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PETITIONER: GOVERNMENT OF MYSORE & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: J.   V. BHAT, ETC.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/10/1974

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH

CITATION:  1975 AIR  596            1975 SCR  (2) 407  1975 SCC  (1) 110  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1991 SC1117  (15)

ACT: Natural   justice-Mysore   Slum   Areas   (Improvement   and Clearance)  Act, 1958 Validity of the  notifications  issued under  the Act-Principles of Natural Justice Whether can  be implied  when  the statute is silent-  Natural  justice  for subjective satisfaction of an administrative body.

HEADNOTE: The  provisions of sections 3, 9, 12 and 15 of the Act  were challenged  as unconstitutional for violating principles  of natural justice. Section 3(1) reads as under : "(1)  where the competent authority upon report from any  of its  officers  or  other information in  its  possession  is satisfied that- (a)  the buildings in any area, used or intended to be  used for human habitation- (i)are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or (ii) are,  by reason of dilapidation,  overcrowding,  faulty arrangement  or design, narrowness of faulty arrangement  of streets,   lack   of  ventilation,  light,   or   sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety, health or morals; it may, by notification in  the official Gazette, declare such area to be a slum area- Section 9(1) reads as under "(1) where the competent authority upon a report from any of its  officers  or  other information in  its  possession  is satisfied   as  respects  any  slum  area  that   the   most satisfactory  method of dealing with the conditions  in  the area is the demolition   of  all the buildings in  the  area the  authority  shall by an order notified in  the  official Gazette, declare the area to be a clearance area, that is to say,  an area to be cleared of all buildings  in  accordance with the provisions of this Act : , Provided  that any building in the area which is  not  unfit for human Habitation or dangerous or injurious to health may be excluded from the declaration if the authority  considers it necessary." Section  12  empowers  the State Government  to  clear  land

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surrounded  by any such slum area or clearance area  or  any other land in any locality. Section  15  prescribes  the  basis  for  determination   of compensation  for the land acquired. No appeal  is  provided against the declarations made under secs. 3 and 9. The validity of the Notifications made under the  provisions of sections 3, 9 and 12 were also challenged. The  High  Court of Mysore struck down sections 3 and  9  as violative of Art. 19(1)(f) and section 12(1)(b) as violative of Art. 14. It did not deal with section 15. It  was  contended  before this  Court  that  provisions  of sections  3,9,12  and  15  are  invalid  for  violating  the principles  of natural justice. It was also  contended  that the  notifications issued under the Act were invalid. it was also contended that the declarations under sections 3 and  9 have far-reaching consequences. That while acting      under sections  3  and 9 the possibility  of  arbitrary  decisions cannot  be ruled out and no appeal is provided  against  the declarations made under sections 3 and 9. 408 HELD  : There are two possible approaches to  the  question. One  is  to  hold that the provisions  of  the  statute  are themselves  unconstitutional because they do not  provide  a reasonable opportunity to the affected parties to be  heard. The  other  is  to  hold that as there  is  nothing  in  the statutory  provisions  which debar the  application  of  the principles of natural justice while the authorities exercise the statutory powers under the Act and as the principles  of natural justice Would apply unless the statutory  provisions point  to the contrary the statutory  provisions  themselves are  not  unconstitutional though the  notifications  issued under  them may be struck down if the authorities  concerned do not observe the principles ’of natural justice.  As there is a presumption of constitutionality, of statutes it is the latter course that appears to us to be the proper  approach. We, think that the duty to hear those whose dwellings are to be condemned becomes imperative before deciding to  demolish their particular buildings although no quasi-judicial  trial was  called  for.   All  that  was  necessary  was  to  hear objections, checked by spot inspections where needed, before taking  a decision.  There can be no two opinion  about  the need  to hear the affected persons before declaring an  area to be a glum area under section 3, or an area as a clearance area  under section 9 or before taking action under  section 10.  All the difficulties would be removed if  the  affected parties  are given an opportunity to be heard in respect  of the  action proposed.  Section 12(1)(b) which  empowers  the authority to acquire any other land in any locality does not suffer from any constitutional defect.  By its very  nature, a slum area is likely to be over-crowded and in redeveloping it,  it may be necessary to acquire other lands.  The  power under  section 12(1)(b) is relatable to the purpose of  slum clearance itself. [409 A-D, 412 E-F; 417B] The  Act is valid but the three notifications  issued  under the  Act are bad as the affected persons were not  given  an opportunity of making representations against them.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos.  1736  to 1740 of 1967. From the Judgment & Order dated the 9th October, 1969 of the Mysore  High Court in W.P. Nos. 1249, 1260, 1432,  2206  and 2271 of 1963.

