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PETITIONER: GUJARAT STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/s. NATSON MANUFACTURING CO. (P) LTD. & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/08/1978

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1765            1979 SCR  (1) 372  CITATOR INFO :  F          1987 SC1950  (4,5)  R          1989 SC2113  (16,17,20,29)

ACT:      State Financial  Corporations  Ac  (Act  LXIII),  1951- Nature of  proceedings under  Sections 31  and 32-Court  Fee payable on  an application  that may  be made  under Section 31(1) of  the Act-Whether  governed by  Article l  or  7  of Schedule 1 or by Article l(c) of Schedule II of Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  Corporation, which  grants or guarantees the loan to be raised By industrial concerns either from the scheduled banks  or state Cooperative Banks or those floated in public  market, is  entitled to  make, for one or more of the reliefs  set out  in Section  31 (  1  )  of  the  state Financial Cooperation  Act, an  application to  the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries  on the  whole or  substantial part  of  its business, when  any such  concern defaults  in repayment  of loan or fails to comply with the terms of the agreement. The Corporation made several applications purporting to be under Section 31(1)  of the  Act in various district courts in the State of Gujarat. question was raised in the District Courts about the  proper court  fee payable  on sch applications. ’ The Corporation  contended that  the  application  would  be governed k  Article 1 (c) of Schedule II of the Bombay Court Fees Act,  1959 and-a  fixed court  fee in  the amount of 65 paise would  be payable  in respect  of the application. But the state  contended that  the application could be governed either by  Article I  of Schedule I or at any rate Article 7 of Schedule  I and the court fee payable would be ad-valorem on the amount of value o the subject matter in dispute or on the amount  of the  monetary gain  or loss  to be  prevented according to  the  scales  prescribed  under  Article  1  of Schedule I.  All the  district courts except Broach accepted the contention  of the  state; but the Broach district court opined that  the application  under Section 31(1) was in the nature of  an execution application and it would be governed by Article  I (c)  of Schedule  II. Both the Corporation and state of Gujarat went in revision before the High Court. The

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High Court  by a  common judgment  held that  an appellation under Section  31(1) should bear an ad valorem court fee. In reaching  this   conclusion,  the  High  Court  treated  the application under  Section 31(1)  of the  Act on  par with a suit by  a mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged  property which  is being  treated as  a money suit falling  within the purview of Article I of Schedule I. Alternatively, it was held the even if the application under Section 31(1) is not  plaint within the meaning of Article I of Schedule  I it  would fall within the purview o Article 7 of Schedule I.      Allowing the appeal, by special leave the Court ^      HELD: 1. The form of the application, the nature of the relief, the  compulsion to  make interim  order, the limited enquiry contemplated  by sub-section  (6) of  Section 32 and the nature  of relief  that can be granted and the manner of execution clearly show that the application under Section 31 (1) is  neither a  plaint as  contemplated by  Article 1  of Schedule I  nor an  application in the nature of a plaint as contemplated by  Article 7  of the Court-Fees Act. 1870. 182 B-C] 373      Once Article  7 of the Schedule I of the Court-Fees Act is excluded  there A  was (and  could be) no dispute that an application under  Section  31(1)  of  trill  Act  would  be covered by the residuary Article 1 (c) of Schedule II of the Court Fees  Act and  it should bear a fixed court fee in the sum of 65 paise. [382 D]      2. Section  31(1)  of  the  Act  prescribes  a  special procedure for  enrichment of  the claims  of  the  Financial Corporation. The  Corporation is  to make an application for the reliefs  set out  Indecision 31(1).  The reliefs  that a Court can  gram are  the sale of the property mortgaged etc. to a  Financial Corporation  as security  for  the  loan  or advance;  transfer  of  the  management  of  the  industrial concern to  the Financial  Corporation; or  restraining  the industrial  concern   from  transferring   or  removing  its machinery or  plant or equipment from the industrial concern without  the  permission  of  the  Board  of  the  Financial Corporation. An  application for  such a relief is certainly not a  plaint in a suit for recovery of mortgage loan. It is not even  something akin  to a suit by a mortgage to recover mortgage  money   by  sale   of  mortgaged   property.   