27 August 1999
Supreme Court
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GRAPHITE INDIA LTD. Vs DURGAPUR PROJECTS LTD.

Bench: M.B.SHAH,D.P.WADHWA
Case number: C.A. No.-004750-004752 / 1999
Diary number: 12475 / 1998


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PETITIONER: GRAPHITE INDIA LTD. AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DURGAPUR PROJECTS LTD. AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       27/08/1999

BENCH: M.B.Shah, D.P.Wadhwa

JUDGMENT:

D.P. Wadhwa, J.

       Leave granted.

     The  appellant  Graphite India Ltd.   (’Graphite’  for short)  was getting electricity supply for its project  from respondent  Durgapur  Projects  Ltd.    (’DPL’  for  short). Graphite  challenged the increase in tariff by filing  three successive  writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court.   The learned  single  Judge  of the High Court allowed  the  writ petitions  holding  that the enhancement of tariff  and  the notices  of  enhancement  issued  by  DPL  for  fixation  of electricity  tariff  were  contrary  to  the  provisions  of Section  57  of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948  (’Supply Act’  for  short)  read with the statutory  requirements  of Schedule  VI  of  that Act.  Against that  judgment  of  the learned single Judge DPL filed an appeal before the Division Bench  of  the High Court which was allowed by the  impugned judgment  dated  June  3,  1998.  Writ  petitions  filed  by Graphite  were  dismissed.  Aggrieved Graphite has  come  to this Court.

     Facts  are  not  much  in dispute.   DPL  was  granted sanction  by the State of West Bengal under Section 28(1) of the  Indian  Electricity  Act, 1910 (’Electricity  Act’  for short)  by  order  dated August 28, 1964 to  engage  in  the business  of  supplying energy to the public  in  accordance with  the conditions specified therein.  Conditions 5, 6 and 9 are relevant and are as under:-

     "NOW  THEREFORE, in exercise of the power concerned by sub-section (1) of section 28 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910  (Act  9  of 1910), the Government  is  pleased,  after consulting the West Bengal State Electricity Board, and with the  consent of the local authorities concerned namely,  the Faridpur  Union Board, Durgapur Union Board, Gopalpur  Union Board  and  Jomua  Union Board, to give  the  said  Durgapur Projects   Limited   (hereafter    referred    to   as   the sanction-holder),  sanction  to  engage in the  business  of supplying  energy  within  the  said area,  subject  to  the following conditions:-

     5)  that  the  provisions of section 11,  section  17, section 18 sub-section (1) and (4) of section 21, section 24 and section 26 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Act 9 of

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1910)  and  the provisions of the Indian Electricity  Rules, 1956,  shall  apply  as  if   the  sanction-  holders   were licensees;

     6)  that the rates per unit for supply of energy shall be  fixed and adjusted from time to time in conformity  with the  provisions  laid  down  to the Sixth  Schedule  to  the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, and with the approval of the State Government;

     9)  that the sanction hereby given shall be liable  to be rescinded or revoked in case the sanction-holders fail to supply  energy  efficiently  and satisfactorily or  fail  to comply  with any of the conditions on which this sanction is granted;"

     DPL entered into agreement with Graphite for supply of energy  to it which agreement was renewed from time to time, the  last  on record being effective from January 21,  1984. Clause  30  of  the Agreement is relevant for  our  purpose, which is as under:-

     "30.   This  agreement shall be read and construed  as subject  in  all  respects to the provisions of  the  Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and  of the Rules for the time being in force thereunder, so far as the same respectively may be applicable."

     On  February 9, 1991 DPL wrote to the State Government to  accord  the  necessary approval to the revision  in  the rates  and  charges,  details  of which were  given  in  the statement  annexed  with the letter for supply of  power  to certain  categories  of  consumers w.e.f.   April  8,  1991. However,  to the Graphite a letter was addressed on February 7,  1991  informing  it  of the increase in  the  tariff  to certain  categories  of  consumers w.e.f.   April  8,  1991. Graphite  was  told  that  all  consumption  of  electricity commencing  from  the date of first meter reading  taken  on April  8, 1991 or thereafter shall be charged in  accordance with  the  revised rates and charges in supersession of  the existing  rates and charges.  Graphite fell in the  category (Rate ’A’ for industrial consumers) where increase in tariff was  applicable.  Graphite protested and when DPL threatened to  disconnect  the supply of electricity Graphite  filed  a writ  petition on October 10, 1991 in the High Court.  While the  writ petition was pending DPL again revised its  tariff in  1993  (w.e.f.   November  1,   1993)  and  1995  (w.e.f. February  10, 1995).  This led the Graphite to file two more writ  petitions  in  the   High  Court  challenging  further revision  in  tariff.  All these three writ  petitions  were allowed by a common order of learned Single Judge on October 3, 1997.  As noted above on appeal filed by DPL the Division Bench  of the High Court set aside the order of the  learned single Judge and dismissed the writ petitions.

     In the present appeal filed by Graphite there are four respondents,  namely, (1) Durgapur Projects Ltd., (2)  State of  West Bengal, (3) The Secretary and Controller of Finance and  Accounts, Durgapur Projects Ltd.  and (4) Damodar Vally Corporation.   DPL  and  the State of West  Bengal  are  the contesting respondents.

     Before  we  consider  the  rival  contentions  of  the

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parties  it  may  be  appropriate to set  out  the  relevant provisions  of  the Acts which bear upon the controversy  in the appeal :-

     The Indian Electricity Act, 1910

     Part I

     "2.  Definitions - In this Act, expressions defined in the  Indian  Telegraph  Act,  1885 (13 of 1885)  or  in  the Electricity  (Supply)  Act,  1948  (54 of  1948),  have  the meanings  assigned  to  them in either of  those  Acts,  and unless  there  is  anything  repugnant  in  the  subject  or context, -

     (h) "licensee" means any person licensed under Part II to supply energy;"

     Part II

     "3.  Grant of licenses - (1) The State Government may, on application made in the prescribed form and on payment of the prescribed fee (if any) grant after consulting the State Electricity  Board, a license to any person to supply energy in  any  specified  area,  and also to  lay  down  or  place electric supply-lines for the conveyance and transmission of energy, -

     (a) where the energy to be supplied is to be generated outside  such  area,  from  a  generating  station  situated outside such area to the boundary of such area, or

     (b) where energy is to be conveyed or transmitted from any place in such area to any other place therein, across an intervening area not included therein, across such area.

