http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12  

PETITIONER: GRAHAK SANSTHA MANCH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA (Bharucha, J.)

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1994

BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) BENCH: BHARUCHA S.P. (J) SAWANT, P.B. VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1994 AIR 2319            1994 SCC  (4) 192  JT 1994 (3)   474        1994 SCALE  (2)705

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT: A Judgment and an Order respectively delivered by BHARUCHA,  J. (on behalf of venkatachaliah, C.J. and  Verma, J.,  Agarwal, J.and himself )- Writ Petition (C) No. 404  of 1986, President, 196 Association of Allottees of Requisition Premises v. State of Maharashtra  originated  upon a letter written to  the  then Chief  Justice of India. It was treated as a  writ  petition and numbered accordingly. On 21-7- 1986 rule was issued upon the writ petition and it was referred to a five-Judge  Bench for  hearing. Accordingly, it comes to be heard by  us.  The writ  petition,  in  effect, seeks  reconsideration  of  the decision  in  H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra2  which  was decided by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court. 2. While the aforementioned writ petition concerns  premises requisitioned for the purposes of residential use under  the Bombay  Land Requisition act, 1948 (hereinafter called  "the said  Act"),  Writ Petition No. 53 of 1993,  Grahak  Sanstha Manch  and  Ors. v. State of Maharashtra  concerns  premises requisitioned  under  the  said  Act  for  commercial   use. Therein  the petitioners are an association  of  cooperative societies  running  fair  price ration shops  in  Bombay  in premises  requisitioned  under the said Act.   Some  of  its members  are  also petitioners and others  are  respondents. Each of these premises was requisitioned more than 45  years back.   Some  of these cooperative societies have  now  been served  with a notice by the State Government  calling  upon them to vacate the premises on or before 26-12-1992 so  that the  premises  may be derequisitioned.   The  writ  petition prays for a writ of mandamus commanding the State Government not   to  evict  the  petitioners  from  the   requisitioned premises.    In  effect,  this  writ  petition   too   seeks

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 12  

reconsideration of the judgment in H.D. Vora case2. 3.   Both  writ petitions have been heard together  and  may conveniently be disposed of by a common judgment. 4.   In H.D. Vora case2 a flat in a residential building was requisitioned  by  an  order dated 9-4-1951,  by  the  State Government  in  exercise  of  powers  conferred  by  Section 6(4)(a)  of  the  said Act.  The flat  was  allowed  to  the appellant,  H.D. Vora, who was neither a government  servant nor  a homeless person.  The allotment was made  despite  an earlier  refusal  by  the State Government to  do  so.   The ownership  of  the building having changed  hands,  the  new owner  requested the State Government to  derequisition  the flat  on  the  ground that its allotment in  favour  of  the appellant  could  not be said to be for  a  public  purpose. This  not having been done, the owner filed a writ  petition in  the High Court at Bombay challenging the continuance  of the  order  requisitioning the flat on the  ground  that  it could  not survive for such a long period of time.  Upon  an examination  of the material that was placed before  it  the High Court held that there was no material which showed  the public  purpose  for which the order of requisition  of  the flat  was  made and there was no denial on the part  of  the State  Government  of the averment that  the  appellant  was neither  a government servant nor a homeless  person.   This Court,  in appeal, found the High Court’s view  well-founded and held that it was not possible to say on the material  on record  that  the  order of requisition had  been  made  for public purpose.  But it was contended on behalf of the 1  1986 Supp SCC 567: (1987) 2 ATC 501 2    (1984) 2 SCC 337  197 appellant that even if the order of requisition was  invalid as  having  been  made for a purpose  other  than  a  public purpose,  the  owner  of the building was  not  entitled  to challenge  the same after a lapse of over 30 years  and  the writ  petition  ought, therefore, to  have  been  dismissed. This Court said (SCC pp. 340-41, para 6)               "Now if the only ground on which the order  of               requisition   was  challenged  in   the   writ               petition was that it was not made for a public               purpose  and  was therefore void,  perhaps  it               might have been possible to successfully repel               this   ground  of  challenge  by  raising   an               objection that the High Court should not  have               entertained the writ petition challenging               the order of requisition after a lapse of over               30  years.   But we find that  there  is  also               another ground of challenge urged on behalf of               respondent  3  and that is a  very  formidable               ground  to  which  there is  no  answer.   The               argument urged under this ground of  challenge               was  that  an order of requisition is  by  its               very  nature  temporary in  character  and  it               cannot endure for an indefinite period of time               and  the order of requisition in  the  present               case   therefore  ceased  to  be   valid   and               effective after the expiration of a reasonable               period  of time and that it could  not,  under               any  circumstances, continue for a  period  of               about  30 years and hence it was liable to  be               quashed  and  set aside or in  any  event  the               State Government was bound to revoke the  same               and to derequisition the flat. This      contention               has,  in our opinion, great force and must  be               sustained.  There is a basic  and  fundamental