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B.R.L. Iyengar and M. Veerappa, for the appellants. H.   B. Datar and R. B. Datar, for the respondents. (in C.A. Nos.,1736 & 1740/67). M.   C.  Bhandare and R. B. Datar, for respondent (in C.  A. No. 1739/67). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI,  J.-These five appeals arise out of five  writ petitions filed before the High Court of Mysore  questioning three  notifications  issued  under the  Mysore  Slum  Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1958.  The notifications were (1)  a Declaration under section 3 of the Act, dated  17-11- 1960,  (2) a declaration under section 9 of the  Act,  dated 20-4-1961,  and (3) a notification by the  Government  dated 20-12-1962  under section 12 by which certain lands were  to be acquired under the Act.  The provisions of section 3,  9, 12 and 15 were also impugned as unconstitutional.  The  High Court  struck  down sections 3 and 9  as  violating  Article 19(1)(f)  of  the  Constitution and  section  12(1)  (b)  as violating  Article 14.  It did not consider it necessary  to consider  the  constitutional validity of section  15.   It, however, held that the three notifications above referred to were  not  unconstitutional  because  in  exercising   their functions  under  sections  3,  9  and  12  the  authorities concerned were not exercising a quasi judicial power. 409 But the result of striking down the section of the Act above referred to was that the notifications also fell along  with them.   The  State of Mysore has filed these  appeals  under certificate granted by the High Court. There are two possible approaches to this question.  One  is to  hold that the provisions of the statute  are  themselves unconstitutional  because they do not provide  a  reasonable opportunity for the affected parties to be heard; the  other is  to  hold  that  as there is  nothing  in  the  statutory provisions which debar the application of the principles  of natural justice while the authorities exercise the statutory powers  under  the  Act, and as the  principles  of  natural justice would apply unless the statutory provisions point to the  contrary  the statutory provisions themselves  are  not unconstitutional though the notifications issued under  them may  be  struck  down if the authorities  concerned  do  not observe  the principles of natural justice while  exercising their  statutory  powers.   As there  is  a  presumption  of constitutionality of statutes unless contrary is established it is the latter course that appears to us to, be the proper approach. This Court has made considerable advances in recent years in its attitude towards the question of the application of  the principles  of natural justice.  The High Court referred  to the  decisions  in  Cooper  v.The Board  of  Works  for  the Wandsworth  District [14CB(NS)180] King v.  The  Electricity Commissioners [ 1924 (1) KB 171 ] as well as Nakkuda Ali  v. M.F.De S. Jayaratne (1951 AC 66), as also to the decision of this  Court  in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas  S.  Advani (AIR 1950 SC 222).  It referred to the decision in Ridge  v. Baldwin  [1963 (2) All E.R. 66] and considered that  it  had considerably   shaken  the  foundations  of  King   v.   The Electricity Commissioners (supra).  It noticed the  decision of  this  Court  in  Board of  High  School  &  Intermediate Education U.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta (AIR 1962 SC 11,10).   It did not however refer to the decision  of  this Court  in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei &  Ors. [1967(2) SCR 625] nor the decision in A.     K.  Kraipak  v. Union  [1970](1) SCR 4571 as they were subsequent  decisions of this Court.

