28 January 1977
Supreme Court
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GOVIND PRASAD CHATURVEDI Vs HARI DUTT SHASTRI AND ANOTHER

Bench: KAILASAM,P.S.
Case number: Appeal Civil 3868 of 1984


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PETITIONER: GOVIND PRASAD CHATURVEDI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARI DUTT SHASTRI AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT28/01/1977

BENCH: KAILASAM, P.S. BENCH: KAILASAM, P.S. RAY, A.N. (CJ) BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1005            1977 SCR  (2) 877  1977 SCC  (2) 539  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1988 SC1074  (6)

ACT:             Contract  Act--contract  relating to sale  of  immovable         property --What is the normal presumption regarding stipula-         tion  of time--Whether presumption  is  displacable--Whether         the question of time being the essence of a contract can  be         raised before the High Court for the first time in appeal.

HEADNOTE:             The  appellants entered into an agreement with  the  re-         spondents on March 24, 1964, for purchasing the suit proper-         ty  belonging  to the latter.  The terms  of  the  agreement         provided that the appellant would get the sale deed executed         upto May 24, 1964, and in case of his failure to do so,  the         earnest  money  paid by him to the  respondent  would  stand         forfeited.   The sale deed was not executed within the  pre-         scribed  time,  and the appellant filed a suit  against  the         respondents for breach of contract.  The trial court granted         him the relief of specific performance of the contract.  The         respondents succeeded in an appeal before the High Court  on         the ground that time was of the essence of the contract  and         therefore  the relief of’ specific performance could not  be         granted,  and also that the appellant had not been ready  to         perform his part of the contract.         Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court,             HELD:  (1) Fixation of the period within which the  con-         tract  has to be performed does not make the stipulation  as         to  time, the essence of the contract. When a  contract  re-         lates  to sale of immovable property it will   normally   be         presumed  that the time is not the essence of the  contract.         The intention to treat time as the essence may be  evidenced         by  circumstances which are sufficiently strong to  displace         the normal presumption. [881 A-C]             Gomathinarayana  Pillai  &  Ors.  v.  Palaniswamy  Nadar         [1967] 1 SCR 227, 233, applied.             (2)  In  the  absence of specific  pleadings  or  issues         raised before the trial court, the question whether the time         is  of the essence of the contract or not. cannot be  raised         before the High Court in appeal. [882 B-C]             (3)  A  careful consideration of the  evidence  and  the

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       correspondence between the parties shows that the  appellant         was  always  ready to perform his part of the  contract  and         that the respondents were evading their responsibilities.                                                      [885F-G]

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 696 of 1971.             Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the  20-4-1970         of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No.15 of 1966.         A.K. Sen, S.T. Desai and P.P. Juneja for the Appellant.         S.V.Gupte and M.V. Goswami for Respondents.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             KAILASAM,  J.  This  appeal is filed  by  the  plaintiff         against  the judgment of the Allahabad High Court on a  cer-         tificate  dismissing the suit for specific performance of  a         contract of sale dated 24th March, 1964.         878         The facts of the case are briefly as follows :--             The  suit property was owned by one Shri  Aditya  Narain         and  the  plaintiff/appellant became a tenant  of  the  suit         property  under  Aditya  Narain in the year  1942.   On  2nd         January,  1961  the respondents, the two defendants  in  the         suit purchased the suit property for Rs. 19,000 from  Aditya         Narain  and the appellant became tenant of the  respondents.         Soon after the purchase of the property by the   respondents         they  sought  to evict the appellant by  filing  a  petition         under  section  3 of the U.P. Rent and  Eviction  Act.   The         appellant resisted and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer         rejected the petition holding that the respondents’ require-         ment of the premises was not genuine..  On the mediation  of         Sri  Chand Doneria the parties entered into the suit  agree-         ment on 24th March, 1964. In pursuance of the agreement  the         appellant  handed  over Rs. 4,000 as earnest  money  to  the         respondents.  The terms of the agreement will be set out  in         due  course  but suffice it at this stage to state  that  it         provided that the appellant should get the sale deed execut-         ed  within two months i.e. upto 24th May, 1964 and  in  case         the  appellant  did not get the sale registered  within  two         months the earnest money of Rs. 4,000 shall stand forfeited.         From the 5th May, 1964 letters and telegrams were  exchanged         between the parties but the sale deed was not executed on or         before  the  24th  or on the 25th May  as  the  parties  had         agreed.   The appellant filed a suit, Civil Suit No. 122  of         1964,  in the court of Civil Judge, Agra, on 2nd  September,         1964  alleging that the appellant has always been ready  and         willing  to perform his part of the contract and he did  all         that he was bound to do under the agreement but the respond-         ents failed to execute the sale deed as agreed and therefore         committed breach of the contract.  The plaintiff prayed  for         a  decree  of specific performance of the contract  of  sale         dated  24th  March,  1964 against the  respondents  and  for         direction to the respondents to execute the sale deed of the         property and get  it registered and in default the sale deed         may be executed by the court according to law.  The respond-         ents  filed a written statement denying the various  allega-         tions made in the plaint and pleaded that the appellant  did         not  perform his part of the contract within the  stipulated         time and the contract thereafter did not subsist and  there-         fore  the  suit was misconceived.  On  these  pleadings  the         trial  court framed five issues of which it is  relevant  to         note  only two which are issues 1 and 3. They are  as  under         :--                         Issue  No. 3. "Whether the contract did  not