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 12  

             distinction   recognised   by   law    between               requisition and acquisition. The  Constitution               itself in Entry 42 of List III of the  Seventh               Schedule    makes   a   distinction    between               acquisition and requisitioning  of   property.               The  original  Article 31 clause  (2)  of  the               Constitution also recognised this  distinction               between compulsory   acquisition           and               requisitioning of property. The two  concepts,               one ofrequisition and the other of acquisition               are   totally   distinct   and    independent.               Acquisition means the acquiring of the  entire               title  of the expropriated owner whatever  the               nature  and  extent of that title  may  be.The               entire  bundle of rights which was  vested  in               the original holder  passes on acquisition  to               the  acquirer leaving nothing to  the  former.               Vide: Observations   of   Mukherjea,   J.   in               Chiranjit   Lal   case3.   The   concept    of               acquisition  has  an  air  of  permanence  and               finality in that there is transference of  the               title of the original holder to the  acquiring               authority.  But  the  concept  of  requisition               involves merely taking of "domain or          control               over  property  without  acquiring  rights  of               ownership" and must   by its very nature be of               temporary   duration.  If  requisitioning   of               property        could  legitimately   continue               for an indefinite period of time, the         distinction               between requisition and acquisition would tend               to  become blurred, because in that event  for               all practical purposes the right to possession               and   enjoyment   of   the   property    which               constitutes a major constituent element of the               right of ownership would be vested               3     Chiranjit  Lal v. Union of  India,  1950               SCR 869: AIR 1951 SC 41               198               indefinitely without any limitation of time in               the  requisitioning authority and it would  be               possible  for the authority  to  substantially               take  over the property without  acquiring  it               and  paying full market value as  compensation               under  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.  We  do               not  think that the Government can  under  the               guise   of   requisition  continued   for   an               indefinite   period  of  time,  in   substance               acquire the property, because that would be  a               fraud   on   the  power   conferred   on   the               Government.   If the Government wants to  take               over the property for an indefinite period  of               time, the Government must acquire the property               but it cannot use the power of requisition for               achieving that object." This  Court  observed  that the  power  of  requisition  was excercisable  only  for  a public purpose  which  was  of  a transitory  character.  If the public purpose for which  the premises  were  required  was of a  perennial  or  permanent character from the very inception, no order could be  passed requisitioning the premises, where the purpose for which the premises was required was of such a character that from  the very  inception it could never be served  by  requisitioning the  premises  but could be achieved only by  acquiring  the same,  which  would be the case where the purpose was  of  a permanent  character or likely to subsist for an  indefinite

