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PETITIONER: GOPAL KRISHNA DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SAILENDRA NATH BISWAS & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT26/02/1975

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH GUPTA, A.C.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1290            1975 SCR  (3) 726  1975 SCC  (1) 815

ACT: Civil   Procedure   Code--Order  21  Rule   71--Meaning   of deficiency  of  price  accrued  by  reason  of  the  auction purchasers’    default--Whether   deficiency    should    be attributable  to the default of  auction  purchaser--Section 12(2)  of Limitation Act 1963--Time requisite for  obtaining certified  copy--Whether  means time  properly  required  or includes time spent negligently.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was one of the joint owners of the premises in question.  In ,,execution of a money decree obtained against the appellant his share in the property was put to sale  and was purchased by the father of the first respondent for  Rs. 77,000.  The purchaser deposited 25 per cent of the purchase price.   The property was put to sale once again and was  in fact  knocked down for a sum of Rs. 700/- in favour  of  the father   of  respondent  No.  1.  The  appellant   made   an application under Order XXI Rule 71 of C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale from the purchase.  Order XXI Rule 71 C.P.C. reads as under :--               "Any deficiency of price which may happen on a               re-sale  by reason of the purchaser’s  default               and all expenses attending such re-sale, shall               be  certified to the Court by the  Officer  or               other  person holding the sale, and  shall  at               the  instance of either the decree  holder  or               the  judgment debtor, be recoverable from  the               defaulting  purchaser  under  the   provisions               relating to the execution of a decree for  the               payment of money." The proclamation of sale for the first sale stated that  the premises were free from encumbrances.  Proclamation for  the second  sale, however, states that the entire  ground  floor excepting two road-side shops, was let out. The  Learned  Single Judge allowed the  application  of  the appellant  and directed the purchaser to pay the  deficiency with  interest.   The  Division Bench  ,of  the  High  Court allowed  the appeal and dismissed application filed  by  the appellant  under Order XXI Rule 71 for recovering  from  the auction  purchaser  the deficiency in the  said  price.   On

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appeal  by certificate under Article 133(1)(a) & (c) it  was contended  before  this Court by the appellant that  he  was entitled to recover from the first respondent the deficiency in  the  price realised in the second sale under  Order  XXI Rule  71.  The respondent contended that the  appellant  can recover the defficiency in the second sale only if it can be attributed to default of the auction purchaser. HELD: The application of Order XXI rule 71 is limited to cases  in which the deficiency of price has occurred by reason of  the auction  purchaser’s default.  Property once put to sale  in execution  proceedings  may have to be  resold  for  reasons which  may or may not be connected with the default  of  the auction  purchaser.   It is not enough that  the  resale  is occasioned  by the default of the auction purchaser.  It  is further  necessary  that the resale must result in  a  defi- ciency  of  price which deficiency is  attributable  to  the default of the auction purchaser.  In the first proclamation of  sale there was no mention of the lease.  In  the  second proclamation  the lease has been mentioned.  In the city  of Calcutta  where  premises  are  situated,  the  West  Bengal Premises  Tenancy Act, 1956 was in force at the time of  the second sale.  Under that Act tenants enjoyed the  privileges of standard rent and immunity from eviction.  The  reference in  the second sale proclamation to a lease and to the  fact that  substantial part of the property was in occupation  of the  tenant  was bound to affect the  marketability  of  the property.   Order  XXI  rule 71 is intended  to  provide  an expeditious  remedy  to the judgment debtor  or  the  decree holder  who has suffered a detriment due to the  default  of the auction purchaser. [729C; G; 731B-D] 727 (2)  The  appeal  before the Division  Bench  was  not  time barred.   The  time requisite for obtaining  Certified  copy means  time  properly required and an  appellant  cannot  in computation  of  the period of limitation  :for  filing  the appeal   ask   for  exclusion  of  time  which   was   spent negligently.  in the present case settlement of  the,  draft decree was adjourned from time to time by an officer of  the court on being properly satisfied that there was good reason for adjournment.  