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PETITIONER: GOVIND SAHAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/04/1968

BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. BENCH: VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAMASWAMI, V. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1968 AIR 1513            1969 SCR  (1) 176  CITATOR INFO :  D          1974 SC 642  (8)

ACT: Contempt  of Court-Suit filed by a political  party  member- Expulsion  of  member  from  party  in  pursuance  of  party resolution-If amounts to contempt of court.

HEADNOTE: The second respondent a member of a political party filed  a suit challenging the election of his opponent to a committee of  the  party.   He also  obtained  an  interim  injunction restraining  his  opponent  from  taking  part  in   certain elections.   The  appellants-office-bearers of’  the  party. issued  letters  expelling the second  respondent  from  the Organisation  in pursuance of an earlier resolution  of  the party  which barred reference of such dispute to law  courts and  provided  for  summary  removal  of  an,,,  member  who initiated  a  suit.  The opponent of the  second  respondent moved  the court for vacating the injunction, in  which  the second appellant filed an affidavit stating the expulsion of the  second  respondent.  The second  respondent  moved  the Munsif  for  taking  proceedings  in  contempt  against  the appellant-,.  which was dismissed.  Thereupon he filed  con- tempt application in the High Court and the High Court  held the  appellants guilty of contempt court.  In  appeal,  this Court : HELD : The appellants were guilty of contempt of court. The  passing  of  the  orders  of  expulsion,  by  the   two appellants -against the second respondent, and the filing of a supporting affidavit, in the suit by the second appellant, clearly  indicated that it was a deliberate attempt, by  the appellants,   to  interfere  with,  instituted   by   second respondent, in the conduct of the litigation, instituted  by him.  It was no answer that the action, by way of  expulsion was taken on the basis of the resolution of the party and to enforce discipline in the Organisation. [181 F-G] Pratap  Singh  v. Gurbaksh Singh [1962] Supp. 2  S.C.R.  838 followed. Webster  v.  Bakewell  Rural  Council,  [1916]  1  Ch.   300 distinguished.

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JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 65  of 1966, Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  20, 1965 of the Allahabad High Court in  Criminal Misc.  Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964. R. K. Garg and S. C.  Agarwal, for the appellants. The respondent did not appear. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by special leave, is  directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High  Court. dated  September 20, 1965, passed in Criminal  Miscellaneous Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964, finding the appellant 177 guilty,   of  having  committed  contempt  of   Court,   and sentencing  each of them, to pay a fine of Rs. 5001-.   They have  also been directed to pay the costs, in  the  contempt proceedings. The  first  appellant  died, during  the  pendency  of  this appeal. As a fine has been imposed, against him, in addition to the liability to pay costs, his widow has been brought on record, as his legal representative, and allowed to continue these proceedings. The circumstances, under which the contempt proceedings came to  be  initiated,  in  the  High  Court,  may  be   briefly indicated.  The second respondent, herein, Sri V. P.  Singh, is an advocate, practising at Azamgarh, and he was a  member of  the  Congress Organisation, at the  material  time.   He stood  for  election,  for  membership  of  the   Prarambhik (primary)  Congress Committee, of Tarwa, in the District  of Azamgarh,  held  on April 10, 1964.  His  opponent  was  one Badri  Singh.  In that election.  Badri Singh .was  declared elected.  The second respondent filed, on April 16, 1964,  a suit,  No.  132 of 1964, in the Court of  the  City  Munsif. Azamgarh,  for having the election of Badri Singh,  declared void    and   inoperative.    He   had    alleged    various irregularities, regarding the conduct of the said  election. Along  with the suit, he had also filed an application,  for injunction,  restraining the District Election Officer,  and other Officers, from holding elections for membership of the District  Congress  Committee.   He had also  asked  for  an injunction, restraining Badri Singh, from taking part in the elections,   for   membership  of  the   District   Congress Committee.    The  City  Munsif  had  granted  the   interim injunction, on April 18, 1964.  Badri Singh, on being served with  this interim order, filed an application, dated  April 21,  1964, before the City Munsif, praying for vacating  the order of interim injunction. At  the time, when the election that was challenged, by  the 2nd  respondent,  took place, Sri Ajit Prasad Jain  was  the President  of  the Uttar Pradesh  Congress  Committee,  Shri Govind Sahai was the General Secretary of the said Committee and Sri Rameshwar Narain Singh was the General Secretary  of the District Congress Committee, Azamgarh.  It appears  that the  Working Committee of the Indian National  Congress  bad passed a resolution. dated December 4/5, 1960, the substance of  which  was that any member of the Congress,  having  any grievance,  in  respect  of any action  taken,  or  decision given, by a Congress Organization. should take advantage  of the tribunals provided, to seek redress by way of appeal  or reference, and that such matters should not be taken to  law Courts.  That resolution further provided that initiating of such  litigation,  and securing of  ex  parte  interlocutory