     (2)  In  respect of every such license and  the  grant thereof the following provisions shall have effect, namely:-

     (a) ........  (b) ........  (c) ........  (d) ........

     (e)  the  grant of a license under this Part  for  any purpose shall not in any way hinder or restrict the grant of license to another person within the same area of supply for a like purpose;

     (f)  the provisions contained in the Schedule shall be deemed  to  be incorporated with and to form part of,  every license  granted under this Part, save in so far as they are expressly  added to, varied or excepted by the license,  and shall,   subject  to  any   such  additions,  variations  or exceptions which the State Government is hereby empowered to make, apply to the undertaking authorised by the license:

     Provided that where a license is granted in accordance with  the  provisions of clause IX of the Schedule  for  the supply  of  energy  to other licensees for  distribution  by them,  then,  in  so  far as such license  relates  to  such supply,  the provisions of clauses IV, V, VI, VII, VIII  and XII  of the Schedule shall not be deemed to be  incorporated with the license."

     Part III

     "28.   Sanction  required by non-licensees in  certain

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cases  - (1) No person, other than a licensee, shall  engage in  the  business of supplying energy to the  public  except with  the  previous sanction of the State Government and  in accordance  with such conditions as the State Government may fix  in this behalf, and any agreement to the contrary shall be void.

     (1A)  The State Government shall not give any sanction under sub-section (1)-

     (a)  except  after  consulting the  State  Electricity Board;  and

     (b) except with the consent -

     (i)  in any case where energy is to be supplied in any area  for  which a local authority is constituted,  of  that local authority;

     (ii) in any case where energy is to be supplied in any area  forming  part of any cantonment, aerodrome,  fortress, arsenal, dockyard or camp or of any building or place in the occupation  of  the Government for defence purposes, of  the Central Government;

     (iii) in any area falling within the area of supply of a licensee, of that licensee:

     Provided   that  except  in  a  case   falling   under sub-clause  (ii), no such consent shall be necessary if  the State  Government  is satisfied that such consent  has  been unreasonably withheld.

     (2) ........."

     The Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948

     "2.  Interpretation

     In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,

     (6)  "licensee" means a person licensed under Part  II of  the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, (9 of 1910) to  supply energy  or a person who has obtained sanction under  section 28 of that Act to engage in the business of supplying energy but  the  provisions  of  section  26 or  26A  of  this  Act notwithstanding,  does not include the Board or a generating company;"

     "57.  Licensee’s charges to consumers

     The  provisions of the Sixth Schedule shall be  deemed to  be  incorporated in the license of every  licensee,  not being a local authority -

     (a)  in  the  case  of a license  granted  before  the commencement  of this Act, from the date of the commencement of the licensee’s next succeeding year of account;  and

     (b)  in  the  case  of a  license  granted  after  the commencement  of this Act, from the date of the commencement of supply,

     and  as from said date, the licensee shall comply with

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the  provisions  of the said schedule accordingly,  and  any provisions  of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of  1910) and  the license granted to him thereunder and of any  other law,  agreement  or  instrument applicable to  the  licensee shall, in relation to the licensee, be void and of no effect in  so  far as they are inconsistent with the provisions  of section 57A and the said Schedule.

     57A.  Rating Committees

     (1)  Where  the provisions of the Sixth  Schedule  are under section 57 deemed to be incorporated in the license of any  licensee, the following provisions shall have effect in relation to the said licensee, namely -

     (a)  the Board or where no Board is constituted  under this Act, the State Government, -

     (i) may, if satisfied, that the licensee has failed to comply  with  any of the provisions of the  Sixth  schedule; and

     (ii)  shall,  when  so requested by  the  licensee  in writing,  constitute  a  rating  committee  to  examine  the licensee’s charges for the supply or electricity and to make recommendations in that behalf to the State Government:"

     SCHEDULE VI

     FINANCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

     "1.   Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (9 of 1910), except sub-section (2) of section  22A,  and  the  provisions  in  the  license  of  a licensee,  the licensee shall so adjust his charges for  the sale  of  electricity whether by enhancing or reducing  them that  his clear profit in any year of account shall not,  as far as possible, exceed the amount of reasonable return:

     PROVIDED  that such charges shall not be enhanced more than once in any year of account:

     PROVIDED FURTHER that the licensee shall not be deemed to  have failed so to adjust his charges if the clear profit in  any  year  of  account has not exceeded  the  amount  of reasonable  return  by  twenty per centum of the  amount  of reasonable return:

     PROVIDED  FURTHER that the licensee shall not  enhance the  charges  for the supply of electricity until after  the expiry  of a notice in writing of not less than sixty  clear days  of  his intention to so enhance the charges, given  by him to the State Government and to the Board:

     PROVIDED  ALSO that if the charges of supply fixed  in pursuance  of  the  recommendations of  a  rating  committee constituted  under section 57A are lower than those notified by  the licensee under and in accordance with the  preceding proviso,  the  licensee  shall refund to the  consumers  the excess amount recovered by him from them:

     PROVIDED  ALSO that nothing in this schedule shall  be deemed to prevent a licensee from levying, with the previous approval of the State Government, minimum charges for supply of electricity for any purpose.

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     1A.   The  notice referred to in the third proviso  to paragraph  I  shall  be accompanied by  such  financial  and technical  date  in support of the proposed  enhancement  of charges  the as State Government may, by general or  special order, specify."

