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PETITIONER: GODAVARI SUGAR MILLS LTD.  AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: S.   B. KAMBLE AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/03/1975

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BHAGWATI, P.N. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1193            1975 SCR  (3) 885  1975 SCC  (1) 696  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC1296  (18,48)  E          1990 SC1771  (9)

ACT: Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands (Ceilings and  Holdings)Act, (27  of  1961) as amended by Acts of 1968,  1969  and  1970- Principal  Act included in the Ninth Schedule-Amending  Acts if protected by Art. 31A or 31B.

HEADNOTE: The  Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceilings  on  Holdings) Act,  1961  came  into  force  on  January  26,  1962.   The constitutional  validity  of the Act was challenged  in  the High  Court and the High Court held that the  provisions  of the Act, other than s. 28, were a measure of agrarian reform and were protected by Art. 31A of the Constitution.  Section 28, however, was held to be violative Art. 14.  In 1964, the Constitution (17th Amendment) Act was passed, as a result of which  the  1961 Act, including s. 28, was included  in  the Ninth  Schedule.   The  1961  Act  was  amended  by  various Maharashtra  Acts, namely Act 16 of 1968, 33 of 1968, 37  of 1969  and  27 of 1970.  The constitutional validity  of  the 1961-Act  as  amended by the various Maharashtra  Acts,  was again  challenged but the High Court upheld the validity  of the  Act as amended on the ground that it was  protected  by Arts. 3 1A and 31B of the Constitution. Dismissing the appeal to this Court, HELD : Though the various amendments to the Act of 1961 were not  protected by Art. 31B. they are, however, protected  by Art. 31A of the Constitution. [898 C-D; 907 A-B] 1.(a) The object of Art. 31B is to give a blanket protection to the Acts and Regulations specified in Ninth Schedule  and the  provisions of those Acts and Regulations,  against  any challenge  to them on the ground that they are  inconsistent with,  or  take  away, or abridge, any  of  the  fundamental rights  in  Part  III.  This  immunity  would  be  available notwithstanding  any judgment, decree or order of any  court or tribunal to the contrary. [896 H--897 B] (b)  The  specification  of  an Act  or  Regulation  in  the schedule  would not prevent the competent  legislature  from repealing  or  amending it.  The inclusion of.  the  Act  or

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Regulation in the Ninth Schedule would protect not only  the principal  Act or Regulation which is included in the  Ninth Schedule  but  also  the amendments  which  have  been  made therein  till  the date of such inclusion  even  though  the constitutional  amendment  by which it is  included  in  the Ninth   Schedule  refers  only  to  the  Principal  Act   or Regulation and not to the amendments made till then. [897 C- D] (c)  But  the  inclusion  in the Ninth  Schedule  would  not extend  the protection to any amendments made in the Act  or Regulation  after  the date of its inclusion  in  the  Ninth Schedule.   The  inclusion of the Act or Regulation  in  the Ninth  Schedule  is  brought  about  only  by  means  of  an amendment of the Constitution by the prescribed majority  in each  house  of Parliament under Art. 368.  It  is  for  the prescribed  majority  in  each house, to  decide  whether  a particular Act or Regulation should be inserted in the Ninth Schedule.  In case the Protection afforded by the Article is extended  to  amendments  made  in  the  Act  or  Regulation subsequent  to  its inclusion in the  Schedule,  the  result would  be,  that  even  those  provisions  would  enjoy  the protection  which were never scrutinised and could  not,  in the  very  nature of things, have been  scrutinised  by  the prescribed  majority vested with the power of  amending  the Constitution.   It would be tantamount to giving a power  to State  Legislatures to amend the Constitution in such a  way is would enlarge the contents of Ninth Schedule. [897 D-H] (d)  The protection of Art. 31B cannot also be invoked for a new  provision inserted by amendment after inclusion of  the Act  in  the  Ninth  Schedule on  the  _ground  that  it  is ancillary   or  incidental  to  the  provisions   to   which protection 886 has already been afforded by such inclusion.  Any  provision which has the effect of making an inroad into the  guarantee of fundamental rights should be construed very strictly  and it  would  not be permissible to widen the scope of  such  a provision  or to extend the frontiers of the protected  zone beyond  what is warranted by the language of the  provision. The  entitlement  to protection being confined only  to  the Acts,   Regulations  and  provisions  which  are   expressly mentioned  in  that  Schedule,  it  cannot  be  extended  to provisions which were not included therein.  This  principle would  hold  good  irrespective  of  the  fact  whether  the provision,  to which entitlement to protection is sought  to be  extended, deals with new substantive matters or  whether it  deals with matters which are incidental or ancillary  to those already protected. [897 H-898 D] Sri Rant Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay (1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R.  489,  Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan;  [1965]  1 S.C.R.  933;  State of Orissa v. Chandra Sekhar  Singh  Bhoi etc.  [19701 1 S.C.R. 593 and State of Maharashtra  etc.  v. Madhavrao  Damodar Patilchand & Ors., [1968] 3  S.C.R.  712, followed. (e)  The  case  of Ramanlal Gulab Chand  Shah  v.  State  of Gujarat  [1969]  1  SCR 42 does not lay down,  as  had  been assumed by the High Court. that if an amending Act does  not cover  a  new field but contains only provisions  which  are incidental  and  ancillary to those which are  protected  by Art. 31B, the Amending Act would also get the protection  of that Article. [900 C-D] 2 (a) The principles applicable in order to find out whether an  impugned enactment for acquisition of land is  protected by Art. 31A are : (i)  Acquisition  of  land by the State should  be  for  the

