REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 849 OF 2002

Gulab Chand Pukhraj .. Appellant

Versus

R.B. Jinender Raj & Another .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari,   J.   

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High  

Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  at  Hyderabad  dated  26.4.2001  

delivered in Civil Revision Petition No.4009 of 1998.  

2. The short question which arises for consideration in this  

appeal  is  – whether a co-owner occupying a non-residential  

premises  can  seek  eviction  of  a  tenant  in  possession  of  

another  non-residential  premises  for  his  bona  fide  

requirements?

3. The appellant is a tenant of the premises bearing No.7-2-

764 situated at Pot Market, Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh.  

The  respondents  are  the  co-owners  of  two  non-residential  

premises bearing Municipal Houses Nos.7-2-763 and 7-2-764  

situated  at  Pot  Market,  Secunderabad.   These  two  non-

residential  premises fell  to their share by virtue of the ‘Will’  

executed by their father.  The respondent landlords have been  

conducting  the  business  in  one  shop  only.   The  First  

respondent has been carrying on business of money lending in  

a portion of the premises 7-2-763 and the second respondent  

has been conducting a business in jewellery in the remaining  

portion  of  the  same  shop.   It  was  the  case  of  the  second  

respondent that he required the premises (shop) in question  

from  the  tenant  for  starting  the  business  exclusively  for  

jewellery in a separate shop.

4. The respondent landlords filed a claim petition before the  

Rent  Controller  in  R.C.  No.231  of  1994  under  section  

10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the  A.P.  Buildings  (Lease,  Rent  &  Eviction)  

Control Act, 1960 [hereinafter referred to as “the 1960 Act”)  

seeking eviction of  the appellant  tenant from the scheduled  

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premises  namely  7-2-764  situated  at  Pot  Market,  

Secunderabad.

5. The appellant contended that the landlords are already in  

possession of a non-residential premises and, therefore, their  

petition seeking eviction of another non-residential premises is  

not maintainable in law.

6. The parties led evidence before the Rent Controller.  The  

Rent  Controller  after  recording  the  evidence  held  that  the  

landlords  are  the  joint  owners  of  non-residential  premises  

bearing nos.7-2-763 and 7-2-764.  However, the landlords are  

in possession of only one shop in the premises bearing no.7-2-

763.  The Rent Controller relying on the decision of the Full  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  Vidya  Bai  &  Another  v.  

Shankerlal & Another AIR 1988 AP 184 held that since the  

landlords  are  already  in  possession  of  one  non-residential  

premises,  they  cannot  seek eviction  of  tenant  from another  

non-residential premises.  The petition filed by the respondent  

landlords was dismissed by an order dated 4.12.1995.

7. The respondent landlords carried the matter in appeal in  

R.A. No.10 of 1996.  The First Appellate Court held that the  

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respondents landlords have proved the bona fide requirement  

for  starting business in jewellery and also held that second  

respondent  is  a  co-owner  and  not  an  exclusive  owner  and  

hence  not  entitled  to  maintain  application  for  eviction  of  

another  residential  premises.   The  First  Appellate  Court  

allowed  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  order  of  the  Rent  

Controller.

8. The appellant tenant aggrieved by the order of the First  

Appellate Court in RA No.10 of 1996 preferred a Civil Revision  

Petition No.4009 of 1998 before the High Court.

9. The  plea  taken  by  the  appellant  tenant  is  that  the  

respondent landlords are the co-owners of one non-residential  

premises and, therefore, they are not entitled to seek eviction  

of  the  appellant  tenant  occupying  another  non-residential  

premises.  The appellant relied on the decision of this court in  

Super  Forgings  & Steels  (Sales)  Pvt.  Ltd.  v.  Thyabally  

Rasuljee  (1995) 1 SCC 410 and  Vidya Bai  (supra).  On the  

other  hand,  the  respondent  landlords  placed  reliance  on  

Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons  v.  Pushpa Trading Co.  

(1998)  5  SCC  572,  according  to  which  a  landlord  is  not  

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precluded to seek eviction of tenant from any non-residential  

building even if he is having another non-residential building.  

Reliance  has  been  also  placed  on  Rasik  Auto  Stores  &  

Others v. Navin V. Hantodkar & Another (1998) 8 SCC 177  

and Om Prakash v. Basanthilal (1999) 9 SCC 618.

10. The issue that arises for consideration is – whether under  

section  10(3)(a)(iii)  of  the  1960  Act,  the  co-owner  can  be  

treated as owner of the premises and whether he is entitled to  

seek eviction of tenant from another non-residential premises?  

11. For proper appreciation of law, it is necessary to set out  

section 10 (3)(a) of the 1960 Act as under:

“10(3)(a) A landlord may subject to the provisions  of  clause (d),  apply to the controller  for  an Order  directing  the  tenant  to  put  the  landlord  in  possession of the building-

(i) & (ii) x  x  x  x  x  

(iii)  in  case  it  is  any  other  non-residential  building, if the landlord is not occupying  a  non-residential  building  in  the  city,  town  or  village  concerned  which  is  his  own or to the possession of which he is  entitled  whether  under  this  Act  or  otherwise-

a) for the purpose of a business which  he is carrying on, on the date of the  application, or

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b) for the purpose of a business which  in the opinion of the Controller, the  landlord  bona  fide  proposes  to  commence.”

12. In J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai (1987) 1 SCC 573, this court  

held that a landlord, notwithstanding his occupation of a non-

residential building, can still seek eviction of his tenant from  

his business premises if the landlord is able to satisfy that the  

non-residential building occupied by him is not sufficient and  

suitable for the purpose of expansion of his business or for the  

purpose of  a new business which he bona fide proposes to  

commence  or  that  the  shifting  of  his  business  has  become  

inevitable.   This  Court  has  taken  the  same  view  in  Saroj  

Kumar Das (Dr.) v. Arjun Prasad Jogani (1987) 4 SCC 262.