     There  are  various clauses in this Schedule  defining capital  base,  clear profit, debenture capital,  intangible assets, ordinary capital, original cost, preference capital, reasonable  return,  standard rate, etc.  all for  adjusting the charges for sale of electricity to match with reasonable return.

     There  is an earlier letter dated August 29, 1986 from State  Government to DPL whereby approval for enhancement of tariff  in  1986 was granted and it was suggested  that  DPL tariff  should  be fixed in the lines of West  Bengal  State Electricity  Board (WBSEB) rates.  This letter we  reproduce as under:-

     "Sir

     I   am   directed  to  refer   to  your   letter   No. COM/Tafiff/1-2025  dated 24.4.86 on the above subject and to say  that the matter was taken up with the Power Deptt.   of this  Govt.   for  concurrence to the enhancement  of  DPL’s tariff  from  1.7.86.  The Deptt.  has since suggested  that for  the sake of uniformity DPL’s tariff should be fixed  in the  lines  of  WBSEB’s rates which have been  revised  from July,   1986.    Power   Deptt.’s    original   letter   No. 404-Power/III   dated  22.5.86  to   the  Secretary,   WBSEB containing  the revised tariff rates of WBSEB has been  made over  to you which may be returned along with the reply.  An extract  of  the  Power  Deptt’s  note  in  this  regard  is enclosed.  I am now to request you kindly to let this Deptt. have  your  views as to whether the proposed  revision  will meet the requirement of DPL."

     Mr.   Dipankar Gupta, learned counsel for the Graphite made the following submissions:-

     1.   DPL is a sanction-holder under Section 28 of  the Electricity  Act.   DPL is thus permitted to engage  in  the business  of  supplying energy to the public "in  accordance with such conditions as the State Government may fix in this behalf".   Reference may be made to condition No.  6 imposed by  the  State Government granting sanction to DPL by  order dated August 28, 1964.  Rates of electricity have thus to be fixed  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the  Sixth Schedule  to  the  Supply Act and with the approval  of  the State   Government.    DPL  in   revising  the  tariff   has contravened condition No.  6.

     2.   Language of Sixth Schedule to Supply Act casts an obligation  upon  the "licensee" to adjust his charges in  a particular  manner  but  shall  not "exceed  the  amount  of reasonable    return".      "Licensee"      would    include sanction-holder  in view of the definition given in  Section 2(6)  of the Supply Act.  Alternatively, even otherwise  the Sixth  Schedule  of  the Supply Act is incorporated  in  the "license  of every licensee" by virtue of Section 57 of that Act   and  since  the   definition  "licensee"  includes   a

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sanction-holder the phrase "license of every licensee" would make  the  terms  and  conditions   of  the  Sixth  Schedule applicable  to sanction as well.  Compliance with the  Sixth Schedule  is  thus  by  force of law an  obligation  of  the sanction-holder.   Sixth  Schedule has been devised to be  a financial  discipline  of  the  supplier  of  energy  and  a protective  provision for the consumer.  A consumer  whether falling   within   the  area  of  a  "licensee"  or   of   a sanction-holder   should  not  be   exposed   to   different considerations  so far as tariff fixation is concerned.   It is the obligation of the sanction-holder before revising the tariff  to comply with the provisions of the Sixth  Schedule and to obtain approval of the State Government.

     3.   60  days  clear notice to  the  State  Government before  tariff  revision  is effected, is  mandatory.   This provision,  which  is  conceived  for  the  benefit  of  the consumer  and  in  the public interest, has to  be  held  as mandatory  and cannot be waived.  This provision is not  for the  "benefit" of the State Government.  It is to enable the State  Government  to examine the issue of tariff  revision. State  Government can complete its examination in a  shorter period  than 60 days and grant approval but it cannot  waive that  notice  can  be  for  a  period  less  than  60  days. Admittedly  while effecting first revision in tariff 60 days notice  was  not given to the State Government.  A  question also  arises  whether  there was any approval of  the  State Government  to  the proposed increase sought by  the  notice dated February 9, 1991.

     4.   Communication of the State Government dated April 27,  1992  though  it grants approval to the  increase  with effect  from April 8, 1991 is of no effect.  Approval  could not  be  given  retrospectively more than a year  after  the increase.   This  letter dated April 27, 1992 of  the  State Government  merely  states  that rate  ’A’  (for  industrial consumer)  had already been increased with effect from April 8, 1991 and the approval was with regard to other categories which  had  been left out during April 8, 1991  revision  of tariff.   There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  State Government  ever applied its mind to the revision  effective from  April 8, 1991 and granted its approval.  Letter  dated April  27, 1992 is not an approval of the increase in tariff with  effect from April 8, 1991.  In any case DPL could  not have  effected tariff revision without prior approval  which came only on April 27, 1992.

     5.   When  DPL  wrote letter dated  February  9,  1991 seeking approval of the State Government the only reason for the revision indicated was that there was a direction of the State  Government that DPL’s power tariff should be fixed in the  line with WBSEB for the purpose of uniformity.  This is an  extraneous consideration and contrary to requirements of Sixth  Schedule of the Supply Act.  Sixth Schedule  provides certain accounting procedure, which, on the face of it, must relate  to  the individual supply company whose tariffs  are under consideration.  The accounting inputs can never be the same  for two suppliers.  Since the relevant conditions have been  ignored and extraneous considerations have been relied upon  the tariff revision with effect from April 8, 1991  is vitiated.

