  Singhji [1954] SCR 996 and Jia Lal v. The Delhi Administration [1963] 2 SCR 364 distinguished.      4. Section  119 of  the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was intended  to serve  a temporary purpose. But Acts, Rules and Regulations  whose constitutional validity is upheld and can be upheld only on the ground that no violation per se of Art. 14 is involved in the application of different laws 371 to different  components of  a State,  if the  area to which unequal laws are applied has become a part of the State as a result of  the States  Reorganisation,  cannot  continue  to apply to such area indefinitely. An indefinite extension and application of  unequal laws  for all  time  to  come  would militate against  their true character as temporary measures taken in order to serve a temporary purpose. The decision to withdraw application  of unequal  laws to  equals cannot  be delayed unreasonably  because the  relevance  of  historical reasons which  justify the  application of  unequal laws  is bound to  wear out  with the passage of time. But it cannot, however, be  said that  the continued application of the Act to the  District became  violative of Art. 14 as immediately as during  the period  under consideration,  which was  just five  or   six  years   after  the  passing  of  the  States Reorganisation Act.  Nor has  the continued  application  of that Act  until now  is shown  to be  violative of  Art. 14. [387E-G]      Narottam Kishore  Dev Varma  and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. [1964] 7 SCR 55 referred to.      Shinghal J. (concurring in the final decision).      1.  In  the  absence  of  necessary  pleadings  by  the appellants it  was not  necessary to  consider  whether  the continued application  of the Madras Act to the district was violative of  Art. 14 of the Constitution. It cannot also be said that  inequality is  writ large  on  the  face  of  the impugned statute in its application to the district and that it is  perilously near  the periphery of unconstitutionality merely because of the lapse of 23 years. [395A]      2. Pleadings  or a  statement of  material facts are of vital importance  because absence of all the necessary facts in a  petition for  the redress  of a  grievance  denies  an opportunity for  the opposite  party to  formulate its case. The parties would not know the points at issue and therefore the controversy would be confined to any point or points. If a  petition  filed  under  Art.  226  or  Art.  32  alleging infringement  of   Art.  14   is  singularly   deficient  in furnishing particulars  justifying the allegation, but makes out only  a mere  plea of  differential treatment,  that, by itself, would  not be  sufficient to  enable  the  Court  to examine the  validity of  the petitioner’s  claim.  [389G-H; 392H]      In the  instant case  the  sole  ground  on  which  the appellants rested  their  plea  of  discrimination  was  the continued application  of the  provisions of  the Act to the district eight  or nine  years after  the reorganisation  of States and  that failure  to "unify"  the legislation on the subject of  Hindu Religious  and Charitable  Endowments  was

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wholly discriminatory.  That is  quite untenable  in view of the decision in Bhopal Sugar Industries case. The other plea of mixing  of Mutts  with temples is not quite intelligible. It had  not even  been referred  by the  counsel during  the arguments. The grounds which had been taken were, therefore, untenable. [394A-C]      3. It is impossible to lay down any definite time limit within which  the State has to make the necessary adjustment for the  purpose of  effectuating the equality clause of the Constitution. While  differential  treatment  could  not  be permitted to  assume permanency  without a rational basis to support it  as years  go by  a  mere  plea  of  differential treatment  is  by  itself  not  sufficient  to  attract  the application of Art. 14.      State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. [1964] 6 SCR 846 followed. 372

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal Nos. 1445- 1448 of 1968.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  25-8-1967  of  the Mysore High  Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1575, 1576, 1579/65 and 1439/66.                             AND             Civil Appeal Nos. 1720-1722 of 1968      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  25-8-1967  of  the Mysore High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 1649/64, 1650/64 and 1651/64.      H. B.  Datar, R.  B. Datar and A. K. Srivastava for the Appellants in C.A. Nos. 1445-48/68.      A. K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar for the Appellants in C.A. Nos. 1720A-1722/68.      V.A. (Dr.)  Sayed Mohamad  and N.  Nettar for RR 1-3 in C.A. Nos. 1445-1448/68 and RR in C.A. Nos. 1720A-1722/68.      R. P.  Bhat and  Girish Chandra  for RR 4 in C.A. 1445- 1448/68.      The Judgment  of Y. V. Chandrachud, C.J., V. R. Krishna Iyer, N.  L. Untwalia and A. D. Koshal, JJ. was delivered by Chandrachud,  C.J.  P.  N.  Shinghal,  J.  gave  a  separate Opinion.      CHANDRACHUD, C.J.  These seven  appeals by  certificate are directed  against the  judgment dated  August  25,  1967 given by  the High  Court of  Mysore in  Writ Petitions Nos. 1649, 1650  and 1651 of 1964, Writ Petitions Nos. 1575, 1576 and 1579  of 1965 and Writ Petitions No. 1439 of 1966. These Writ Petitions  were filed  by the  appellants under article 226 of  the Constitution  praying that  the  demand  notices issued  by   the  Commissioner   for  Hindu   Religious  and Charitable Endowments of Mysore be quashed and for a writ of mandamus restraining  the respondents from taking any action in pursuance thereof.      Until November  1, 1956, when the States Reorganisation Act, 37  of 1956,  came into  force the  District  of  South Kanara was a part of the former State of Madras. As a result of the States Reorganisation Act that District became a part of the State of Mysore, now the State of Karnataka.      The Madras  Legislature passed an Act called the Madras Hindu Religious  and Charitable  Endowments Act,  19 of 1951 ("the Madras  Act of  1951"),  to  provide  for  the  better administration  and   governance  of   Hindu  Religious  and Charitable Institutions and Endowments 373

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in the State of Madras Section 76(1) of the Act, as it stood originally,  provided   that  in  respect  of  the  services rendered  by   the  Government  and  their  officers,  every religious institution  shall, from the income derived by it. pay  to   the  Government  annually  such  contribution  not exceeding 5  per centum  of its income as may be prescribed. This provision  and some  other provisions  of the  Act were challenged in  the Madras High Court on behalf of the Shirur Mutt and  others. The challenge was upheld by the High Court and the  appeal filed  therefrom by  the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, was dismissed by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras, v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha  Swamiar of  Sri  Shirur  Mutt.  Section 76(1) was  held void  by this  Court on  the ground that the provision relating  to the  payment of  annual  contribution contained in  it was  in the  nature of  tax and not fee and therefore it  was beyond  the legislative  competence of the Madras State  Legislature to enact the provision. The Madras Legislature amended  section 76(1)  of  the  Act  so  as  to provide that  in respect  of the  services rendered  by  the Government  and  their  officers,  "and  for  defraying  the expenses  incurred  on  account  of  such  services",  every religious institution  shall, from the income derived by it, pay to  the  Commissioner  annually  such  contribution  not exceeding  five   per  centum   of  its  income  as  may  be prescribed. The  validity of the amended section, was upheld by  this  Court  in  H.  H.  Sudhundra  Thirtha  Swamiar  v. Commissioner for  Hindu Religious  & Charitable  Endowments, Mysore.      After the  formation of  the new  State of Mysore under the States  Reorganisation Act,  1956, laws  which  were  in force in  the areas which were formerly comprised within the Madras  State,   continued   to   apply   to   those   areas notwithstanding the  fact that  they became  part of the new State of  Mysore. Section  199 of  the Act  of 1956 provides that the  provisions of  Part II  (’Territorial Changes  and Formation of  new States’)  shall  not  be  deemed  to  have effected any  change in  the territories to which any law in force  immediately  before  the  appointed  day  extends  or applies, and  territorial references  in any  such law to an existing  State   shall,  until   otherwise  provided  by  a competent  Legislature  or  other  competent  authority,  be construed as  meaning  the  territories  within  that  State immediately before  the appointed  day. It  is by  reason of this section  that the Madras Act of 1951 continued to apply to the  South Kanara  District which  prior to  November  1, 1956, was a part of 374 the Madras  State but which became after that date a part of the Mysore State.      We will refer to the facts of Civil Appeal 1445 of 1968 which arises out of Writ Petition 1575 of 1965. The facts of the other  appeals are  in  material  respect  similar.  The appellant who  is the Mathadhipati of Shri Admar Mutt in the South Kanara District received a notice dated April 24, 1964 from  the   Commissioner,  Hindu  Religious  and  Charitable Endowments, Mysore  demanding payment  of  contribution  for Fasli years  1367 to 1370 which correspond to calendar years 1957 to 1960. By the notice, the Commissioner demanded a sum of Rs.  12,724.60 for the Fasli year 1367, Rs. 12,274.60 for the Fasli  year 1368,  Rs. 11,270.70 for the Fasli year 1369 and Rs.  12,169.20 for  the Fasli  year 1370.  The appellant disputed his liability to pay the contribution on the ground that the  Commissioner was  not entitled  to make any demand for the  period  subsequent  to  November  1956,  that  even