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             In Binapani Dei’s case this Court held:               "The  rule that a party to whose prejudice  an               order is intended to be passed is entitled  to               a hearing applies alike to judicial  tribunals               and bodies of persons invested with  authority               to  adjudicate  upon matters  involving  civil               consequences.   It is one of  the  fundamental               rules of our constitutional set-up that  every               citizen  is  protected  against  exercise   of               arbitray   authority  by  the  State  or   its               officers.   Duty  to  act   judicially   would               therefore  arise from the very nature  of  the               function intended to be performed, it need not               be super. added.  If there is power to  decide               and  determine to the prejudice of  a  person,               duty  to  act judicially is  implicit  in  the               exercise of such power.  If the essentials  of               justice  be  ignored  and  an  order  to   the               prejudice of a person is made, the order is  a               nullity.  That is a basic concept of the  rule               of  law and importance thereof transcends  the               significance  of a decision in any  particular               case."               410               In Krajak’s case it was held:               "The rules of natural justice operate in areas               not covered by any law validly made, that  is,               they  do not supplant the law of the lard  but               supplement  it.  They are not  embodied  rules               and  their  aim  is to secure  justice  or  to               prevent  miscarriage of justice.  If  that  is               their  purpose  there is-no  reason  why  they               should    not    be   made    applicable    to               administrative  proceedings  also,  especially               when  it  is not easy to draw  the  line  that               demarcates   administrative   enquiries   from               quasi-judicial ones, and an unjust decision in               an  administrative  enquiry may have  are  far               reaching  effect than a decision in  a  quasi-               judicial enquiry.               It is further observed :               "The concept of natural justice has  undergone               a great deal of change in recent years.   What               particular  rule  of  natural  justice  should               apply  to a given case must depend to a  great               extent on the facts and circumstances of  that               case, the framework of the law under which the               enquiry  is held and the constitution  of  the               Tribunal or the body of persons appointed  for               that  purpose.  Whenever a complaint  is  made               before a court that some principle of  natural               justice had been contravened, the court has to               decide whether the observance of that rule was               necessary for a just decision on the facts  of               that  case.  The rule that enquiries  must  be               hold  in good faith and without bias, and  not               arbitrarily  or unreasonably, is now  included               among the principles of natural justice."               This Court also pointed out:               "The  dividing line between an  administrative               power and a quasijudicial power is quite  thin               and  is  being  gradually  obliterated.    For               determining    whether   a   power    is    an               administrative power or a quasi-judicial power               one  has  to look to the nature of  the  power