     6.   The  word "shall" in the third proviso  to  Sixth Schedule  is mandatory and it is wrong to contend that it is not  mandatory  and the mere use of the word "shall" is  not

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decisive factor in deciding whether a provision is mandatory or  directory.   The  provisions   contained  in  the  Sixth Schedule  are  for  the  benefit of the  consumers  and  the Government  is  to act as a watch dog for their  benefit  in order  to  ensure  that the enhancement of  tariff  is  made within the parameters as laid down in the Sixth Schedule and that  it  is not framed in a manner which is  arbitrary  and unreasonable.   Provisions  contained in Sixth Schedule  are made  for  public  good and cannot be waived by  the  person proceeded against.  It has been held that in case of failure to  observe  procedural  provision  which  is  of  mandatory character  it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in  public  interest.   In  these  circumstances  the  third proviso to Sixth Schedule is a provision of mandatory nature and the State Government cannot waive the requirement of the notice.   It has been rightly observed by the learned single Judge  that  the  notice dated April 9, 1991 by DPL  to  the State Government is also not in conformity with para (1A) of the  Sixth  Schedule.   Reliance  has  been  placed  to  two decisions  of this Court in State Bank of Patiala and others vs.   S.K.  Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364) and Rajendra Singh vs. State of M.P.  (1996 (5) SCC 460).

     7.   Object of Section 57 of the Sixth Schedule is  to protect  the consumer from arbitrary enhancement of rate for supply  of  electricity.   Reliance  has been  placed  on  a decision  of this Court in Poona Electric Supply Co.   Ltd., Bombay  vs.   Commissioner  of Income-tax,  Bombay  City  I, Bombay  (AIR 1966 SC 30).  Any objection to the legality  of the price and rate fixation is not beyond challenge as court is  always  entitled to go into the question  and  ascertain whether  the  price  or  rate  fixation  is  valid  or  not. Reference  has been made to a decision of this Court in Shri Malaprabha  Coop.   Sugar Factory Ltd.  vs.  Union of  India and  another  (1994 (1) SCC 648), which was a case of  price fixation under the Essential Commodity Act.

     All  these  objections  have been to the  revision  in tariff  in 1991.  In respect of tariff revisions in 1993 and 1995  Mr.   Gupta  submitted  that  though  for  both  these enhancement  and  revision notices were given by DPL to  the State  Government and approval obtained, the enhancement was ex-facie  illegal  and  without jurisdiction  and  arbitrary inasmuch  as  revision  was  not   in  accordance  with  the provisions  contained  in the Sixth Schedule to  the  Supply Act.   He  said there has been no consideration of  relevant material   and   reliance  was    placed   upon   extraneous considerations as in the case of first revision in 1991.  He said  second  and  third  revisions in  1993  and  1995  are consequently also vitiated.

     Mr.  A.K.  Mitra, learned counsel appearing for DPL in reply  referred  to a decision of this Court in  U.P.   Avas Evam  Vikas Parishad and another vs.  Friends Coop.  Housing Society  Ltd.  and another (1995 Supp.  (3) SCC 456).   This he  said was an authority for the proposition that  approval subsequently given can date back to the date of the request. He  also  said that in the first writ petition there was  no challenge   to  the  tariff  revision   on  the  ground   of non-application  of  mind and it was only when  the  counter affidavit  of  the State Government dated January  10,  1992 mentioned  that  the approval had not been given  that  this ground  of  non-  application of mind was  advanced  in  two subsequent writ petitions.

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     Mr.   V.R.   Reddy,  appearing for the State  of  West Bengal supported the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of  the High Court.  His submissions are summarised as under :-

     1.   DPL  is a wholly owned Government company of  the State  of  West Bengal.  It has been granted sanction  under Section  28  of the Electricity Act.  DPL is not  a  license holder under clause (h) of Section 2 of Electricity Act.  It has  no licence under Part II of that Act.  Section 28 under which sanction has been accorded to DPL falls under Part III of  the Act which applies to non-licensees.  Although  under Section  2(6)  of the Supply Act DPL becomes a licensee  for the  purpose  of said Act but that Act does not  define  the term  "license"  nor does it prescribe that  sanction  under Section  28  of  the  Electricity Act shall  be  treated  as license.   Definition  of the "license" as given in  Section 2(6)  of the Supply Act has to be read as such unless  there is  anything repugnant in the subject or context.  By virtue of   Section  57  of  the   Supply  Act  Sixth  Schedule  is incorporated in the license of a licensee.  Since DPL is not a  holder of license the question of incorporation into  the license  of  Sixth Schedule does not arise.   Provisions  of Section  57  and  the  Sixth  Schedule do  not  apply  to  a sanction-holder  under  Section 28 of the  Electricity  Act. These will not, therefore, apply to DPL.

     2.   Clause (5) of the sanction order dated August 28, 1964  incorporates  certain sections of the Electricity  Act and  Indian Electricity Rules, 1956 to the  sanction-holders as if they were licensees.  Section 57 of the Supply Act and the  Sixth Schedule thereto are not even made applicable  to DPL.  However, clause (6) of the sanction order directs that DPL shall fix the tariff on the principles enumerated in the Sixth  Schedule.  Applicability of Sixth Schedule is not  by virtue  of  any statute but is contractual.  Sanction  order itself provides for consequences of breach of the provisions contained  in the Sixth Schedule.  Notice which was given to the  State Government for tariff revision in 1991 was  short by two days.  Notices are to be given by the licensee to the State  Government  and  to the Board under  Sixth  Schedule. Revision of tariff becomes automatically effective on expiry of  60 days.  There is no provision for subsequent refund of excess  if  the  Rating  Committee  reduces  the  tariff  as proposed  by licensee.  Fourth proviso of the Sixth Schedule giving  60  days  notice is procedural  and  not  mandatory. State Government accepted the short notice without objection and  waived the shortness of two days.  It gave its approval to  the first revision though retrospectively.  Consumer has no right to object that notice is short.  It is a matter for the  State  Government.   The period of notice  is  for  the benefit  of State Government and the Board.  60 days  notice is not a condition precedent for revision of tariff becoming effective.   Short  term  notice  does  not  invalidate  the revision.   60  days notice was given to  Graphite.   Tariff revision  was  not  effected before the expiry  of  60  days period.   That  provision  for notice is directory  and  not mandatory  and  that substantial compliance would be  enough and  further mandatory provisions can be waived by the party concerned.   Reference was made to a decision of this  Court in  State Bank of Patiala and others vs.  S.K.  Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364).