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assuming that  he had  the  lawful  authority  to  make  the demands,  the  amount  demanded  was  excessive  bearing  no relationship with  the services  rendered by  the Department and  that   the  expenditure   which  was  incurred  on  the maintenance of  the office and staff of the Commissioner and the Deputy  Commissioner could  not wholly  or  in  part  be recovered from  the appellant  by way  of contribution under section 76(1) of the Madras Act of 1951.      Since the  Commissioner did  not accept the appellants’ contention, the  appellants filed  the Writ Petitions in the Mysore High  Court asking that the demand notices be quashed as illegal.  Those Writ Petitions were dismissed by the High Court but  it has  given to  the appellants  certificates to appeal to this Court under articles 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.      Simultaneously  with   the  States  Reorganisation  Act coming  into  force,  the  Government  of  Mysore  issued  a notification under  section 122  of that Act authorising the Commissioner for  Settlements and  Charitable Endowments for Mysore to  exercise the  functions of the Commissioner under the Madras  Act of  1951. It  is contended  on behalf of the appellants  that  the  aforesaid  notification  lacks  law’s authority because,  the  Commissioner  being  a  Corporation Sole, the  only authority  which is  competent to  issue the notification under section 122 is the Central Government, by reason of  the provisions contained in section 109(i) of the S.R. Act. It is true that by section 80 of the Madras Act of 1951, the  Commissioner is  constituted a  Corporation  Sole with a  perpetual succession.  But the provisions of section 109(1) of  the S.  R. Act on which the argument rests do not support the  argument. The  relevant part of section 109 (1) provides that where any body corporate has been 375 constituted under  a State  Act for  an existing  State, any part of  which is  by virtue of the provisions of Part II of the  S.R.   Act  transferred   to  any   other  State,  then notwithstanding such  transfer, the body corporate shall, as from the  appointed day  continue to function and operate in those areas  in respect  of which  it  was  functioning  and operating immediately  before that  day,  "subject  to  such directions as may from time to time be issued by the Central Government". Under  this provision,  it is  competent to the Central Government  to issue  directions to a body corporate and by reason of sub-section 2 of section 109, any direction issued by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall include a  direction that  any law  by which  the said  body corporate is  governed shall  have effect  subject  to  such exceptions and  modifications as  may be  specified  in  the directions. In  other  words,  the  body  corporate  has  to function within  the scope  of and  in accordance  with  the directions issued  by the  Central Government  from time  to time. But  the power of the body corporate to function under the parent  Act  is  not  conditional  on  the  issuance  of directions by  the Central  Government.  If  directions  are issued by  the Central  Government, they have to be complied with by the body corporate. If no directions are issued, the powers and  functions of the authority remain unimpaired and can nevertheless  be exercised  as contemplated  by the  Act which creates the body corporate.      The second  contention made on behalf of the appellants is that the demands made by the Commissioner for the payment of  fees   is  illegal  because,  considering  the  services rendered to  them, the  demands are  clearly  excessive.  In other words  the argument  is that  there is no quid pro quo between the services rendered by the State to the appellants

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and the  fees which the Commissioner has called upon them to pay.      The affidavit  of Shri  Annaji Rao  in support  of Writ Petition 1575  of 1965  filed by the Admar Mutt contains the following averments  directed to establishing the absence of quid pro  quo. It  is stated  in paragraphs  14 to 18 of the said affidavit that,           (1)  in the  district of  South Kanara,  there are                about 310  major religious institutions which                are dealt  with by  the establishment  of the                Commissioner. Out  of these,  only 30 have an                annual income  exceeding Rs. 20,000/-. Out of                these 30, 17 are Mutts and out of these 17, 9                are situated in Udipi, South Kanara.           (2)  the 30  major institutions  are dealt with by                the  Deputy   Commissioner,   South   Kanara,                Mangalore, under  the powers delegated to him                by  the   Commissioner.  The   remaining  280                Institutions are dealt with by the 376                Assistant Commissioner  who  has  a  separate                establishment of his own;           (3)  the Deputy  Commissioner, who  deals with the                30 major  institutions, utilises the services                of two  Clerks and  one Stenographer  in  his                office at Mangalore, the expenditure on whose                salary cannot  exceed Rs.  6,000/- per  annum                approximately. The  only work  that is  being                done by the Deputy Commissioner in respect of                the Mutts  is to  receive  the  draft  Annual                Budgets submitted  by them  and to  make  his                remarks thereon.  A service  of  this  nature                cannot cost more than Rs.200/- per annum;           (4)  for  the   petty  services  which  are  being                rendered to  the appellants,  the five  Udipi                Mutts have  been called up on to pay a sum of                Rs. 30,000/-  for the four years in question.                A sum  of Rs.  25,000/- is  demanded from the                other four  Mutts for  the same period. Apart                from these  9 Mutts,  there are 8 other Mutts                and 13  other major  institutions from whom a                sum of  Rs. 50,000/- has been demanded. These                demands are  grossly uncorrelated to the cost                of services rendered to the appellants.      On December  20, 1966  an application  was filed in the High Court  on behalf  of the  appellants  asking  that  the respondents be directed to furnish the necessary particulars regarding, inter  alia, (i)  the  date  when  the  Religious Endowments Fund  was constituted;  (ii) the  demands made in respect of the major institutions in South Kanara; (iii) the salaries payable  to the  establishments of the Commissioner and the  Deputy Commissioner;  (iv) the functions discharged by the  Deputy Commissioner  in respect  of Mutts;  (v)  the expenditure  incurred   by  the   Commissioner’s  office  in Mangalore and  in Bangalore  and (vi)  the total  number  of institutions controlled  by the Department in the four areas which were  formerly parts  of other  States but  which  had become a  part of  the State  of  Mysore  under  the  States Reorganisation Act.      The information  sought by  the appellants  could  have been supplied  by the  respondents because  matters like the date of  constitution of  the Fund, the annual salary budget of the  Commissioner’s establishment at different places and the total  number of  institutions to  which  services  were rendered would  be within  their special  knowledge. For the