The Auction purchaser cannot be blamed for the  time  thus spent in settling the draft  of  the  decree under appeal. [734F-G]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal no. 10,  2332  & 2333 of 1968. From the Judgment & Order dated the 21st March, 1967 of  the Calcutta High Court in Appeal Nos. 9, 10 and 43 of 1959. P. K. Sen and G. S. Chatterjee, for the appellant. A. K. Sen, P. K. Chatterjee, Rathin Das and Mrs. Anjana Sen, for respondent No. 1 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD,  J.  Premises No. 4-A, Chowringhee  Road,  Cal- cutta, belonged to the appellant Gopal Krishna Das and  four others,  each having an undivided one-fifth  share  therein. In  1951, one Ganga Prosad Gupta obtained two  money-decrees against the appellant and another person in the total sum of Rs.  12,378.  In execution of these decrees,  the  undivided one-fifth share of the appellant was put to sale on June 16, 1954 and was purchased by Pashupati Nath Biswas, the  father of  the  first respondent, for Rs. 77,040.   Pashupati  Nath Biswas  deposited Rs. 19,260 in the court, being 25% of  the

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purchase  price and later he deposited a further sum of  Rs. 15,000.   He  however,  failed to pay  the  balance  of  the purchase  price whereupon the appellant made an  application that the property be put to a fresh sale.  Accordingly,  the property  was put to sale on March 20, 1957 and  once  again Pashupati  Nath Biswas was the highest bidder.  But  whereas in  the first sale he had offered a bid of Rs.  77,040  this time  the sale was knocked down in his favour for  a  paltry sum  of Rs. 700.  The second sale was confirmed on  May  29, 1957. In  the  meanwhile, on May 16, 1957  the  Sheriff  certified under Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the deficiency in the price realised in the second sale  due to  the default of the auction purchaser, after  giving  him credit  in  the sum of Rs, 15,000 paid by him in  the  first sale,  amounted  to  Rs.  61,340 apart  from  the  cost  and expenses of the sales. On  June  28, 1957 the appellant made an  application  under Order XXI, Rule 71 C.P.C. for recovering the deficiency from Pashupati  Nath  Biswas.   A learned  single  Judge  of  the Calcutta  High Court allowed that application and direct  by an order dated August 19, 1958 that Pashupati Nath Biswas do pay to the appellant a sum of Rs. 42,080 with interest at 6% per  annum.   This order was challenged  by  Pashupati  Nath Biswas in appeal No. 10 of 1959. The  auction purchaser had also filed an application  asking that  the  appellant  be restrained  from  taking  execution proceedings for recover- 728 ing the deficiency in price.  That prayer was rejected.   It may be mentioned that pursuant to an application dated April 13,  1957  filed by the auction purchaser  himself,  it  was directed  by an order dated May 21, 1957 that a sum  of  Rs. 22,000  be  paid by the, Sheriff out of  the  sale  proceeds lying with him, to the Official Receiver in satisfaction  of the decree obtained by Ganga Prosad Gupta against the  appe- llant, in execution of which the two sales were held.  Ganga Prosad  Gupta’s estate, it seems, had come to be  vested  in the Official Receiver, he is the second respondent to  these appeals.   The auction purchaser prayed that the Sheriff  do pay to him the balance after deducting therefrom the sum  of Rs.  22,000  and the cost and the expenses of  the  Sheriff. This prayer was also rejected.  The auction purchaser  filed appeal  No.  9  of 1959 against  the  order  rejecting  this application. The  appellant  then  filed  an  application  for  an  order directing  that  the Sheriff do pay to him  all  the  moneys lying with him after deducting the cost and the expenses  of the  sales.   That application was allowed  by  the  learned single  Judge on December 11, 1958.  The  auction  purchaser challenged that order in appeal No. 43 of 1959. The  three appeals were heard together and disposed of by  a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court by three  separate judgments.   By  its.  judgment dated  March  21,  1967  the Division Bench allowed appeal No. 10 of 1959, and  dismissed the application filed by the appellant under order XXI, Rule 71 for recovering from the auction purchaser the  deficiency in  the sale price.  The two other appeals were disposed  of consistently  with  that judgment.   The  auction  purchaser Pashupati  Nath  Biswas having died on April 16,  1964,  the first respondent Sailendra Nath Biswas came on the record of the,  appeals as his Executor and legal representative.   On December  15, 1967 the High Court granted to  the  appellant leave  to  file  an  appeal  to  this  Court  under  Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution.