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 12  

period  of time, the Government could acquire  the  premises but it certainly could not requisition the same and continue the  requisitioning indefinitely.  It was also  observed  by this  Court that it was not necessary to decide what  period of time may be regarded as reasonable for the continuance of an   order  of  requisition  in  a  given   case,   because, ultimately,  the  answer to this question  depended  on  the facts and circumstances of each case; but there could be  no doubt that whatever be the public purpose for which an order of  requisition  was made, the period of time for  which  it could be continued could not be an unreasonably long  period such  as  thirty years.  This Court, therefore,  upheld  the view  of the High Court that the order of requisition  could not survive any longer, that the State Government was  bound to revoke it and to derequisition the flat and to take steps to  evict the appellant from it and to hand over its  vacant possession to the owner. 5.   Before we proceed to discuss the provisions of the  Act and submissions of counsel it is convenient to notice  three judgments of this Court concerning the said Act. 6.   In State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji4 the validity of the said  Act  was upheld by a Constitution Bench.   This  Court noted  that at the time the said Act was passed the  housing situation  in Bombay was acute largely due to the influx  of refugees.   The question of public decency,  public  morals, public  health and the temptation to lawlessness and  crime, which such a situation brought in its train, at once  arose; and the public conscience was aroused on the ground of plain humanity.   A race of proprietors in the shape of  rapacious landlords who thrived on the misery of those who could  find no  decent  roof’ over their heads sprang into  being.   The efficiency of the administration was 4 (1955) 1 SCR 777: AIR 1955 SC 41 199 threatened because government servants could not find proper accommodation.  Milder efforts to cope with the evil  proved ineffective.  It was necessary, therefore, for Government to take more drastic steps in the form of the said Act, and  in doing  so  it  had acted for the public  weal.   There  was, consequently, a clear public purpose and an undoubted public benefit. 7.  In Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra5 land owned  by  the respondents  was  requisitioned under the said Act  for  the public  purpose  of  establishing  a  new  village  site  to resettle  flood victims.  The requisition was challenged  on the ground that an order passed for a permanent purpose  was outside the scope of the said Act, which, at that time,  was a temporary Act.  This Court held that the words of  Section 5(1)  of  the  said Act, namely, "any land  for  any  public purpose"  were  sufficiently  wide  to  include  any  public purpose,  whether temporary or otherwise.  To read,  it  was said,  into  the  section  a  limitation  that  the  purpose contemplated by it was only temporary was to confound    the temporary  life  of the statute with the  character  of  the purpose  for which the power thereunder could be  exercised. The life of the power of requisitioning and the purpose  for which it was exercised were two distinct ingredients,  which were not to be confused.  The words "for any public purpose" were  wide enough to include any public purpose and did  not contain  any  restriction  regarding  the  nature  of   that purpose.  They placed no      limitation  on  the  competent authority as to the kind of public purpose necessary for the valid  exercise  of  its  power nor  did  they  confine  the exercise  of  that  power  to  a  purpose  which  was   only temporary.  Except for the limitation that the purpose  must

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 12  

be  a public purpose, no restriction was imposed as  to  the manner  in which the land which was requisitioned was to  be used.   It  could be used for a temporary purpose or  for  a purpose which was   not  temporary.  If  the  requisitioning authority  used  the  land  for  a  purpose  which  was  not temporary,  such  as setting up a new village site  and  for construction  of houses thereon, it was for  the  Government and  those  who  put up the structures  to  contemplate  the possibility of having to return the land to the owner in its original  state,  but that did not mean that the  power  was restricted only to a temporary purpose. 8.  Next, we turn to a judgment subsequent to that  in  H.D. Vora case2. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., who was one of the  two learned Judges who heard H.D. Vora case2, spoke for a  Bench of  three  learned  Judges.   He  said  that  there  was  no contradiction between the decision in the cases of Collector of’ Akola5 and H.D. Vora2.  In the Collector of Akola  case5 no   question  was  raised  as  to  whether  the  order   of requisition  could continue for an indefinite duration.   In H.D.  Vora  case,,  no one contended  that  the  purpose  of housing  homeless persons was not a temporary purpose but  a permanent  purpose and, therefore, the order of  requisition was bad.  The principal argument that was advanced was  that though  the order of requisition was good when made, it  had ceased  to  be  valid and effective  because  it  could  not legitimately be continued for an indefinite length of  time. The order of requisition had been 5 (1068) 1 SCR 401: AIR 1968 SC’ 244 200 allowed to continue for a period of almost 30 years and that is why it was said that the order of requisition had  ceased to be valid and effective and the premises must therefore be derequisitioned.  The Court said :               "It  is no doubt true that  some  observations               have  been made in the judgment in  that  case               with  regard  to the  permanent  or  temporary               character of the purpose for which an order of               requisition  could be made and to that  extent               what  is said in that judgment may have to  be               slightly modified, but the principal  decision               in that case was that an order of  requisition               is  by its very nature temporary in  character               and  cannot  be  allowed to  continue  for  an               indefinite  length  of time, because  then  it               would  tantamount to an order  of  acquisition               and would amount to a fraud on the exercise of               the  power  of requisition,  especially  where               there   is  no  impediment  in   making   the.               acquisition and no effort was made to acquire,               must  be regarded as a correct enunciation  of               the  law  which does not in any  way  conflict               with  what  was  laid  down  in  the  case  of               Collector of Akola v. Ramchandra5." The Court approved the observations of the Nagpur High Court in Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.P.6 which read thus :               "If  the term ’requisition’ has  acquired  any               technical meaning during the two World Wars it               has   been  used  in  the  sense   of   taking               possession of property for the purpose of  the               State or for such purposes as may be specified               in the statute authorizing a public servant to               take  possession  of private  property  for  a               specified  purpose  for a  limited  period  in               contradistinction  to acquisition of  property               by   which   title  to   the   property   gets