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orders,   against  the  Congress  Committee   and   Congress authorities. 178 was   highly   detrimental   to  the   discipline   of   the Organisation, and its smooth working.  The resolution  wound up, by saying that the Working, Committee resolved that  any member,  who  instituted a suit or other proceeding  in  law Courts against any Congress Committee or Official, did so at the  risk of being considered guility of gross  indiscipline and  of  being summarily, and without  any  further  notice, removed  from  membership of the Congress, by order  of  the Provincial  Congress  Committees concerned, or  the  Working Committee.   In  view of this resolution,  Sri  Gulzari  Lal Nanda, who is stated to have been delegated the authority of the   Working  Committee,  in  respect   of   organisational elections in Uttar Pradesh, issued a directive, dated  April 20,   1964,  to  the  President,  Uttar   Pradesh   Congress Committee,  Sri Ajit Prasad Jain, to take  immediate  action against those members, who had gone to Courts, in regard  to Congress   organisational  elections,  anywhere   in   Uttar Pradesh.  Accordingly, Sri Jain, on April 21, 1964, sent out circular  letters to all the District Returning Officers  in Uttar Pradesh, expelling those Congressmen, from  membership of the Congress, who had filed suits, in Courts,  concerning organizational   elections.   Sri  Govind  Sahai   and   Sri Rameshwar  Narain Singh, the appellants herein,  also  sent, each  of them, a letter to the District  Returning  Officer, expelling the second respondent, and removing his name, from the membership of the Congress.  This decision was duly com- municated, to the second respondent. To resume the narrative, regarding the proceedings, connect- ed   with  the  suit,  the  application  for  vacating   the injunction, filed by Badri Singh, came up for final hearing, before  the City Munsif, on April 25, 1964, when the  second appellant, filed an affidavit, mentioning the fact that  the second  respondent,  herein, who was the  plaintiff  in  the suit, had been expelled, from the Congress Organisation.  In view  of the fact that the very foundation,  for  initiating action,  vanished, the City Munsif dismissed the  injunction application,  on  April  27, 1964, on the  ground  that  the second  respondent  was no longer a member of  the  Congress Organisation.   The second respondent moved an  application, before  the  City  Munsif,  on  May  9,  1964,  for   taking proceedings in contempt, against the appellant and Sri  Ajit Prasad  Jain, but that application was dismissed on May  30, 1964,  on  the ground that the present appellants  were  not parties  to the suit.  The second respondent filed  Criminal Miscellaneous  Contempt Application No. 76 of 1964,  in  the High  Court.   After setting out  the  circumstances,  under which he filed the suit, and the order of expulsion,  passed against  him, the second respondent alleged that the act  of the  appellants,  along  with Sri  Ajit  Prasad  -Jain,  had directly  interfered with the normal course of  justice,  by hampering the progress of the suit. 179 Sri  Ajit  Prasad Jain, and the  appellants,  filed  written statements,  containing identical pleas.   Their  contention was  that the second respondent was bound by the  rules  and regulations, of the Indian National Congress, and that  they had  full  right and justification, for expelling  him,  and removing  his  name, from the membership  of  the  Congress. That   action,   expelling  the  second   respondent,   they contended, had been taken on the strength of the  resolution of  the  Congress Working Committee,  referred  to  earlier. They  had further contended that their object, in  enforcing