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purpose of agrarian reform.   The  scope of agrarian  reform is wider than that of land reform. (ii) Acquisition  of land by taking it from a senior  member of  the  family and giving it to a junior member  is  not  a measure of agrarian reform. (iii) Acquisition of land for urban slum clearance or for  a housing  scheme in the neighbourhood of a big city is not  a measure of agrarian reform. (iv) Acquisition of land by the State without specifying the purpose  for  which land is to be used is not a  measure  of agrarian reform. (v)  But  schemes of rural development envisaging  not  only equitable distribution of land but also raising of  economic standards  and  the  bettering of rural  health  and  social conditions  in  the villages, by making  provision  for  the assignment of land to a Panchayat for the use of the general community  or for hospitals, schools, manure  pits,  tanning grounds  etc.  which  ensure for the benefit  of  the  rural population, constitute a measure of agrarian reform. (vi)  Provision  for reservation of land  for  promotion  of agriculture  and for the welfare of agricultural  population constitutes a measure of agrarian reform. (vii)  If the dominant and general purpose of the scheme  is agrarian  reform,  the  scheme  may  provide  for  ancillary provisions to give full effect to the scheme. (viii) A provision fixing ceiling area and providing for the disposal  of  the surplus land in accordance with  rules  to implement  a  programme of agrarian reform is a  measure  of agrarian reform. [905 A-G] Kavalappara Kottarathi Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras JUDGMENT: Collector [1965] 1 SCR 614; Ranjit Singh & Ors. v. State  of Punjab & Ors. [1965] 1 SCR 82; Balmadies Plantations Ltd. v. State  of  Tamil Nadu [19731 1 SCR 258;  Kanan  Devan  Hills Produce Co. Ltd. v. The State of Kerala & Anr. [19731 1  SCR 356 and State of Kerala .It Anr. v. Gwalior Rayon Silk  Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. etc. [19731 2 SCC 713, and Fida Ali v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, [1974] 2 SCC 253 referred to. (b)  In  the  present case a  conspectus  of  the  different provisions  of the impugned Act goes to show that  the  main purpose   of  the  Act  was  to  prevent  concentration   of agricultural  land in the hands of a few.  Section 3 of  the impugned  Act imposes a ceiling on holding  of  agricultural land.   S.  4  provides that no person shall  hold  land  in excess of ceiling.  Under s. 14 inquiry is to 887 be  made  for  determining such excess.   On  completion  of inquiry a declaration is made under s. 21 giving particulars of the area which is delimited as surplus land.   Possession of  such  surplus  land is then taken by  the  Collector  on behalf  of  the State Government free of  all  encumbrances. Section  27 provides for the distribution of  surplus  land, and  s.  28 makes a special provision in  respect  of  lands taken over from industrial undertakings to ensure  efficient cultivation  and continued supply of raw-material for  those undertakings.   For such a purpose, if the State  Government considers it necessary to maintain the integrity of the land acquired  from  the industrial undertaking in  one  or  more compact  blocks, it might, subject to terms and  conditions, grant  the  land  or any part thereof  to  a  joint  farming society or a member thereof consisting, as far as  possible. of the persons specified in that section. [905 G-906 C] (c)From the preamble to the Amending Act 27 of 1970 and  the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government it appears  that efforts to set up a joint farming  society  as

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contemplated by s. 28 of the Act did not bear fruit in spite of the fact that the time for setting up of those  societies was  extended.  The State Government also found  that  short extensions of time was hampering the full and efficient  use of  the  land  for agriculture  and  the  Maharashtra  State Farming  Corporation, which had been cultivating  that  land for  the  interim period, could not undertake any  plans  or schemes for the improvement of the land because of the short extensions.   The State Government. therefore, decided  that the  cultivation  of the land might be  continued  with  the Maharashtra  State.   Farming  Corporation  on  a  permanent basis.   In arriving at this decision the  State  Government was   also   influenced  by  the  consideration   that   the implementation  of the joint farming societies scheme  would lead  to fragmentation of the land and hamper  its  economic development and for implementing this purpose. P. 28-IAA was inserted  in  the  Act  and  the  other  amendments  of  the principal Act  were made, by Act 27 of 1970. [906 C-F] (d)  It  could not be contended that  only  distribution  of acquired land among landless persons or poor peasants  would constitute   agrarian  reform,  and  that.  when  lands   of industrial undertakings are not so distributed but had to be cultivated by the State Farming Corporation, the acquisition cannot  be  considered to be a measure of  agrarian  reform. The  acquisition of land held by industrial undertakings  is not  to  be taken in isolation but as part  of  the  general scheme and object of the Act that there should be a  ceiling on  private  holdings.   S. 28-IAA has to be  taken  in  its context  and  setting  with the other  provisions  the  Act. Ordinarily   distribution  of  acquired  surplus   land   of individuals among landless persons and poor peasants is part of the scheme of agrarian reform.  The legislature here  has made  special  provision  in  respect of  land  held  by  an industrial   undertaking,   in   order   to   prevent    the fragmentation  of a large tract of land and to subserve  the purpose  of  supplying raw-material to the  undertaking  and provided  that  it  should be cultivated by  a  State  owned farming corporation.  Acquisition simpliciter of land by the State  to augment its resource& and without  specifying  the purpose  for which it is to be used after acquisition  would not get the protection of Art. 31A.  To decide the  question of protection. the general scheme of the statute  containing the  provision  for  the  acquisition.  the  object  of  the acquisition, and the reasons which weighed for retaining the land with the State or its corporation without  distributing it  among  the landless persons and poor peasants.  must  be considered.   The concept of agrarian reform is  not  static and  with  the change of times, under the  impact  of  fresh ideas and in the context of fresh situations, the concept of agrarian  reform  is  bound to acquire  new  dimensions.   A measure which has the effect of improving the rural  economy or  promoting  rural  welfare would be a  part  of  agrarian reform.   The  fact  that part of the  acquired  land  would remain  vested  in  the State Government or  a  State  owned farming corporation would not therefore militate against the object  of agrarian reform, if the continued vesting of  the land  in the Government or the corporation is a part of  the general  scheme of agrarian reform and there is  no  oblique deviation from the avowed purpose, especially when it is  in the interest of rural economy that the compact area  instead of  being  fragmented by distribution. be preserved  as  one compact   block  cultivated  by  the  State  owned   farming corporation.  [907 E-908 C] Ranjit Singh v. State of  Punjab [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82, followed. 888

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& CIVIL APPELLATE     JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1426 of 1974. From  the  judgment and order dated the  3/5/8-4-74  of  the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. 1271/68. A. K. Sen M. C. Bhandare, D. M. Popat, S. I. Thakore, P.  H. Parekh and Sunanda Bhandare, for the appellant. Niren  De, Attorney General of India and M. N.  Shroff,  for the respondents 1-4. I. N. Shroff, and J. C. Bhatt, for respondent No. 5. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by : KHANNA,  J. The short question which arises in  this  appeal filed  on certificate by Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd.  and  its two shareholder directors against the judgment of the Bombay High  Court  is the constitutional validity  of  Maharashtra Agricultural   Lands   (Ceiling  on  Holdings)   Act,   1961 (Maharashtra Act No. 27 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act) as amended by Maharashtra Acts Nos. 16 of 1968, 33 of 1968, 37 of 1969 and 27 of 1970.  The High Court has upheld the validity of the Act on the ground that it  is protected by article 31A and 31B of the Constitution. The  principal  Act  came into force on  January  26,  1962. According  to  its  long title, it was an act  to  impose  a maximum  limit (or ceiling) on the holding  of  agricultural land  in  the  State  of Maharashtra;  to  provide  for  the acquisition and distribution of land held in excess of  such ceiling;  and  for  matters  connected  with  the   purposes aforesaid.   Section  3  of the Act deals  with  ceiling  on holding of agricultural land.  According to that section, in order   to  provide  the  more  equitable  distribution   of agricultural  land  amongst the peasantry of  the  State  of Maharashtra  (and  in particular, to provide  that  landless persons  are  given land for personal cultivation),  on  the commencement  of  the  Act, there shall be  imposed  to  the extent,  and in the manner hereinafter provided,  a  maximum limit  (or  ceiling)  on the holding  of  agricultural  land throughout  the  State.  Section 4 provides that  no  person shall hold land in excess of the ceiling area, while section 5  specifies as to what area would constitute  ceiling  area under  each class of land in specified local area.   Returns have to be submitted to the Collector in respect of  surplus land under section 12 of the Act.  Section 14 gives power to the Collector to hold an enquiry for determining as to  what area  in  respect  of  the holding of  a  person  should  be declared to be in excess of the ceiling area.  On completion of  the  enquiry  if the Collector finds the  holding  of  a person  in  excess of the ceiling area the  Collector  shall make  a  declaration under section 21 of the Act  about  the area,  description and full particulars of the and which  is delimited  ,is  surplus  land.   The  declaration  is   then notified   under  section  21(2)  in  the  official   Gaztte According to sub-section (4) of that section, the  Collector for  shall after the publication of the  notification  under sub-section (2) take in the prescribed manner possession  of the land which is delimited is surplus 889 and. It is further provided that the surplus land shall with effect  from  the date on which the  possession  thereof  is taken  as  aforesaid be deemed to be acquired by  the  State Government   for  the,  purposes  of  the  Act   and   shall accordingly  vest  free from ad encumbrances  in  the  State Government  Section 27 makes provision for the  distribution