The distinguishing  features   noticeable  between  a  suit  for recovery of mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and an application  under s.  31 for  one or  more of the relief specified therein  lares that  even if  the  Corporation  as applicant so chooses, it cannot in the application, pray for a preliminary  decree for  accounts or  a final  decree  for payment of  money nor  can it  seek to  enforce any personal liability even if such one is incurred under the contract of mortgage. At any rate in an application under Section 31 ( 1 ) the  Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding  dues. It can make an application for one of the three  reliefs, none  of which, if granted, results in a money decree  or decree for recovery of outstanding loans or advance. The  foreign of  the relief  by  itself  would  not attract one  or the other Article of Court-Fees Act. Section 32 of  the Act  clearly points  to the  conclusion that  the proceedings under  Section 31(1)  of the  Act are not in the nature  of  a  money  recovery  proceedings.  Article  1  of Schedule I would, therefore not be attracted. attracted      3. The  whole conspectus  of provisions  in Section  32 coupled with  the nature  relief sought under s. 31(1) makes

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it clear that special provision is made for certain types of reliefs  that  can  be  obtained  by  a  Corporation  by  an application under Section 31 ( I ) which could not be styled as substantive  relief for  repayment of  mortgage money  by sale of  mortgaged property.  Nor can  it be  said to  be  a proceeding to  obtain substantive  relief capable  of  being valued in  terms of  monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss. The substantive myself in an application under Section 31(1) is  something akin to an application for attachment of property in  execution of  a decree  at a stage posterior to the passing  of the  decree. It  may be that in the ultimate analysis the  result would be that the property will be sold for repayment of the loan or advance taken by the industrial concern from  the Corporation  but it could not be said that it is  substantive relief  claimed by  the Corporation which can be  valued in  terms of  monetary gain  or prevention of monetary loss  as envisaged  by Article  7 of  Schedule I of Court-Fees Act. [382 A-C & 381G-H]      Sub section (6) of Section 32 of the Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed. It does not expand the contest in  the application  as if  it  is  suit  between  a mortgagee and  the mortgagor for sale of mortgaged property. [38 I E] 374 Observation:      [When  dealing   With  a  question  o  court  fee,  the perspective should  be informed  by the  spirit of the magna carta and  of equal  access to justice which suggests that a heavy price  tag on  relief in  Court should  be regarded as unplayable.] [382E]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1553 of 977,      Appeal by  Special Leave  from the  Judgment and  order dated 5-4-1977  of the Gujarat High. Court in Civil Revision Application No. 847 of 1975.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Addl.  So]. General and P. H. Parekh for the Appellant.      D. V.  Patel, Badri  Das Sharma  and M.  N. Shroff  for Respondent No. 5.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      DESAI, J.  This appeal by special leave raises a narrow but interesting  question on the nature of proceedings under section 31  and 2  of the  State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (’Act’  for short)  which has  a direct  impact on  the question of court fees tc be paid on an application that may be made  under s.  31 of  the Act. The question arose in the context of the following facts:      The state of Gujarat set up the Gujarat state Financial corporation (’Corporation’ for short), the appellant herein, under s. 3 of the Act. The Corporation was set up inter alia for granting  or guaranteeing  tile loans  to be  raised  by industrial concerns either from scheduled banks or state co- operative banks  or those  floated in the public market. The Corporation guaranteed  numerous such loans, advanced to the industrial concerns in the state of Gujarat on certain terms and  conditions   agreed  between   the  parties.  When  the industrial concern defaults in repayment of loan or fails to comply with  the terms  of the  agreement the Corporation is entitled to make an application to the District Judge within the limits  of whose  jurisdiction  the  industrial  concern carries on the whole or substantial part of its business for