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 12  

             transferred  from the individual to the  State               or  to  a public body for  whose  benefit  the               property  is acquired.  In  ’requisition’  the               property  dealt  with is not acquired  by  the               State  but is taken out of the control of  the               owner for the time being for certain specified               purposes.   Even  for  this  limited  purpose,               however,   the  owner  becomes   entitled   to               compensation,  because  ’requisition’  of  the               property  amounts  at  least  to  a  temporary               deprivation of the property." The   Court   observed  that,   normally,   the   expression requisition meant the taking of possession of property for a limited  period in contradistinction to  acquisition.   This popular meaning had to be kept in mind in judging whether in a particular case there had been in fact any abuse of power. Orders   of  requisition  and  acquisition   had   different consequences.   The  two concepts were  different.   In  one title  passed to the acquiring authority and in  the  order, while  title remained with the owner, possession  was  taken over by the requisitioning authority. 9.   Mr   V.M.  Tarkunde,  learned  counsel  for  the   writ petitioners in Writ Petition No. 53 of 1993, submitted  that requisitioning  was resorted to in conditions of  emergency. An ordinance passed in 1947 had preceded the said Act, which had  been passed in the next year.  There had then  been  an acute  shortage  of accommodation in several cities  in  the then Bombay State.  That 6 ILR 1955 Nag 34: AIR 1955 Nag 153 201 Stringency  of  accommodation  had not  diminished  but  had become more acute.  In such a situation the continuation  of requisition  orders could not be held to be bad in law,  nor could the court specify that requisitions could not continue beyond  a particular number of years.  The Constitution  did not  lay  down any maximum period for  which  a  requisition could  continue.   No  provision of  the  Constitution  made invalid  a law of requisitioning under which property  could be  requisitioned for an indefinite period.  The  mere  fact that  requisitioning  for  a long period  might  amount,  in substance,  to acquisition did not impair the validity of  a provision which continued the requisition for an  indefinite period.    H.D.  Vora  case2  was,  therefore,   incorrectly decided.   There  was no reason why the requisition  of  the premises   occupied  by  the  writ  petitioner   cooperative societies  should  not be continued while  they  served  the public purpose of supplying foodgrains and the like at  fair prices under the Public Distribution Scheme and the need for requisitioning  arising out of scarcity of accommodation  in Bombay continued.  The said Act had been extended until  31- 12-1994 and ought to be extended further. 10.  Ms Indira Jaising, learned counsel for the  petitioners in  Writ  Petition  No.  404 of  1986,  contended  that  the provisions for requisitioning of premises under the said Act had  been made to control rents.  The said Act was meant  to cure the mischief of scarcity of accommodation and it  could not be said to be finite in time.  In this behalf  reference was made to certain provisions of the Act to which we  shall presently advert. 11.  Mr  Nariman,  appearing for the writ petitioners  in  a newly-filed,  un admitted writ petition  (being  Maharashtra State   Government  Employees’  Confederation  through   its General  Secretary Shri R.G. Karnik v. State of  Maharashtra through Chief Secretary  to the Government of  Maharashtra7) was  permitted  to  intervene, and  he  submitted  that  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 12  