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of the surplus land.  Section 28 of the Act makes  provision in respect of land taken over from industrial undertaking to ensure  efficient  cultivation and continued supply  of  raw material.   The section as it stood before its amendment  by Act 33 of 1968 read as under               "28. (1) Where any land held by an  industrial               undertaking is acquired by, and vests, in  the               State  Government under section 21, such  land               being  land  which  was  being  used  for  the               purpose of producing or providing raw material               for the manufacture or production of any goods               articles  or commodities by  the  undertaking,               the  State  Government shall  take  particular               care  to  ensure that the acquisition  of  the               land does not affect adversely the  production               and  supply of raw material from the  land  to               the undertaking.               (2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained   in               section  27 but subject to any rules  made  in               this behalf for the purpose of so ensuring the               continuance of the supply of such raw material               to the imdertaking, and generally for the full               and efficient use of the land for  agriculture               and   its  efficient  management,  the   State               Government--               (a)  may,  if  it is in the  opinion  of  that               Government necessary for the purpose aforesaid               (such  opinion being formed after  considering               the   representation  of  persons   interested               therein) maintain the integrity of the area so               acquired, in one or more compact blocks, and               (b) may, subject to such terms and  conditions               (including in particular, conditions which are               calculated  to ensure the full  and  continued               supply of raw material lo the undertaking at a               fair  price),  grant  the  land  or  any  part               thereof  to  a  joint farming  society  (or  a               member thereof) consisting as far as possible,               of--               (i)  persons  who had previously  leased  such               land to the undertaking,               (ii) agricultural labour (if any) employed  by               the undertaking on such land,               (iii) technical or other staff engaged by  the               undertaking  on such land, or in  relation  to               the production or supply of any raw material,               (iv)   adjoining  landholder  who  are   small               holders.               (v) landless persons :               Provided that the State Government may-               (a)  for such period as is necessary  for  the               setting  up  of  joint  farming  societies  as               aforesaid being not more than 890               three years in the first instance  (extensible               to  a further period not exceeding two  years)               from  the  date of taking  possession  of  the               land,  direct that the land acquired,  or  any               part  thereof, shall be cultivated by  one  or               more farms run or managed by the State, or  by               one or more corporations (including a Company)               owned or controlled by the State               (b)  grant  to  the landlord so  much  of  the               surplus land leased by him to the undertaking,               which together with any other land held by him

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             does  not exceed the ceiling area (but if  the               landlord  be  a  public trust  and  the  major               portion  of the income from the land is  being               appropriated  for  purposes  of  education  or               medical  relief, grant the entire land to  the               public trust) on condition that the  landlord,               or as the case may be, the public trust  lease               the land to a farm or corporation described in               clause  (a) aforesaid, and thereafter, in  the               case of a landlord (not being a public  trust)               that he becomes a member of the joint  farming               society,  and in the case of a  public  trust,               that  it  lease the land to  a  joint  farming               society.               (3) The State Government may provide that,-               (a)  for the breach of any term  or  condition               referred to in clause (b) of sub-section  (2),               or               (b)  if  the  landlord to  whom  the  land  is               granted falls to lease the land to the farm or               corporation  or to become a member of a  joint               farming society;               (c)  if it considers after such inquiry as  it               thinks fit, that the production and supply  of               raw  material  to  the  undertaking   is   not               maintained  it  the  level or  in  the  manner               which, with proper and efficient management it               ought to be maintained, or               (d) for any other reason it is undesirable  in               the   interest  of  the  full  and   efficient               cultivation  of  the  land,  that  the   joint               farming society, should continue to  cultivate               the land, the grant shall. after giving  three               months’  notice  or  termination  thereof  and               after   giving  the  other  party   reasonably               opportunity  of showing cause, be  terminated,               and  the land resumed.  Thereafter, the  State               Government may make such other arrangements as               it  thinks fit for the proper  cultivation  of               the land and maintenance of the production and               supply of raw material to the undertaking. At this stage we may advert to the facts giving rise to  the present  appeal.  The appellant company owns  two  factories for  the  manufacture  of sugar and  allied  products.   The company hold large areas of land in Ahmednagar district  for the cultivation of sugarcane for its factories.  On March 1, 1963  Special Deputy Collector respondent No. 2 declared  an area  of 8468 acres 261/2 gunthas in village Sakarwadi  held by the appellant company to be in excess of the ceiling 891 area.  On March 7, 1963 Special Deputy Collector  respondent No.  1  passed an order declaring 2677 acres 16  gunthas  of appellant-company’s  land situated in Lakshmiwadi to  be  in excess  of  the ceiling area.  Thus a total  area  of  12146 arres  1/2  guntha  was declared  to  be  surplus.   Appeals against  the  aforesaid orders were filed by  the  appellant company to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal.  The appellants &   some  others  also  filed  petitions   challenging   the constitutional  validity of the principal Act.   A  Division Bench of the Bombay High Court as per judgment dated October 25,  1963  delivered in a petition filed  by  another  party upheld the constitutional validity of all the provisions  of the principal Act, except section 28 which was struck down,. It  was  held  that the provisions of  the  Act  other  than section  28  were a measure of agrarian reform and  as  such