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                     subsist on the date the to perform his part of                       the contract  as  alleged  in the plaint ?"                         Issue  No. 3. "Whether the contract did  not                       subsist on the. date the suit was field ?         The trial court found that it was proved beyond a shadow  of         any doubt that the appellant was always ready and willing to         perform his pan of the contract and the respondents were not         at  all anxious to execute the sale deed in his  favour  and         that the respondents were guilty of breach of contract.   On         issue  No. 3 it found that even though the time for  getting         the sale deed executed expired after the 24th May, 1964 the         879         appellant would not be disentitled to the relief of specific         performance of the contract for sale on the. ground of delay         as  the respondents themselves were responsible for it.  The         respondents preferred an appeal to the Allahabad High  Court         and a Bench of the court on the arguments set out two points         for determination in the appeal.  They are:’ (1) whether the         appellant  or the respondents committed the breach  of  con-         tract entered into between the parties on 24th March,  1964;         and (2) whether the time was of the essence of the contract.         If not, its effect. The High :Court found that the  respond-         ents were always ready and willing to perform their part  of         the  contract  in terms of the agreement dated  24th  March,         1964  and it was the appellant who committed the  breach  of         the  contract by not getting the sale deed executed by  25th         May, 1964 in terms of the agreement dated 24th March,  1964.         The  High Court on the issue as to whether time was  of  the         essence  of the contract held that in the  circumstances  of         the ease and in view of the conduct of the parties of  serv-         ing  on  each other notices, counter notices  and  telegrams         they  expressed  their intention to treat time  as  of   the         essence of the contract and that once the time is held to be         the  essence of the. contract the appellant’s suit for  spe-         cific  performance must fail. The High Court also held  that         even  if time is not held to be of the essence of  the  con-         tract it was of the opinion that the appellant is not  enti-         tled  to a decree for specific performance as he had  failed         to  prove that he was ready to perform his part of the  con-         tract.             The  appellant  applied for a certificate and  the  High         Court  by  its order dated 22nd February, 1971  granted  the         certificate  under clause (a) of Article 133(1) of the  Con-         stitution.             In  this  appeal before us the learned counsel  for  the         appellant  submitted  that the High Court was  in  error  in         holding that the time was of the essence of the contract and         that  the  High Court’s finding that the appellant  was  not         ready and willing to perform his part of the contract  while         the  respondents were always ready to perform their part  of         the contract is opposed to oral and documentary evidence and         the probabilities of the case.             The  first  question that arises  for  consideration  is         whether  time is of the essence of the contract.   In  order         to.  determine this question it is necessary to set out  the         suit agreement which is marked as Ex. 23 at page 137 of  the         papers.  It runs as follows :--                       "Dear Pandit Govind Prasad Ji Chaturvedi,                        Sir,                             A  litigation has been going on  between                       you  and us with respect to the Kothi of  Bima                       Nagar, of which you are  a tenant on behalf of                       us.   The said dispute has been decided  today                       through the mediation of Sri Shri Chand  Done-                       riya, on the terms and conditions given  below