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Questions ’raised in the High Court by the rival parties  as regards  the  disbursement  by the Sheriff  of  the  balance remaining  with  him after.satisfying Ganga  Prosad  Gupta’s decree are incidental to the main controversy arising out of the appellant’s application- under Order XXI, Rule 71,  Code of  Civil  Procedure.   The real question  for  decision  is whether the appellant is entitled under Order XXI, Rule  71, to  recover from the first respondent the deficiency in  the price realised in the second sale. The  scheme  of the Code in relation to execution  sales  is like  this  Under Order XXI, Rule 64 any Court  executing  a decree  may order the sale of a property in satisfaction  of the decree.  Order 21, Rule 66 provides that the Court shall cause a proclamation of the intended sale to be made.   Sub- Rule (2) of Rule 66 specifies the details which are required to  be  mentioned in the proclamation of sale.   The  person declared to be the purchaser must under order XXI, Rule  84, pay  immediately after the declaration a deposit of  25%  of the purchase-money.  In default of such deposit the property has to be re-sold forthwith.  By Rule 85 the full amount  of purchase-money  has  to be paid by the purchaser  within  15 days from the date of sale.  If the 729 purchaser  commits  a default, the deposit is liable  to  be forfeited  to  the Government by virtue of Rule 86  and  the property is liable to be re-sold.  A re-sale of property, in default  of payment of the purchase-money, can be made  only after the issue of a fresh proclamation as provided in  Rule 87.  Under Order 21, Rule 71 :               "Any deficiency of price which may happen on a               re-sale by reason of the purchaser’s  default,               and all expenses attending such re-sale, shall               be  certified to the Court by the  officer  or               other  person holding the sale, and shall,  at               the  instance of either the decree  holder  or               the  judgment debtor, be recoverable from  the               defaulting  purchaser  under  the   provisions               relating to the execution of a decree for  the               payment of money It  is  clear  on  a careful reading of  Rule  71  that  its application  is limited to cases in which the deficiency  of price  has  occurred by reason of  the  auction  purchaser’s default.  Property once put to sale in execution proceedings may  have to be re-sold for reasons which may or may not  be connected with the default of the, auction purchaser.  A re- sale  consequent on the failure of the auction purchaser  to deposit  25% of the purchase price immediately after  he  is declared  to be the purchaser of the property or  a  re-sale consequent  upon his failure to deposit the balance  of  the purchase  price  within 15 days of the safe  are  instances’ when the re-sale is occasioned by the default of the auction purchaser.   On the other hand, re-sale consequent upon  the setting  aside  of  the  sale  on  the  ground  of  material irregularity  in  publishing  or  conducting  the  sale   as provided  in Order XXI, Rule 90, may not be attributable  to the default of the purchaser.’ The provisions of Order  XXI, Rule 71, come into play only if the property is required  to be resold on account of the default of the action purchaser. If  the  re-sale,  is not due  to  the  auction  purchaser’s default,  there can be no question of mulcting him with  the deficiency in the price realised in the re-sale. The  words : "Any deficiency of price which may happen on  a resale  by reason of the purchaser’s default"  occurring  in Rule 71 therefore mean : "Any deficiency of price which on a resale may happen by reason of the purchaser’s default".  As

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stated before, the question of holding the auction purchaser liable to make good the defficiency in price can arise  only if  the re-sale is occasioned by his default.   But  though, this is necessary, it is not enough to meet the requirements of  Rule  71.   What  is  necessary  is  that  the   re-sale occasioned by the auction purchaser’s default must result in a  deficiency of price, which deficiency is attributable  to his  default.   A  resale may have to be  held  because  the auction  purchaser  has  committed  default  in  paying  the deposit  of 25% under Order XXI, Rule 84, or because of  his default  in paying the full price which 15 days of the  sale as  required  by Rule 85.  And yet the deficiency  of  price realised  in  the  re-sale may not be  attributable  to  his default  as,  for  example, where the market  value  of  the property  is  reduced to the discovery or disclosure  of  an infirmity in the right, title and interest of the  judgment- debtor in the property put to sale.  An encumbrance existing on the property at 730 the  time  of  the  first sale  but  not  disclosed  in  the proclamation of that sale will have no bearing on the  price realised  in the auction sale, unless the existence  of  the encumbrance  was  otherwise  known  to  the  bidders.    The disclosure  of  that encumbrance in  the  sale  proclamation accompanying  the  re-sale must, on normal  commercial  con- siderations,  have  a  direct impact on the  price,  of  the property  put  to sale.  