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protected  by article 31A of the Constitution.   Section  28 was held to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. On  June 20, 1964 the Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment) Act was passed.  As a result of the Seventeenth Amendment of the Constitution the principal Act including section 28  was included  in the.  Ninth Schedule,.  The petition  filed  by the,  appellants challenging the validity of  the  principal Act was in view of the Seventeenth Amendment dismissed by  a Division  Bench of the Bombay High Court on March 10,  1965. The  appellants came up in appeal to this Court against  the judgment  of  the  Bombay High Court  but  that  appeal  was dismissed by this Court on April 10, 1968.  The judgment  of this  Court  is  reported in (1968) 3 SCR 712.   It  may  be stated that a stay order was made during the pendency of the appeal filed by the appellants.  After the dismissal of  the appeal on application filed by the respondents, the  counsel for the appellants gave an undertaking on April 26, 1968  to deliver  possession of 10315 acres of land on or before  May 2. 1968.  Possession of 10315 acres of land in pursuance  of the  above  undertaking  was handed over  by  the  appellant company  in  May  1968.   As  the  joint  farming  societies referred to in section 28 had not yet been formed, till such formation  the  said land along with some other  land  taken over  from  others in similar circumstances  was  given  for cultivation  to  the Maharashtra State  Farming  Corporation Limited   respondent  No.  5.  The  said   Corporation   was incorporated on March 6, 1963 under the Companies Act and is owned and controlled by the State of Maharashtra  respondent No. 3. On May 17, 1968 amending Act 16 of 1968 was published.  As a result of the amending Act section 28-IA was inserted in the princiPal  Act.   This section extended the period  for  the setting  up  of  joint  farming  societies  contemplated  by section  28  of  the principal Act by  one  year.   It  also empowered  the  State Government to make a  scheme  for  the interim  period.   On  June 26, 1968  the  appellants  filed petition under article 226 and 227 of the Constitution for a declaration  that the principal Act as amended by Act 16  of 1968  was  unconstitutional Interim  injunction  was  issued restraining the respondents from taking any steps under  the amended Act on June 27, 1968.  The injunction was thereafter vacated  in respect of 10315 acres of land.  The  appellants also gave an undertaking that they would not press their- 892 appeals  before the Tribunal in respect of  10315  acres  of land.  Accordingly, on July 22, 1968 the Maharashta  Revenue Tribunal dismissed the appeals of the appellants in  respect of  10317 acres 37 gunthas of land.  The  appeals  regarding the rest of the land measuring 1829 acres were kept  pending in view of the injunction issued by the High Court. On December 28, 1968 amending Act 33 of 1968 was  published. Section  2  of  the amending Act  added  an  explanation  in section 28 as trader :               "Explanation.-For  the avoidance of doubt,  it               is  hereby  declared that a  producer  of  raw               material  (being  a person,  a  joint  farming               society, or corporation) (including a company)               referred to in sub-section (2) shall be liable               to  supply  raw material  to  the  undertaking               concerned only on that undertaking agreeing to               accept such supply at the fair price." The amending Act also introduced section 28-IB, the material part of which was as under :               "28-1B.   The  supply of raw material  by  any               producer  (being  a person,  a  joint  farming

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             society or corporation) (including a  company)               to   the  undertaking  during  any  shall   be               regulated,  and the fair prices at which  such               supply is to be made to the undertaking  shall               be fixed, in accordance with the provisions of               the Third Schedule." Clause 3 of the Third Schedule provided for the formation of a committee for fixation of the fair price. On July 26, 1969 amending Act 37 of 1969 was published.  The amending Act made changes in the Third Schedule and provided for the setting up of a Board for fixation of the fair price of  the  raw material supplied to an undertaking  under  the principal Act. Amending Act 27 of 1970 was published on May 19, 1970.   The long preamble of the Act reads as under :               "Whereas,   section  28  of  the   Maharashtra               Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holding,,) Act,               1961  inter  alia  provides  that  the   State               Government  shall  take  particular  care   to               ensure that the acquisition of land held by an               industrial  undertaking (being land which  was               being  used  for the purpose of  Producing  or               providing raw material for the manufacture  or               production   of   any   goods,   articles   or               commodities  by  ’he  undertaking)  does   not               affect adversely the production and supply  of               raw material from such land to the udertaking,               and  that for the purpose of so  ensuring  the               continuance  of  supply of such  raw  material               from   such  land  to  the   undertaking   and               generally  for the full and efficient  use  of               the   for   agriculture  and   its   efficient               management  the State Government may  maintain               the, integrity of the area so acquired in  one               or more compact block. 893 and  may  grant the, land, or any part thereof, to  a  joint farming society (or a member thereof) consisting of  persons referred  to  in  clause  (b) of  sub-section  (2)  of  that section; And  Whereas, that section inter alia further provides  that for such period as is necessary for the setting up of  joint farming  societies  as provided in sub-section (2)  of  that section  (being not more than five years in  the,  aggregate from  the date of taking possession of the land),  the  land acquired or any part thereof should be cultivated by one  or more  farms run or managed by the State, or by one  or  more corporations  (including a company) owned or  controlled  by the State; And   whereas,   the  State  Government   have   accordingly constituted   the  Maharashtra  State  Farming   Corporation Limited  (a  company formed and registered  under  the  pro- visions of the Companies Act, 1956), for managing the  farms till  the setting up of the joint farming  societies  afore- said; And  whereas, efforts so far made in the setting up of  such societies  including the efforts made for the setting UP  of such  societies  under  the  Maharashtra  Agricultura   Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Setting up of Joint Farming  Societies Scheme, 1968, made under section 28-IA of the said Act  have not borne fruit, and the periods for the setting up of  such societies  are due to expire between the months of  May  and October 1970; And whereas, in the light of experience mentioned aforesaid, it  is  not  possible to say that  any  such  joint  farming

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societies can be set up at all; And whereas, short extensions of time for the setting up  of such joint farming societies is hampering the full and effi- cient  use  of the land for agriculture  and  its  efficient management for the reason that the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation is thereby prevented from undertaking any  plans or schemes for the improvement of the Land and it is finding it difficult to carry out the objects of clause (b) of  sub- section (2) of section 28; And whereas, most of the undertakings have also  represented to the State Government that cultivation of the land may  be continued with the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation  on a permanent basis for the reason that implementation of  the Joint  Farming  Societies  Scheme  aforesaid  will  lead  to fragmentation   of   land  and  that  since   the   economic development  of  land  is  part  of  agrarian  reform,   the continuation  of  the management of the lands  by  the  said Corporation will subserve the purpose of agrarian reform  in consonance with the object of the said Act; 894               And   whereas  the  State   Government   after               carefully   considering   the   question,   in               particular, in the light of what has been  set               out  hereinabove, is also of opinion that  the               cultivation  of the land should  be  continued               with the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation               on a permanent basis;               And whereas, it is necessary to amend the said               Act  for the purposes aforesaid, and also  for               certain other purposes hereinafter  appearing;               it is hereby enacted in the Twenty-first  Year               of the Republic of India as follows :--" Sections  2  and 3 of the amending Act  inserted  additional words In the long title and preamble of the principal Act so as to include the words :               "also  to  provide that the lands  taken  over               from  undertakings and the integrity of  which               is  maintained in compact blocks for  ensuring               the  full  and efficient use of the  land  for               agriculture   and  its  efficient   management               through  corporations  (including  a  company)               owned  or controlled by the State, be  granted               to such corporations or company;" Section  4  of the amending Act amended section  21  of  the principal  Act by providing in a newly inserted  sub-section (5)  that where possession of any land delimited as  surplus is handed over by the holder in pursuance of an  undertaking given  by  him  in any court, and the appeal  filed  by  the bolder  against the declaration of that land as surplus  has been  subsequently  withdrawn or dismissed, the  land,  not- withstanding  anything contained in sub-section  (4),  shall with effect from the date on which the possession thereof is taken by the Collector, be deemed to be duly acquired by the State Government for the purposes of the Act.  Section 7  of the amending Act deleted section 28-IA of the principal Act. Section  28-IAA  was inserted by section 8 of  the  amending Act,  Sub-sections  (1) and (2) of section  28-lAA  read  as under :               "28-1AA.  (1)  The State  Government  may,  by               notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  not               later  than ninety days from the  commencement               of the Maharastra Agricultural Lands  (Ceiling               on Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1970, grant  the               surplus  land taken over from  the  industrial               undertakings and referred to in section 28 and