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purpose  of  finding  whether  there  is  a  correlationship between the services rendered to the fee payers and the fees charged to them, it 377 is necessary  to know  the cost  incurred for organising and rendering the  services. But matters involving consideration of such a correlationship are not required to be proved by a mathematical formula.  What has  to be seen is whether there is a  fair correspondence  between the  fee charged  and the cost of  services rendered to the fee payers as a class. The further and  better particulars  asked for by the appellants under Order  VI, rule  5 of  the Civil Procedure Code, would have driven the court, had the particulars been supplied, to a laborious and fruitless inquiry into minute details of the Commissioner’s departmental  budget. A  vivisection  of  the amounts  spent   by  the   Commissioner’s  establishment  at different  places   for  various  purposes  and  the  ad-hoc allocation by  the court  of different  amounts to different heads would  at best  have been  speculative. It  would have been no  more possible for the High Court if the information were before  it, than  it would  be possible  for us  if the information were  before us,  to find  out what  part of the expenses incurred  by the  Commissioner’s  establishment  at various places  and what  part of the salary of his staff at those places should be allocated to the functions discharged by  the   establishment  in  connection  with  the  services rendered to  the appellants.  We do not therefore think that any substantial  prejudice has been caused to the appellants by reason  of the  non-supply of  the information  sought by them.      The necessity for establishing quid pro quo between the fee and  the cost  of services rendered is a matter which is no longer open to doubt or debate. Several decisions of this Court have  considered that question, beginning perhaps with the decision  in the  Shirur Mutt  case (supra)  and  ending (hopefully)  with   the  recent   judgment  delivered  by  a Constitution Bench  of this Court in a large group of Market Fee cases  from Punjab and Haryana in Kewal Krishan Puri and Anr. etc. v. State of Punjab and Ors. etc.      In the Shirur Mutt case (supra) in which the levy under the unamended  section 76(1)  of the  Madras Act of 1951 was held to  be a  tax Mukherjea, J., who delivered the judgment of the  Court, said that the distinction between a tax and a fee lies  primarily in  the fact  that a  tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is for a special benefit or privilege. Public interest, according to the Court, is at the basis of all impositions but in a fee it is some special benefit which  the individual receives. After this decision, section 76  was amended  by the  Madras Legislature  and the amended section  was  upheld  by  this  Court  in  Sudhundra Thirtha Swamiar  case (supra). It was held in that case that a fee  does not cease to be of that character merely because there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness 378 present in  it, nor  is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct  relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to  the individual  who obtains the benefit of the service. Shah,  J., who spoke for the Court, emphasised that "if with  a view  to providing  a specific  service, levy is imposed by  law and expenses for maintaining the service are met out  of the  amounts collected, there being a reasonable relation between  the levy  and the  expenses  incurred  for rendering the  service, the levy would be in the nature of a fee and  not in the nature of a tax". In other words, "a fee being a  levy in  consideration of  rendering service  of  a

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particular type,  correlation between the expenditure by the Government and  the levy  must undoubtedly exist, but a levy will not  be regarded as a tax merely because of the absence of uniformity  in its incidence, or because of compulsion in the  collection   thereof,   nor   because   some   of   the contributories do  not obtain  the same degree of service as others may".  In Hingir Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Orissa  and Ors.,  the Court  while upholding the levy of fee said  through Gajendragadkar,  J. that the scheme of the Act showed  that the  cess was  levied against  the class of persons owning  mines in the notified area and it was levied to enable  the State  Government to render specific services to that  class by  developing the  notified mineral area. In Indian Mica  & Micanite  Industries Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., Hedge, J. who spoke for the Court said that before any levy can  be upheld as a fee, it must be shown that the levy has "reasonable  correlationship" with the services rendered by the  Government to  the fee  payer but  that it  will  be impossible to  expect an exact correlationship. According to the learned  Judge, the correlationship expected is one of a general character  and not as of arithmetical exactitude. In Secretary, Government of Madras, Home Department and Anr. v. Zenith Lamp  & Electrical  Ltd. where  the question  was  as regards the validity of court fees, Sikri, C.J. speaking for the  Court,   pointed  out  that  there  must  be  a  "broad correlationship" between  the fees collected and the cost of administration of civil justice and that each case has to be judged from  a reasonable  and practical  point of  view for finding out  the element  of quid  pro  quo.  All  of  these decisions have  been discussed  and the principles laid down therein reaffirmed  by this  Court in the Punjab and Haryana Market Fee cases (supra) in which the judgment was delivered by one of us, namely, Untwalia, J.      It is  clear from  the various  facts mentioned  by the respondents in  their affidavit in the High Court that under the supervision  and control  of the Commissioner, there are as many as 324 institutions 379 with an  income  of  over  Rs.  200/-  per  annum  and  1796 institutions with  an income  of less  than  Rs.  200/-  per annum. The latter class of smaller institutions requires and receives services  from the Department as much as the former class of  bigger institutions does. The amounts collected by the levy  of fees  on these  institutions was just enough to balance the  bulk of  the  expenditure  incurred,  at  least during the period under review, for financing the conduct of affairs of  a Department  which is charged with the duty and obligation  of   rendering  services   to  the  institutions directly and  to the  public which patronises or visits them indirectly.      The  rules   framed  under   the  Madras  Act  of  1951 prescribed a  fee varying from 3 to 5 per cent of the annual income of  the institutions.  The figures  furnished by  the Commissioner in  the third  statement dated  August 10, 1967 which was  filed in pursuance of the directive issued by the High Court  show that  the total  demand  made  on  all  the religious institutions  for fees  during the  years 1957  to 1964 amounted  to Rs. 8,80,389/- while the allocable expense for the  services was  Rs. 7,54,160/-.  It  is  not  without significance that  though the total demand made on the Mutts during the said period was in the sum of Rs. 3,64,591/-, the contribution received  from the Mutts was Rs. 24,526/- only. In the  absence of  any acceptable evidence showing that the Department had  built up large accumulations or reserves out of the  fees collected  from the  various  institutions  and

