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PETITIONER: GUJARAT STATE TRANSPORT CORPORATION, ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VALJI MULJI SONEJI AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT03/05/1979

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1980 AIR   64            1979 SCR  (3) 905  1979 SCC  (3) 202  CITATOR INFO :  R          1980 SC 367  (13)  F          1990 SC1232  (3)

ACT:      Land Acqusition Act, 1894, Sections 4 and 6-Validity of Section 6  Notification struck  down by  the  Supreme  Court after 13  years of legal battle intrtaties-Consequent to the decision second  notification under  Section 6 issued on 10- 10-1967 after  gving  fresh  notice  under  Section  5A  and personal  hearing   of  the   parties-Whether   the   second notification is  hit by  the postulate that "every statutory power must  be  exercised  reasonably"-Effect  of  the  Land Acquisition  (AmenJment and Validation) Act 1967 introducing amendments to Section 4(2) aan proviso to Setion 6.      Legal Representatives  to be  brought  on  record-Civil Procedure Code,  1908-Making an application under Order XXII Rule 10 instead of under Order XXXI Rule 4 is not correct.

HEADNOTE:      A suit (No. 1262/53) Challenging the notification under Section 4  of the  Land  Acquisition  Act  dated  10-10-1952 issued by  the former Government of Bombay and later another notification under  Section 6  of the  Act  dated  14-8-1953 (issued during the pendency of the suit), notifying that the final plots  Nos. 41.  42 and  43 were  required for  public purpose viz.  State Transport-was  dismissed  by  the  Trial Court on  28-1-1959. The first and the second appeals having failed, the respondents came up to this Court. This Court in its decision  inter partes,  Valji Bhai’s  case struck  down Section 6  notification on  the ground  that the acquisition being for  the benefit of a Corporation, though for a public purpose was  bad beeause  no part of the compensation was to come out  of the  public revenue  and the provisions of Part VII of the Act had not been complied with.      After the bifurcation of the erstwhile State of Bombay, the land  acquisition proceedings came within the cognizance of Gujarat  State. The  State by  its letter dated 22-8-1966 decided to  contribute towards compensation a sum of Re. 1/- which was  subsequently raised  to Rs. 500/-. The Government felt that  as long time has elapsed since the earlier report under Section  5A was  submitted by  the Collector,  a fresh enquiry should  be made.  Accordingly the Additional Special

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Land Acquisition  Officer issued  a  notice  dated  1-8-1966 intimating to  the respondents  that if they so desired they might submit  their further  objections on  or before  16-8- 1966. Complying  with this notice, the respondents submitted further objections  on 31-8-1966  and they were also given a personal  hearing.   After  examining   the  enquiry  report submitted by  the enquiry  officer the Government of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 6 on 10-10-1967.      The respondents questioned the validity and legality of this notification  in the writ petition filed by them on 14- 2-1968 on  the only  ground that  it was issued more than 15 years after  the date  of Section  4 notification.  The High Court was  of the  opinion that  if  the  power  to  make  a declaration under Section 906 6 is  exercised after an unreasonable delay from the date on which notification  under Section  4 is issued such exercise of power would be invalid and it accordingly struck down the notification under  Section 6  of the  Act.  Hence  the  two appeals one  by the  State of  Gujarat and  the other by the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation.      Allowing the appeals by certificate, the Court ^      HELD: 1. The impugned section 6 notification was issued within  the   prescribed  period   introduced  by  the  1967 Amendment Act and, therefore could not be struck down on the only ground  that  the  power  to  issue  second  section  6 notification  was   exercised  after   an  unreasonable  and unexplained  delay.   Section  6  notification,  dated  10th october 1967, therefore is valid and legal.[918G-H, 919A]      2. A  combined reading  of the  provisions contained in sub-section (2)  of Section  4 with the one contained in the proviso to  sub-section (1)  of Section  6 introduced by the Land Acquisition  (Amendment and  Validation) Act,  (Central Act 13  of 1967)  with effect  from 20-1-1967  would make it clear that  the Government  would be precluded from making a declaration under  section 6 after the expiry of a period of three years  from the  date of issue of a notification under Section 4  which may  be issued after the Amendment Act came into force.  And in respect of those section 4 notifications which were issued prior to the commencement of the Ordinance i.e. 20-1-1967,  any notification  which is  required to  be issued under  section 6  must be made within a period of two years  whereafter   as  a   necessary  corollary  all  s.  4 notifications issued  prior to 20th January 1967 would stand exhausted and would not provide either a source of reservoir for issuing  s. 6  notification. Consequently  the  mischief sought to  be set  at naught by the High Court by reading by necessary implication  in the scheme of ss. 4, 5A, and 6 the concept of  exercise of  statutory power within a reasonable time has been statutorily remedied. The apprehensions of the High Court  that if  not checkmated  by implying  that  such statutory power  must be  exercised within a reasonable time to curb  arbitrary exercise  of power  to the detriment of a citizen have been taken note of by the legislature and fully met. Absence  of any  decided case  on the  subject of which High Court  took note  could not  permit an inference as has been done by the High Court that in the absence of a decided case the legislature would not remedy the possible mischief. Legislature often  does take  note of  a possible  abuse  of power by  the executive  and proceed to nip it in the bud by appropriate legislation and that has been done in this case. There is now no more possibility of a gap of more than three years from  the date  on which  s. 4 notification is issued, otherwise it would be invalid as being beyond the prescribed