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             which  is  being  cultivated by  one  or  more               corporations  (including a company) owned  and               controlled  by the State to such  corporation,               or  corporations, as the case may be,  subject               to  such  terms and conditions,  including  in               particular,  the condition of maintaining  the               integrity oil the surplus land, in one or more               compact  blocks,  and  conditions  which   are               calculated  to ensure the full  and  continued               supply of raw material to the undertaking at a               fair price.  On the grant of such surplus land               to one or more corporations ,is aforesaid, the               provisions  of  section  28  so  far  as  they               provide  for  setting  up  of  joint   farming               societies shall not apply in relation to  such               surplus land. 895               (2) The State Government may provide that,-               (a)  for the breach of any term  or  condition               referred to in subsection (1), or               (b)  if it considers after such inquiry as  it               thinks fit, that the production and supply               of  raw  material to the  undertaking  is  not               maintained  at  the  level or  in  the  manner               which,  with proper and  efficient  management               it-ought to be maintained, or               (c) for any other reason it is undesirable  in               the   interest  of  the  full  and   efficient               cultivation of the land, that the corporation,               (including  a  company)  should  continue   to               cultivate the land,               the  grant shall, after giving  three  months’               notice  of  termination  thereof,  and   after               giving the corporation reasonable  opportunity               of  showing cause be terminated, and the  land               resumed.  Thereafter, the State Government may               itself  take steps by running or managing  one               or  more farms for the proper  cultivation  of               the land and maintenance of the production and               supply of raw material to the undertaking at a               fair price.               Explanation.-For the avoidance of doubt, it is               hereby                            declared  that a producer of  raw               material being                            the   corporation  (including   a               company) or the                            State  Government referred to  in               this section                            shall  be  liable to  supply  raw               material to the                            undertaking  concerned  only   on               that undertaking                            agreeing to accept such supply at               the fair                            price." It  may  be mentioned that the principal Act has  also  been amended by Maharashtra Act 50 of 1973 which was published on December  22, 1973.  Petitions challenging the  validity  of the principal Act as amended by Act 50 of 1973 are stated to be  pending in the High Court.  The High Court in  the  case which  is the subject matter of the present  appeal  allowed amendment of the petition so as to include challenge to  the principal Act as amended by Act 27 of 1970.  It may also  be stated that before the amendment made by Act 27 of 1970, the

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principal Act was amended by various amending Acts,  besides those  to which reference has already been made, but we  are not concerned with those other amending Acts. To  complete  the  narration  we  may  also  refer  to   the Maharastra  Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings)  Grant of  Surplus  Lands Taken Over  from  Industrial  Undertaking Order,  1970 which was issued by the Maharashtra  Government on  August 13, 1970 in exercise of the powers  conferred  by section 28-1AA of the Act.  Clause 2(c) of the Order defines "Corporation"   to  mean  the  Maharashtra   State   Farming Corporation Ltd.  Clause 3 of the Order reads as under :               "Grant  of  lands  to  Corporation.-The  lands               specified  in column 3 of the schedule  hereto               (being  surplus  lands  taken  over  from  the               undertakings  referred  to in section  28  and               specified  in column 2 of that  schedule)  and               which are being culti- 896               vated by the Corporation are hereby granted to               the Corporation on payment of occupancy  price               and  on the terms and conditions specified  in               this Order." Clause   4  of  the  Order  specifies  the  conditions   for maintaining  the integrity of surplus land, whole  clause  5 deals  with  conditions so as to ensure full  and  continued supply of raw material to industrial undertakings.  Clause 6 provides for conditions as to termination of grants. By the judgment under appeal the High Court, as already men- tioned,  has upheld the validity of the impugned Act on  the ground  that it is protected by articles 31A and 31B of  the Constitution. Mr.  Sen  on  behalf of the appellants  has  at  the  outset assailed  the finding of the High Court in so far as it  has held the impugned Act to be protected by article 31B of  the Constitution. The High Court while affording the protection of article 31B of the Constitution to the impugned Act has referred to  the fact  that  the  principal  Act  including  section  28  was inserted  in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as  item No.  34  by the Seventeenth Amendment to  the  Constitution. The  submission advanced on behalf of the  respondents  that the  amending Acts of 1968 and 1970 were only ancilliary  or incidental  to section 28 of the principal Act and  as  such the amended Act was protected under article 31B found favour with the High Court.  The High Court accordingly observed:               "We,  therefore, hold that section 28-1A,  and               section 281AA are only ancillary or incidental               to section 28 of the principal Act and section               21(5)  is  also  ancillary  or  incidental  to               section  21  and, therefore, all  these  three               amendments are protected by article 31B of the               Constitution." We have given the matter our consideration and are unable to agree with the above conclusion of the High Court.   Article 31B reads as under :               "31B.  Without prejudice to the generality  of               the provisions contained in article 31A,  none               of  the Acts and Regulations specified in  the               Ninth  Schedule  nor  any  of  the  provisions               thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to               have become void, on the ground that such Act,               Regulation or provision is inconsistent  with,               or  takes away or abridges any of  the  rights               conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and               notwithstanding any judgment, decree or  order