judgments  in  the cases of Bhanji Munji4 and  Collector  of Akola5 bound the Bench that decided H.D. Vora case2 and that the judgment in H.D. Vora2 was inconsistent therewith. 12.  The principal argument on behalf of the respondents was addressed  by  Mr Soll J. Sorabji, learned counsel  for  the landlords  in  Writ Petition No. 404 of 1986.   He  did  not dispute  that  the purpose of requisitioning could be  of  a permanent  nature.   His submission was that the  period  of requisitioning  could not be permanent.  It was inherent  in the  concept of requisitioning that possession and user  was limited  in duration and he emphasised the judgment  in  the case  of Jiwani Kumar Paraki8.  Mr Sorabji also referred  to the  Tenth  Report  of  the  Law  Commission  of  India   on Acquisition and Requisitioning of Land.  The Law  Commission was  of  the  view  that the  power  of  requisitioning  the property  of a private owner was an extraordinary power  and could  Justifiably be invoked only when an emergency  arose. That  was perhaps the reason why most of the  Requisitioning Acts  were temporary.  The Law Commission  recommended  that the law of requisitioning should be 7    WP (C) No. 27 of 1994 8    Jiwani   Kumar   Paraki  v.  First   Land   Acquisition Collector, (1984) 4 SCC 612 202 embodied  in  a permanent code but should  be  brought  into force  by  a notification only when such action  was  deemed necessary.  It was also recommended that property should not be  kept  under requisition for a period  longer  than  five years.   If  before the expiry of  that  period,  Government thought  it  necessary  to acquire the property  it  was  at liberty to do so; if however, it was decided not to  acquire it  then  it  was not proper for it  to  keep  the  property indefinitely  in its possession.  It was pointed out  by  Mr Sorabji  that  the said Act as also the  Requisitioning  and Acquisition  of  Immovable  Property  Act,  1952,  had  been amended accordingly.  Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for  the State Government adopted, in the main, the submissions of Mr Sorabji." 13.  The  said  Act, as it now stands on the  statute  book, defines  "land"  in Section 4(1) to  include  benefits  that arise  out of land and buildings and all things attached  to the earth or permanently fastened to the buildings or things attached  to the earth.  "Premises" are defined  in  Section 4(3)  to  mean  any building or part of a  building  let  or intended  to  be let.  The expression  "to  requisition"  is defined in Section 4(5) to mean, in relation to any land, to take  possession  of the land or to require the land  to  be placed  at  the disposal of the State  Government.   Section 5(1) empowers the Government to requisition any land for any pubic  purpose by order in writing if in its opinion  it  is necessary or expedient so to do.  The proviso thereto states that  no  building or part thereof wherein  the  owner,  the landlord  or  the tenant, as the case may be,  has  actually resided  for a continuous period of six  months  immediately preceding  the  date of the order  shall  be  requisitioned. Subsection  (2)  of Section 5 requires an  enquiry  in  this behalf  to be made.  Section 6(1) obliges the  landlords  of premises  situated  in  any  area  specified  by  the  State Government  by notification in the Official Gazette to  give intimation  the prescribed form to the State  Government  of any vacancy therein.  Subsection (3) of Section 6  precludes the   landlord,   without  the  permission  of   the   State Government,  from  letting, occupying or  permitting  to  be occupied such premises before giving such intimation and for a period of one month from the date on which the  intimation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 12  