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period. [916 G-H, 917 A-D]      In the  instant case, the notifications under section 4 was prior  to the  commeneement of the ordinance. Therefore, the provision  contained in  sub-section (2) of section 4 of the 1967  Amendment Act  would be  directly  attracted.  The Government could,  therefore, make  a declaration  within  a period of  two years  from 20th January 1967. The Government has in fact issued the impugned notification under section 6 on 10th  October 1967  i.e. within  the period prescribed by the Statute. [917 E-F] 907      3.When a  period is prescuibed for exercise of power it manifests  the  legislative  intention  that  the  authority exercising the power within the prescribed time could not at least be  accused of  inaction or  dithering and, therefore, such exercise  of power  could not  be said  to  be  bad  or invalid on the only ground that there was unreasonable delay in the  exercise of the power. The very prescription of time inheres a  belief that  the nature  and quantum of power and the manner  in which  it is to be exercised would consume at least  that  much  time  which  the  statute  prescribes  as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within the time could not  be negatived  on the  only ground of unreasonable delay. [917H, 918 A-B]      Therefore, in  this case,  there  was  no  unreasonable delay in  exercise of  power  and  hence  the  exercise  was neither bad nor invalid. [918B]      4. Once  the legislature  stepped in  and prescribed  a sort of  limitation within which power to issue notification under section  6 could be exercised, it was not necessary to go in  search of  a further  fetter  on  the  power  of  the Government by raising the implication. [918F-G]      In this  case, the  High Court  by implication  read  a fetter on  the  power  of  the  Government  to  issue  s.  6 notification within  a reasonable time after the issue of s. 4 notification  after observing  that there  was no  express provision that  such power  ought to  be exercised  within a reasonable time. In raising this impliccation the High Court took into  account the  postulate that every statutory power must be  exercised reasonably  and a  reasonable exercise of power implies its exercise within a reasonable time. Coupled with it two other factors were taken into consideration such as the  effect of  issuing a s. 4 notification on the rights and obligations  of the  owner of  the land  whose  land  is proposed to  be acquured;  the right  of the  Government  to unilaterally cancel  s. 4  notification in the event of fall in prices; history of legislation; and delayed issue of s. 6 notification would  deny adequate compensation to the owner. But by  the time  the High  Court examined  this matter  the legislature had  already introduced a provision by which the power to  issue s. 6 notification was to be exercised within the prescribed  period of  time. At  that stage there hardly arose a  question of  a search of the fetter on the power of the Government ignoring to some extent the express statutory provision. [918C-F]      5. In  the case of death of a party to a proceeding who is joined  in his  capacity as  Karta of  an undivided Hnndu family, if  the undivided  Hindu family  continues to  be in existence the  succeeding Karta  can be  substituted for the deceased Karta  of the  family and  that would be sufficient compliance with Order XXII Rule 4 of C.P.C. [911D-E]      In the insant case an application made under Order XXII Rules  10   C.P.C.  made  after  the  prescribed  period  of limitation and  in order  to avoid  seeking  condonation  of delay for setting aside abatement is not correct. [911E]

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    [The Court,  however, overruled  the objection  on this ground since the L.rs. have already been substituted].