In such a case  the  deficiency  of price  realised  in  the resale  will  be  attributable  not necessarily to the default of the auction ,purchaser but  to circwnstances  extraneous to his default.  Order  XXI,  Rule 71,  concerns itself not with that class of cases  but  with those  in which the deficiency of price realised in the  re- sale   is  attributable  to  the  default  of  the   auction purchaser. Even  a broad and non-too-meticulous examination of the  two proclamation  of  sale  in the instant  case  is  enough  to conclude  that the deficiency in price realised in  the  re- sale  cannot  be  said to have happened on  account  of  the auction  purchaser’s  default.  The first sale was  held  on June  16, 1954 and the proclamation of sale accompanying  it is  dated May 10, 1954.  The second sale was held  on  March 20,  1957 for which the relevant sale proclamation is  dated February 8, 1957.  Both the proclamations mention that  what was being put to sale was the right, little and interest  of the appellant, Gopal Krishna Das, in the undivided one fifth share  in the particular property.  But there is a  material difference  in the terms of the two proclamations in  regard to   the  encumbrances  existing  on  the   property.    The proclamation of 1954 sets out in a tabular form encumbrances like  leases  and  mortgages  to  which  the  ,Property  was previously subjected, as appearing from the affidavit of one Damodar Mullick.  The proclamation then says :-               "It  appears from the said affidavit that  all               the Mortgages have been reconveyed.  The lease               has  expired.  The sale is in respect  of  the               undivided  1/5th share of Purna Ch.  Das.   It               appears from the said affidavit that the 1/5th               share  of Gopal Kr.  Das in the said  premises               is free from encumbrances." The  proclamation  of 1957, relying on an affidavit  of  one Sudhansu  Kumar Roy says undoubtedly that  the,  appellant’s one-fifth  share was free from encumbrances but the  tabular statement  of  encumbrances  included  in  the  proclamation refers  to  a  Term  Lease and Agreement  of  1955  and  the proclamation says :

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             "The  lease  of 1955 is for  five  years  from               October,  1955 and the same is in  respect  of               the  Restaurant "Bombay Crown" containing  the               entire  ground floor excenting two  road  side               shops  and was executed by one Abde Ali  Abdul               Hussain,  in  favour of  Ashlifaq  and  Jaffar               Hussain." It is notorious that properties in possession of tenants who enjoy  the  protection of Rent Acts do not  fetch  the  same price as properties of which the purchaser can obtain vacant possesion.  In the 731 city of Calcutta where the Property in question is situated, The  West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, XII of 1956,  was  in force,  at the time of the second sale.  Under that Act  the tenants enjoyed the privileges of standard rent and immunity from eviction save on stated grounds.  It is unnecessary  to enter  into refinements arising out of the West  Bengal  Act but even the sub-tenants would appear to enjoy thereunder  a certain amount of immunity from eviction.  Reference may  in this behalf be made to sections 13(2), (4), (5) and  section 16 of the Act of 1956. The  reference  in the second sale proclamation  to  a  live lease and sub-lease and to the fact that a substantial  part of tlie property was in occupation of the tenant or the sub- tenant  was  bound  to  affect  the  marketability  of   the property.  The paltry price realised in the second sale  may justifiably be attributed to the disclosure of  encumbrances in the second proclamation, which were not mentioned in  the first  proclamation.   It is not without  significance  that apart  from the auction purchaser there were no  bidders  at the  second sale.  The paucity of bidders may reasonably  be taken  to reflect the fall in the value of the  property  in the estimation of prospective bidders. Order  XXI,  Rule 71 is intended to provide  an  expeditious remedy  to the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder who  has suffered  a  detriment  due to the default  of  the  auction purchaser.  The officer or other person holding the sale has to.  certify to the Court the deficiency of price which  on, the re-sale has happened by the purchaser’s default and  all expenses attending the re-sale.  Upon such certification the amount becomes recoverable from the defaulting purchaser  at the  instance of the decree-holder or  the  judgment-debtor, "under the provisions relating to the execution of a  decree for  the  payment  of money".  The Code  has  not  made  the certificate  conclusive  of  the facts  stated  therein  and consequently  it  is  permissible to the  purchaser  who  is alleged  to have defaulted to challenge the  correctness  of the  certificate in all its particulars.  But the object  of certification,  as  evidenced  even  more  clearly  by   the provision that the proceeding to recover the amount will  be governed by provisions relating to the execution of a  money decree is to eschew an elaborate inquiry into the  competing causes culminating in the deficiency of price., This  object can  be  achieved only if the property successively  put  to sale  is in material respects identical, that is to  say  if the right. title and interest of the judgment debtor is  put to  sale under substantially the same description.  If  that happens it is easy to predicate that the deficiency of price has resulted on account of the purchaser’s default.  But if, as  here,  what was shown as unencumbered  in  the  previous proclamation   is   expressly   described   in   the   later proclamation  as being subject to an encumbrance which on  a reasonable  assessment, is calculated to affect  the  market value of the property, the proceeding ceases to be a  simple