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the Circular, dated December 4/5, 1950, was only to  enforce discipline  in the Congress, and not with a view  to  render the second respondent’s suit infructuous, or interfere  with the Court’s proceedings.  They ultimately pleaded that  none of them were guility of any contempt of Court. So  far  as Sri Ajit Prasad Jain is concerned,  it  is  seen that.  after filing his written statement, he was  appointed Governor  of Kerala.  The High Court, in view of  Art.  361, clauses (2) and (3), held that the proceedings could not  be continued against that party, and hence discharged the rule. Regarding  the  appellants, the High Court held  that  their conduct   directly  tended  to  interfere  with   the   suit proceedings,  pending  in  Court, initiated  by  the  second respondent, and, as such, amounted to contempt of Court,  of the  City  Munsif, Azamgarh.  In view of the  fact  that  no expression  of  regret  was made, by them,  the  High  Court sentenced each of the appellants, to pay a fine of Rs. 5001- and  also  pay costs of the State,, as well  as  the  second respondent, herein. Mr.  R. K. Garg, learned counsel for the  appellants,  urged that  the  second respondent was a member  of  the  Congress Organisation, and he was bound by the Resolutions, passed by the same.  The appellants had only acted, in accordance with the  directions,  given by the appropriate officers  of  the Congress  organisation,  and  they were bound  to  obey  the instructions,  given  to them.  When, in the course  of  the discharge of their duties, they had been directed to enforce the  resolution, of the Congress dated December  415,  1950, they issued the Circulars, expelling the second  respondent, from  the Congress.  Their object, in expelling  the  second respondent, was not in any manner intended to interfere with the proceedings, pending in the suit.  The fact that the injunction application was dismissed,  because it  became  infructuous,  by the  second  respondent  having ceased  to  be a member of the  Congress  Organisation,  was certainly not a circumstance which could be put against  the appellants,   in  the  matter  of  issuing   the   circular, concerned. There has been no appearance, on behalf of the  respondents. After giving due consideration, to the contentious, urged by the 180 learned  counsel, for the appellants, we are satisfied  that the High  Court  has  rightly found  the  appellants  guilty  of contempt of Court. The  original  first appellant, Sri Govind  Sahai,  and  the second  appellant,  had each sent letters  to  the  District Returning  Officer,  expelling the  second  respondent,  and removing  his  name, from the membership  of  the  Congress. There  is  no  dispute, about this fact.   It  is  also  not disputed  that the second appellant filed an  affidavit,  in Suit No. 132 of 1964, drawing the attention of the Court, to the  order of expulsion, from membership, passed as  against the  second respondent, and it is substantially in  view  of this  that  the application, for temporary  injunction,  was dismissed.  We are of opinion’, that these acts are of  each a  nature,  as to interfere with, or  prejudice  the  second respondent in the proceedings, connected with this suit. Oswald,  in  his book ’Contempt of  Court’,  Third  Edition, says, at p. 6;               "To speak generally, Contempt of Court may  be               said  to  be constituted by any  conduct  that               tends    to    bring   the    authority    and               administration of. the law into disrespect  or

