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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2802-2803 of 2002

PETITIONER: Gurpal Singh

RESPONDENT: State of Punjab & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/05/2005

BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

       By the impugned judgment a Division Bench of the Punjab  and Haryana High Court held that the appointment of the  appellant as Auction Recorder of the Market Committee,  Patran was invalid and illegal.  The said order came to be  passed on the basis of a Writ Petition filed by  respondent  No. 4.  It is to be noted that the said petition was styled   as a Public Interest Litigation (in short ’PIL’).  

A brief reference to the factual aspect would be  necessary.

       Appellant was appointed as Auction Recorder on  19.11.1986.  Appointment of the appellant was challenged by  one Ashok Kumar, clerk of the Market Committee by filing a  complaint before the competent authority alleging that the  appellant having been convicted under Section 61(1)(a) of  Punjab Excise Act in 1974 for alleged commission of offence  on 21.5.1973 and was therefore ineligible for being  considered for appointment.  The complaint was looked into  by the Market Committee and by order dated 22nd May, 1989  it was held that the appointment was not contrary to law.   The Standing Counsel of the Committee categorically opined  that since no moral turpitude of any kind was involved,  there was no ineligibility attached to the appellant and his  appointment was in accordance with law.  For the aforesaid  purpose reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab and  Haryana High Court in the case of Narain Singh v. N.S. Chima  (1997 SLWR 448). On 5.9.1989 appellant’s services were  regularized under the Punjab Market Committees (Class III)  Rules, 1989 which came to be operative after appellant was  appointed. Prior to that no specific Rules were there.  A  Civil Writ Petition No. 3451 of 1989 was filed by one  Chandra Bhan before Punjab and Haryana High Court  challenging the direct appointment of the appellant.  During  pendency of the said Writ Petition Sukhjinder Singh  filed a  complaint before the Administrator, Market Committee  questioning appellant’s appointment.  Notice was issued by  the Administrator to the appellant, who filed his reply.  A  revision in terms of Section 42 of the Punjab and Haryana  Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (in short the  ’Markets Act’) was filed before the Special Secretary to the

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Government of Punjab, Department of Agriculture who passed  orders to the effect that Administrator should look into the  matter and take a decision as to whether action against the  appellant was called for. While Writ Petition No. 3451 of  1989 was pending, Civil Writ Petition No. 6180 of 2000 was  filed by the respondent No. 4 challenging appointment of the  appellant and as noted above the petition was stated to be  one in public interest.  Counter Affidavit was filed by the  Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee taking the stand  that since conviction of the appellant did not involve any  moral turpitude the appointment was in accordance with law.   Appellant also filed counter affidavit before the Market  Committee questioning locus standi of the Writ Petitioner to  challenge his appointment. It was pointed out that no public  interest involved and because of political and personal  rivalry the petition had been filed.  The High Court by the  impugned order held that since the appellant had been  convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction under Section  61 of the Punjab Excise Act, his appointment was not  according to rules. Therefore his appointment was set aside  and the Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee were  directed to start fresh process of selection for filling up  of the post.  

       In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellant submitted that Writ Petition filed by the writ  petitioner (respondent No. 4) was nothing but a sheer abuse  of process of court.  It was by no stretch of imagination   Public Interest Litigation and it was filed because of  personal and political rivalry and ought to have been  dismissed by the High Court. The assertion that appellant  and respondent No.4 were pitted against each other in  several elections has not been denied. Even the Punjab  Government has as back as on 22.6.1981 issued a Circular  that only records of conviction for preceding five years  were to be taken note of.   

       Learned counsel appearing for the Market Committee  supported the stand of the appellant and submitted that  there was nothing irregular in the appointment of the  appellant and the same was in terms of the rules of  appointment.  Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, writ  petitioner however, submitted that merely because the writ  petition was filed after fourteen years and because there  was some personal differences that cannot dilute the public  interest element involved in the writ petition. It was  further submitted that notwithstanding the clear direction  of the High Court to start the process of selection afresh  within four months, nothing has been done and this amounts  to contempt of Court.  

The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a  public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner  particularly in matters involving service of an employee has  been examined by this court in various cases. The Court has  to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant;  (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information  given by him; (c) the information being not vague and  indefinite.  The information should show gravity and  seriousness involved.  Court has to strike balance between  two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to  indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the  character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief  and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for  oblique motives, justifiable executive actions.  In such

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case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal.  It  has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of  redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the  sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the  Legislature.  The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing  with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers  impersonating as public-spirited holy men.  They masquerade  as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of  Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public  or even of their own to protect.

       Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and  prevent law from crafty invasions.  Courts must maintain the  social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake  of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the  social interest and public good.  (See State of Maharashtra  vs. Prabhu, (1994 (2) SCC 481), and Andhra Pradesh State  Financial Corporation vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr.,  (AIR 1994 SC 2151).  No litigant has a right to unlimited  draught on the Court time and public money in order to get  his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes.  Easy access  to justice should not be misused as a licence to file  misconceived and frivolous petitions.  (See  Dr. B.K.  Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996 (7) JT 265). Today  people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this  attractive name of public interest.  They must inspire  confidence in Courts and among the public.

       As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the  petitions, which though titled as public interest  litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to  note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called  public interest litigations where even a minuscule  percentage can legitimately be called as public interest  litigations.  Though the parameters of public interest  litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number  of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and  objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and  wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could  be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though  in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and  Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), this Court held that in service  matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so- called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in  the Courts and strangely are entertained.  The least the  High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of  the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in  the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even  indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them.   In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was  given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was  lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner  opened it, he found copies of the official documents.   Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain  possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the  petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be  desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous  petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so  that the message goes in the right direction that petitions  filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the  Courts.         The aforesaid position was highlighted in Ashok Kumar  Pandey v. State of W.B. (2004 (3) SCC 349). It is depressing to note that on account of such  trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts,

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innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have  been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine  litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and  developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our  long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the  oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are  infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un- represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our  opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate  grievances relating to civil matters involving properties  worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights  and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death  facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to  life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years,  persons suffering from undue delay in service matters -  government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax  cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized  collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting  their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all  standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond  hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances  redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers,  wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real    public interest except for personal gain or private profit  either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any  other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break  the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public  interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing  vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who  have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and  thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as  a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of  the court never moves, which piquant situation creates  frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.

Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be  used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary  has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful  veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested  interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to  be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for  delivering social justice to the citizens.  The attractive  brand name of public interest litigation should not be  allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief.  It  should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or  public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on  personal vendetta.  As indicated above, Court must be  careful to see that a body of persons or member of public,  who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for  personal gain or private motive or political motivation or  other oblique consideration.  The Court must not allow its  process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked  phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with  vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with  judicial process either by force of habit or from improper  motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich  themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win  notoriety or cheap popularity.  The petitions of such busy  bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the  threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.

The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford  Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation"  in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:

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"Public Interest Law is the name that has  recently been given to efforts provide legal  representation to previously unrepresented  groups and interests.  Such efforts have  been undertaken in the recognition that  ordinary market place for legal services  fails to provide such services to  significant segments of the population and  to significant interests.  Such groups and  interests include the proper  environmentalists, consumers, racial and  ethnic minorities and others." (See : Dr.  B. Singh v. Union of India and Others  (2004(3) SCC 363)

       When a particular person is the object and target of a  petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see  whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really  intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or  some other mala fide object. Since in service matters public  interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope for  taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition  is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated  15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High  Court’s order.  

Judged in the above said background the High Court was  not justified in entertaining the Writ Petition.  The  judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is therefore  set aside.               The appeals are allowed with no orders as to costs.