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             conferred, the person or persons on whom it is               conferred, the framework of the law conferring               that power, the consequences ensuring from the               exercise of that power and the manner in which               that  power is expected to be  exercised......               in recent years the concept of  quasi-judicial               power  has been undergoing a  radical  change.               What was considered as an administrative power               some  years back is now being considered as  a               quasi-judicial power."               It also observed:               "With  the  increase  of  the  power  of   the               administrative bodies it has become  necessary               to provide guidelines for the just exercise of               their  power.   To prevent the abuse  of  that               power  and  to see that it does not  become  a               new  despotism, Courts are gradually  evolving               the principles to be observed while exercising               such  powers.  In matters like  these,  public               good  is not advanced by a rigid adherence  to               precedents.    New  problems  call   for   now               solutions.   It   is  neither   possible   nor               desirable to fix the limits of a quasijudicial               power." 411 The  audi  alteram  rule  was  held  to  be  applicable   by implication,    to  a  case  of deprivation  of  a  right  in property  in Daud Ahmed v. District Magistrate  Allahabad  & Ors. (AIR 1972 SC 896 & 899) where this Court held:               "It  is  the  nature  of  the  power  and  the               circumstances and conditions under which it is               exercised that will occasion the invocation of               the principle of natural justice.  Deprivation               of  property affects rights of a  person.   If               under  the Requisition Act the petitioner  was               to  be  deprived  of  the  occupation  of  the               premises  the District Magistrate had to  hold               an  enquiry in order to arrive at  an  opinion               that  there existed alternative  accommodation               for the petitioner or the District  Magistrate               was to provide alternative accommodation." The  Mysore High Court, in the judgment under appeal,  seems to  have  boon of opinion that the principle  laid  down  in Cooper  v.  The Board of Works for the  Wandsworth  District (supra)  was  departed  from  in  King  v.  The  Electricity Commissioners  (supra) and by the Privy Council  in  Nakkuda Ali  v.  M.  F. De S. Jayaratne  (supra).   The  Electricity Commissioners’  case was followed by this Court in  Province of  Bombay   v.  Khushadas .’V. Advani  (supra).   The  High Court’s view seems to have been that this line of  reasoning prevented the Court from inferring any procedure apart  from that  laid down in the statute.  It seemed to have  been  of opinion that only what was laid down in the Constitution  is the Constitutional law of the land.  This is clear from  the following passage in the judgment under appeal:               "The principles of natural justice  recognised               in  this  country arc largely if  not  wholly’               moulded  by  the  decisions  of  the   English               Courts. In this country, as in England, though               the  principles  of  natural  justice  are  of               utmost  importance  in the  administration  of               justice   they  do  not  form  part   of   the               Constitutional  law  of  our  country   except               probably when we consider cases falling  under               Article 311 of the Constitution.  Some of  our

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             statutes  embody those principles but  largely               they  are the product of  judicial  decisions.               Those  principles  do not  over-ride  specific               provisions  contained in any.  statute  unless               the  same comes into conflict with any of  the               provisions in the Constitution." We  may  point out that, in holding the  impugned  provision void for contravention of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, the  High  Court  itself relied on a  principle  of  natural justice  inasmuch as it held that a procedure providing  ,or due  hearing  to the party affected before  a  building  was condemned to be demolished was not provided in the  impugned Act.   In  other words, the High Court itself  was  treating rules  of  natural justice as part of  requirements  of  our Constitutional  law  although  they  are  not   specifically conferred upon citizens under a separate heading. We  think that the Electricity Commissioners’  case  (supra) which  was followed by this Court in Khushaldas S.  Advani’s case  (supra), was not really a departure from  the  general principle laid down in 412 Cooper  v.  The Board of Works for the  Wandsworth  District (supra), but, it was an attempt to formulate the  conditions under  which the general principle laid down  thereby  Erle, C.J., who quoted the Biblical story of how even God  Himself had given Adam an opportunity of answering why he had  eaten the forbidden fruit before, expelling him from Paradises was applicable  in the circumstances of an increasingly  complex economic  and  social  order whose  problems  compelled  the emergence  of  the welfare socialistic State with  its  many organs  armed with extensive powers.  Courts  attempted,  in the interests of justice, where its imperative demands  were not met, to control administrative action by assimilating it to   judicial  action  over  which  Courts  could   exercise supervision.  In later cases, emphasis was more on the needs of  justice  and fairness rather than upon  the  distinction between    the   judicial   and    administrative    action. Administrative  action had, however, to be given free  scope within its legitimate sphere without jeopardizing rights  of individuals  affected.   Policies and schemes  framed  under statutory  provisions, which affected rights of  individuals could  impose  the obligations upon the  authorities  taking what were essentially administrative decisions at points  at which  they begin to impinge on specific individual  rights. It is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit  the giving of an opportunity to be heard, but,  on the  other  hand, the nature of the statutory  duty  imposed itself  necessarily  implied an obligation  to  hear  before deciding  that  the  "audi alteram  partem"  rule  could  be imported.  The nature of the hearing would, of course,  vary according  to the nature of the function and what  its  just and  fair  exercise  required  in  the  context  of   rights affected. We must, therefore, examine the nature of functions  imposed by statute and the requirements they are designed to meet in applying the tests stated above.  We think that, the duty to hear  those  whose  dwellings are to  be  condemned  becomes imperative  before  deciding to  demolish  their  particular buildings  although we do not think that any  quasi-judicial trial was called for.  All that was necessary was to I  hear objections,  checked  by  spot  inspections,  where  needed, before  taking  a decision.  This would have  met  with  the requirements of natural justice in such cases where emergent action  may sometimes be very necessary.  We may  point  out that,  in  cases of demolition orders, pursuant  to  schemes