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considering that  services are  required to be rendered to a large class  of institutions  consisting of  major and minor institutions, we do not think that we can positively come to the  conclusion   that  there   is   no   approximation   or correspondence between the fees levied on the appellants and the services rendered to the class to which they belong. The second contention therefore fails.      The third  and last  contention  made  by  the  learned counsel for  the appellants  is that  the application of the Madras Act  of 1951  to one  district only  of the  State of Karnataka  offends   against  the   guarantee  of   equality contained in  article 14  of the Constitution which provides that the  State shall not deny to any person equality before the law  or the  equal protection  of the  laws  within  the territory of  India. It  is urged  that as  a result  of the application of  the Madras  Act of  1951 to  the  Mutts  and temples in  the South  Kanara District, they are required to pay fees  under the  Act which similar institutions situated in other  areas of  Karnataka do not have to pay. The burden thus imposed  on the  appellants is  said to  be an  act  of hostile discrimination and therefore unconstitutional.      In support  of this  argument  counsel  has  drawn  our attention to  certain decisions  of this Court which we will presently examine but 380 before doing  so, we must recall the background in which the Madras Act  of 1951  became applicable  to the  South Kanara District of the State of Mysore, now the State of Karnataka. To recapitulate briefly, the South Kanara District which was formerly a part of the State of Madras, became a part of the State of  Mysore as a result of the Reorganisation of States on November  1, 1956.  It is  by reason of the provisions of the States  Reorganisation Act,  1956 that the Madras Act of 1951  continues  to  apply  to  the  South  Kanara  District notwithstanding the  fact that it is no longer a part of the State of  Madras. Section  119 of  the S.R.  Act provides to that effect.      In State  of Rajasthan  v. Rao  Manohar  Singhji  three Ordinances, No. XXVII of 1948 and Nos. X and XV of 1949 were challenged on  the ground,  inter  alia,  that  after  final formation of  the  State  of  Rajasthan  in  May,  1949  the Ordinances remained in force in a part of the State with the result that while Jagirs in a part of the State were managed by the  State, the Jagirs in the rest of the State were left untouched and  remained with  the  Jagirdars.  Section  8-A, which was  inserted in  Ordinance XXVII of 1948 by section 4 of Ordinance  X of  1949 and  was amended  by section  3  of Ordinance XV  of 1949,  provided that  the revenue including taxes, cesses and other revenue from forests which was until then collected  by Jagirdars shall in future be collected by and paid  to the  Government. After deducting the collection charges and  other expenses,  the Government was to pay back the revenue to the Jagirdars concerned.      This case is distinguishable for the simple reason that the decision  turned on the application of article 13 of the Constitution and  the case  did not  involve  considerations arising out  of the  provisions of the States Reorganisation Act. The  respondent therein  was a  Jagirdar in  the former State of  Mewar which  was integrated  in April 1948 to form what was  known as  the former United State of Rajasthan. In April and  May 1949  that State  was  amalgamated  with  the former States  of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur and the former  Union of  Matsya to form the State of Rajasthan. The three  Ordinances in  question were issued by the former United  State  of  Rajasthan,  as  a  result  of  which  the

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management of  the Jagirs  in the  State, including those in Mewar, was  assumed by  the State. After the final formation of the  State of  Rajasthan  in  May  1949,  the  Ordinances remained in  force in  a part  of the  State only  with  the result that  the Jagirdars of only a part of the State could not collect  their rents while Jagirdars in other areas like Bikaner, Jaipur,  Jaisalmer, Jodhpur,  and the  Matsya Union were under no such disability, since there was 381 no such  law in  those areas.  But when  the integration  of April and May, 1949 took place, the discrimination exhibited itself not  by virtue  of anything  inherent in the impugned Ordinances but  by reason  of the fact that Jagirdars of one part of the State were subjected to a disability while those in the  other parts  remained wholly unaffected. As observed by this  Court in  its judgment, this was an obvious case of discrimination not supported on the ground that it was based upon a reasonable classification. The discrimination was not open to any exception until the Constitution came into force on January  26, 1950  when by reason of Article 13, all laws in force  in the  territory of  India immediately before the commencement of  the Constitution  in so  far as  they  were inconsistent with  the provisions of Part III became void to the extent  of the  inconsistency. The High Court as well as this Court  found  that  Section  8-A  was  unconstitutional because there  was no  real and  substantial distinction why the Jagirdars  of a  particular area  should continue  to be treated with  inequality as  compared with  the Jagirdars in another area  of the  State. There  was nothing to show that there was  any peculiarity  or any  special feature  in  the Jagirs of  the former United State of Rajasthan, like Mewar, to justify  differentiation from the Jagirs comprised in the States which  were subsequently integrated into the State of Rajasthan in  1949. In  other words,  after the formation of the new State there was no justification for taking away the powers of the Jagirdars of a disfavoured area like Mewar and to leave  them intact in the rest of the areas like Bikaner, Jaipur and Jodhpur.      In Jai  Lal v.  The Delhi Administration, on which also the appellants  rely, there  were two  appeals  before  this Court arising  out of convictions under section 19(f) of the Indian Arms  Act, 1878. Section 29 of that Act provided that for prosecution  for an  offence under  section 19(f) of the Act committed  in the  territories north  of the  Jumna  and Ganga, no  sanction was  required but  sanction was required for the  prosecution if  the offence  was committed in other areas. The court examined the legislative history of section 29 and  noticed that  the section made a distinction between the areas  to which  the Arms  and Ammunition  Act  of  1960 applied and the other areas. The former included territories which had been disarmed under orders of the Governor-General and those  in which a general search had been ordered, which comprised the territories north of the Jumna and Ganga. This differentiation came to be made as a result of the political situation which  obtained in India following the "rebellion" of 1857,  its genesis  being that  the largest opposition to the British  Government came  from Taluqdars to the north of the Jumna 382 and  Ganga.   Bearing  in  mind  these  historical  reasons, Venkatarama Aiyar, J., speaking for the Court, observed that more  than   a  century  had  elapsed  since  1857  and  the conditions had  so radically  changed that it was impossible any  longer   to  sustain   any  distinction   between   the territories north  of the  Jumna and  Ganga  and  the  other

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territories on any ground pertinent to the object of the law in question. Section 29 was accordingly held to be repugnant to article  14. This decision too is distinguishable for two reasons. Firstly,  more than a century had elapsed since the occurrence of  events which  led to  differential  treatment being accorded  to the area north of Jumna and Ganga; and it is a  well-known fact  of history  that political conditions had changed vastly in India during that period. Secondly, as in Rao  Manohar  Singhji,  (supra)  the  discrimination  was violative of  article 14  of the  Constitution because there was  no   longer  any   nexus   between   the   geographical classification made  by section  29 of  the Indian Arms Act, 1878 and  the object  of that provision. After the enactment of  the   Constitution,  article   13  rendered  section  29 unconstitutional.      There  are   certain  other   decisions  to  which  the appellants’ counsel  himself drew  our attention  fairly and they clinch  the issue.  We  will  now  refer  to  them.  In Bhaiyalal Shukla  v. State  of Madhya Pradesh, the appellant was engaged  in the business of construction as a contractor under the  P.W.D. in  the Rewa Circle of the former State of Vindhya Pradesh  which had  become a  part of  the State  of Madhya Pradesh.  He challenged  the levy  of  Sales  Tax  on building materials supplied by him during the years 1953-59. After the  re-organisation of  States, Madhya Pradesh had as many as  four Sales  Tax Acts. One of the arguments advanced on behalf  of the  appellant was  that a person belonging to the area  of the  former State  of Madhya  Pradesh  was  not liable to  sales  tax  on  building  materials  in  a  works contract, under  the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act because of the decision  of this  Court in Pandit Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of  Madhya Pradesh,  but another  person living  in an area forming part of the former State of Vindhya Pradesh was liable to  sales tax  under the  same Act,  as  extended  to Vindhya Pradesh.  While rejecting  the argument that article 14 was thereby contravened, this Court held that the laws in different portions  of the  new State of Madhya Pradesh were enacted by  different legislatures, and under section 119 of the States  Reorganisation Act,  all laws  in force  were to continue until  re-pealed  or  altered  by  the  appropriate Legislature. The  Sales Tax  law in  Vindhya Pradesh  having been validly enacted, it carried its 383 validity  with   it  under   section  119   of  the   States Reorganisation Act, when it became a part of Madhya Pradesh. Thereafter, observed  Hidayatullah,  J.  on  behalf  of  the Court, the  different laws  which were in force in different parts of  Madhya Pradesh  could be  sustained on  the ground that the differentiation arose from historical reasons and a "geographical classification  based on  historical  reasons" was valid.  For the last proposition, reliance was placed on two unreported  decisions of the Court, dated November 2 and November 30, 1960.      In Anant  Prasad Lakshminivas  Ganeriwal  v.  State  of Andhra Pradesh  and Others,  the appellant who claimed to be the sole  hereditary trustee  and mutawalli  of a  temple in Hyderabad was  served with  a  notice  by  the  Director  of Endowments, Hyderabad,  to have  the temple registered under the Hyderabad  Endowments Regulations, 1940. The Director of Endowments of  Hyderabad also  passed two  orders  directing that the  supervision of  the temple  be taken over under r. 179 of  the Endowments  Rules and that the management of the temple do vest in the Director of Endowments, Hyderabad. The appellant filed  a Writ  Petition in  this Court challenging the  validity  of  the  Regulations  and  the  Rules  framed