     3.   Under  the sanction order dated August  28,  1964

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prior  approval of the State Government is not required  for tariff  revision.   The  expression of the approval  of  the State  Government as appearing in clause (6) of the sanction order  does  not mean that approval should be  taken  before hand.    There  is  difference   between   the   expressions "approval"  and  "permission" as held by this Court in  U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Anr.  vs.  Friends Coop.  Housing Society  Ltd.  & Anr.  [1995 Suppl.  (3) SCC 456].  In  that case this Court construed the expression "with the approval" and  held that once approval is given, all the previous acts done  or  action taken in anticipation of the  approval  get validated.

     4.   Under  the  Sixth Schedule of the Supply  Act  no approval  of  the  State  Government is  necessary  at  all. Approval  of  the  first  revision   granted  by  the  State Government  may  be at a subsequent stage but that  ratified all  actions  taken  by  the DPL  in  contemplation  of  the approval.

     5.   Letter  of the State Government dated August  29, 1986  contains  guidelines of the State Government that  for uniformity  DPL’s  tariff  should be fixed in  the  line  of tariff  of  WBSEB.   There  is no  allegation  that  DPL  is exceeding  tariff rate of the WBSEB or that DPL is making  a clear profit in excess of 20% of the reasonable profit.  DPL has been regularly suffering losses since 1989.  It has been pointed  out in the affidavit of DPL in the High Court filed in  opposition in the second writ petition that DPL has been meeting  losses  and  there has been no denial of  the  said factual statements.  Relevant considerations were taken into account and this has been explained in the counter affidavit filed by DPL.

     6.   State Government has power to amend or add to the conditions of sanction order.

     7.    Consideration  of  WBSEB’s   tafiff  is  not  an extraneous  matter.   WBSEB  is  the main  supplier  of  the electricity  in  the  State  of  West  Bengal.   It  is  the undertaking  of  the State Government.  Tariff of  WBSEB  is comparable  unit to decide upon responsibleness of tariff of DPL  as  the  other similar supplier of electricity  in  the State of West Bengal.

     8.    It   is  wrong  to   allege   that   there   was non-application  of  mind  by  the State  in  approving  the tariff.   There is no particulars alleged by the Graphite to show  that  there was non-application of mind by  the  State Government.  That there was application of mind by the State Government  as well as by DPL would appear from the  counter affidavit  of the State Government and from the letter dated April  27,  1992 approving the enhancement of the tariff  by State  Government and by DPL by its letter dated February 9, 1991 and 405th meeting of the Board of Directors of DPL held on  December  13,  1991.   The  very  fact  that  the  State Government  reduced  the  tariff  proposed by  DPL  to  L.T. consumers   showed   application  of   mind  by  the   State Government.

     9.   There  is  no allegation that the tariff  of  DPL exceeds that of WBSEB at the relevant times.  In fact it was less at various times.

     10.  In the second and third writ petitions admittedly

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for  tariff  revision notices were duly served and  approval obtained.  There is no allegation in the writ petitions that on  account of tariff revisions DPL was making clear profits on  electricity  account or more than 20% of the  reasonable return.   Rather fact remains that DPL was suffering  losses on  electricity account during the relevant times.  From the year-wise  losses  of  DPL  it would  appear  that  DPL  was continuously  suffering  losses in the years 1992  to  1996. There  is no denial of the said factual statement.  From the affidavits  filed by the State Government as well as by  DPL it  is  apparent  that the revision of tariff  was  made  in accordance with law.

     11.   Burden of proof that the revision in tariff  was not in accordance with law was on the Graphite, which it has failed  to  discharge [see The Amalgamated  Electricity  Co. Ltd.  vs.  N.S.  Bhathena & Anr.  (1964 (7) SCR 503)].

     12.   Scope  of  judicial review  in  tariff  revision matter  is very limited.  It has been held that fixation  of tariff  is  a matter of legislative policy  [Hindustan  Zinc Ltd.   etc.   etc.   vs.  Andhra Pradesh  State  Electricity Board & Ors.  (1991 (3) SCC 299)].

     Concluding  his  arguments  Mr.  Reddy said  that  the Graphite be directed to pay to DPL the amount of electricity charges  which DPL could not collect due to interim order of injunction  obtained by Graphite in the writ proceedings  in the  High  Court.   These  charges,   he  said,  amount   to Rs.11,02,90,654.83  with  delayed payment surcharge  at  the agreed  rate  as  stipulated in the  existing  agreement  of supply dated January 21, 1984.

     Arguments  have been in somewhat detail but the issues are  not  so  complex.   Broadly   the  contentions  of  the appellants are:  Statutory requirements of Section 57 of the Supply  Act read with Sixth Schedule have not been fulfilled inasmuch  as  relevant  considerations   required  for   the revision in tariff have not been kept in view and extraneous consideration  has  been  taken   into  account.    Relevant consideration is that for revision in tariff there should be reasonable  profit and extraneous consideration is that  the tariff  fixed by WBSEB has been kept in view.  For the first writ petition where revision in tariff was effected in 1991, contentions  are  (a)  60  days   clear  notice,  which   is mandatory,  was not given, (b) there was no approval of  the State  Government before the increase was effected, and  (c) subsequent  approval  at  later  date   cannot  be  of   any consequence.

     Respondents   on   the  other    hand   contend   that applicability  of Sixth Schedule to a sanction-holder  under Section  28 of the Electricity Act is merely contractual and when  approval  is  given  it relates back to  the  date  of increase  in the tariff.  All these points are basic  around which arguments revolve.

     That approval can date back we have been referred to a decision of this Court in U.P.  Avas Evam Vikas Parishan and another  vs.   Friends  Coop.   Housing  Society  Ltd.   and another   (1995  Supp.   (3)  SCC   456).   In   this   case notification  under Section 28 of the U.P.  Avas Evam  Vikas Parishan  Adhiniyam,  1965  was published on June  7,  1982. Immediately  the  appellant had sought for approval  of  the State  Government  through its letter dated July  27,  1982.