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 2316/69 and 1598/70.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  14/17/18th  March, 1969 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A. No. 729/68. 908      R. H.  Dhebar and  M. N.  Shroff for  the Appellants in C.A. 2316/69.      D. V. Patel, M. V. Goswami and Ambrish Kumar for RR 1-5 in C.A. 2316/69 and RR. 1-4 in C.A. No. 1598/70.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI,  J.-These   two  appeals  by  certificate  under article 133(1)(c)  of the Constitution arise from a judgment rendered  by   the  Gujarat  High  Court  in  Special  Civil Application No.  720/68, being  a petition under article 226 of  the   Constitution  challenging   the  validity   of   a notification issued  by the  Government of  Gujarat on  10th october 1967  under section  6 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (’Act’   for  short).  Civil  Appeal  No.  2316/69  is preferred by  the original  respondent No.  2 Gujarat  State Transport Corporation,  and the  cognate  Civil  Appeal  No. 1598/70 is  preferred by  the State  of Gujarat,  the  first respondent in  the petition.  As both the appeals arise from the same  proceedings and  raise identical  contentions they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.      A notification  under s. 4 of the Act was issued by the former Governent  of Bombay  on 10th  October 1952 notifying that final  plots 41, 42 and 43 were likely to be needed for a public  purpose, viz.,  State   Transport. The respondents who are  tenants of  different parcels  of land comprised in the aforementioned  final plots  objected  to  the  proposed acquisition. Soon after filing the objections under s. 5A of the Act  the respondents  fild Civil Suit No. 1262/53 in the Court of  Civil Judge,  Second Division,  Ahmedabad,  for  a declaration that the notification under s. 4 was illegal and ultra vires and for an injunction restraining the respondent State from  proceeding with  the acquisition of the lands in possession of  the respondents.  During the pendency of this suit the  then Government  of Bombay,  after considering the report submitted  under s. 5A, made a declaration under s. 6 as per  the notification  dated 14th  August 1953 declaring, inter alia, that final plots 41, 42 and 43 were required for the purpose  of State  Transport.  The  respondents  amended their plaint  adding a  relief for quashing the notification under s.  6. The suit filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the trial court and first and second appeals did not meet with success.  They carried  the matter  to this  Court  and succeeded as  per judgment  reported in  Valjibhai Muljibhai Soneji &  Anr. v.  The  State  of  Bombay  (now  Gujarat)  & Ors.(1).  As  per  that  judgment  this  Court  decreed  the plaintiff’s suit  which would  imply that this Court quashed both notifications  under ss.  4 and 6. Reading the judgment as a whole it 909 appears that  the validity  of s.  4 notification was upheld and only the notification under s. 6 was struck down. In the mean timn  on the  bifurcation of  the  erstwhile  State  of Bombay these  land acquisition  proceedings came  within the cognizance of  Government of  Gujarat  and  when  the  State

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Government became  aware some  where in 1965 about the error in the  decree, Review  Applications Nos.  11 and 12 of 1965 were made  for correcting the decree. This Court granted the applications and modified the decree on 13th September 1965.      The Government  taking its  clue from  the judgment  of this Court which invalidated s. 6 notification on the ground that the  acquisition having  been made for the benefit of a Corporation, though  for public  purpose, is  bad because no part of  the compensation  is to  come  out  of  the  public revenue and  provisions of  Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have  not been  complied with, decided as per its letter dated 22nd  August 1966  to contribute  Re. 1/-,  which  was subsequently  raised   to  Rs.   500/-  towards  payment  of compensation. The  Government, however,  felt that  as  long time has  elapsed since  the earlier  report under s. 5A was submitted by  the Collector,  a fresh enquiry should be made Accordingly the  Additional Special Land Acquisition Officer issued a  notice dated  1st August  1966 intimating  to  the respondents that  if they  so desired  the may  submit their further objections  by or before 16th August 1966. Complying with  this   notice  the   respondents   submitted   further objections on  31st August  1966 and  they were also given a personal hearing.  After examining  the report  submitted by the enquiry  officer the  Government  of  Gujarat  issued  a notification  under   s.  6   on  10th  October,  1967.  The respondents questioned  the validity  and legality  of  this notification in the petition filed by them on 14th February, 1968.      Respondents questioned  the validity of the impugned s. 6 notification  on the  only ground  that it was issued more than 15  years after  the date of s. 4 notification and thus it had  been issued  after an  unreasonable delay and it was illegal and  void. While  this was the only contention which found  favour   with  the   High  Court,  in  reaching  this conclusion the  High Court,  after taking  note of  the fact that there  was no  express provision  in the  Act requiring that the  notification under  s. 6  must be  issued within a reasonable time  after issue of s. 4 notification, primarily relied upon the postulate that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably,  a doctrine  too finally entrenched in our jurisprudence to brook any refutation which would assist in raising  the implication  that  s.  6  notification  must follow within a reasonable time 910 after issue  of s.  4  notification.  The  Court  also  drew support from  the scheme  of ss.  4, 5A and 6 as well as the history of  the legislation.  On behalf of the appellants it was pointed  out to  the High  Court that  in  view  of  the provisions contained  in sub-s.  (2) of  s. 4  of  the  Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (’Amendment Act’ for  short), as  well as  the proviso  to s.  6(1) also introduced by  the same  amendment Act  the situation as has arisen  in  this  case  is  not  likely  to  arise  and  the apprehended mischief is not likely to be committed in future and, therefore,  the Court  should not  go in  search of the fetters on  the power  of  the  Government  to  issue  s.  6 notification, in  the absence  of any  express provision, by implication that  statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable time.  It was  further submitted  on their behalf that once  the legislature  has clearly permitted a thing to be done within the time specified in the statute it would be impermissible by  a process  of interpretation to reduce the statutory period  by implying  a further fetter on the power of the  Government and  that would  be  the  effect  if  the contention on  behalf of  the respondents  was accepted.  In