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enough  matter  like  the execution of a  money  decree  and assumes  the  form of a contentious claim  open  to  diverse defences as in a substantive suit.  The speedy remedy intend to  be provided by Order XXI, Rule 71 will lose its  meaning and 732 purpose  if the executing court seized of the claim  against the,  alleged  defaulting  purchaser has to  embark  upon  a comparative,  evaluation  of  the causes  that  led  to  the deficiency  in  the  price.   Such,  meat  is  not  for  the executing court. Counsel  for  the appellant relied on certain  decisions  to fasten   liability  on  the  auction  purchaser  but   those decisions  will not help. In Annavajhula  Venkatachellamayya v.  Rama Girjee Milakanta Girjee(1), a purchaser in a  court auction  of  the  judgment-debtor’s  right  to  get  a   re- conveyance  of certain lands on payment of a  specified  sum was,  on default in payment of the balance  purchase  money, held liable to pay the deficiency in price on re-sale  under Order  XXI, Rule 71, C.P.C., though the date stipulated  for making  the  payment  in  order  to  get  the  re-conveyance happened  to be shortly after the court sale and before  the expiry  of  the 15 days within which the  auction  purchaser could  deposit  the balance of the  purchase-money.   Wallis C.J. observes in his judgment that the sale and the re-sale, were of the, judgment-debtor’s interest as it existed at the date  of the sale and the re-sale and that the  depreciation which occurred in the meantime was one for which the auction purchaser  was exclusively responsible.  In  his  concurring judgment  Kumaraswami  Sastriyar  J.  observes  that  having regard  to the fact that there is no warrant of title  in  a court auction, the maxim caveat emptor applies and therefore the purchaser cannot avoid the sale so long as the judgment- debtor has some saleable interest in the property, howsoever small.    The  learned  Judge  further  observes  that   the objections  which  a  defaulting  purchaser  can  urge   are practically  confined  to those which can be.  urged  in  an application  for  setting aside the sale  under  Order  XXI. Relying  on these observations it is contended on behalf  of the  appellant that since in the instant case the  judgment- debtor had a saleable interest the auction purchaser  cannot avoid  his liability to make up the deficiency in  price  on the ground that the deficiency was caused by the  disclosure of  the  encumbrance.   We  are  unable  to  appreciate  the relevance of the maxim caveat emptor on a question like  the one  before us.  The auction purchaser is not attempting  to avoid  the sale.  Far from it.  He adheres to  his  purchase but disputes his liability for the deficiency.  There is  no question of any failure on his part to take due care at  the time  of the first sale because that sale was held  in  1954 whereas   the   encumbrance  referred  to  in   the   second proclamation was stated to have been created in 1955. Madho v. Watsalubai(2), on which the appellant relies, was a case in which the existence of a maintenance charge and  the right of residence were omitted to be mentioned in the  sale proclamation.   The  High  Court at  Nagpur  held  that  the auction purchaser could not avoid his liability to make good the  deficiency  in the sale price as the  decree-bolder  in whose favour the charge was created had reiterated again and again  that  she was willing to waive the  charge.   Hidaya- tullah  J.  who  decided the case further  observes  in  his judgment that (1) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 474. (2) I.L.R. [1947] Nag. 939. 733

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on a comparison of the two sale proclamations he found  that the  existence  of the charge was not mentioned  in  either. Naturally,  the deficiency in price could not be  attributed to the, existence of the charge. In Nelluri Brahmaiah vs.  Mohd.  Sheik Mohiddin and Anr.,(1) the  auction  purchaser  disputed  his  liability  for  the, deficiency  on  the ground that the judgment debtor  had  no saleable  interest  in the property.   This  contention  was based  on  the  circumstance that though  the  property  was situated  in Venkatapuram it was wrongly described as  lying within  the  limits of Borrampalem.  There  was  no  dispute about  the boundaries, about the survey number or  the  area and  it was not suggested that there was any other  property of  the  particular description in  Borrampalem.   