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thereunder as  being repugnant  to articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. His contention was that there were two laws in force in  two parts  of the  State of  Andhra  Pradesh  with respect to religious endowments and that these two laws were different in  many matters resulting in discrimination which was hit  by article  14. The  State of Andhra Pradesh, as it came into  existence after  the States  Reorganisation  Act, 1956, consists  of two areas one of which came to that State from the former Part A State of Madras in 1953 and the other from the  former Part  B State  of Hyderabad  in 1956.  This Court observed,  while repelling the challenge under article 14, that  the two  areas naturally  had different  laws  and that, assimilation  of the  laws which  were in operation in the two  parts of  the State  and bringing  them  under  one common pattern  was bound to take some time. It appears that the Court  was informed  that the question of having one law for public  trusts of  religious or  charitable  nature  was under the  active consideration of the State Government, for which reason,  the Court  thought that  it was  not right to strike down  all laws  prevailing in  the two  parts of  the State because  of certain differences in them arising out of historical reasons. The Court applied to the facts before it the ratio  of Bhaiyalal Shukla (supra) and distinguished the decision in Rao Manohar Singhji (supra).      In  The   State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Bhopal  Sugar Industries  Ltd.,   the  respondent  company  filed  a  Writ Petition in August 1960 384 in the  M.P. High  Court praying  that the  State of  Madhya Pradesh  be  restrained  from  enforcing  the  Bhopal  State Agricultural Income-tax  Act, 1953  on the  ground  that  it contravened the  company’s right  under article  14  of  the Constitution. By  the States  Reorganisation Act,  1956, the territory of  the State  of Bhopal  became from  November 1, 1956 a  part of  the State of Madhya Pradesh. Though shortly thereafter, the Adaptation of Laws Order was issued to apply certain laws  uniformly to  the entire  State and though the Legislature, under the Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act, 1953  had   made  certain  other  alterations  in  the  laws applicable to  the  State,  the  Bhopal  State  Agricultural Income-tax Act  remained unamended.  Nor was  its  operation extended to  the other  regions of the State. The result was that Agricultural Income-tax was levied within a part of the State of  Madhya Pradesh,  namely, in  the territory  of the former State  of Bhopal but not in the rest of the territory of the  State of  Madhya Pradesh.  Reversing the judgment of the High  Court, this  Court held,  relying  upon  Bhaiyalal Shukla (supra)  and other  cases that  where application  of unequal laws is reasonably justified for historical reasons, a geographical  classification founded  on  such  historical reasons is  valid. While  upholding the  impugned statute in its application  to a  part of the State, the Court observed that section  119  of  the  States  Reorganisation  Act  was intended to  serve a  temporary purpose, viz., to enable the new units  to consider  the  special  circumstances  of  the diverse units, before launching upon a process of adaptation of laws  so as  to make  them reasonably uniform, keeping in view  the   special  needs  of  the  component  regions  and administrative efficiency. Therefore, differential treatment arising out  of the  application of the laws so continued in different regions  of the  same reorganised  State, did  not immediately  attract   the  clause   of   the   Constitution prohibiting discrimination.      In Vishwesha  Thirtha Swamiar & Ors. v. State of Mysore and Anr.,  the new  State of  Mysore enacted the Mysore Land

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Revenue (Surcharge)  Act, 1961  and the  Mysore Land Revenue (Surcharge) Amendment  Act, 1962. These Acts were challenged on the  ground, inter  alia, that  they  were  violative  of article 14  since there  was inequality  in taxation between lands situated  in  South  Kanara  District  and  the  lands comprised in  areas  situated  in  the  erstwhile  State  of Mysore. This  challenge was  repelled by  this Court  on the ground  that  the  impugned  Acts  were  in  the  nature  of temporary measures, passed while resettlement and survey was being done  in the  entire State.  This process  necessarily took a long time and therefore it could not be said that the State had  acted arbitrarily  in imposing  surcharge on land revenue  which   was  being   levied  under   the   existing settlements and Acts. 385      These decisions  are  authority  for  the  validity  of section 76(1)  of the  Madras Act of 1951 in its application to the South Kanara District of the State of Mysore, now the State of  Karnataka. This Court has said time and again that dissimilar treatment does not necessarily offend against the guarantee  of  equality  contained  in  article  14  of  the Constitution. The  rider is  that there  has to  be a  valid basis for  classification and  the classification  must bear nexus with  the object of the impugned provision. In matters arising  out   of  reorganisation   of   States,   continued application of  laws of  a State  to territories, which were within that  State but  which have  become a part of another State is  not discriminatory  since the classification rests on  geographical   considerations  founded   on   historical reasons.      In Bhopal  Sugar Industries  Ltd., (supra) Shah J., who spoke for  the court,  has traced the genesis of section 119 of the  States Reorganisation  Act to  which  attention  may usefully be called:           "It is  necessary to bear in mind that the various      administrative units  which existed  in  British  India      were the result of acquisition of territory by the East      India Company  from time  to time. The merger of Indian      States since  1947 brought  into the  Dominion of India      numerous Unions  or States,  based upon arrangements ad      hoc, and  the constitutional  set up  in 1950  did  not      attempt,  on   account  of   diverse   reasons   mainly      political,  to   make  any  rational  rearrangement  of      administrative  units.   Under  the   Constitution   as      originally promulgated  there existed  three categories      of States,  besides the centrally administered units of      the Andaman  and Nicobar  island. Part  ’A’ States were      the former Governors’ Provinces, with which were merged      certain territories of the former Indian States to make      geographically  homogeneous   units:  Part  ’B’  States      represented groups  formed out  of  275  bigger  Indian      States by  mutual arrangement  into  Unions:  Part  ’C’      States were  the former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces.      These  units  were  continued  under  the  Constitution      merely because  they formerly existed. Later an attempt      was  made   under  the  States  Reorganisation  Act  to      rationalize the  pattern of  administration by reducing      the four  classes of  units into  two-States, and Union      territories-and by  making a  majority  of  the  States      homogeneous linguistic  units. But  in  the  States  so      reorganised  were   incorporated  regions  governed  by      distinct laws, and by the mere process of bringing into      existence reorganised  administrative units, uniformity      of laws could 386