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                     which  shall be. fully binding on you as  well                       as us.                             1.  That you are agreeable  to  purchase                       our  Kothi   of which you are a tenant  and  a                       transaction between you and                       880                       us  has  been finally settled  today;  at  Rs.                       24,000  (rupees  twenty-four  thousand),  with                       respect to the said Kothi.                             2.That you are paying us, at present,  a                       sum of Rs. 4000 in cash, as earnest money, the                       receipt  where,of has been acknowledged by  us                       by  affixing  a revenue stamp at the  foot  of                       this  letter,  and that the remaining  sum  of                       Rs.  20,000 shall be paid by you to us at  the                       time of registration.                             3. That the expenses relating  registra-                       tion  and cost  of stamps etc. shall be  borne                       by  you and we shall be entitled to get a  sum                       of  Rs. 24,000 (rupees  twenty-four  thousand)                       net.                             4.  That  you  must get  the  sale  deed                       executed within two months i.e. upto 24th May,                       1964, and in case you do not get the sale-deed                       registered within two months then the  earnest                       money amounting to rupees four thousand,  paid                       by  you shall stand forfeited without  serving                       any notice.  But in cane we in some way  evade                       the execution of the sale deed, then you  will                       be entitled to compel us to execute. the  sale                       deed legally and we shall be liable to pay the                       costs and damages incurred by you.                             5. That we shall furnish you a guarantee                       of good title in respect of the property which                       is free and immune from all sorts of disputes.                             6.  That you shall be liable to pay  the                       rent  till  the  date you  get  the  sale-deed                       registered and you shall clear off all  amount                       due to us before registration.                             7. That both the parties shall  withdraw                       their  respective cases or get the  same  dis-                       missed and shall bear their own costs.                             8.  That  neither party shall  take  any                       fresh  legal  steps during this period of  two                       months by which any hindrance may be caused in                       execution of our sale deed.                           In confirmation of the agreement which has                       been  made  between you and  me  through  this                       letter, you too have affixed your signature on                       this letter.                                                                       Your s,                                                    Signature of Hari                       Dutt Shastri                                                                       24-3 -1964                                                    Signature      of                       Bhavbhooti Sharma                                                                      24-3- 1964                                          X    X      X      X      X         The  relevant  clause is clause 4 which  provides  that  the         appellant must get the sale deed executed within two  months         i.e. upto 24th May, 1964, and in case the appellant did  not         get the sale deed registered within

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       881         two months then the earnest money amounting to Rs. 4000 paid         by  the appellant shall stand forfeited without serving  any         notice.   The clause further provides that in case  the  re-         spondents  in some way evade the execution of the sale  deed         then  the appellant will be entitled to compel them to  exe-         cute  the  sale deed legally and the  respondents  shall  be         liable  to pay the costs and damages incurred by the  appel-         lant.  It  is settled law that the fixation  of  the  period         within which the contract has to be performed does not  make         the  stipulation  as to time the essence  of  the  contract.         When  a contract relates to sale of immoveable  property  it         will  normally be presumed that the time is not the  essence         of  the  contract.   (vide  Gomathinayagam,  Pillai  &  Ors.         v. Palaniswami Nadar)(1).  It may also be mentioned that the         language used in the agreement is not such as to indicate in         unmistakable  terms that the time is of the essence  of  the         contract.  The intention to treat time as the essence of the         contract may be evidenced by circumstances which are  suffi-         ciently strong to displace the normal presumption that in  a         contract  of sale of land stipulation as to time is not  the         essence-of the contract.             Apart from the normal presumption that in the case of an         agreement  of  sale of immovable property time  is  not  the         essence of the contract’ and the fact that the terms of  the         agreement do not unmiStakably state that the time was under-         stood  to  be  the essence of the contract  neither  in  the         pleadings  nor  during the trial the  respondents  contended         that time was of the essence of the contract.  In the plaint         the allegation was that the appellant has always been  ready         and  willing to perform his part of the contract and he  did         all  that he was bound to do under the agreement  while  the         respondents committed breach of the contract.  The  respond-         ents  did not set up the plea that the time was of  the  es-         sence  of  the contract.  In paragraph 32  of   the  Written         Statement all that was stated was that the appellant did not         perform his part of the contract within the stipulated  time         and  that the contract thereafter did not. subsist  and  the         suit  is consequently misconceived.  The parties did not  go         to  trial on the basis that time was of the essence  of  the         contract  for no issue was framed regarding time  being  the         essence of the contract.  Neither is there any discussion in         the  judgment of the trial court regarding this point.   The         trial  court  after  considering the evidence  came  to  the         conclusion  that appellant was always ready and  willing  to         perform his part of the contract while the respondents  were         not  in the circumstances  therefore the High Court  was  in         error setting as one of the points for  determination wheth-         er time was of the essence of the contract.  The High  Court         after  referring to the agreement was of the view  that  the         agreement  was entered into between the parties  during  the         course  of  a litigation between the appellant and  the  re-         spondents and in pursuance of the agreement the parties were         directed, to withdraw their cases and were directed  further         not  to  take fresh legal steps during the  period  of  two.         months  within which the sale deed was to be  executed.   On         taking         (1) [1967] 1 S.C..R. 227, 233.         882         into,  account the circumstances of the case and...the  con-         duct of the parties of serving on each other notices,  coun-         ter notices and telegrams the High Court inferred an  inten-         tion  on  the part of the parties  to treat the time  as  of         essence,  of the contract.  We will refer to  the  terms  of         the  contract and the correspondence between the parties  in