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one or  more of  the reliefs set out in s. 31(1) of the Act. The  Corporation   appears  to   have,   made   applications purporting to  be under  s. 31(1)  of  the  Act  in  various District Courts  in the  State of  Gujarat against different industrial concerns.  A question  was raised in the District Courts  about   the  proper   court  fee   payable  on  such applications. The Corporation contended that the application would be  governed by Article 1 (of Schedule II o the Bombay Court) Fee Act, 1959, and a fixed court fee in the amount of 65 paise  would be payable in respect of the application. On the other  hand, the  State contended that application would be governed either by 375 Article I   Schedule  I or  at any  rate  by  Article  7  of Schedule I  and the court fee payable would be ad valorem on the amount  of value  of the subject matter in dispute or on the amount  of the  monetary gain  or loss  to be  prevented according  to  the  scale  prescribed  under  Article  I  of Schedule I.  It appears  that except  for the  Distt. Judge, Broach, all other District Judges accepted the contention on behalf of  the State.  The Distt.  Judge, Broach  was of the opinion that  the application  under s.  31(1)  was  in  the nature of  an execution application and it would be governed by Article  l(c) of  Schedule II.  The Corporation preferred revision applications  to the  High  Court  questioning  the correctness of  the decisions  directing levy  of ad valorem court fee.  The State  of Gujarat  also preferred a revision application against the decision of the Distt. Judge, Broach holding that  the application under s. 31 (1) of the Act was in the nature of an execution application. The High Court by a common  judgment held that the application under s. 31 (1) should  bear   ad  valorem   court  fee.  In  reaching  this conclusion the  High Court  treated the application under s. 31(1) of  the Act  on par  with a  suit by  a  mortgagee  to enforce the  mortgage debtor  sale of the mortgaged property which is  being treated  as a  money suit falling within the purview or  Article I  of Schedule  I. Alternatively, it was held that  even if  the application under s. 31 (1) is not a plaint within  the meaning  of Article  1 of  Schedule I, it would fall  within the  purview of  Article 7  of Schedule I which provides  an ad  valorem court  fee on  an application made for  obtaining substantive  relief which  is capable of being valued  in terms  of monetary  gain or  prevention  of monetary loss  because  to  all  intents  and  purposes  the application is  one for recovery of the outstanding claim of the Corporation.  In  accordance  with  these  findings  the revision applications  preferred  by  the  Corporation  were dismissed and the one preferred by the State was allowed.      Mr. Sorabji,  learned  counsel  who  appeared  for  the appellant Corporation  contended that  the view taken by the learned Judge  of the  High Court  that on  an  analogy  the application under  s. 31(1)  by the Corporation is akin to a suit by  a mortgagee to enforce his mortgage debt by sale of mortgaged  property  and,  therefore,  money  suit,  falling within the  purview of Article 1 of Schedule I of the Bombay Court Fee Act, 1959, or the observation that the substantive relief claimed in the application is one which is capable of being value  in terms  of monetary  gain  or  prevention  of monetary loss  and would attract Article 7 of Schedule I, is not correct.        The  State  Financial  Corporations  Act,  1951,  was enacted by  the Parliament with a view to enabling the State Governments  to   establish  a   Financial  Corporation  for enhancing the pace of industrialisa- 376

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tion by  providing credit  on  easy  terms  for  setting  up industrial concerns  and/or for  expanding the activities of the existing  industrial concerns.  Section 25  enables  the Financial Corporation  to carry  on and  transact any of the business set out therein which includes guaranteeing on such terms and  conditions as may be agreed upon (i) loans raised by industrial  concerns which  are repayable within a period not exceeding  20 years and are floated in the public market or (ii)  loans raised  by industrial concerns from scheduled banks or  State Co-operative  Banks. It  can also underwrite the issue  of stock,  shares,  bonds  or  debentures  by  an industrial concern. The Corporation can either guarantee the loan raised  by the  industrial concern  or may  even  grant itself a  loan on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the Corporation and the industrial concern.      