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other words,  as the  legislature has  now provided  that in respect of  a notification  issued under  s.  4  before  the commencement  of   the  Land   Acquisition  (Amendment   and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, no declaration under s. 6 shall be made  after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the  aforesaid Ordinance,  and futher  that  in  case  of section 4  notification issued after the commencement of the Ordinance a  statutory limit  of three years is fixed within which declaration  under s.  6 can  be made, the apprehended arbitrary exercise of power is thwarted and the Court should not further  restrict or curtail the power of the Government to issue  notification under s. 6 within the time prescribed by the statute.      The High  Court was of the opinion that if the power to make  a  declaration  under  s.  6  is  exercised  after  an unreasonable delay from the date on which notification under s. 4  is issued  such exercies of power would be invalid and accordingly struck  down the  notificatio under  s. 6. Hence these two appeals.      A preliminary  objection was  raised  by  the  learined counsel for  the respondents  in both the appeals contending that as  the appellants  in both  the appels  failed to seek within the  prescribed time  substitution of  the heirs  and legal representatives of respondent 5 who died on 8th March, 1970 during the pendency of the appeal in this Court, in the circumstances of  the case  these appeals  would abate  as a whole. Undoubtedly,  respondent 5  who is  described in  the cause title  of the  Memos. of Appeals as "Ramesh Ramjibhai, Manager, Ramesh  Restaurant, a joint hindu family business", died on 8th March 1970. what 911 appears to  have happened  thereafter is  that  applications were made by the appellants under Order 22, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure,  for bringing  Shri Krishnakant  Ramjibhai, Manager of Ramesh Restaurant, a joint hindu family business, on record  in place  of deceased  respondent 5. According to the appellants  the deceased  respondent  5  had  filed  the original petition  in his capacity as manager of joint hindu family business  and on  his death  as the interest devolved upon the  succeeding  manager  of  the  joint  hindu  family business, applications  under order 22, rule 10, C.P.C. were made to  bring the  person on  record on  whom the  interest devolved pending  the appeal.  Mr. D.  V. Patel took serious exception to  the procedure  adopted by  the appellants  and there is  some merit in this criticism. In fact, when Ramesh Ramjibhai who  filed the initial petition in his capacity as karta of the undivided hindu family business died during the pendency of the appeal, proper applications should have been made by  the appeal,  proper applications  should have  been made by  the appellants  under O.  22, r.  4, to  substitute heirs of  Ramesh Ramjibhai  who  was  respondent  5  in  the appeals before  this Court. In case of death of a party to a proceeding who  is joined  in his  capacity as  karta of  an undivided  hindu  family,  if  the  undivided  hindu  family continues to  be in  existence the  succeeding karta  can be substituted for  the deceased  karta of  the family and that would be  sufficient compliance  with Order  22, r.  4. What appears to  have been  done is to make applications under O. 22, r. 10 and those applications appear to have been granted subject to  just exceptions. The applications appear to have been made  after the prescribed period of limitation, and in order to  avoid seeking  condonation of  delay  for  setting aside abatement,  O 22,  r. 10 appears to have been invoked. Mr. Patel  is right  in saying that this was a device but in any event if proper applications were made under O. 22. r. 4