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             disregard,  or to interfere with or  prejudice               parties litigant or their witnesses during the               litigation." This statement, has been quoted, with approval, by Das,  J., who  delivered  the  majority  judgment,  in  the  decision, reported  as  Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh  Singh(1).   More  or less,  under similar circumstances, this Court, in the  said decision,  has  held  that certain  actions,  taken  by  the officers  therein, amounted to contempt of Court.  From  the facts, noted in that decision, it emerges that an Officer of the Forest Department, against whom an order for recovery of certain  amounts, had been made, had instituted a  suit  for having that order declared null and void.  When the  summons in  the suit, was served on the State Government, the  Under Secretary  to the Government, in the  concerned  Department, sent  a  memorandum, to the Chief  Conservator  of  Forests, drawing  his attention, to a Circular letter, issued by  the Government,  on January 25, 1953.  In that Circular  letter, the  Government  had  indicated  that  any  attempt,  by   a Government servant, to seek decision, in a Court of law,  in respect of matters, arising out of employment, or conditions of service, without exhausting the normal official  channels of  redress,  was  considered to  be  contrary  to  official propriety  and  subversive of discipline, and  such  conduct would justify the initiation of disciplinary action, against the  government  servant.   The  Under  Secretary,  in   his communication  to  the  Chief Conservator  of  Forests,  had stated that the (1) [1962] Supp.2 S.C.R.838,  848. 181 officer, who had instituted the suit, had not exhausted  his departmental  remedies,  and,  therefore,  he  had  rendered himself liable to disciplinary action, as per the Government Circular  letter, of January 25, 1953.  The Under  Secretary further  added  that the Chief Conservator  should  intimate what  action  he proposed to take,  against  the  particular officer.    On   receipt  of   this   letter,   disciplinary proceedings  were  initiated, against the officer,  who  had filed   the   suit.   Promptly,  that   officer   filed   an application,  before the High Court, for taking  action  for contempt,  against  the officers,  mentioned  therein.   The defence was that the action, taken, was perfectly competent, and it did not amount to contempt of Court.  The High  Court negatived the defence contention and held that the officers, who  had initiated disciplinary proceedings, were guilty  of contempt  of Court.  This Court, on appeal, approved of  the decision of the High Court. In  that decision, Das, J., and Subba Rao, J., (as  he  then was),  took the view that the action, of the  officers,  who initiated the disciplinary proceedings, against the  person, who  had  filed  a  suit,  amounted  to  contempt;  whereas, Raghubar  Dayal,  J., held to the contrary on  facts.   But, Raghubar  Dayal, J., also agreed with the proposition  that, if  any pressure is put on a party, in order to make it  act in  a particular manner, with respect to a  pending  action, that would amount to contempt of Court, in which the  matter be  pending.  But, the learned Judge was of the  view  that, inasmuch as disciplinary proceedings had been initiated,  in view  of the Government Circular letter, dated  January  25, 1953,  there was no question of contempt.  With respect,  we are  in  agreement  with the majority  view,  in  the  above decision. In the instant case, the passing of the orders of expulsion, by  the two appellants, against the second  respondent,  and the  filing  of a supporting affidavit, in the suit  by  the

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second appellant, clearly indicate that it was a  deliberate attempt, by the appellants, to interfere with, or  prejudice the  second  respondent, in the conduct of  the  litigation, instituted by him.  It is no answer that the action, by  way of  expulsion, was taken on the basis of the Resolution,  of the  All  India Congress Working Committee, and  to  enforce discipline, in the Congress Organization.  As emphasized  by Das,  J.,  in Pratap Singh’s Case(.),  ’any  conduct,  which interferes with, or prejudices parties litigant, during  the litigation,  is  undoubtedly Contempt of Court’.   The  High Court, in this case, was justified in holding the appellants guilty of contempt.  We agree with the said conclusion. Before closing the discussion, on this matter, we may  state that  Mr.  Garg referred us, to the decision in  Webster  V. Bake- (1) [1962] Supp 2 S.C.R. 838 (2) [1916] 1 Ch. 300 182 well  Rural Council(1), and urged that, on  the  principles, laid  down  therein,  the  appellants  were  not  guilty  of contempt.  The consideration of this English decision,  need not  detain  us much, because it has been adverted to  ,  by Das,  J.,  in  Pratap Singh’s  Case(1),  and  distinguished. Therefore, Websters Case(2) does not apply, to the facts  of the instant case. The result s that this appeal fails, and is dismissed. Y.P.           Appeal dismissed. (1)  [1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 838. (2)  [1916] 1 Ch. 300. 183