Section 29  confers upon Financial Corporation, in case of default by industrial concern, the right to take over the management of  possession or  both of the industrial concern as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the  property pledged,  mortgaged,  hypothecated  or assigned to  the Financial  Corporation, and any transfer of property made  by the  Corporation in  exercise of the power conferred by  s. 29 shall vest in it all rights in or to the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property.      The relevant  two sections  with which we are concerned In this  appeal are  ss. 31  and 32.  Section 31 provides as under:-           "31. (1) Where an industrial concern, in breach of      any agreement,  makes any  default in  repayment of any      loan or advance or any instalment thereof or in meeting      its obligations  in relation  to any guarantee given by      the Corporation  or otherwise  fails to comply with the      terms of  its agreement  with the Financial Corporation      or  where   the  Financial   Corporation  requires   an      industrial concern  to make  immediate repayment of any      loan or  advance under  section 30  and the  industrial      concern fails  to make  such repayment,  then,  without      prejudice to  the provisions  of section 29 of this Act      and of  section 69  of the  Transfer of  Property  Act,      1882,  any   officer  of   the  Financial  Corporation,      generally or  specially authorised by the Board in this      behalf may  apply to  the  district  judge  within  the      limits of  whose jurisdiction  the  industrial  concern      carries on  the whole  or  a  substantial  part  of  it      business for  one or  more of  the  following  reliefs,      namely:-           (a)   for an  order for  the sale  of the property                pledged, mortgaged,  hypothecated or assigned                to the 377                Financial Corporation  as  security  for  the                loan or advance; or           (b)    for  transferring  the  management  of  the                industrial   concern    to   the    Financial                Corporation; or           (c)   for an ad interim injunction restraining the                industrial  concern   from  transferring   or                removing its  machinery or plant or equipment                from the  premises of  the industrial concern                without the  permission of  the Board,  where                such removal is apprehended.           (2) An  application under  sub-section  (1)  shall      state the  nature and  extent of  the liability  of the      industrial concern  to the  Financial Corporation,  the

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    ground on  which it  is made and such other particulars      as may be prescribed."      Section 32(1) provides that when an application is made seeking reliefs  mentioned in  clauses (a) and (c) of sub-s. (1) of  s. 31,  it is  obligatory upon the District Judge to pass an  ad interim  order attaching the security or so much of the  property of the industrial concern as would on being sold  realise   an  amount   equivalent  in   value  to  the outstanding liability  of  the  industrial  concern  to  the Financial  Corporation   together  with  the  costs  of  the proceedings  with   or  without  an  ad  interim  injunction restraining the  industrial  concern  from  transferring  or removing its machinery, plant or equipment. If the applicant seeks relief  mentioned in  clause (b) of sub-section (1) of s. 31,  the District Judge shall pass an order of ad interim injunction   restraining   the   industrial   concern   from transferring or  removing its machinery, plant or equipment. A notice  accompanied by copies of the interim order and the application is  required to  be served  upon the  industrial concern calling  upon it  to show cause why ad interim order of attachment  should not be made absolute or the injunction confirmed or  the management transferred to the Corporation. If no  cause is  shown on  or before the specified date, the order is  to be  made absolute.  Sub-section (6)  of  s.  32 provides that  if the  industrial concern  shows cause,  the Distt. Judge  is required  to investigate  the claim  of the Financial Corporation  in  accordance  with  the  provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions  may be  applied thereto.  On completing the investigation the  District Judge  may  either  confirm  the order or  vary  the  order  or  release  the  property  from attachment. An  order of  attachment or sale of property has to be  carried into  effect as  far as  practicable  in  the manner provided  in the  Code of  Civil Procedure, 1908, for the attachment  or sale of property in execution of a decree as if the Financial Corporation were the decree holder. 