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       due course but at this stage it is sufficient to state  that         neither  the terms of the agreement nor  the  correspondence         would  indicate that the parties treated time as of  essence         of  the contract.  In fact, according to the  agreement  the         sale deed ought to have been executed by the 24th May but it         is the admitted case that both the parties consented to have         the  document registered on the 25th May.   On the  question         whether the time is of the essence of the contract or not we         are  satisfied that the High Court was in error in  allowing         the  respondents to: raise this question in the  absence  of         specific  pleadings or issues raised before the trial  court         and when the case of time being the essence of the  contract         was  not put forward by the respondents in the trial  court.         Apart from the absence of pleadings we do not find any basis         for  the  plea of the respondents that the time was  of  the         essence of the contract.             The decision on this issue would be sufficient to  allow         this  appeal and to grant the appellant the decree for  spe-         cific  performance  which he has prayed for but  as  on  the         question whether the appellant was always ready and  willing         to  perform his part of the contract the courts  below  have         given  contrary finding and the High Court ,has  recorded  a         finding  that  the appellant was not ready and  willing  to.         perform his part of the contract while the respondents  were         always ready and willing with which finding we are unable to         agree we will discuss the evidence at some length.             The  background to the suit agreement dated 24th  March,         1964  is that there was litigation between the parties.  The         appellant  was  a tenant under the  previous  owner,  Aditya         Narain,  from 1942.  The respondents purchased the  property         in  1961 and in 1963 filed. a petition to evict  the  appel-         lant.   That petition was resisted and the Rent Control  and         Eviction Officer dismissed the petition of the  respondents.         While  the  matters stood thus the  compromise  was  entered         into.  The appellant having been a tenant of  the"  premises         from 1942 would have been naturally anxious to, continue  in         possession  while  the respondents who.  had  purchased  the         property  in 1961 were anxious to. get into possession.   As         they  wanted to settle their dispute the respondents  agreed         to.  sell the property for which the appellant  was  willing         and. which they had purchased on 2-1-1961 for Rs. 19,000  to         the appellant for Rs. 24,000.  Of this Rs. 24,000 the tenant         paid Rs. 4000 in cash as earnest money.  This would indicate         that the tenant was keen on purchasing the property in which         he  was living since 1942.  The agreement provided that  the         appellant must get the sale deed executed within two, months         after  24th March, 1964 and, if the appellant failed to  get         the sale deed registered within two months the earnest money         of  Rs. 4000 shall stand forfeited.  Normally one would  not         expect the appellant to. forfeit his earnest money.  As  the         period  stipulated was 24th May, 1964 the appellant  started         prepara-         883         tions for getting the sale deed executed.  According to  the         appellant he wrote Ex. 24 on 5th. May, 1964 calling upon the         respondents  to come to Agra on the 18th May, 1964 for  exe-         cuting and making registration in pursuance of the  contract         and to complete the sale deed. According to the appellant no         reply  was  received  to this letter and he  sent  a  notice         through his advocate, Ex. 35, on 13th May, 1964 in which  he         stated that he was ready to pay the balance of the consider-         ation  of Rs. 24,000 along with the entire arrears  of  rent         and  requested the respondents to. execute the sale deed  by         18th May and latest by 24th May, 1964.  The lawyer’s  notice         ,,iso.  referred  to  the letter of the  5th  May.   Another