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framed  under the Housing Act in England, the duty  to  hear before making them was held by the Court to be implied.  The earliest of these cases was Cooper v.The Board of Works  for Wandsworth District.These duties are now imposed by  statute (see Sections 16 and 20 of Housing Act, 1967). Before  proceeding to deal with the questions that arise  it is necessary to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Section 3 provides for declaration of slum areas.  It reads "(1)  Where the competent authority upon report from any  of its officers or other information in its possession is satisfied that- (a)  any   area is or may become a source of danger  to  the public  health, safety or convenience of residents  in  that area or in its 413 neighbourhood.  by  reason  of  the  area  being   lowlying, insanitary squalid or otherwise, or (b)  the buildings in any area, used or intended to be  used for human habitation- (i)  are in any respect unfit for human habitation; or (ii) are, by reason of dilapidation, over crowding, faulty  arrangement or design, narrowness or faulty arrangement  of streets,   lack   of  ventilation,  light,   or   sanitation facilities, or any combination of these factors, detrimental to safety,. health or morals; it  may,  by notification in the official  Gazette,  declare such area to tea slum area- (2)  In  determining whether a building is unfit  for  human habitation for the purposes of this Act, regard hall be  had to  its condition in respect of the following matters,  that is to any- (a) repair; (b)  stability; (c)  freedom from damp; (d)  natural light and air; (e)  water supply; (f)  drainage and sanitary conveniences; (g)  facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of food and for the disposal of waste water; and the building shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid if and  only  if it is so far defective in one or more  of  the said  matters  that  it  is  not  reasonably  suitable   for occupation in that conditions."’ Once an area is declared as a slum area, the owner of  every building  in  that  area  has  to  apply  to  the  competent authority  as required by section 3-A(1) of the Act for  the registration  of the building owned by him in that area  and also furnished to the said authority such particulars as may be required by it. Section 3-B lays down: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force; no person shall- (ii)in  respect  of any area declared as a slum  area  under section 3 after the commencement of the said Act, subsequent to the date of declaration of such area as a slum area, erect any new building in such slum area, or make any  addi- tion  to or any alteration in any building already  existing on the said date in such slum area, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority and subject to such restrictions or conditions as may be imposed by  the said authority." 414 Section  9  gives  power to declare any slum area  to  be  a clearance ;area.  It leads :