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The  Government  approved  the  scheme on  August  24,  1982 (Section  28  is  equivalent  to Section 4(1)  of  the  Land Acquisition   Act,  1890).    Thereafter  declaration  under Section  32 of the Adhibiyam (equivalent to Section 6 of the Land  Acquisition  Act) was published on February 28,  1987. Allahabad  High  Court  in  a writ petition  set  aside  the declaration  holding that since prior approval of the  State Government  was not obtained the notification under  Section 28  and  declaration under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam  were invalid  and  inoperative.  Question before this  Court  was whether  it  would  be  prior  approval  or  approval  given subsequent   to  the  notification   under  Section  28   or declaration  under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam was valid  in law.   This Court observed that if prior approval would have been  a pre-condition for further steps, the Act would  have said so and this not having been done what is material is to obtain  the  approval of the State Government.   This  Court said  that  the reason for this appeared to have  been  that when a scheme has been framed the land suitably required for effective  implementation  of  the scheme  should  alone  be acquired  and  not  in excess in the guise  of  framing  the scheme.   Relying  on  its  two earlier  decisions  in  Life Insurance  Corpn.  of India vs.  Escorts Ltd.  (1986 (1) SCC 264)  and The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Ltd.  vs.   Workmen (AIR 1961 SC 860) this Court held:-

     "This  Court  in Life Insurance Corpn.  of  India  vs. Escorts  Ltd.  considering the distinction between  "special permission" and "general permission", "previous approval" or "prior  approval"  in para 63 held that:  "We are  conscious that  the  word ’prior’ or ’previous’ may be implied if  the contextual  situation  or  the  object  and  design  of  the legislation   demands  it,  we   find  no  such   compelling circumstances  justifying reading any such implication  into Section  29(1)  of  the  Act."  Ordinarily,  the  difference between  approval  and permission is that in the first  case the  action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other  case it does not become effective until permission is obtained.   But permission subsequently granted may validate the  previous  Act.   As to the word ’approval’  in  Section 33(2)(b)  of  the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated  in Lord  Krishna  Textiles  Mills Ltd.  vs.  Workmen  that  the Management  need  not  obtain the  previous  consent  before taking any action.  The requirement that the Management must obtain  approval was distinguished from the requirement that it  must  obtain  permission, of which mention  is  made  in Section 33(1)."

     This  Court  then said that approval envisaged  is  to enable  the  Parishad, the appellant, to proceed further  in implementation  of  the scheme framed.  Unless  approval  is given  by  the Government the scheme may not be  effectively implemented.   This Court then said "nevertheless, once  the approval  is  given, all the previous acts done  or  actions taken  in anticipation of the approval get validated and the publications made under the Act thereby become valid".

     It  would  thus appear that in the present  case  when approval  was granted by the State Government by its  letter dated  April  27,  1992 the approval relates  back  and  the revision  would  be  effective from April 8,  1991.   It  is difficult to accept the argument of Graphite that the letter dated  April 27, 1992 is not an approval of the increase  in tariff  effective from April 8, 1991.  On December 23, 1991,

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DPL  wrote to the State Government on the subject of general revision  in  power tariff by it and referred to its  letter dated February 9, 1991.  It said that the Board of Directors of  DPL at 405th meeting held on December 13, 1991  approved the  proposal for general revision of power tariff of DPL to all  its  consumers.   DPL  sought  approval  of  the  State Government to effect the tariff revision from March 3, 1992. It  also  pointed out that "the company (DPL) should have  a benefit  of  revision in rate of supply to WBSEB as a  whole for  which Government should be moved".  In its letter dated April  27, 1992 to DPL the State Government granted approval for revision of tariff for different categories of consumers and  as regards rate applicable to Graphite the letter  said "as  existing w.e.f.  8.4.91".  We do not think any argument is needed for us not to hold that ex post facto approval was granted  for  tariff  revision  as  regards  the  supply  to Graphite from April 8, 1991.  It is also difficult to accept the argument of the Graphite that unless approval is granted there  cannot  be  any revision in tariff.  It  is  not  the requirement  of law even if Sixth Schedule of Supply Act  is held to be applicable that approval has to be granted within 60  days of the notice given to the State Government.   That revision can certainly become applicable after the expiry of the  period  of  60 days.  If approval is not  granted,  the increased  charges  paid  by the consumer are liable  to  be adjusted/refunded.  In this connection reference may be made to  the  constitution of the Rating Committee under  Section 57A  of the Supply Act.  Under fourth proviso to clause  (1) of  the  Sixth  Schedule it is provided that if  charges  of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations of a Rating Committee are lower than those notified by the licensee, the licensee  shall  refund to the consumers the  excess  amount recovered by him from them.

     Under  Section 28 of the Electricity Act for a  person other than a licensee to engage in the business of supplying energy  to  the  public two conditions  are  required:   (1) sanction  of the State Government and (2) in accordance with such  conditions  as  the State Government may fix  in  that behalf.   State  Government  is not free  to  give  sanction except  (A)  after consulting State Electricity  Board,  (B) with  the  consent of local authority the licensee in  their respective  areas  and  (C)  in case the  energy  is  to  be supplied  in any area forming part of cantonment, aerodrome, etc.   of  the Central Government.  The Central  Government, however,  cannot  withhold  its   consent  unreasonably.   A question  arises  if  the conditions imposed  by  the  State Government   while  granting  sanction   are  statutory   or contractual.