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the gentleman  who became  the karta  of the undivided hindu family after  the death  of the former karta could have been substituted on  record for the deceased respondent 5. In any event, succeeding karta of the undivided hindu family having been brought  on record  though not  strictly in  accordance with law,  we do  not propese to give any importance to this technical objection and overrule the same.      In a  decision inter  partes, Valjibhai’s case, (supra) this Court  struck down  the first  section  6  notification issued  on   14th  August   1953  on  the  ground  that  the acquisition being  for the  benefit of a Corporation, though for a  public purpose,  was  bad  because  no  part  of  the compensation was  to come  out of the public revenue and the provisions of  Part VII  of the  Act had  not been  complied with. It  would appear  that s. 4 notification was issued on 10th October  1952 and  within less  than  one  year,  after completing the enquiry under s. 5A and the 912 examination of  the report by the appropriate Government, s. 6 notification  was issued  on 4th August 1953. By any yard- stick it could not have been said that there was delay, much less  an   unreasonable  delay,   in  making  the  necessary declaration under  s. 6  after the issue of the notification under s.  4. The  chronology of  events that followed in the wake of  issuance of  a notification  under s.  6 dated 14th August 1953  would wholly  exonerate the  Government of  any charge of  dithering  or  dilatoriness  or  inaction.  These events be  noticed now so as to appreciate the submission on behalf of  the appellants that they cannot be accused of any inaction, deliberate dilatoriness or dithering.      Soon after  the issue  of the  notification under  s. 4 dated 10th  October 1952 and even before the declaration was made under  s. 6  as per notification dated 14th August 1953 the respondents filed Civil Suit No. 1262/53 challenging the notification under s. 4 and sought an injunction restraining the  then   State  of   Bombay  from   proceeding  with  the acquisition of  the lands  in possession of the respondents. An interim  injunction was  sought but the same was refused. Thereafter came  the notification  under  s.  6  dated  14th August 1953.  It appears  that  thereafter  the  respondents amended the  plaint to add a relief for quashing and setting aside the notification under s. 6 also. It would thus appear that whatever  was required to be done by the Government for completing the proceedings of acquisition was undertaken and finished within a period of less than one year from the date of the  notification under  s. 4.  The  suit  filed  by  the respondents was  dismissed by  the trial  court as  per  its judgment dated  28th January  1959. Both  the  notifications were held  valid and  they were not found to suffer from any infirmity as contended for and on behalf of the respondents. The respondents carried the matter in appeal to the District Court and  this appeal  was dismissed by the first appellate court as  per its  judgment dated  28th September  1959. The respondents preferred  second appeal  to the  High Court but failed to  carry conviction  with the  High Court,  with the result that  the appeal  failed and  was  dismissed  on  1st August 1960.  The respondents  did not rest content with the dismissal  of  their  second  appeal  and  applied  for  and obtained special  leave of  this Court  under article 136 of the Constitution.  The appeal  of the respondents by special leave succeeded  as per  judgment rendered  by this Court on 8th May 1963.      The question  is whether  there was any delay much less unreasonable delay  on the  part of  the State Government in taking follow  up action after issuing notification under s.