13. It  may  be  pertinent  to  mention  that  this  court  in  D.  

Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 729 had  

an occasion to deal with section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the 1960 Act.  In  

that  case,  this  court  took a contrary  view and categorically  

held  that  a  landlord  in  possession  of  other  non-residential  

buildings is not entitled to evict tenant from a non-residential  

building.

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14. Obviously, there is clear conflict of opinions of this court  

in the aforementioned cases.  In  Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah  

& Sons (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this court examined  

all these three decisions given in D. Devaji (supra), Dr. Saroj  

Kumar Das  (supra)  and  J. Pandu  (supra)  and came to the  

conclusion that the aspects of quality, size and suitability of  

the building have been totally put out of consideration.  Non-

consideration of the quality, size and suitability of the building  

would  be  to  frustrate  the  purposes  of  the  Act.   The  Court  

observed as under:

“5. The  expression  “reasonably  suitable  accommodation”  is  the  pivot  of  the  provision  permitting the court going into the question whether  the premises involved were reasonably suitable for  the  purpose.  It  is  on  that  count  that  Dr  Saroj  Kumar  Das  case  was  decided  by  making  the  following observation:  

“So far as the law on the question is  concerned  it  is  well  settled  that  the  alternative  accommodation  must  be  reasonably  suitable  and  if  it  is  not  so  then  mere  availability  of  alternative  accommodation will  not  be a ground to  refuse  a decree for  eviction if  otherwise  the courts are satisfied about the genuine  requirement  of  the  landlord and to  this  counsel for both the parties also agreed  but the main contention was that on the  facts appearing in evidence in this case  whether  the  inference  could  be  drawn  that  the  flat  on  the  thirteenth  floor  in  South Calcutta  was  reasonably  suitable  to  satisfy  the  need  of  the  appellant- landlord.”

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6. J. Pandu case is  closer  being  one  under  Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings  (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 which  we are examining. That case apparently was decided  on  its  own  facts  as  would  be  evident  from  the  finding culled therefrom:  

“The  fact  that  the  respondent  has  been using the entire house purchased in  1970  i.e.  including  the  ‘malgis’  for  residential  purposes  and  that  the  respondent  is  forced  to  run  the  family  business  in  a  rented  premises  in  the  same  locality  where  the  lease  premises  are  situate  have  weighed  with  the  Rent  Controller and the appellate authority to  concurrently  hold  that  the  respondent’s  requirement  of  the  building  is  undoubtedly bona fide. The findings have  been sustained by the High Court as well.  We  cannot,  therefore,  accept  the  argument  of  Mr.  Subba  Rao  that  the  order  of  eviction  passed  by  the  courts  below and affirmed by the High Court is  vitiated because of the ownership of four  ‘malgis’  by  the  respondent.  The  ‘malgis’  have  ceased  to  be  non-residential  premises from 1970 onwards and hence  their mere ownership cannot preclude the  respondent  from seeking  the  eviction  of  the appellant under Section 10(3)(a)(iii).”

7. It,  thus,  becomes  evident  that  there  is  no  conflict as such between the said decisions and they  have gone on in the context of their own facts and  the provisions of law. Even so, the argument of the  appellant’s learned counsel carries weight that the  intention of  the  legislature  in  D. Devaji case has  been scuttled by putting an extremely narrow and  literal  construction  on  the  provision.  It  has  been  observed therein as under: (SCC p. 732, para 4)

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“The  landlord  should  not  be  in  possession  of  another  non-residential  building or of which he is entitled to be in  possession  in  the  city,  town  or  village  concerned.  The  intendment  of  the  legislature thereby is clear that a landlord  who is in occupation of a non-residential  building  which  is  his  own  or  to  the  possession  of  which  he  is  entitled  to  under  the  Act  or  any  other  law should  not be permitted to recover possession of  another  non-residential  building  belonging to him by evicting the tenants  therefrom.”

8. The aspects of quality,  size and suitability of  the  building  have  been  totally  put  out  of  consideration.  We  think  this  would  frustrate  the  purposes of the Act. Here was a claim set up by the  landlord that the non-residential premises he owned  did not serve the purpose of his need of setting up a  textile and cloth business and that the need could  only be met in seeking eviction of the tenant from  the  premises  sought.  As  we  view  it  there  is  no  difficulty in  D. Devaji case standing in the way of  the landlord-appellant to have the issue examined  from the point of view which would carry out the  purposes of the Act. We refrain from mentioning any  facts on the basis of which the landlord’s claim is  based  lest  the  manner  they  are  recounted  cause  prejudice to either of the parties.”

15. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons (supra), this court  

was clearly of the opinion that the aspects of quality, size and  

suitability of the building cannot be out of consideration and  

doing so would be to frustrate the purposes of the Act.  In the  

said case, the court remitted the matter to the High Court for  

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considering the objection of the tenant as to the claim of the  

landlord.   

16. The  three-Judge  Bench  decision  in  Boorgu  

Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons (supra) seems to be a reasonable  

view and of course is binding on us.

17. Consequently,  we  allow  the  appeal  and  set  aside  the  

impugned  judgment  and  remit  the  matter  to  the  Rent  

Controller for considering the objection of the tenant as well as  

the claim of the landlords.  The Rent Controller may permit  

the parties to lead additional evidence.   

18. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we deem it  

appropriate to request the concerned Rent Controller to decide  

the case as expeditiously as possible.  We direct the parties to  

bear their own costs.

…….……………………..J.  (Dalveer Bhandari)

…….……………………..J.  (Harjit Singh Bedi)

New Delhi; August 27, 2009.

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