is  given.  Under sub-section (4) the State Government  may, whether or not an intimation tinder subsection (1) has  been given  and notwithstanding anything contained in Section  5, requisition premises for any public purpose and use them  in such  manner  as may appear to it as expedient.   Section  8 provides  for  payment  of compensation  when  any  land  is requisitioned  under the said Act.  It  contemplates,  inter alia,  payment of compensation in a lump sum.   Section  8-B empowers  the  State  Government  to  appoint  a   competent authority  for the purposes of the said Act.  Under  Section 8-C  that  competent authority, if satisfied  after  holding such   inquiry  as  it  deems  fit,  that  an  allottee   of requisitioned land or premises has not paid the due  monthly compensation  or  has Sublet the whole or any  part  thereof without   permission   or   has  committed   any   acts   in contravention  of the terms and conditions of the  allotment or has been in unauthorised occupation thereof or that  some other person is in unauthorised occupation or that such land or  premises are to be released from requisition, may  order the  203 allottee  to  vacate the same.  Section 8-E makes  it  clear that  the allotment of requisitioned land or premises  shall be deemed to be a licence in favour of the allottee for  its use   and  occupation.   Section  9  authorises  the   State Government  to  release  at any time  from  requisition  any requisitioned  land.  Sub-section (1-A) thereof states  that the   State  Government  shall  release  from   requisition, notwithstanding  anything contained in sub-section (1),  any land  requisitioned under the said Act on or  before  31-12- 1994,  and  by reason of sub-section (2) such land  must  be restored, as far as possible, in the same condition in which it  was  when  the State Government was  put  in  possession thereof.   With the other provisions of the Act we  are  not here  concerned.   We  need  only note  that  the  said  Act repealed  the  provisions  of the  Bombay  Land  Requisition Ordinance,  1947  and sub-section (2) of Section  20  stated that, notwithstanding the repeal of the Ordinance, any  land requisitioned  or  continued to be  subject  to  requisition under  the  Ordinance  would  be deemed  to  be  subject  to requisition under the said Act. 14.  When  the said Act was originally enacted  it  provided (Section  3) that it would remain in force up to  31-3-1950. Section  6(4)(b)  of  the said  Act  as  originally  enacted empowered  the  Provincial Government, as it  then  was,  to require  the  landlord  to let  the  premises  to  specified persons or class of persons or in specified  circumstances". The said Act was amended so that Section 3 stood deleted  by Section  2 of Maharashtra Act 51 of 1973.  At the same  time sub-section (1-A) was introduced in Section 9, which obliged the State Government to release land from requisition on the expiry  of a stated period.  That period was  extended  from time  to time by successive amendments and, as the said  Act presently stands, the period expires on 31-12-1994.  Section 6(4)(b)   was  deleted  by  Section  3(2)  of   the   Bombay (Amendment)  Act 5 of 1952 and consequential  amendments  in the proviso to sub-section (4) were made. 15.  The   said  Act  as  originally   enacted,   therefore, empowered  the State Government to require landlords to  let out  premises.  The provisions it that regard were  deleted. It  is,  therefore,  not possible  to  accept  Ms  Jaising’s submission  that the said Act as it stands is  rent  control legislation.   That the said Act as originally  enacted  had contemplated   both  the  requisitioning  of  premises   and compulsory  letting  out thereof indicates  the  legislative

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 12  

intent  that  whereas  letting  out was  intended  to  be  a permanent  arrangement,  requisitioning was intended  to  be only a temporary arrangement.  Emphasis was laid by  counsel for the petitioners upon the fact that Section 9  authorises the State Government to release "land" from requisition  and under the provisions of sub-section (1-A) thereof obliges it to  do  so before the period stated therein.  It  was  urged that  "land" and "premises" were separately defined for  the purposes of the Act so that there was no compulsion upon the State Government to release from requisitioning  "premises". namely,  any building or part of a building let or  intended to  be  let and that, insofar as  premises  were  concerned, requisitioning   was   not  intended  to  be   a   temporary arrangement.   "Land" has been defined to  include  benefits that arise out of land and buildings and all things attached to the earth or permanently 204 fastened  to the buildings or things attached to  the  earth and  "premises" to mean any building or part of  a  building let  or intended to be let.  The definition of land  is,  in our  view,  wide  and clearly includes a  building  or  part thereof let or intended to be let.  Premises would appear to separately  defined only because the said Act as  originally enacted   empowered  the  State  Government  not   only   to requisition premises but also to compel landlords to let out premises.   It  is, therefore, not possible  to  accept  the contention  that  under sub-section (1-A) of Section  9  the State  Government  is not obliged to release  premises  from requisition within the period stated therein. 16.  We  find ourselves in agreement with the view taken  in the  cases of Collector of Akola5 and Jiwani  Kumar  Paraki8 that  the purpose of a requisition order may  be  permanent. But  that is not to say that an order of requisitioning  can be  continued  indefinitely or for a period of  time  longer than  that which is, in the facts and circumstances  of  the particular  case  reasonable.  We note and approve  in  this regard, as did this Court in Jiwani Kumar Paraki case8,  the observations  of  the  Nagpur  High Court  in  the  case  of Mangilal Karwa v. State of M.p.6 which have been  reproduced above  That  the concept of requisitioning is  temporary  is also  indicated  by the Law Commission in its  Tenth  Report and,  as pointed out earlier, by the terms of the  said  Act itself,  as it originally stood and as amended from time  to time  There is no contradiction in concluding that  while  a requisition  order  can  be issued for  a  permanent  public purpose, it cannot be continued indefinitely  Requisitioning might have to be resorted to for a permanent public  purpose to give an example, to tide over the period of time required for  making  permanent  premises  available  for  it.    The concepts  of  acquisition  and  requisition  are  altogether different  as are the consequences that flow  therefrom.   A landlord cannot, in effect and substance, be deprived of his rights  and  title  to  property  without  being  paid   due compensation,   and   this  is  the  effect   of   prolonged requisitioning.  Requisitioning may be continued only for  a reasonable  period; what that period should be would  depend upon  the facts and circumstances of each case and it  would ordinarily, be for the Government to decide. 17.  For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the decision in H.D.  Vora  case2  does not  require  reconsideration.   We, however,  do  not  approve  the  observations  therein  that requisition  orders under the said Act cannot be made for  a permanent purpose.  We make it clear that the said  decision does not lay down, as has been argued, a period of 30  years as  the  outer  limit  for which  a  requisition  order  may