     Supply of electric energy is governed by two statutes, i.e.,  The Electricity Act and the Supply Act.  A license is the  requirement  under the Electricity Act for a person  to supply electric energy in any area.  Supply Act provides for the   rationalization  of  the   production  and  supply  of electricity  and generally for taking measures conducive  to electrical  development.   One  of its main  objects  is  to prevent  such licensees from charging unreasonable rates  to the  detriment of the consumers.  Under Section 57(1) of the Supply  Act  the  provisions of the Sixth Schedule  and  the table appended to the Seventh Schedule thereto are deemed to be  incorporated  in  the license of  every  licensee.   The question involved depends on the provisions of the two Acts. While  the Electricity Act deals with the supply and use  of electrical energy and the rights and obligations of licensee

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and  the  sanction-holder  under Part III of  the  Act,  the Supply  Act deals with the statutory powers and functions of the  Central Electricity Authority, State Electricity Boards and  generating  companies and also provides for  fixing  of charges to the consumers of energy by the licensee.  Section 2(6)  of  the  Supply Act thus defines licensee  to  mean  a person  licensed  under Part II of the Electricity  Act  and also  a person who has obtained sanction under Section 28 of that  Act.  But then the term ’license’ and ’sanction’  have not been defined.  Section 2 also starts with the expression that "in this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject  or  context"  and, therefore, what  licensee  means under  Section  2(6) can be different if there  is  anything repugnant  in  the  subject  or   context.   Had  the   term ’licensee’  defined to mean a person licensed under Part  II of  the Electricity Act to supply energy or a person who had obtained  sanction  under  Section 28 of that  Act  and  the expression   ’license’  and  ’sanction’   to  be   construed accordingly  things would have been much simpler.   However, it is not that whenever the word ’licensee’ has been used in the  Supply  Act it would also include the  sanction-holder. In  this connection we may refer to Section 41 of the Supply Act which provides for use by the State Electricity Board or the  generating  company to use for any of its purposes  any transmission lines or main transmission lines of a licensee. Here  ’licensee’ would certainly mean a person who has  been granted  licensee  under Part II of the Electricity  Act  as well  who has been granted sanction under Section 28 of that Act.   The question which falls for consideration is if  the word  ’licensee’  in  Section  57 of the  Supply  Act  would include a sanction-holder.  This Section provides that Sixth Schedule  shall be deemed to be incorporated in the  license of  every  licensee,  not being a local authority  and  that would be notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of  the  Electricity Act or terms of the license granted  to him  under that Act or under any other law.  Sixth  Schedule of  the  Supply  Act  has thus  over-riding  effect.   Sixth Schedule  uses  the  expression  ’license’  in  its  various clauses.   It  would  be  difficult  for  us  to  hold  that ’license’  would mean ’sanction’ as well.  We have to see in what  context  the  term  ’license’  had  been  used.   When sanction was granted to DPL in the year 1964, much after the coming  into  force of the Supply Act, it  was  specifically mentioned  that  certain provisions of the  Electricity  Act would  apply  (clause  5)  and clause 6  of  the  conditions provided  that the rates for supply of energy shall be fixed and  adjusted  from  time  to time in  conformity  with  the provisions  of the Sixth Schedule to the Supply Act and with the approval of the State Government.  If Sixth Schedule was applicable  to  a  sanction-holder under Section 28  of  the Electricity  Act  there  was  no   occasion  for  the  State Government to mention that rates would be fixed and adjusted in  conformity  with the Sixth Schedule.  Moreover,  when  a licensee  under Part II fixes and adjusts the rates in terms of  the  Sixth  Schedule he is not required  to  obtain  any approval  by  the  State  Government.   Rather  power  under paragraph   (1)   of  the   Sixth  Schedule  would   justify enhancement  of  the rate beyond that fixed earlier  by  the licensee  or by any order of the State Government.  Though a sanction-holder  is bound to seek approval of the rates from the  State  Government  there  is no such  limitation  on  a licensee.   This term would show that conditions imposed  by the  State Government to a sanction-holder under Section  28 of the Electricity Act are contractual in nature and are not statutory.

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     In  The  Amalgamated Electricity Co.  Ltd.  vs.   N.S. Bhathena and another (1964 (7) SCR 503) one of the questions raised  was  the effect of the Supply Act on the maximum  of rates  fixed  by  the Government under Section 3(2)  of  the Electricity  Act  which  could be charged by  the  licensee. This  Court held that under provisions of Sixth Schedule the limit  imposed  by the maximum rates, if any, prescribed  by the State Government has no application and that licensee is free  to adjust the rates in terms of Sixth Schedule.   This Court  further  held that unless it is established that  the rates  charged  by the licensee resulted in a profit  to  it over  the "reasonable return", the licensee would be held to have   adjusted   these  rates  in   conformity   with   the requirements  of the relevant provisions of the Supply  Act. Court observed:-

     "There  is  no presumption that the rate charged by  a licensee  contravenes the statutory prohibition.  It is  for the  party who alleges his right to relief to establish  the facts  upon  which such relief could be obtained.   It  was, therefore,  for  the  plaintiffs to prove  by  facts  placed before  the  court  that  the   rate  charged  offended  the statutory  provision.  This they admittedly failed to do and we,  therefore,  hold  that they were not  entitled  to  the declaration  and  injunction which the learned Judge of  the High Court granted."

     Graphite  has  been  unable to show that  increase  in tariff  by  DPL has contravened the provisions of the  Sixth Schedule

     In  State  Bank of Patiala & Ors.  vs.   S.K.   Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364] this Court observed that even a mandatory requirement  can  be waived by the person concerned if  such requirement  is in his interest and not in public  interest. This is how the court said :

     "In  the case of violation of a procedural  provision, which  is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether  the  provision is conceived in the interest of  the person  proceeded  against or in public interest.  If it  is found  to  be the former, then it must be seen  whether  the delinquent  officer has waived the said requirement,  either expressly  or by his conduct.  If he is found to have waived it,  then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground  of the said violation.  If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or  that the provision could not be waived by him, then  the Court  or  Tribunal  should   make  appropriate   directions (include  the  setting  aside of the order  of  punishment), keeping  in  mind the approach adopted by  the  Constitution bench  in Managing Director, ECIL vs.  B.  Karunakar [(1993) 4  SCC  727].  The ultimate test is always the  same,  viz., test  of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called."