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.lm15 "(1) Where the competent authority upon a report from any of its  Officers  or  other information in  its  possession  is satisfied   .as  respects  any  slum  area  that  the   most satisfactory  method of dealing with the conditions  in  the area is the demolition of all the buildings in the area, the authority  shall  by  an order  notified  ,in  the  official Gazette, declare the area to be a clearance area, that is to say,  an area to be cleared of all buildings  in  accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided  that any building in the area which is  not  unfit for human habitation or dangerous or injurious to health may be excluded from the declaration if the authority  considers it necessary. (2)The  competent authority shall forthwith transmit to  the State  Government  a  copy of  the  declaration  under  this section  together with a statement of the number of  persons who  .on  a date specified in the statement  were  occupying buildings comprised in the clearance area." Section  12 gives power to the State Government  to  acquire land.  It reads : "  (1)  Where  on  any  representation  from  the  competent authority it appears to the State Government that, in  order to  enable the authority to execute any work of  improvement in  relation  to any building in a slum area or to  form  or widen  lanes  .and  roads  the-rein  or  to  re-develop  any clearance  area,  or  to rehabilitate slum  dwellers  it  is necessary to acquire- (a)  any  land within, adjoining or surrounded by  any  such slum area or clearance area; or (b)  any other land in any locality; the  State Government may acquire the land by publishing  in the  official Gazette a notice to the effect that the  State Government  has decided to acquire the land in pursuance  of this section : Provided  that before publishing such notice the State  Gov- ernment may call upon the owner, or any other person who, in the  opinion of the State Government may be  interested  in, such  land to show cause why it should not be acquired,  and after  considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner  or any   other  person  interested  in  the  land,  the   State Government may pass such order as it may deem fit. (2)When  a notice as aforesaid is published in the  official ,Gazette,  the land shall on and from the date on which  the notice  is  so  published,  vest  absolutely  in  the  State Government free from all encumbrances." 415 Section  16  prescribes  the  basis  for  determination   of compensation  for  the land acquired under section  12.   It reads :               "(1)  The  amount payable as  compensation  in               respect  of any land acquired under this  Act,               shall be determined in the manner specified in               sub-section (2).               (2)(a) In respect of any land within adjoining               or  surrounded by any slum area  or  clearance               area-               (i)   the amount payable as compensation shall               be  the  amount equal to sixty times  the  net               average monthly income actually derived  from,               such  land during the period of five  consecu-               tive years immediately preceding the date  of’               publication  of  the  notice  referred  to  in               section12; and               (ii)  the net average monthly income  referred

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             to,  above shall be calculated  in  accordance               with the principles and in the manner set  out               in the Second Schedule.               (b)   In respect of any other land, the amount               payable:  as compensation shall  be,an  amount               equal to the market value of such land on  the               date  of  publication  of  the  notice   under               section 12 : Provided that the amount payable under clause (a) or  clause (b) shall not be in excess of the market value of the:  land or similar land on the first day of July 1959. (3)The prescribed authority shall, after holding an inquiry, in  the prescribed manner, determine in accordance with  the provisions of subsection (2) the amount payable as compensa- tion and publish a notice in the official Gazette specifying the  amount so determined and calling upon the owner of  the land’ and every person interested therein to intimate to  it before a. date specified in the notice whether such owner or person  agrees, to the amount so determined and if  he  does not  so  agree,  what. amount he claims  to  be  the  amount payable as compensation- (4)Any  person  who  does not agree to the  amount  of  com- pensation determined by the prescribed authority under  sub- section  (3) and claims a sum in excess of that  amount  may prefer  an appeal to the Court of the District Judge  having jurisdiction  within thirty days from the date specified  in the notice referred to in that sub-section. (5)On. appeal, the Court of the District Judge shall  deter- mine the amount of compensation and its determination  shall be final. (6)Where  there  is any building on the arid in  respect  of which the amount of compensation has been determined 416 under clause (a) of sub-section (2) no separate compensation shall be paid in respect of such building. Provided  that where the owner of the land and the owner  of the  building  on such land are  different,  the  prescribed authority shall apportion the amount of compensation between the owner of the land and the owner of the building in  such proportion as it considers reasonable: Provided  further  that the compensation in respect  of  the building shall not in any case exceed fifty per cent of  the total  amount of compensation which has been  determined  in accordance with the provisions of this section." As  pointed  out by the High Court, no  appeal  is  provided against  the declaration made under sections 3 and 9.  Those declarations  have far-reaching consequences.  While  acting under section 3 and 9 the possibility of arbitrary decisions cannot  be ruled out.  ’ It must also be borne in mind  that most  of  the owners of properties in the  slum  area-,  are likely to be poor persons with slender means.  On the  other hand  it  may also be necessary to bear in mind  that  quite often the persons who live in the slums may not be owners of the property but all the slum area might be owned by a  rich person.   In such cases .the residents of  slums  themselves might  be interested in the slums being declared  as  slums. Once an area is declared as a slum area the owners of  every building  therein  have to apply for registration  of  their buildings.  No owner of a property in the area can erect any now  building or make any addition to, or alteration in  any existing  building without previous permission which may  be subject to such restrictions or conditions as may be imposed by  the  competent authority.  The authority  concerned  may also call upon the owners to carry out works of  improvement and  if such a direction is not complied with the  authority