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 12  

continue.   The  period  of 30 years was  mentioned  in  the decision only in the context of the date of the  requisition order there concerned.  An order of requisition can continue for a reasonable period of time and it was held, as we hold, that the continuance of an order of requisition for as  long as 30 years was unreasonable. 18.  The  position in respect of requisitioned  premises  in the State is set out in the affidavit filed on 21-4-1986  by Vasant  J. Patwardhan on behalf of the State  Government  in Writ Petition No. 404 of 1986 thus :  205               "After   requisitioning  the   premises,   the               Government  of Maharashtra has been  allotting               such    requisitioned   premises   to    State               Government      servants/State      Government               Offices/other   category  of   persons/offices               permissible  under the policy  of  Government.               The residential requisitioned premises in  the               State   of  Maharashtra  has  not  only   been               allotted to the State Government servants  but               also  to persons of other categories  such  as               homeless persons.  At present, there are about               2300  requisitioned residential and about  247               non-residential premises in Maharashtra.   Out               of  these about 1928 residential premises  are               in Bombay alone and out of which 1779 premises               were requisitioned in or before 1960 i.e. have               already  been  under requisition for  over  25               years.   In Bombay, about 1404 premises  stand               allotted to government servants and about  276               of   them  are  continued  in  possession   of               government  servants  who have  ceased  to  be               government   servants.   About  497   of   the               residential premises stand allotted to persons               of  other  categories like  victims  of  house               collapse, homeless persons etc." We may add that of these residential premises some are large flats in the best localities of Bombay city. 19.  The  State  Government  cannot,  in  our  opinion,   be compelled to provide     alternate   accommodation  to   the allottees of all the requisitioned premises  and  we  reject the plea of counsel for the petitioners in this behalf.   It is for the State Government to consider the desirability and feasibility of providing alternate accommodation to such  of them as would be in the interests of the administration. 20.  The continuance of requisition orders made in the  late 1940s  and  early  1950s and  thereabouts,  particularly  of residential  premises, have been struck down by  the  Bombay High Court in numerous cases following the judgments in H.D. Vora case2.  There are no appeals there against (except  one which  was, by a separate order of this  Bench,  dismissed). The  allottees  of  these  requisitioned  premises   (except retired government servants allotted premises  requisitioned for  the purpose of housing government servants)  and  their legal  representatives have continued in occupation  thereof by  reason of the interim orders of this Court  passed  from time  to  time  in Writ Petition No. 404  of  1986.   Having regard   to  the  known  difficulty  of  finding   alternate accommodation   in   Bombay  and  other  large   cities   in Maharashtra,  the  protection  of these  interim  orders  is hereby  continued  until  30-11-1994,  on  which  date   all occupants of premises the continued requisition of which has been quashed as aforesaid shall be bound to vacate and  hand over  vacant possession to the State Government so that  the State Government may, on or before 31-12-1994, derequisition