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4. The  State Government  had actually  taken the  follow up action expeditiously  within less  than a  year when on 14th August 1953, s. 6 notification was issued. Even 913 before s.  6 notification  was issued  the respondents filed the suit  and went on preferring appeals. They succeeded for the first time in this when this Court allowed their appeals on May  8, 1963.  Till then  the  Government  could  not  be accused of  any inaction  or delay  in taking  the follow up action. What  was the  Government expected  to do during the time the respondents went on preferring successive appeals ? Was the Government expected, even though it succeeded in the trial court and first and second appellate courts to foresee in advance  that at  some stage by some court in the pyramid of appeals  its notification under s. 6 would be found to be ineffective and forestall such a decision by issuing another s. 6  notification ex  major cautela  ?  If  the  Government succeeded in  three courts  and was  assured by three courts that both its notifications under ss. 4 and 6 were valid and effective, it  is difficult to appreciate the observation of the High  Court that when the Government issued the first s. 6 notification it was ineffective exercise of power under s. 6 and  the Government wrongly went on contending that it was a valid  exercise of  power.  This  criticism  is  not  well merited. There  would have  been  some  legitimacy  in  this criticism of  the stand  of the Government if the Government had lost  in the  first court  and went on filing successive appeals even  if each court went on holding the notification ineffective. The  reverse is  the position.  The  Government went on  succeeding and  the courts  went on  upholding  the notification. There  was no  alternative with the Government but to go on defending its action before the courts to which it was  dragged by  the respondents  after their  successive failures. In  this background  the question was posed by the High Court:  Can the  Government then  contend, when  it  is found to be wrong by the highest court in the land, that the delay in  the exercise of the power under s. 6 occasioned by its own  wrong stand  should be regarded as reasonable ? and answered by  it by  saying that  if the  Government had  not persisted in  wrongly asserting the validity of the first s. 6 notification  and accepting  its invalidity, had cancelled it, the  delay in  the effective exercise of the power under s. 6  could have  been avoided. This answer is unfortunately not borne  out by  the events succeeding the issuance of the first s.  6 notification.  Not only the Government stand was not found to be wrong but by three courts it was found to be correct. It  is this  Court in  the last  appeal found  s. 6 notification invalid.  Could the  Government be  expected to speculate in advance that ultimately it may fail to convince this Court  though it  had convinced three other courts and, therefore, right  at the  time of institution of the suit in the court,  concede the  contention of  the respondents  and cancel the  first s. 6 notification and issue a second one ? There was  no guarantee  that the  second one would not have been challenged and obviously there was 914 no assurance that some defect may not be found by some court even in  the second s. 6 notification. The Government cannot be put  on the  horns of  a dilemma.  Therefore, we  find it difficult to agree with the High Court that having adopted a wrong stand  and thus  taken about  11 years  the Government cannot now be permitted to urge that the delay so occasioned should  not   be  regarded  as  unreasonable.  In  fact  the Government had  practically  little  or  no  option  but  to support the decisions of the Courts which were in its favour

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till this  Court for the first time found some defect in its notification under  s. 6.  Any other  view  may  lead  to  a starting result  that every  litigant before  it can explain the delay  on the  ground of  being led  from court to court must foresee  a possible  error that the hierarchy of courts may at  some stage  notice and rectify its stand in advance. It would  be nothing  short of  a speculative approach which may ill-suit any litigant and more so the Government.      The High  Court was further of the opinion that even if there was  some explanation  for the  delay from 14th August 1953 to 8th May 1963, there was no explanation for the delay in making  the review  application in  the beginning of 1965 before the  Supreme Court  and that  this period of one year and 9 months remains totally unexplained. In this context it may be  advantageous to  state that  the respondents  in the earlier  round   of  litigation   had  challenged  both  the notifications under  ss. 4  and 6  had lost before the first three courts.  This Court  while allowing  the appeal by its judgment dated 8th May 1963 passed the final order as under:           "We, therefore,  allow the  appeals and decree the suits of the appellants with costs in all the Courts."      Literally implemented,  the decretal portion would mean that both  s. 4  and s.  6 notifications  were struck  down. Reading the  body of the judgment it clearly transpires that this Court  upheld the validity of the notification under s. 4. When  this inconsistency  between the  judgment  and  the decree  came   to  the  notice  of  the  Government,  Review Petitions Nos.  11 and  12 of 1965 appear to have been filed in the  year 1965,  and these petitions were allowed by this Court as per its order dated 13th September 1965 by deleting the  decretal   portion  of   the  judgment   as   extracted hereinabove and substituting it in the following words:           "and decree  the  suit  for  permanent  injunction restraining the respondents from proceeding further with the land acquisition  proceedings under  the  said  notification issued under  s. 6(1)  of the  Act with  costs  in  all  the courts". 915      The High  Court was  of the opinion that the Government took a  long time  of one  year and 9 months in ascertaining this inconsistency  between  the  decretal  portion  of  the judgment and  the main  body of  the judgment  and there was delay in  moving the review applications. In this connection a reference to the affidavit of Mr. D. K. Motwani, Secretary to the  Gujarat State  Road Transport  Corporation for whose benefit the  acquisition was  made, as well as the affidavit of Shri  S. R.  Pardhan, Under  Secretary to  Government  of Gujarat, would  show that after the copy of the judgment was received and it was examined to ascertain what further steps were required  to  be  taken  to  complete  the  process  of acquisition consistent  with the  judgment  of  the  Supreme Court,  the  error  was  discovered  and  then  the  learned advocate was  instructed to  file review  applications. This delay of  a year  and few months in the context of the facts in this case cannot be said to be unreasonable.      The third stage where the High Court found the delay in taking the  follow up  action was  after the grant of review application and  before the impugned notification dated 10th October 1967  was issued.  This  Court  allowed  the  review applications  on   13th  September   1965.  Thereafter   the Government directed  a fresh  enquiry under  s. 5A. This was done in  fairness to the respondents, though Mr. D. V. Patel learned counsel  for the  respondents was rather critical of this fairness  of the  Government inasmuch  as he  said that there was  no necessity for a fresh enquiry. Earlier enquiry