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       lawyer’s  notice.  was sent, Ex. 36, on 20th  May,  1964  by         registered  post  complaining that the respondents  had  not         replied  to his letter dated 5th May, 1964 and to  his  law-         yer’s  notice dated 13th May, 1964 and called upon them  to.         get  the sale deed registered by 25th May, 1964 as 24th  May         is Sunday. Along with the lawyer’s notice a draft sale  deed         was  endorsed.  These three letters were followed  by  tele-         grams which were sent by the appellant to both the  respond-         ents on 20th May, 1964, Ex. 30.  On the 22nd. May the appel-         lant  attended  the office of the  Sub-Registrar,  Agra  and         presented an application to the Registrar to the effect that         he  was at the Registrar’s office between the hours 3 and  4         p.m. on that day. On 22nd May, 1964 the appellant received a         reply  from  the respondents  acknowledging  the  registered         notices given on 13th and 20th May by the appellant’s  coun-         sel.   According to  the reply by the advocate on behalf  of         the  respondents  the two letters of the 13th and  20th  May         were  received  by the respondents only on  the  22nil  May,         1964.   In this reply of 22nd May, 1964 the advocate of  the         respondents  denied the allegation in the notice dated  20th         May,  1964  of the. appellant that the draft sale  deed  has         been  put in the cover.  It also complained that  the  draft         sale  deed has not been sent.  The respondents  stated  that         they  were ready to execute the sale deed but the  appellant         was wanting postponement for reasons best known to him.   It         may  be noted that the two complaints that are made  in  the         advocate’s notice  on behalf of the respondents. do not bear         scrutiny.  The notice complains that the draft sale deed has         not  been enclosed.  It has been proved that in one  of  the         notices  sent to the son and which was opened in  the  court         the draft sale deed was found enclosed.  Further without the         cooperation of the respondents it is difficult to prepare  a         draft  sale  deed as the date.of sale by  Aditya  Narain  in         favour of the respondents would not have been available  to.         the  appellant.  In fact Mr. Gupte the learned  counsel  for         the  respondents  submitted that the letter stating  that  a         copy  of the draft sale deed was enclosed cannot be true  as         the  appellant  could  not have got  particulars  about  the         earlier document of title of the respondents.  The  respond-         ents’  plea that the draft sale deed was not  received  does         not show that they were willing or cooperating in the execu-         tion  of the sale deed.  We  are unable to, give any  weight         to  the  contention of the learned counsel that  their  plea         that  they  sent a draft sale deed cannot be  true  as  they         could  not have been in possession of particulars about  the         title  deed  of the respondents.  In fact  no  question  was         asked of the appellant when he was in the box as to how they         got  information  as to the sale deed, by Aditya  Narain  in         favour of the respondents.  The letter of the         884         5th May the receipt of which was not denied by the reply  of         the advocate for the respondents and the lawyer’s notices on         behalf  of the appellant, Ex. P-35 and P-36, dated 13th  May         and  22nd May, 1964 would show great anxiety on the part  of         the  appellant to complete the sale deed.  There can  be  no         doubt  that they had basis for suspecting that the  respond-         ents were not willing to perform their part of the contract.             A  considerable  volume of evidence has been let  in  on         behalf of the appellant as well as the respondents regarding         as to what took place in the Sub-Registrar’s office on  25th         May,  1964.   It  is sufficient to state   that   both   the         parties  let in  oral  evidence  as  well as  acknowledgment         by  the Sub-Registrar to prove their presence.  Though  both         the parties would assert their presence it is common  ground         that  they did not meet each other.  It is difficult for  us