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             of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each               of  the  said  Acts  and  Regulations   shall,               subject   to  the  power  of   any   competent               Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in               force.  " The  above article was inserted in the Constitution  by  the First  Amendment.  The object of this article is to  give  a blanket protection to the Acts and Regulations specified  in the  Ninth  Schedule and the provisions of  those  Acts  and Regulations against any challenge to those Acts, 897 Regulations  or  the provisions thereof on the  ground  that they  are inconsistent with or take away or abridge  any  of the  rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.   The result is that howsoever violative of the fundamental rights may be the provisions of an Act or Regulation, once the  Act or  Regulation is specified in the Ninth Schedule  it  would not  be  liable  to  be struck down  on  that  score.   This immunity  against  the above challenge  would  be  available notwithstanding  any judgment, decree or order of any  court or  tribunal  to the contrary.  The effect of  article  31B, however, is not to prevent challenge, to an enactment on the ground  that it is beyond the legislative competence of  the legislature  which  enacted it.  It is also plain  from  the language of the article that the specification of an Act  or Regulation  would not prevent the competent  legislature  to repeal or amend it. The  protection  and immunity afforded by  article  31B  is, however,  restricted  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act   or Regulation  as they exist on the date the Act or  Regulation is included in the Ninth Schedule.  The inclusion of the Act and  Regulation would protect not only the principal Act  or Regulation which is included in the Ninth Schedule but  also the amendments which have been made therein till the date of its  inclusion  in  the  Ninth  Schedule,  even  though  the constitutional  amendment by which the Act or Regulation  is included in the Ninth Schedule refers only to the  principal Act  and Regulation and not to the amendments thereof.   The protection  or  immunity enjoyed by the Act  or  Regulation, including  the  amendments  thereof till  the  date  of  its inclusion  in the Ninth Schedule would not, however,  extend to  the amendments made in the Act or Regulation  after  the date of its inclusion in the Ninth Schedule.  The reason for that  is that the inclusion of an Act or Regulation  in  the Ninth  Schedule  can be brought about only by  means  of  an amendment  of  the  Constitution.   The  amendment  of   the Constitution  can be carried out in accordance with  article 368  of the Constitution.  Such a power is exercised not  by the  legislature  enacting  the  impugned  law  but  by  the authority  which  makes the constitutional  amendment  under article 368, viz., the prescribed majority in each House  of Parliament.  Such a power can be exercised in respect of  an existing  Act or Regulation of which the provisions  can  be scrutinized before it is inserted in the Ninth Schedule.  It is  for  the  prescribed majority in each  House  to  decide whether a particular Act or Regulation should be inserted in the  Ninth  Schedule,  and if so, whether it  should  be  so inserted  in its entirety or partly, In case the  protection afforded by article 31B is extended to amendments made in an Act  or Regulation subsequent to its inclusion in the  Ninth Schedule,  the  result would be that even  those  provisions would enjoy the protection which were never scrutinized  and could not in the very nature of things have been scrutinized by the prescribed majority vested with the power of amending the Constitution.  It would, indeed, be tantamount to giving

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a  power to the State legislature to amend the  Constitution in  such  a  way  as would enlarge  the  contents  of  Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. The protection of article 31B can also not be extended to  a new  provision  inserted  as a result of  amendment  on  the ground that it is 11--564SCI/75 898 ancillary   or  incidental  to  the  provisions   to   which protection  has already been afforded by including  them  in the  Ninth  Schedule.  Article 31B carves  out  a  protected zone.   It has inserted Ninth Schedule in  the  Constitution and  gives immunity to the Acts, Regulations and  provisions specified in the said schedule from being struck down on the ground  of  infringement of fundamental rights  even  though they  are  violative  of  such  rights.   Article  31B  thus excludes  the  operation of fundamental rights   in  matters dealt  with by those Acts, Regulations and provisions.   Any provision which has the effect of making an inroad into  the guarantee of fundamental rights in the very nature of things should be construed very strictly, and it would not, in  our opinion,  be  permissible  to  widen the  scope  of  such  a provision  or to extend the frontiers of the protected  zone beyond  what is warranted by the language of the  provision. No  Act,  Regulation or provision would enjoy  immunity  and protection of article 31B unless it is expressly made a part of the Ninth Schedule.  The entitlement to protection  being confined  only  to  the  Acts,  Regulations  and  provisions mentioned  in the Ninth Schedule, it cannot be  extended  to provisions  which were not included in that schedule.   This principle  would hold good irrespective of the fact  whether the  provision to which entitlement to protection is  sought to be extended deals with new substantive matters or whether it  deals with matters which are incidental or ancillary  to those already protected. We  are  fortified in the above conclusion by  the  previous decisions of this Court.  In the case of Sri Ram Ram  Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay(1) the ’Constitution Bench of  this Court  dealt  with the question as to whether  an  amendment made by an Act of 1956 would be protected by article 31B  if the  1948  Act  in which that amendment was  made  had  been included  in  the Ninth Schedule to the  Constitution.   The question  was  answered  in  the  negative.   Bhagwati,   J. speaking for the Court observed :               "The  impugned  Act which was  passed  by  the               State  Legislature  in  1956  was  a   further               measure  of agrarian reform  carrying  forward               the  intentions which bad their roots  in  the               1948 Act.  Having regard to the comparison  of               the  various  provisions of 1948 Act  and  the               impugned  Act  referred to above it  could  be               legitimately urged that if the cognate  provi-               sions of the 1948 Act were immune from  attack               in  regard  to their constitutionality,  on  a               parity   of   reasoning   similar   provisions               contained  in  the impugned Act,  though  they               made further strides in the achievement of the               objective of a socialistic pattern of  society               would  be  similarly  saved.   That  position,               however,  could  not obtain  because  whatever               amendments  were made by the impugned  Act  in               the  1948  Act  were future  laws  within  the               meaning of Art. 13 (2) of the Constitution and               required   to  be  tested  on  the   self-same               touchstoNe.  They would not be in terms  saved

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             by  Art. 31B and would have to be  scrutinized               on their own merits before the courts came  to               the  conclusion that they were enacted  within               the (1) [1959] Supp.1 S.C.R. 489. 899               consistitutional limitations.  The very  terms               of  Art.  31B  envisaged  that  any  competent               legislature would have the power to repeal  or               amend  the Acts and the Regulations  specified               in  the 9th Schedule thereof and if  any  such               amendment  was  ever made the  vires  of  that               would have to be tested."               .lm0               To  the  same effect is the decision  of  this               Court in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State  of               Rajasthan(1).   Gajendragadkar  C.J.  speaking               for the majority observed               "There  is  one more point to which  we  would               like   to  refer.  In  the  case  of   Sankari               Prasad(2)  this  Court has observed  that  the               question  whether the latter part of Art.  31B               is too widely expressed, was not argued before               it,  and  so, it did not express  any  opinion               upon  it.   This question has,  however,  been               argued  before  us, and so, we would  like  to               make  it  clear that the effect  of  the  last               clause  in Art. 3 1 B is to leave it  open  to               the respective legislatures to repeal or amend               the Acts which have been included in the Ninth               Schedule.   In other words, the fact that  the               said  Acts  have been included  in  the  Ninth               Schedule with a view to make- them valid, does               not  mean  that the legislatures  in  question               which  passed  the said Acts have  lost  their               competence  to repeal them or to  amend  them.               That is one consequence of the said provision.               The  other inevitable consequence of the  said               provision is that if a legislature amends  any               of the provisions contained in any of the said               Acts, the amended provision would not  receive               the  protection of Art. 31 B and its  validity               may be liable to be examined on the merits." In  the case of Ramanlal Gulab Chand Shah etc. v.  State  of Gujarat  &  Ors(3).   Hidayatullah C.J. also  dealt  with  a similar question and observed :               "The  first question to consider is the  vires               of  the addition to s.65 by the Amending  Act,               which  addition has been shown in the  section               quoted   already.   This  matter  has  to   be               considered  with reference to Arts.  31-A  and               31-B  read  with  the  Ninth  Schedule.    The               protection  is claimed on the basis  of  these               two  articles by the State.  Article  31-B  no               doubt gives protection to all statutes  listed               in  Schedule IX of the Constitution  and  this               Act  is so listed.  But it was  listed  before               the amendment of s.65 and that amendment  came               to  be said to have been considered  when  the               Amendment of the Constitution was made.   That               Amendment  if  accepted as  unassailable  will               have  the  indirect  effect  of  amending  the               original Schedule IX by including something in               it  which  was  not  there  before.   This  is               undoubtedly beyond the competence of any state