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    not    immediately     be    secured.    Administrative      reorganisation evidently  could not await adaptation of      laws,  so  as  to  make  them  uniform,  and  immediate      abolition of  laws which  gave distinctive character to      the regions  brought into the new units was politically      inexpedient even  if theoretically possible. An attempt      to secure  uniformity of  laws before reorganisation of      the units  would also  have considerably  retarded  the      process  of   reorganisation.  With   the   object   of      effectuating   a    swift   transition,    the   States      Reorganisation Act  made a blanket provision in section      119 continuing  the operation  of the  laws in force in      the territories  in which they were previously in force      notwithstanding  the  territorial  reorganisation  into      different  administrative  units  until  the  competent      Legislature or  authority amended,  altered or modified      those laws.......... Continuance of the laws of the old      region after  the reorganisation  by section 119 of the      States   Reorganisation   Act   was   by   itself   not      discriminatory even  though it resulted in differential      treatment of  persons, objects  and transactions in the      new State,  because it  was intended  to serve  a  dual      purpose-facilitating the early formation of homogeneous      units  in   the  larger  interest  of  the  Union,  and      maintaining even  while merging  its political identity      in the  new unit,  the distinctive  character  of  each      region, till  uniformity of  laws was  secured in those      branches in  which it  was expedient after full enquiry      to do  so. The  laws of  the regions  merged in the new      units had  therefore to  be  continued  on  grounds  of      necessity and expediency."      Bearing in  mind these  considerations, we  are of  the view that  the Madras Act of 1951, in its application to the South Kanara  District of  Mysore, now  Karnataka, does  not infringe article 14 of the Constitution.      But then,  learned counsel  for the  appellants  argues that while  following the  judgments above  referred to,  we must not  overlook the  caveat contained  in those judgments and the  description therein  of section  119 of  the States Reorganisation Act as a ’temporary measure’. In this behalf, reliance is  also placed  by  counsel  on  the  decision  in Narottam Kishore  Dev Varma  and ors. vs. Union of India and Anr. The  petitioners therein applied for the consent of the Central Government  under section  87B of  the Code of Civil Procedure to  sue the Maharaja of Tripura, Ruler of a former Indian State  which had  merged with  India. Consent  having been  refused,  they  filed  Writ  Petition  in  this  Court challenging the validity of section 87B on 387 the ground  that in  granting exemption  to Rulers of former Indian States from being sued except with the consent of the Central Government,  the section  contravened article  14 of the Constitution. The Court followed an earlier judgment and repelled the  challenge but  while doing so, Gajendragadkar, C.J., speaking  for the Court, made an important observation inviting  the   Central  Government  to  consider  seriously whether it  was necessary  to allow  section 87B  to operate prospectively  for   all  time   and  whether   transactions subsequent to  January 26,  1950  should  also  receive  the protection of  the section.  The Court felt that, considered broadly in  the light  of the  basic principle  of  equality before law,  it was  somewhat odd  that section  87B  should continue to operate for all time. "With the passage of time" observed  the   learned  Chief  Justice,  "the  validity  of historical considerations  on which  section 87B  is founded

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will wear out and the continuance of the said section in the Code of  Civil  Procedure  may  later  be  open  to  serious challenge".      The narrow  question that remains for consideration now is whether, though the initial application of the Madras Act of 1951  to the  South Kanara  District was not violative of article 14,  its continued  application offends  against the guarantee of  equality. In  this  connection,  a  matter  of primary importance  to be  borne in mind is that section 119 of the  States Reorganisation  Act, 1956,  was intended,  as said in  Bhaiyalal Shukla,  (supra) to  serve  a  "temporary purpose", viz.,  to enable  the new  units to  consider  the special circumstances of the diverse units, before launching upon a  process of  adaptation of  laws so  as to  make them reasonably uniform,  having regard  to the  special needs of the various  regions and  the requirements of administrative efficiency. Acts, Rules and Regulations whose constitutional validity is upheld and can be upheld only on the ground that no violation  per so  of  article  14  is  involved  in  the application of  different laws  to different components of a State, if  the area  to which  unequal laws  are applied has become  a  part  of  the  State  as  result  of  the  States "reorganization, cannot  continue  to  apply  to  such  area indefinitely. An  indefinite extension  and  application  of unequal laws  for all  time to  come will  militate  against their true character as temporary measures taken in order to serve a  temporary purpose.  Thereby, the very foundation of their  constitutionality  shall  have  been  destroyed,  the foundation  being   that   section   119   of   the   States Reorganization Act  serves the significant purpose of giving reasonable time  to the  new units  to consider  the special circumstances obtaining  in respect  of diverse  units.  The decision to  withdraw the  application of  unequal  laws  to equals cannot be delayed unreasonably because the relevance 388 of historical  reasons  which  justify  the  application  of unequal laws  is bound to wear out with the passage of time. In Broom’s Legal Maxims (1939 Edition, Page 97) can be found a useful  principle, "Cessante  Ratione  Legis  Cessat  Ipsa Lex’, that  is to  say, "Reason  is the soul of the law, and when the  reason of  any particular  law ceases, so does the law itself".      We do  not however  see any  justification for  holding that the  continued application of the Madras Act of 1951 to South Kanara  District became  violative of  article  14  as immediately as  during the period under consideration, which was just  five or  six years after the passing of the States Reorganisation Act.  Nor indeed are we disposed to hold that the continued  application of that Act until now is shown by adequate data to be violative of article 14.      But that  is how the matter stands to-day. Twenty three years have  gone by  since the States Reorganisation Act was passed but unhappily, no serious effort has been made by the State Legislature  to introduce  any legislation-apart  from two  abortive  attempts  in  1963  and  1977-to  remove  the inequality between  the temples  and Mutts  situated in  the South Kanara  District and  those situated in other areas of Karnataka. Inequality  is so  clearly writ large on the face of the  impugned statute  in its application to the District of South  Kanara  only,  that  it  is  perilously  near  the periphery  of   unconstitutionality.  We   have   restrained ourselves from  declaring the  law as  inapplicable  to  the District of  South Kanara  from to-day  but we would like to make it clear that if the Karnataka Legislature does not act promptly and  remove  the  inequality  arising  out  of  the

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application of  the Madras  Act of  1951 to  the District of South Kanara only, the Act will have to suffer a serious and successful challenge  in the  not distant future. We do hope that the  Government of Karnataka will act promptly and move an appropriate  legislation, say,  within a  year or  so.  A comprehensive legislation  which will  apply to  all temples and Mutts  in Karnataka,  which are  equally situated in the context  of   the  levy   of  fee,   may  perhaps  afford  a satisfactory solution  to the  problem. This,  however, is a tentative  view-point   because  we  have  not  investigated whether the  Madras Act  of 1951, particularly section 76(1) thereof, is  a piece of hostile legislation of the kind that would involve  the violation  of article 14. Facts in regard thereto may  have to  be  explored,  if  and  when  occasion arises.      In the  result the  appeals fail  and are dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.      SHINGHAL J.-I have gone through the judgment of my Lord the Chief  Justice. While I concur with him that the appeals fail and 389 should be  dismissed, I think there is really no occasion to consider the  argument  of  Mr.  Datar  that  the  continued application of  the Madras  Hindu Religious  and  Charitable Endowments Act,  1951 (referred to as the Madras Act of 1951 by the  Chief Justice)  to the  South  Kanara  district,  is violative of  article 14  of the Constitution. So also, I am unable to  subscribe to  the view  that  "inequality  is  so clearly writ  large on  the face  of the impugned statute in its application to the district of South Kanara only that it is perilously  near the  periphery of  unconstitutionality," when the  necessary data  to justify that conclusion has not been placed  on the  record and  when it has been found that there is  no justification  for holding  that the  continued application of  that Act  to the  South Kanara  district has become violative  of article 14 "until now". If I may say so with respect,  that is  my apology  for expressing myself on that short point, although I agree with my Lord on questions relating  to   the  competence   of  the   Commissioner  for Settlements  and   Charitable  Endowments  to  exercise  the functions of  the Commissioner under the Madras Act of 1951, and the existence of quid pro quo.      The right  to equality enshrined in article 14 has been shortly but grandly stated in the form of the directive that the State  shall not  deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of the  country. It  is therefore  a fundamental right which every citizen possesses; and he has the further right, under article 13(2),  to ask  that the  law which  takes  away  or abridges any  of the  rights conferred by Part III shall, to the extent  it contravenes  that right,  be declared  to  be void. That  is why further provision has expressly been made in article  32 guaranteeing the right to move this Court "by appropriate proceedings"  for the  enforcement of the rights conferred by  Part III,  and it has been provided in article 226, inter  alia, that every High Court shall have the power to issue the writs mentioned therein, for the enforcement of any of  those rights.  It does  not require much argument to say further  that, in  either case,  it is for the aggrieved citizen to file the appropriate proceeding or petition for a redress of  his grievance,  in order that the Court may hear the other concerned party, examine the merits of the matter, and arrive at a decision.      In other  words, a  pleading  or  a  statement  of  the material facts  is necessary  on the  side of the petitioner