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 11 of 12  

such premises and hand back vacant possession thereof to the landlords. 21.  The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.   There shall be no order as to costs. 206 ORDER SAWANT, J.- I have had the benefit of perusing the draft  of the judgment prepared by Bharucha, J. While I agree with the findings on the questions of law, I am unable to agree  with the  proposed order.  I am of the view that  notwithstanding the legal position, the following directions can be given to mitigate the hardship of the allottees of the  requisitioned premises.   These directions will ’In no way  prejudice  the interests of the landlords of the premises.  At present they are  receiving the same rent from the allottees as from  the other  tenants.  On account of the Rent Act, they  will  not receive more rent from the new tenants whom they may  induct after the premises ire released from requisition.  It is  in rare  cases  that  the premises would  be  required  by  the landlords  for  bona fide personal requirement.   All  that, therefore,  they will be deprived of for some time more,  on account  of  these directions, is the right  to  induct  new tenants  of their choice.  It is a notorious fact that  such choice is, more often than not, exercised in favour of those who  can  offer competing  illegal  consideration,  commonly known as "pugree" which is escalating with passage of time. 23.  I  would, therefore, pass the following order.   There are  two  sets  of  allottees  before  us  :  (a)   Consumer Cooperative  Societies  which are allotted premises  to  run fair price ration shops and (b) individuals who are allotted residential premises. 24.  Those  who  avail of the fair price  ration  shops  are mostly  drawn from the middle and low income  groups.   They are  large  in number.  The  allottee  consumer  cooperative societies among themselves also employ a sizeable number  of employees who will have overnight to face unemployment  when the  shops are required to be vacated and as a  consequence, the  societies  may  have to wind  up.   It  is,  therefore, necessary that the State Government should, for the  benefit of  the  consumers, first, make  suitable  arrangements  for housing  the ration shops in the shops run by others in  the same  localities  where  at  present  the  allottee-consumer cooperative  societies are running their shops, before  they are evicted from the present shops.  Secondly, the  consumer societies  should  have sufficient time to  search  for  new premises and the employees of the societies should also have sufficient time to find out alternative employment.   Hence, the State Government should not derequisition and evict  the consumer  cooperative societies from the  allotted  premises before 31-5-1996. 25.  As   regards   the  allottees  of   the   requisitioned residential premises, they belong to different strata of the society, and the requisitioned premises also differ in size. Most  of the allottees belong to the middle and  low  income groups  "hereinafter referred to as "MIG and LTG") and  they are  identifiable  by the criteria laid down  by  the  State Government  and other authorities for allotting  houses  for such  groups.   The premises in their  occupation  are  also small  in size.  Even among the MIG and LTG, some  may  have secured other residential premises either in their own  name or in the name of their spouses and dependents.  As a result of this decision, it is only those allottees 207 belonging  to  the MIG and LIG who have not  acquired  other premises in the meanwhile, who would be hit hard inasmuch as

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 12 of 12  

they  will be dishoused and thrown on the street with  their families overnight.  The State Government should, therefore, give  preference to such MIG and LIG allottees in  providing residential  accommodation.   It is possible for  the  State Govern  to do so (a) by giving priority in the allotment  of its  own plots of land, (b) by requiring or making  suitable arrangements  with  the  City  and  Industrial   Development Corporation  of  Maharashtra  Ltd.  and  Maharashtra   State Housing Board for giving them priority in the allotments  of plots, and tenements which are either already constructed or are proposed to be constructed by them, (c) by requiring the said organisations to construct tenements specially for such allottees,  or (d) in any other manner the State  Government deems fit.  I understand that the State Housing Board has at present  sufficient  number of residential  premises  (about 6000) available for being allotted on hire-purchase as  well as  on rental basis to the MIG, and LIG.  The  allottees  of the  requisitioned  premises are no more  than  about  3000. Since  for  making the premises available  to  the  eligible among  these  groups sufficient time will be  required,  the State  Government  should not derequisition, and  evict  the said  allottees  from, the present premises  till  they  are offered suitable alternative premises.  The State Government should make such premises available at the latest before 31- 5-1996. 26.  The  other premises may be derequisitioned as  directed in the order proposed by the majority. 27. I dismiss the writ petitions subject to the above order. 208