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             Legislature.   The  argument  of  the  learned               Attorney  General that the general schemes  of               the  Preamble and the provisions of s.44  made               applicable by (1) [1965] 1 S.C R. 933. (3) [1969] S.C.R. 42. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 89. 900               s.65 (2) both of which have the protection  of               Art.31-B  must give protection is  fallacious.               Even  if the preamble and s.44 could  be  read               (and  we  do not decide that they  can  be  so               read)  to give validity it is clear  that  the               preamble  talked only of landholders  and  the               addition  of the words to s.65 is intended  to               apply   to   principle   to   non-landholders.               Similarly  the  provisions of s.44  under  the               unamended  Act,  could  not  have  been   made               applicable   to  such  non-landholders.    The               amendment of s.65 was really carrying the  Act               into new fields and not being considered as an               amendment  of  the Constitution,  how  can  it               claim  the protection given to  the  unamended               Act  ?   Therefore  Art. 31 B  and  the  Ninth               Schedule cannot be called in aid." The  concluding part of the above passage did not lay  down, as seems to have been assumed by the High Court, that if  an amending  Act  does  not  cover a  new  field  but  contains provisions which are incidental and ancillary to those which are  protected by article 31B, the amending Act  would  also get  the  protection  of article 31B.   This  Court  in  the concluding  part  merely repelled the contention  which  bad been advanced by the Attorney General.  The principle  which should  guide  the courts in such cases was,  however,  laid down  in the earlier part of the passage wherein this  Court repelled the argument that the amending Act was unassailable because  of  the original Act having been  included  in  the Ninth Schedule. It may be stated that Shah J. was also a party to the  above decision.   In  the subsequent case of State  of  Orissa  v. Chandra  Sekhar Singh Bhoi etc.,(1) Shah J. relied upon  the above decision and observed as under :               "By the amendments made in the Constitution by               the  17th Amendment Act the principal  Act  is               incorporated  in  the Ninth  Schedule  to  the               Constitution  with effect from June 20,  1964.               The Act is therefore not liable to be attacked               on  the plea that it is inconsistent  with  or               takes away or abridges any of the  fundamental               rights  conferred by Part III of  the  Consti-               tution.   But  the  power  of  the   competent               Legislature   to  repeal  or  amend  the   Act               incorporated  in  the Ninth  Schedule  is  not               thereby  taken away.  The amending Act  passed               after   the  enactment  of  the   Constitution               (Seventeenth  Amendment)  Act, 1964  does  not               therefore  qualify for the protection of  Art.               31-B.   See Ramanlal Gulabchand Shah  etc.  v.               State of Gujarat & Ors. and Sri Ram Ram Narain               Medhi  v.  State  of  Bombay  (supra).    This               position is not disputed." In  the  case  of State of  Maharashtra  etc.  v.  Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand & Ors. etc. (2) which was decided between these  very  parties,  a seven-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court repelled  the contention that article 31B does  not  protect

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amending Act 13 of 1962 because in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution only the Maharashtra State (1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 593. (2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712. 901 Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 had  been included and not the amending Act of 1962.  Sikri J. (as  he then was) speaking for the Court observed :               "But then there are many other Acts which  had               been amended before they were inserted in  the               Ninth  Schedule,  and we can.  hardly  imagine               that  Parliament intended only to protect  the               Acts  as originally passed and not the  amend-               ments   made   up  to  the   date   of   their               incorporation  into the Ninth  Schedule.   The               reason  for this express insertion of  certain               amending  Acts seems to be that  some  States,               out  of  abundant  caution,  recommended  that               their  amending Acts be specifically  inserted               in the Ninth Schedule."               It was further observed               "Accordingly   we  must  overrule  the   first               submission made by the learned counsel for the               appellant and hold that Art. 31B protects  the               impugned Act including the amendments made  in               it upto the date of its incorporation into the               Ninth Schedule." The next question which arises for consideration is  whether the impugned provisions are protected by article 31A of  the Constitution.   According  to  Mr. Sen, the  effect  of  the aforesaid  provisions  is  to  acquire  land  held  by   the appellants and as the acquisition is not for the purpose  of agrarian reform, the provisions do not enjoy the  protection of  article  31A.   As against that,  the  learned  Attorney General on behalf of the respondents has contended that  the impugned provisions constitute a measure of agrarian  reform and as such are protected by article 31A. It  is  now well-established that before the  protection  of article  31A can be afforded to the acquisition of any  land by  the State, the acquisition should be for the purpose  of agrarian  reform.  As observed by Subba Rao J. (as  he  then was)  speaking for the majority in the case  of  Kavalappara Kottarathil Kochuni & Ors. v. The State of Madras &  Anr.(1) the object of inserting article 31A in the Constitution  and of  subsequently  amending  it was  to  facilitate  agrarian reforms.   It was held in that case that an enactment  which sought  to  regulate the rights of sthanees and  the  junior members  of  a  tarwad  by  depriving  the  sthanee  of  its properties  and vesting them in the tarwad under the  Madras Marumakkathayam  (Removal  of Doubts) Act, 1955  was  not  a measure of agrarian reform. In  P.  Vajravelu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy  Collector  (2) Subba  Rao J. speaking for the Court while reiterating  that the  object  of  article  31A was to  enable  the  State  to implement pressing agrarian reforms held that the purpose of slum clearance for which the land was sought to be  acquired under  the  Land Acquisition (Madras  Amendment)  Act,  1961 could not be related to agrarian reform.  It is significant (1) [1960] 3 S.C. R. 887. (2) [1965] 1 S. C. R. 614. 902 that  this Court in that case dealt with the acquisition  of land  for development of the area as "neighbourhood" in  the city of Madras for housing schemes. In the case of Ranjit Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.