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may itself execute the works of improvement and recover the’ cost from him.  Under section 10 the owners of the buildings may  be asked to vacate and demolish them and on failure  to do  so the buildings may be demolished and the cost  of  de- molition recovered from the owners. A  notification  under  section  9 enables  an  area  to  be declared  a  ,clearance  area on the ground  that  the  most satisfactory  method of dealing with the conditions  in  the area  is  the demolition of all the buildings in  the  area. But even in a slum area there may be buildings which may not have  to  be  pulled  down and they may  be  in  quite  good condition.  The proviso to sub-section (1) provides for such a  contingency but if there is no provision for hearing  the affected  person  he  cannot  bring to  the  notice  of  the concerned authority that his building is not unfit for human habitation  or  dangerous or injurious to  health  and  such person would go unheard.  There can be no two opinions about the  need to hear the affected persons before  declaring  an area  to  be  a slum area under section 3 or an  area  as  a clearance area under section 9 or before taking action under section  10.  All these difficulties will be removed if  the affected  persons  are given an opportunity to be  heard  in respect of the action proposed. 417 With regard to section 12(1)(b), however, we do not consider that  that is a section which suffers from the same vice  as the  other sections.  The validity of section  12(1)(a)  has been upheld by the High Court and as we agree with the  High Court we do not think it is necessary to say anything  more. As  regards section 12(1)(b), however, we do not agree  with the  High Court that the power to acquire any other land  in any locality suffers from any constitutional objection.  The power under section 12(1) is exercisable to execute any work of improvement in relation to any building in a slum area or to  form or widen lanes and roads therein or  to  re-develop any clearance area.  The power under section 12(1) (a) would be relatable to this purpose.  But that section also enables acquisition  of lands to rehabilitate slum  dwellers.   Such rehabilitation may not be in the original slum area  itself. By its very nature a slum area is likely to be  over-crowded and  in redeveloping it not enough land may be available  to house  all persons formerly living in the cleared area.   It may  be necessary to acquire other lands for the purpose  of rehabilitating  them.,  Therefore the  power  under  section 12(1)(b)  is  relatable  to the purpose  of  slum  clearance itself.   Furthermore, that power is nothing more  than  the power  available  to  a  State  Government  under  the  Land Acquisition Act.  As the section itself provides for calling upon the owner or any other person interested in the land to show  cause why it should not be acquired,  which  provision corresponds to section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, we do not consider that this section suffers from any defect. As regards section 15 though the High Court considered  that it was not necessary to go into its validity in view of  its finding regarding the other sections, it may be necessary to consider  the validity of this section in the view  that  we have taken holding that the sections themselves are not  bad but  only the notifications issued thereunder.  But we  were informed  at  the bar by the learned Advocate  appearing  on behalf of the State of Mysore that a subsequent amendment of the Act has made provision regarding compensation applicable to  acquisitions  under section 12 of the Act  on  the  same terms  as  under  the  Land Acquisition  Act.   We  do  not, therefore,  consider it necessary to express any opinion  on the validity of section 15.

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In the result the appeals are allowed in part.  We hold that sections  3, 9 and 12(1)(a) and (b) are valid but the  three notifications, already referred to, are bad as the  affected persons   were   not   given  an   opportunity   of   making representations against them.  In the circumstances of  this case there will be no order as to costs. P.H.P. Appeals allowed in part. 418