     In  Rajendra Singh vs.  State of M.P.  & Ors.  [(1996) 5  SCC 460] this Court again affirmed that even a  mandatory provision  which  is  in the interest of the  party  can  be waived by the party himself but if it is in public interest, it cannot be waived.

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     A  person  to  whom sanction has  been  granted  under Section  28  of the Electricity Act cannot exercise all  the powers  of  a  licensee under that Act.  The  powers  to  be exercised  by holder of sanction are specifically  mentioned under  the Act.  Reference may be made to Section 29 of  the Electricity  Act.  Under that Act, the local authority  may, by  order in writing, confer and impose upon any person, who has  obtained  the  sanction of the State  Government  under Section 28 to engage in the business of supplying energy, to the  public,  all or any of the powers and liabilities of  a licensee  under Sections 12 to 19, and the provisions of the said sections shall thereupon apply as if such person were a licensee  under  Part II of the Act.  It is, thus,  apparent that  a sanction holder under Section 28 of the  Electricity Act  cannot be equated with a licensee under Part II of that Act.

     Under  Section 57 of the Supply Act the Sixth Schedule is  applicable  to a licensee.  This Schedule has been  made applicable  to  a  sanction holder under the  terms  of  the sanction.  Third proviso to the Sixth Schedule provides that the licensee shall not enhance the charges for the supply of electricity until after the expiry of a notice in writing of not  less  than  sixty  clear days of his  intention  to  so enhance  the  charges, given by him to the State  Government and  to  the State Electricity Board.  In the present  case, when  we  are  considering the applicability  of  the  Sixth Schedule to the sanction holder, it is not the case that any notice was required to be given to the WBSEB.  Why notice is required  to  be given to the State Government can  be  seen from  the  fact  that  the State  Government  or  the  State Electricity  Board  could constitute a rating  committee  to examine the licensee’s charges for the supply of electricity and  to  make  recommendations in that behalf to  the  State Government.     What   are    the    consequences   of   the recommendations  of  the  rating committee find  mention  in Section 57A and in the Sixth Schedule.  There is no question of  any approval to be given by the State Government to  the licensee.  When notice of enhancement of charges is given in the case of sanction holder under the terms of the sanction. approval  of the State Government is required.  We have seen above,   approval   from  the   State  Government   can   be retrospective.  The bar in the proviso is only to the extent that  enhanced  charges  may not be levied  till  after  the expiry  of  sixty days notice to the Government.  It is  not that  the State Government is required to grant its approval within  60  days  period.   As far  as  sanction  holder  is concerned,  requirement of notice and approval by the  State Government   are  not  statutory   conditions.   These   are contractual  and  could  be varied or waived  by  the  State Government.   Conditions  have  been imposed  by  the  State Government  and  not  by virtue of any statute.   It  would, therefore,  appear to us that the requirement of sixty  days notice  to  the State Government is not mandatory.   In  its counter  affidavit dated January 10, 1992 filed in the first writ  petition, the State Government took the stand that the DPL  before  enhancing the tariff with effect from April  8, 1991  did  not  comply  with the  necessary  formalities  as required under the Supply Act read with the Government Order No.4520  (Power)  dated August 28, 1964.  Graphite  was  not informed  of  the  said hike which came  into  force  w.e.f. April  8,  1991.   However, in the  supplementary  affidavit filed  by  the  DPL  subsequently it  was  stated  that  the Government  of  West Bengal by their letter dated April  27, 1992  duly approved the enhancement of tariff w.e.f.   April

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8,  1991.  In the letter dated February 9, 1991 to the State Government,  the  DPL  mentioned that the  tariff  was  last revised  for  all categories of consumers w.e.f.  August  1, 1988  and thereafter the cost of operation of maintenance of power plant has increased considerably.  The revenue derived by the company from the existing tariff has been found to be quite inadequate to absorb spiraling cost and expenses.  The State  Government  is also informed that by its order  dated January  31, 1991, it had approved revision in tariff by the WBSEB  w.e.f.   March  1,  1991 and WBSEB  has  published  a notification in the press announcing revision in their rates and  charges.   It  was further pointed out that  the  State Government  by its letter dated August 29, 1986 had directed the  DPL’s power tariff should be fixed in line with that of the  WBSEB  for  the purpose of uniformity.  In  the  letter seeking  tariff revision for the year 1993-94, details  were given  as  to how revision in tariff has been  necessitated. As  noted  above  Graphite has failed to show as to  how  it could  be  said that charges enhanced by the DPL exceed  the amount  of reasonable return as required under clause (1) of the   Sixth   Schedule.    It  is   certainly   a   relevant consideration for the DPL to fix its tariff in line with the WBSEB for the purpose of uniformity and as Mr.  Reddy put it for  capping  unless  it is shown that tariff  revision  has contravened  the  provisions of the Sixth  Schedule.   State Government  has  not insisted of notice being less  than  60 days.  No prejudice is shown to have been caused to Graphite on the ground that notice period fell short by two days.  In the  circumstances of the case requirement of 60 days notice does not appear to us to be mandatory.

     We  do  not  find merit in these appeals.   These  are dismissed with costs.

     It  has  been pointed out that during the pendency  of the  writ petitions in the High Court, the Graphite has  not been  paying  electricity  charges on the basis  of  revised rates  which was the subject matter of the challenge in  the High  Court.   We  have upheld the validity of  the  revised tariff from April 8, 1991.  Graphite is, therefore, bound to pay  the  differential amount with such charges for  delayed payment as per agreement dated January 21, 1984.  Respondent Durgapur Projects Ltd.  has pointed out that on that account an  amount  of  Rs.11,02,90,654.83   with  delayed   payment surcharge  at  the  agreed rate as per clause  (23)  of  the agreement dated January 21, 1984 is due from Graphite to it. If  there is any dispute regarding the amount claimed by the respondent  the  same shall be considered by the High  Court and  for that the party shall move the High Court which  may pass  appropriate orders.  The amount which is not  disputed by the Graphite shall be paid by it to the respondent within four weeks with charges for delayed payment.