378      Article 1  of Schedule I of the Court-fees Act provides for ad  valorem court  fee on plaint or memorandum of appeal (not otherwise  provided  for  in  the  Act)  or  of  cross- objections presented  to any  civil or  revenue court, to be levied according to the scale set out in the Schedule on the value of  the subject-matter  in dispute. Article 7 provides for court-fees  on a plaint or application or petition other than those  provided  in  the  earlier  Articles  to  obtain substantive relief  capable of  being  valued  in  terms  of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss including cases where an  application or  petition is  treated either  as  a plaint or a described as the mode of obtaining the relief as aforesaid, the  fee to  be calculated  on the  amount of the monetary gain  or monetary loss to be prevented according to the scale prescribed under Article 1.      Section  31(1)   prescribes  a  special  procedure  for enforcement of  claims  by  the  Financial  Corporation  The Corporation is  to make  an application  for the reliefs set out in  s. 31 (1) . The reliefs that a Court can grant under s. 31(1)  are the  sale of the property mortgaged, etc. to a Financial Corporation  as security  for the loan or advance; transfer of  the management of the industrial concern to the Financial Corporation  or restraining the industrial concern from transferring  or removing  its machinery  or  plant  or equipment  from  the  premises  of  the  industrial  concern without  the  permission  of  the  Board  of  the  Financial Corporation. An  application for  such a relief is certainly not a  plaint in  a suit  for recovery  of mortgage money by

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sale of  mortgaged property.  On a breach of an agreement by an industrial  concern the  Corporation can seek one or more of the three reliefs set out in s. 31(1). If the Corporation seeks the  relief of  transferring  the  management  of  the industrial concern  to the  Financial Corporation  it  could hardly be  said that the application purports to be a plaint for recovering  the mortgage  money  by  sale  of  mortgaged properly. It  would be  inappropriate  to  say  that  on  an analogy an application under s. 31(1) is something akin to a suit by  a mortgagee  to recover  mortgage money  by sale of mortgaged property.  At any rate, in an application under s. 31 (1) the Corporation does not and cannot pray for a decree for its outstanding dues. It can make an application for one of the  three reliefs, none of which, if granted, results in a money  decree, or  decree for recovery of outstanding loan or advance.  Section 31(1)  of the Act, in the circumstances therein set out, permits the Corporation to seek one or more of the  three reliefs  therein stated.  It is  difficult  to comprehend that  merely the form of relief would attract one or the other Article of Court-fees Act. If relief of sale of mortgaged property  is sought which permits an argument that the application is nothing but a suit for realising mortgage money by sale of mortgaged property and, therefore, 379 ad valorem  court-fees is  payable, then  what would  be the nature of  the application when instead of sale of mortgaged property the  relief asked for is transfer of the management of  the   industrial  concern   or  an   interim  injunction restraining the  industrial  concern  from  transferring  or removing its machinery, plant or equipment from the premises cf the  industrial concern  without the  permission  of  the Board? In  the  last  mentioned  two  cases  the  relief  is incapable of  any monetary  evaluation. The  High Court  got over this  difficult question  by merely observing that this need not be answered in the petitions before the High Court. Frankly speaking,  they shed some light on the nature of the proceedings contemplated  by s.  31, and  s. 32  of the  Act clearly points  to, the  conclusion that the proceedings are not in the nature of a money recovery proceedings. Article 1 of Schedule I would, therefore, not be attracted and we must say in  fairness to  Mr. D.V. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent State of Gujarat who specifically stated that the application would not fall under Article I of Schedule I but it would be governed by Article of Schedule. I.      Developing the  contention, Mr.  Patel urged  that  the substance of  the matter  is that  even if  the  Corporation applies for  an order  of sale  of mortgaged  property,  the substantive relief  is one  of sale of mortgaged property so that the  Corporation  may  reimburse  itself  of  the  loan advanced  to   the  industrial   concern  thereby  acquiring monetary gain  or at  any rate preventing monetary loss. The outward form, it was said may be different but the substance of the  matter is  that the Corporation seeks to recover its loan by  sale of mortgaged property. It was said that at any rate either  the Corporation by the substantive relief seeks to make  a monetary gain of reimbursing itself in respect of the loan  advanced by  it or  prevents the  loss that it may suffer if  the loan is not repaid, by bringing the mortgaged property to  court auction  and appropriate  the sale  price towards its loan.      Section 31(1)  enables the  Corporation in the event of breach of agreement or default in payment of loan or advance or an  Instalment thereof  to make an application not merely for sale of mortgaged property but even for transferring the management  of  the  industrial  concern  to  the  Financial