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under s.  5A was  in 1952.  By this time nearly 15 years had elapsed since the enquiry. If the Government in the backdrop of these  facts considered it fair and just to order a fresh enquiry to give the respondents an opportunity to file fresh objections, the Government cannot be accused of dithering or whiling away precious time on what was described as a futile exercise. This  second enquiry  under s.  5A was  held after giving an  opportunity as  per notice  dated August 1966, to file objections which in fact were filed on August 31, 1966, and then  a notice  dated 30th December 1966 was served upon the respondents  calling upon  them to  appear for  personal hearing on  12th January  1967. The enquiry was adjourned at the request  of the  respondents 9  times as  set out in the affidavit of  Shri S.  R. Pardhan.  The enquiry  was over on 13th April  1967. During  the course of personal hearing the respondents appeared through their advocates Sarvashri K. M. Vyas, A.  L. Shah, V. R. Bhatt and N. D. Pandey. The last of the submissions appear to have been made on 13th April 1967. Thereafter the  enquiry officer submitted his report and the Government took  the prompt  action of  issuing the impugned notification on  10th October 1967. Even here the High Court found a  further unexplained delay after 13th September 1965 till 10th October 916 1967 when  the impugned  notification was  issued. The  High Court possibly  overlooked  the  affidavit  of  Shri  S.  R. Pradhan when  it observed  that there  was  no  satisfactory answer to  the question  posed by it, in the affidavit filed on behalf  of the  respondents.  With  respect,  it  is  not possible to subscribe to this view of the High Court in view of the  facts clearly  set out  hereinabove. It,  therefore, unmistakably transpires  that in the facts and circumstances of this  case there  was no  delay, though  apparently there appears a  time lag of nearly 15 years between s. 4 and s. 6 notifications because  the events in the interregnum clearly made it impossible for the Government to issue a second s. 6 notification when  it  had  already  issued  a  first  s.  6 notification within  a period of less than one year from the date of  the issue of the s. 4 notification and the validity of which was beyond reproach till May 6, 1963.      Assuming that the High Court was right in rejecting the explanation preferred  by the  Government for  the delay  in issuing the second s. 6 notification, would it still be fair to hold  that there was an unreasonable delay in issuing the second s.  6 notification  in view of the specific provision contained in  sub-s. (2)  of s.  4 of the 1967 Amendment Act which provides  that notwithstanding  anything contained  in clause (b)  of sub-s.  (1), no declaration under s. 6 of the principal Act in respect of any land which has been notified before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment & Validation) Ordinance, 1967, under sub-s. (1) of s. 4 of the principal Act,  shall be  made after the expiry of two years from the  commencement of  the Ordinance. The Ordinance came into force  on 20th  January 1967.  Simultaneously a proviso was added to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 in the following terms:           "Provided that  no declaration  in respect  of any particular land  covered by a notification under s. 4 sub-s. (1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment &  Validation) Ordinance,  1967,  shall  be  made after the  expiry of  three years  from  the  date  of  such publication". A combined reading of the provisions contained in sub-s. (2) of s.  4 with the one contained in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 introduced by the Amendment Act would clearly put an end to  the unsatisfactory situation which troubled the High