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and,  if  his  claim  is  contested,  on  the  side  of  the respondent, for that enables them to formulate their case in preparation of  the hearing.  Besides giving  fair notice of the case  of either  side, that  defines the points at issue and confines  the controversy  to them.  It also enables the parties to bring out their 390 evidence to  best advantage,  and eliminates  prejudice or a snap decision.  Pleadings are  thus of vital importance, for if there is no pleading of the necessary facts in a petition for the  redress of  a grievance, the petitioner has himself to thank for his ultimate discomfiture on that account.      Before referring  to the  pleadings in  these cases, it may be  mentioned that  a point  quite similar  to  the  one before us arose for consideration in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal  Sugar Industries  Ltd. In  that case,  the former Bhopal State  enacted the  Bhopal State Agricultural Income- tax Act, 1953, which provided for the imposition and levy of tax on  agricultural income.  The Act was brought into force on July  15, 1953,  and was  applied to the territory of the whole of  the Bhopal State. That State was incorporated into the new State of Madhya Pradesh with effect from November 1, 1956,  and   by  virtue   of  section   119  of  the  States Reorganisation Act,  1956,  the  Bhopal  State  Agricultural Income-tax  Act   continued  to  remain  in  force  in  that constituent region.  Later, the  Madhya Pradesh Extension of Laws Act,  1958, extended  several Central and State laws to the entire  State of  Madhya Pradesh, but no change was made in  the   territorial  operation   of   the   Bhopal   State Agricultural  Income-tax   Act  in  the  area  to  which  is originally applied  in 1953.  There was,  however, no law in the rest  of the Madhya Pradesh State providing for the levy of tax on agricultural income.      The  Bhopal  Sugar  Industries  Ltd.,  which  had  been incorporated under  the Companies  Act of  the Bhopal State, continued to  pay  the  agricultural  income-tax  under  the Bhopal Act  until 1960,  when  it  challenged  the  levy  as violative of  article 14 of the Constitution. It was held by a Constitution  Bench of this Court that while, prima facie, a differential  treatment was being accorded by the State of Madhya  Pradesh   to  persons   carrying   on   agricultural operations in the Bhopal region, because the State subjected them to  tax on  agricultural income  which was  not imposed upon agricultural  income earned  in the  rest of the State, "that by  itself (could)  not be  a ground for declaring the Act ultra  vires."   This Court  took note of the mandate of article  14,  and  referred  to  a  number  of  its  earlier decisions in  which it  had been held that where application of unequal  laws was  reasonably  justified  for  historical reasons, a  geographical  classification  founded  on  those historical reasons would be upheld. This Court expressed its view as follows:-           "Continuance of  the laws  of the old region after      the  reorganisation   by   s.   119   of   the   States      Reorganisation Act  was by  itself  not  discriminatory      even though it resulted in 391      differential  treatment   of   persons,   objects   and      transactions in  the new State, because it was intended      to  serve   a  dual   purpose  facilitating  the  early      formation of  homogeneous units  in the larger interest      of the  Union, and  maintaining even  while merging its      political identity  in the  new unit,  the  distinctive      character of  each region,  till uniformity of laws was      secured in  those branches  in which  it was  expedient

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    after full  enquiry to  do so.  The laws of the regions      merged in  the new  units had therefore to be continued      on grounds  of necessity and expediency. Section 119 of      the States  Reorganisation Act  was intended  to  serve      this temporary  purpose, viz.,  to enable the new units      to consider  the special  circumstances of  the diverse      units, before launching upon a process of adaptation of      laws so  as to make them reasonably uniform, keeping in      view the  special needs  of the  component regions  and      administrative   efficiency.   Differential   treatment      arising out of the application of the laws so continued      in different regions of the same reorganised State, did      not therefore  immediately attract  the clause  of  the      Constitution prohibiting discrimination."      It was  at the same time appreciated that by passage of time, considerations  of necessity  and  expediency  may  be obliterated, and  the grounds which justified classification of a geographical region for historical reasons may cease to be valid,  and it  was  observed  that  a  purely  temporary provision could  not be permitted to assume permanency so as to perpetuate  a discriminatory treatment without a rational basis  to  support  it  after  the  initial  expediency  and necessity  had  disappeared.  But  even  while  making  this observation on  a point  relating to the legal aspect of the prayer for  redress under  article 14  of the  Constitution, this Court  expressed disagreement with the view of the High Court  that   as  no   attempt  was   made  to   remove  the discrimination in  the matter  of the  levy of  agricultural income-tax, it  was unlawful because the State had since the enactment of  the States  Reorganisation Act sufficient time and opportunity  to decide  whether the  continuance of  the Bhopal State  Agricultural  Income-tax  Act  in  the  Bhopal region  would   be  consistent   with  article   14  of  the Constitution. In  that connection, the Court went on to hold as follows-           "It would  be impossible  to lay down any definite      time limit within which the State had to make necessary      adjustments so  as to effectuate the equality clause of      the Constitution.  That initially  there  was  a  valid      geographical classification  of  regions  in  the  same      State justifying unequal laws when the State was formed      must be accepted. But whether 392      the continuance of unequal laws by itself sustained the      plea of  unlawful discrimination  in  view  of  changed      circumstances could  only be  ascertained after  a full      and  thorough  enquiry  into  the  continuance  of  the      grounds on  which the  inequality could  rationally  be      founded, and the change of circumstances, if any, which      obliterated the  compulsion of expediency and necessity      existing at  the time  when the  Reorganisation Act was      enacted."      Specific mention  was made  of  the  pleadings  of  the parties and it was held that,-           "there was  no clear  perception by the parties of      what has  to be  pleaded and proved to establish a plea      of denial  of equal protection of the laws. The Company      merely assumed  that the existence of a law relating to      taxation which  imposed agricultural  income-tax in the      Bhopal region,  there being no similar levy in the rest      of the  State, was in law discriminatory. That is clear      from the  petition of the Company which merely asserted      that the  Act discriminated  between  the  Company  and      other owners  of sugarcane farms in the State of Madhya      Pradesh, because  it singled  out the Company and other