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Corporation or  merely injunct  the industrial  concern from transferring  or   removing  its   machinery  or   plant  or equivalent from  the premises  of the  concern  without  the permission of  the Board.  An application  for  transfer  of management of  the industrial concern could by no stretch of imagination, be  said to  be an application for repayment of the loan  though Mr.  Patel did  say that the management can only  be   retained  till   such  time  as  the  Corporation reimburses itself. Further, if an application under s. 31(1) is merely  for  an  injunction  restraining  the  industrial concern from transferring or removing its machinery or plant or equipment with- 380 out the  permission of  the Board,  it could hardly, or even remotely. be  said that such a relief substantively provides for repayment  of the  loan or  it is a relief to prevent an anticipatory loss.  Let it he recalled at this stage that if the Court-fees  Act is  a taxing statute its provisions have to be  construed strictly  in favour of the subject litigant (vide State  of Maharashtra  v. Mishrilal  Tarachand Lodha & ors.,) In  a taxing  statute the  strict legal  position  as disclosed  by   the  form  and  not  the  substance  of  the transaction is  determinative of  its taxability (vide Joint Commercial Tax  Officer, Harbour  Div. II,  Madras v.  Young Men’s Indian  Association (Regd.),  Madras & ors. If it is a fee, the  enormity of the exaction will be more difficult to sustain.  While   we  do  not  pronounce,  we  indicate  the implication of the High Court’s untenable view.      What then  is the nature of proceedings contemplated by s. 31(1)  if it  is not a suit by the mortgagee for recovery of mortgage  money by sale of mortgaged property. Section 31 would to  some extent provide a clue to this question. On an application under  s. 31(1) being made it is obligatory upon the Court  to make  an interim  order attaching the security with  or   without  interim   injunction   restraining   the industrial concern  from transferring or removing its plant. machinery or  equipment without  the permission of the Board of the Corporation. If the relief claimed in the application is transfer  of the  management of the industrial concern to the Corporation  it is  obligatory upon  the Distt. Judge to grant an  ad interim  injunction restraining  the industrial concern from  transferring or  removing its machinery, plant or  equipment.  In  either  event  a  notice  notifying  the industrial concern to show cause why the order should not be made absolute  is required  to be served upon the industrial concern.      It was  said that  if cause  is shown by the industrial concern  it   is  obligatory   upon  the   Distt.  Judge  to investigate  the  claim  of  the  Financial  Corporation  in accordance with the provision contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in so far as such provisions may be applied thereto. The  contention is  that once an industrial concern shows cause  and contests the application of the Corporation there arises  a lis  between the parties which would include the investigation  of the  monetary claim of the Corporation and per  se it would be a suit between the mortgagee and the mortgagor in  which the ultimate relief is sale of mortgaged property for  repayment of the mortgage money. Sub-s. (6) of s. 32  of the  Act has to be read in the context in which it is placed.  The claim of the Corporation is not the monetary claim to be investigated though it may become necessary to 381 specify the  figure for  the purpose of determining how much of the security should be sold. But the investigation of the claim does  not involve  all the  contentions  that  can  be