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Court in  this case.  In view  of  the  statutory  provision noticed herein the Government would be precluded from making a declaration  under s.  6 after  the expiry  of a period of three years  from the  date of  the issue  of a notification under s.  4 which may be issued after the Amendment Act came into force. And in respect of those s. 4 notifications which were issued perior to the 917 commencement of  the Ordinance  hereinabove  noted  on  20th January 1967 any notification which is required to be issued under s.  6 must  be made  within  a  period  of  two  years whereafter as  a necessary  corollary all s. 4 notifications issued prior  to 20th January 1967 would stand exhausted and would not  provide either  a source or reservoir for issuing s. 6  notification. Consequently  the mischief  sought to be set at  naught by  the High  Court by  reading by  necessary implication in  the scheme of ss. 4, 5A and 6 the concept of exercise of  statutory power  within a  reasonable time  has been statutorily  remedied. The  apprehensions of  the  High Court that if not checkmated by implying that such statutory power must  be exercised  within a  reasonable time  to curb arbitrary exercise  of power  to the  detriment of a citizen have been  taken note  of by  the legislature and fully met. Absence of  any decided  case on  the subject  of which High Court took  note could  not permit  an inference as has been done by the High Court that in the absence of a decided case the legislature  would not  remedy  the  possible  mischief. Legislature often  does take  note of  a possible  abuse  of power by  the executive  and proceed to nip it in the bud by appropriate legislation and that has been done in this case. There is now no more possibility of a gap of more than three years between  s. 4  and  s.  6  notifications  because  any declaration made after the expiry of a period of three years from the  date on which s. 4 notification is issued would be invalid as being beyond the prescribed period.      These newly  inserted provisions  were brought  to  the notice of  the High  Court. Now, as pointed out earlier, the Ordinance  came   into  force  on  20th  January  1967.  The notification under  s. 4  in this  case  was  prior  to  the commencement of  the  Ordinance.  Therefore,  the  provision contained in sub-s. (2) s. 4 of the 1967 Amendment Act would be directly  attracted. The Government could, therefore make a declaration within a period of two years from 20th January 1967.  The  Government  has  in  fact  issued  the  impugned notification under  s. 6  on 10th  October 1967, i.e. within the period prescribed by the statute.      The question  then is: when a statute confers power and prescribes time  within which  it can be exercised, could it ever be  said that even though the power is exercised within the statutory  period yet the Court can examine the question of delay and record a finding that there was an unreasonable delay in  exercise of the power and, therefore, the exercise of power  is bad  ? This  approach  would  defeat  the  very purpose for  prescribing a sort of a period of limitation on exercise of  power. When a period is prescribed for exercise of power  it manifests  the legislative  intention that  the authority exercising the power 918 within the  prescribed time could not at least be accused of inaction or dithering and, therefore, such exercise of power could not  be said  to be  bad or invalid on the only ground that there  was unreasonable  delay in  the exercise  of the power. The  very prescription of time in heres a belief that the nature  and quantum  of power and the manner in which it is to  be exercised  would consume  at least  that much time

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which the  statute prescribes  as reasonable and, therefore, exercise of power within that time could not be negatived on the only  ground of  unreasonable delay.  Therefore, in this case it is difficult to agree with the High Court that there was an unreasonable delay in exercise of power and hence the exercise was either bad or invalid.      The High  Court by  implication read  a fetter  on  the power of  the Government to issue s. 6 notification within a reasonable time  after the  issue of s. 4 notification after observing that  there was  no express  provision  that  such power ought  to be  exercised within  a reasonable  time. In raising this  implication the  High Court  took into account the postulate  that every  statutory power must be exercised reasonably and  a reasonable  exercise of  power implies its exercise within a reasonable time. Coupled with it two other factors were  taken into consideration such as the effect of issuing a s. 4 notification on the rights and obligations of the owner of the land whose land is proposed to be acquired; the right  of the  Government to  unilaterally cancel  s.  4 notification in  the event  of falling  prices;  history  of legislation; and  delayed issue  of s.  6 notification would deny adequate compensation to the owner. But by the time the High Court  examined this matter the legislature had already introduced a  provision by  which the  power to  issue s.  6 notification was  to  be  exercised  within  the  prescribed period of  time. At that stage there hardly arose a question of a  search of  the fetter  on the  power of the Government ignoring to  some extent  the express  statutory  provision. Therefore, while  appreciating the anxiety of the High Court we are  of the  opinion that once the legislature stepped in and prescribed  a sort  of period of limitation within which power to issue notification under s. 6 could be exercised it was not necessary to go in search of a further fetter on the power of the Government by raising the implication.      It thus  appears to  be satisfactorily established that the  impugned  s.  6  notification  was  issued  within  the prescribed period  introduced by the 1967 Amendment Act and, therefore, could  not be struck down on the only ground that the power  to issue  second s.  6 notification was exercised after an  unreasonable and unexplained delay. This being the only infirmity  found by  the High Court to which we are not able to 919 subscribe, it must be held that the second s. 6 notification dated 10th October 1967 is valid and legal.      Accordingly both  these appeals succeed and are allowed and the  decision of the High Court is set aside and Special Civil Application  No. 729/68  filed by  the respondents  is dismissed but  in the  circumstances of  the case,  with  no order as to costs. S.R.                                        Appeals allowed. 920