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       to. comprehend as to how if both the parties were present at         the Sub-Registrar’s office they did not meet each other.  It         is obvious therefore that the parties were keen on  creating         evidence  in support of the ensuing litigation. But  on  the         facts the conclusion is irresistible that it was the  appel-         lant who was anxious to get through the sale deed, he having         paid  Rs. 4000 as the earnest money and living in the  prem-         ises for over 25 years.  It is not necessary for us to refer         to  the subsequent letters and telegrams  exchanged  between         the  parties  as that would not alter the  position  in  any         event.             On  a  consideration of the letters and  telegrams  that         passed between the parties the trial court held that it  was         proved  beyond  a  shadow of doubt that  the  appellant  was         always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract         and  that  the respondents were not anxious to  execute  the         sale deed.  The trial court accepted the evidence on  behalf         of the appellant that the appellant was possessed of  suffi-         cient funds and in fact he withdrew a sum of Rs. 20,500 from         the Central Bank of India Ltd.  As the appellant  had   paid         the  respondents Rs. 4000 he had to pay them only Rs. 20,000         towards  the balance of sale consideration. The  arrears  of         Rs.  956  due towards rent and a sum of Rs. 2000 was  to  be         spent  on getting the sale deed executed.  In all a  sum  of         Rs.  22,956 was required.  He had withdrawn Rs. 20,500  from         the Central Bank of India Ltd.  The trial court accepted the         evidence  adduced  by the appellant.  The trial  court  also         accepted the evidence that the appellant had Rs. 5,000  with         him  at  home and about Rs. 30,000 in deposit with  a  firm.         This  part of the testimony on behalf of the  appellant  was         proved  by  the evidence of Kailash Nath. P.W.2,  Manira  of         M/s. Chhitar Mal Ram Dayal and the trial court accepted  the         evidence  and found that the appellant had sufficient  funds         for getting the sale deed executed.             This  conclusion which we consider is  irresistible  was         not  accepted by the High Court.  The High Court  while  ac-         cepting   the   evidence  that the appellant had  a  sum  of         Rs.4,500  in  deposit in the bank upto 20th  May,  1964  and         subsequently  on  21st  May,  1964 he  deposited  a  sum  of         Rs.14,000 and again a sum of Rs. 2,500 on 22nd May,         885         1964  and that thus the appellant had Rs. 21,000 in bank  on         22nd  May, 1964 found the case of the appellant unworthy  of         credit.   The  High Court further observed  that  after  the         appellant  had raised his deposit in the bank to Rs.  21,000         he  did  not deposit any further amount  and  therefore  the         amount  fell short of the needed amount by Rs. 2,000.   Con-         scious of the weakness in his story, the appellant  asserted         in his statement that he had Rs. 7,000 or 8,000 with him  at         his house.  We are at a loss to follow the  reasoning of the         High  Court.   The appellant stated that  he  deposited  the         money which was with him in the house in the bank on  advice         for the purpose of proving that he had money with him.   The         Court does not suspect that he did not have Rs. 20,500.  The         shortage  at the most is of Rs. 2,000 and it cannot be  said         that the  evidence of the  appellant  that he  had necessary         money for expenses of registration is unacceptable.  Further         the appellant examined Kailash Nath, P.W.2, of M/s.  Chhitar         Mal  Ram Dayal who stated that a sum of Rs.30,000  belonging         to  the  appellant was lying in deposit with them.   We  are         unable to accept the conclusion of the High  Court that  the         appellant   did not have enough funds for getting  the  sale         deed   executed  the  High Court while not disbelieving  the         fact  that  various letters and telegrams were sent  by  the         appellant  has remarked that the appellant did not take  the

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       course of personally going to the respondents and asking for         the:  sale deed.  In our view, the parties  were  suspecting         each  other  and  nothing would have been  achieved  by  the         appellant by going in person and requesting the  respondents         to execute the sale deed.  In fact the respondents set up. a         story  that  the appellant approached  the  respondents  and         stated  that  he  was not able to perform his  part  of  the         contract  within the Stipulated time.  This evidence  cannot         be accepted taking into account the relationship between the         parties.  We have carefully considered the evidence and  the         correspondence between the parties and we have no hesitation         in accepting the conclusion reached by the trial Judge  that         the  appellant was always ready and willing to  perform  his         part  of the contract and that the respondents were  evading         their responsibility.  The finding on this issue by the High         Court  is not supported by evidence or on the  probabilities         of the case.             In the result we allow the appeal on the ground that the         respondents have failed to establish that the time is of the         essence. of the contract and that the appellant has succeed-         ed  in establishing that he was always ready and willing  to         perform his part of the contract and, the respondents evaded         their responsibility.  The judgment of the High Court is set         aside and that of the trial court is restored,  The.  appeal         is   allowed  with  costs.   The  appellant   will   deposit         Rs.20,000/and  the sale documents in the court of the  Civil         Judge, Agra within six weeks from today and the parties will         take  further direction in the matter from the Civil  Judge,         Agra.         M.  P,,.                                              Appeal         allowed.         886