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    agriculturists  in   the  Bhopal   region  from   other      agriculturists and  sugarcane farm  owners in the State      of Madhya  Pradesh  and  subjected  them  to  liability      without any reasonable basis for classification." This Court  made a  reference to  the view of the High Court that if after the expiry of a reasonable period during which the State  had  the  opportunity  of  making  the  necessary adaptations so as to make the Act applicable to the entirety of the  new State,  the State  fails to  adapt the  law, the historical  considerations  which  initially  justified  the classification  must  be  deemed  to  have  disappeared.  It clearly  held  that  such  an  assumption,  without  further enquiry, was  not correct.  It in fact went to the extent of holding that  "the mere  existence  of  agricultural  income impost in  one region, and absence of such impost in another region may  not necessarily justify an inference of unlawful discrimination.      It was  therefore,  held  in  that  case  that  as  the petition  for   the  writ   was  "singularly   deficient  in furnishing particulars  which  would  justify  the  plea  of infringement of  article of the Constitution", the mere plea of differential  treatment was by itself not sufficient. For that reason  it allowed  the State’s appeal and remanded the case for  retrial after giving an opportunity to the parties to amend the writ petition and the affidavit in reply. 393      I have made a reference to the above unanimous decision of a  Constitution Bench  of this Court for it has stood the test of time and directly bears on the point on which I have felt it  necessary to  express myself  differently from  the view taken  by my  Lord the Chief Justice. I shall therefore proceed to  examine whether  the appellants  in these  cases could be said to have furnished the necessary particulars in their pleadings,  to enable  the High Court to examine their claim with  reference to article 14 of the Constitution, for it is by now well settled that mere efflux of time would not raise  the   presumption  of  discrimination  or  denial  of equality before the law.      It  will   be  sufficient  for  me  to  refer  in  this connection to  the pleadings  in writ  petition No.  1575 of 1965 and  the accompanying  affidavit, for  the averments in the other petitions are no better.      It has  thus been stated in paragraph 22, in respect of the Admar Mutt, Udipi, as follows:-           "22.  The   petitioner  submits  that  the  States      Reorganisation Act  came into  effect on 1-11-1956. The      Madras H.R.E.  Act is being enforced by the respondents      only in  the old  Madras area  namely, South Kanara and      the Kollagal  Taluk of  the  present  Mysore  District,      whereas in  entire  areas  of  old  Mysore,  Coorg  and      Hyderabad, there is no such demand, nor any legislation      similar to  the one  in the former areas. In the Bombay      area, there is a separate Bombay Public Trusts Act. The      3rd respondent  has ample time in these 8 or 9 years to      unify the  legislation and not to take advantage of the      disparities between the different areas and then try to      enforce the Madras Act and to make as much amount as it      can from  out of  the district  of South  Kanara alone.      This  action   of  the   1st   respondent   is   wholly      discriminatory under  Section 14 of the Constitution of      India and is void and illegal on that ground alone." Then it  has been  stated in  paragraph 23  that the demands made by  the Commissioner  of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments upon  the mutts  and the  non-mutts out of the 30 major  institutions   and  the   others  which   are   minor

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institutions is  discriminatory and  illegal for  the reason that  "mutts  are  a  class  by  themselves  and  cannot  be discriminately mixed  up with temples even from the point of view of  the services  rendered by  the first  respondent to them."      It is thus quite clear that the appellants rested their plea of discrimination on the sole ground that the continued application of  the provisions  of the  Act to  South Kanara district of  the reorganised  State after  8 or 9 years from November 1, 1956, (when the State was 394 formed) without "unifying" the legislation on the subject of Hindu  religious  and  charitable  endowments,  was  "wholly discriminatory."  The  other  plea  in  paragraph  23  about "mixing" of mutts with temples is not quite intelligible and has not  even been  referred to by counsel during the course of their  arguments. The  ground which  has  been  taken  is therefore quite untenable for, as has been mentioned, it has been declared  in the  case of  the Bhopal  Sugar Industries that it  is impossible  to lay  down any definite time limit within which  the State has to make the necessary adjustment for the  purpose of  effectuating the equality clause of the Constitution, and  that  while  the  differential  treatment could not  be  permitted  to  assume  permanency  without  a rational basis  to support it as years go by, a mere plea of differential  treatment  is  by  itself  not  sufficient  to attract the application of article 14. The following further observation in  that case  clearly bears  on the point under consideration:-           "It cannot  be said  that because a certain number      of years  have elapsed or that the State has made other      laws  uniform,   the  State  has  acted  improperly  in      continuing an  impost which  operates upon  a class  of      citizens more harshly than upon others."      It may  be that  if the  appellants had  furnished  the necessary  particulars   in  support   of  their   plea   of discrimination, the  respondents would  have come  out  with whatever defence  was available  to them.  For instance, the State might perhaps have found it possible to plead that the provision for  the  collection  of  the  contribution  under section 76  of the  Madras Act of 1951 was beneficial to the religious and charitable institutions and endowments and was not burdensome  in view  of the  services  rendered  by  the authorities of  the State  government, and  that sub-section (5) of  that section  was beneficial  as it provided that if there was  a surplus  after meeting all the charges referred to in  the preceding  sub-section, it  could be utilised for helping the  poor and  needy institutions  etc.  As  it  is, section 81  of the Act provides for the establishment of the Madras   Hindu    Religious   and    Charitable   Endowments Administration Fund,  which vests  in the  Commissioner, and not in  the State, so that it has its separate existence and purpose, and  it might  have  to  be  examined  whether  the provision for  the making  of compulsory  contribution to it was unfair or discriminatory.      If the  appellants thought  otherwise, it was necessary for them  to plead  and establish  the  necessary  facts  to enable a  proper enquiry into their allegation of inequal or discriminatory treatment.  But, as has been stated, that has not been  done. I  am therefore unable to think that, in the absence of the necessary pleadings, it can be said that 395 inequality is  so clearly  writ large  on the  face  of  the impugned statute in its application to the district of South Kanara only,  that  is  perilously  near  the  periphery  of

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unconstitutionality merely because of the lapse of 23 years.      But quite  apart from  the unsatisfactory nature of the pleadings in  these cases  which, by  itself, justified  the dismissal of  the  writ  petitions,  and  the  fact  that  a Constitution Bench  of this Court has taken the view, in the case of  the Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd., that it cannot be said that  because a  certain number  of years have elapsed, the State has acted improperly in continuing an impost which operates upon  a class  of citizens  more harshly  than upon others, it  has to  be remembered  that a mutt is a monastic institution for the use and benefit of ascetics belonging to a particular  Order presided  over by  a superior who is its religious teacher.  The  mutt  property,  though  originally given  by   a  donor,   belongs  to  that  spiritual  family represented by the superior or mahant. It does not, however, vest in him, as he is some sort of a "shabait", and vests in the mutt  as a  juristic person.  This has been sufficiently borne out  in the  definition of  "math"  in  clause  10  of section 6  of the Madras Act of 1951. A mutt has therefore a laudable object  and it  is in the interest of all concerned that such  endowments should  be properly  administered.  As there are  mutts in  the other  areas of the Karnataka State (besides the South Kanara district) it is necessary that the State Government  should examine  whether  the  contribution provided for  by the  Madras Act of 1951 is really necessary and  advantageous  for  the  proper  administration  of  the religious and  charitable institutions and endowments in the State as  a whole  and if  not, whether it is an inequality, and its continued applicability to the South Kanara district can be  justified  with  reference  to  article  14  of  the Constitution. I  agree with  the Chief Justice that this may be done "say, within a year or so." P.B.R.                                    Appeals dismissed. 396