The  High Court of Andra Pradesh held that in these circumstances  the property  could be easily identified, that the  location  of the property put to sale was known to everyone concerned and therefore it was difficult to posit that the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property. The decisions in Baijnath Sahai vs.  Moheep Narain  Singh(") and in Gangadas Dayabhai vs.  Bai Suraj(3) , are more to the point.   These cases arose under section 293 of the Code  of 1882  corresponding  to Order XXI, Rule 71, of the  Code  of 1908.    In  the  Calcutta  case,  at  the  first  sale   no encumbrance  upon the properties sold was notified.  In  the re-sale two encumbrances were notified.  The second sale was held  because the auction purchaser had committed a  default in  paying the balance, of the purchase-price in  the  first sale.   The price fetched in the second sale resulted  in  a deficiency for which the auction purchaser was sought to  be made  liable.  Apart from the circumstance that the  decree- holder   was  himself  to  blame  for  not  mentioning   the encumbrances  in  the first proclamation and  was  therefore attempting  to  obtain an advantage of his  own  wrong,  the Calcutta  High Court expressed the legal position  correctly by  saying that "the re-sale contemplated by s. 293  of  the Code of Civil Procedure must be a sale of the same  property that was first sold, and under the same description, and any substantial  difference of description at the sale  and  the re-sale in any of the matters required to be specified by s. 287 to enable intending purchasers to judge of the value  of the property should disentitle the decree-holder to  recover the  deficiency of price ,under s. 293." In the Bombay  Case the  errors in the two proclamations were so confusing  that the  deficiency  in  the price could not, it  was  held,  be attributed to the default of the purchaser.  The description in  the second proclamation being materially different  from that in the first, the re-sale was not of the same  property and the auction purchaser, though he had defaulted in paying the  balance of the purchase-price was absolved from  making good the deficiency. It  was  contended that Pashupati Nath Biswas,  the  auction purchaser,  being  in possession of a part of  the  property must be deemed (1)  [1964] (1) Andhra Law Times, 321. (2)   I. L. R. 16 Cal. 535. (3)   I. L. R. 36 Bom. 329. 734 to  have  been  aware of the lease  and  the  sub-lease  and therefore  he  is  estopped from relying upon  the  same  as having  led  to the deficiency in, price.  No  estoppel  can arise against the auction purchaser on the question  whether the  deficiency  in price can be recovered  from  him.   The question  which arises under Order XXI, Rule 71  is  whether the  deficiency  can be attributed to the  default  of  the,

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auction purchaser or whether it can be reasonably attributed to  any other supervening circumstance.  This is not a  case in  which  the auction purchaser can be said  to  be  taking advantage of his own wrong.  He cannot therefore be estopped from  contending that the disclosure of the  encumbrance  is the operative cause of the fall in price. We may mention that the matter under consideration arose out of the Ordinary Original civil jurisdiction of the  Calcutta High Court and therefore the Original Side Rules of the High Court would govern the matter.  That will, however, not make any  difference to our decision because Chapter XXV, Rule  7 of  the Rules of 1914 provides by the Third clause  for  re- sale of the property in default of the payment of the  price by  the  purchaser within the stipulated time,.   The  Third clause  of Rule 7 provides : "Where the proceeds of the  re- sale  are  less  than  the  price  bid  by  such  defaulting purchaser,  the difference shall be leviable from him  under the  rules  contained  in  Order XXI of  the  Code  for  the execution of a decree for money." The Fifth clause of Rule 7 also  provides that the sale. is made under and  subject  to all  other  provisions  contained  in  the  Code  of   Civil Procedure relating to sales in execution of decrees.   Order XXI, Rule 71 of the Code would therefore apply. It was finally contended on behalf of the appellant that the appeal  filed by the auction purchaser from the judgment  of the single Judge to the Division Bench of the High Court was barred   by  limitation.   We  see  no  substance  in   this contention.   The  time requisite  for  obtaining  certified copies undoubtedly means "the time properly required" and an appellant  cannot  in  the  computation  of  the  period  of limitation for filling the appeal ask for exclusion of  time which  was  spent  negligently.  But  the  facts  and  dates mentioned  to  us by the appellant’s counsel show  that  the settlement  of the draft decree was adjourned from  time  to time by an officer of the court on being property  satisfied that  there  was good reason for  adjournment.  The  auction purchaser  cannot be blamed for the time thus spent in  set- tling  the draft of the decree under appeal.   The  argument must therefore fail. For these reasons we confirm the judgments and dismiss these appeals with Costs.  Costs shall be in one set. P.H.P.                       Appeals dismissed. 735