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raised in a suit. The claim of the Corporation is that there is a  breach of  agreement or default in making repayment of loan or  advance or  instalment thereof  and, therefore, the mortgaged property  should be sold. It is not a money claim. The contest  can  be  that  the  jurisdictional  fact  which enables the  Corporation to  seek  the  relief  of  sale  of property is  not available  to it or no case is made out for transfer of management of the industrial concern. Sub-s. (7) of  s.  32  prescribes  what  reliefs  can  be  given  after investigation under sub-s. (6) is made, and it clearly gives a clue to the nature of contest under Sub-s. (6). Sub-s. (8) of s.  32 only  prescribes the mode and method for executing the order  of attachment  or sale of property as provided in the Code  of Civil Procedure. Sub-ss. (6), (7) and (8) of s. 32 read together would give an opportunity to the industrial concern to  appear and  satisfy the  District Judge what the situation envisaged  by s.  31(13 has  not  arisen  and  the relief should  not be granted. In the absence of a provision giving such  an opportunity  to the  industrial  concern  to whose detriment  the order is required to be made, a serious question may  arise about the constitutional validity of the procedure prescribed  under s. 31(1) inasmuch as it would be violative of principles of natural justice and that too in a proceeding in  a Court  of Law.  The provision  contained in sub-s. (6)  does not  expand the  contest in the application made under  s. 31(1)  as to  render the  application to be a suit between  a mortgagee,  and the  mortgagor for  sale  of mortgaged property.  If that  were so, the Corporation would not be limited to specified reliefs only and if the contract permits  it  may  seek  to  enforce  personal  liability  of mortgage which  it cannot  enforce in  an application  under Sec. 31  ( 1). It may be, as contended by Mr. Patel, that in the ultimate  analysis the result would be that the property will be  sold for  repayment of the loan or advance taken by the, industrial  concern from  the Corporation  but it could not be  said that  it is a substantive relief claimed by the Corporation which can be valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of  monetary loss  as envisaged  by Article  7 of Schedule I  of Court-fees  Act. The substantive relief in an application  under   s.  31(1)   is  something  akin  to  an application for  attachment of  property in  execution of  a decree at a stage posterior to the passing of the decree. We are unable  to appreciate  the view  taken by the High Court that the  proceeding is  not in the nature of execution of a decree because  the question  of enforcement of the order of attachment or  sale would  only arise after the same is made absolute under  Sub-s. (7).  One has  to look  at the  whole conspectus of provisions in s. 32 coupled with the nature of relief sought under s. 31(1) 382 and it  becomes clear  that special  provision is  made  for certain  types   of  reliefs  that  can  be  obtained  by  a Corporation by an application under s. 31(1) which could not be styled  as substantive  relief for  repayment of mortgage money by  sale of  mortgaged property. Nor can it be said to be a  proceeding to  obtain substantive  relief  capable  of being valued  in terms  of monetary  gain or  prevention  of monetary loss.  The form  of the  application, the nature of the relief,  the  compulsion  to  make  interim  order,  the limited enquiry  contemplated by  Sub-s. 6  of s. 32 and the nature of  relief that  can be  granted and  the  manner  of execution clearly  show that  the application under s. 31(1) is neither a plaint as contemplated by Article 1 of Schedule I nor an application in a nature of a plaint as contemplated by Article 7 of Schedule I of Court-fees Act.

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    Once Article  7 of  Schedule I of the Court-fees Act is excluded there  was  (and  could  be)  no  dispute  that  an application under  s. 31(1)  of the  Act would be covered by the residuary  Article l(c) of Schedule II of the Court-fees Act and  it should  bear a  fixed court fee in the sum of 65 paise. Therefore,  the High  Court was  clearly in  error in holding that  the application  should bear  ad valorem court fee.      When  dealing   with  a  question  of  court  fee,  the perspective should  be informed  by the  spirit of the magna carta and  of equal  access to justice which suggests that a heavy price  tag on  relief in  Court should  be regarded as unpalatable.      In this  view of  the matter this appeal is allowed and the order  made by the High Court as well as the orders made by the  various District  Judges except  the District Judge, Broach, are  set aside.  On the question of costs, we looked at  the  specimen  applications  filed  by  the  Corporation disclosing a  clear lack  of  wisdom  on  the  part  of  the Corporation in  asking for a decree for certain amount which could not be granted under s. 31 (1). Therefore, there was a misconception on  either side and the proper order should be that the parties shall bear their own costs. S.R.                                         Appeal allowed. 383