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(1)  this Court dealt with the validity of the  East  Punjab Holdings.  (Consolidation and Prevention  of  Fragmentation) Act,  the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act and the  Punjab  Village Common  Lands  (Regulation) Act and  the  proceedings  taken under  these enactments, as a result of  which  proprietor’s interest was acquired by the State without compensation.  It was held that the impugned provisions as also the provisions of  the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act were all a  part of a general Scheme of agrarian reform and the modifications of  rights envisaged by them had the protection of  Art.  31 (A).   Hidayatullah,  J. (as he then was) speaking  for  the Court observed :               "The   scheme  of  rural   development   today               envisages  not only equitable distribution  of               land  so that there is no undue  imbalance  in               society  resulting in a landless class on  the               one  hand and a concentration of land  in  the               hands  of  a few on the other,  but  envisages               also  the  raising of economic  standards  and               bettering rural health and social  conditions.               Provisions  for  the assignment  of  lands  to               village  Panchayat for the use of the  general               community,  or for hospitals, schools,  manure               pits,  tanning  grounds  etc.  enure  for  the               benefit of rural population must be considered               to be an essential part of the  redistribution               of  holdings  and  open  lands  to  which   no               objection  is apparently taken.   If  agrarian               reforms  are to succeed, mere distribution  of               land  to  the landless is not  enough.   There               must be a proper planning of rural economy and               conditions   and  a  body  like  the   village               Panchayat  is best designed to  promote  rural               welfare   than  individual  owners  of   small               portions of lands." In the case of Balmadies Plantations Ltd. & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu (2) it was held while dealing with the provisions of Gudalur Janmam   Estates  (Abolition and Conversion  into Ryotwari) Act that  the object and general scheme of the Act was  to  abolish intermediaries between the  state  and  the cultivator  and to help the acutal cultivator by giving  him the  status of direct relationship between himself  and  the state.  The Act, as such, in its broad outlines was held  to be  a  measure of agrarian reform and protected  by  article 31A.  The acquisition of forests in Janmam estates was  held to be not in furtherance of the objective of agrarian reform and  consequently not protected by article 31A.  This  Court in that context observed :               "In the absence of anything in the Act to show               the  purpose for which the forests are  to  be               used by the Government, it cannot be said that               the acquisition of the forests in Janmam  land               would  be  for a purpose related  to  agrarian               reform.   The mere fact that the ownership  of               forests  would stand transferred to the  State               would not show that the object of the (1) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 82.          (2) [1973] 1 S. C. R. 258. 903               transfer  is to bring about  agrarian  reform.               Augmenting  the  resources  of  the  State  by               itself  and  in the absence of  anything  more               regarding the purpose of utilisation of  those               resources,  cannot be held to be a measure  of               agrarian reform.  There is no material on  the               record  to  indicate  that  the  transfer   of

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             forests  from the Janmi to the  Government  is               linked  in any way with a scheme  of  agrarian               reform or betterment of village economy." In  the  case of Kanan Devan Hills Produce Co. Ltd.  v.  The State  of  Kerala  &  Anr.(1)  this  Court  dealt  with  the provisions of Kannan Devan Hills (Resumption of Lands)  Act. One  of the questions which arose for determination in  that case  was whether the three purposes mentioned in section  9 of the Act, namely :               (1)  reservation  of lands for  promotion.  of               agriculture;               (2)  reservation  of land for the  welfare  of               agricultural population;               (3)   assignment   of   remaining   lands   to               agriculturists and agricultural labourers; were covered by the expression "agrarian reform" and as such the aforesaid provision was protected by article 31A of  the Constitution.   Sikri  CJ.  while  holding  that  the  above objects  were  covered by the expression  "agrarian  reform" observed :               "It is urged that the wording of the first two               purposes  in s.9 is too wide.  But if we  look               at  the definition of ’common purpose,’  which               was sustained by this Court in Ranjit  Singh’s               case  (supra),  it  shows  that  the  purposes               sustained thereby would come under either  the               expression   ’promotion  of  agriculture’   or               ’welfare of agricultural population’ in s.  9.               Indeed  some  would  fall  under  both.    For               instance,  reservation  of  lands  for  manure               pits,  waterworks  or  wells,  village   water               courses or water channels and grazing  grounds                             would   promote   agriculture;   schoo ls    and               playgrounds,  dispensaries,  public   latrines               etc.    would   be   for   the   welfare    of               agriculturists.               If  the State were to use lands  for  purposes               which  have  no  direct  connection  with  the               promotion   of  agriculture  or   welfare   of               agricultural  population  the State  could  be               restrained  from  using the  lands  for  those               purposes.  Any fanciful connection with  these               purposes would not be enough.               It  seems  to  us that if we  read  these  two               purposes  to  mean  that  these  include  only               ’common  purposes,’  which were  sustained  by               this  Court  and purposes similar  thereto  it               would  be difficult to say that they  are  not               for  agrarian  reform.  In  a  sense  agrarian               reform is wider than land reform.  It includes               besides  land reform something more  and  that               some- (1) [1973] S.C.R. 356. 904 .lm15 thing more is illustrated by the definition of ’common  pur- pose,’  which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit  Singh’s case." In the case of State of Kerala & Anr. v. Gwalior Rayon  Silk Mfg.  (Wvg.)  Co.  Ltd. etc.(1) this Court  dealt  with  the provisions  of  the  Kerala  Private  Forests  (Vesting  and Assignment)  Act, under which private forest lands  situated in  the  former Malabar district stood transferred  to  the, State.  The Act was held to be a measure of agrarian  reform

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and  as such protected by article 31A.  Palekar J.  speaking for the majority in that case observed :               "The objectives of increasing the agricultural               production and the promotion of the welfare of               the  agricultural  population  are  clearly  a               predominant  element in agrarian reform.   How               those  objectives  are to be  implemented  are               generally  stated in sections 10 and 11.   All               the    private    forests,    after    certain               reservations,   are   to   be   assigned    to               agriculturists  or agricultural labourers  and               to the poorer classes of the rural  population               desiring bona fide to take up agriculture as a               means of their livelihood.  The reservation in               respect of certain portions of the forests  is               also made in the interest of the  agricultural               population  because the section says that  the               reservations will be such as may be  necessary               for purposes directed towards the promotion of               agriculture  or  welfare of  the  agricultural               population or for purposes ancillary thereto." Krishna Iyer J. speaking for himself and Bhagwati J.  agreed with the conclusions of the majority and observed :               "Once  we accept the thesis  that  development               orientation and distributive justice are  part               of  and inspire activist agrarian reform,  its               sweep and reach must extend to cover the needs               of  the  village  community  as  well.    What               programme   of  agrarian  reform   should   be               initiated to satisfy the requirement of  rural               uplift  in  a particular community  under  the               prevailing  circumstances  is  a  matter   for               legislative judgment." In  Kh.   Fida Ali & Ors. v. State of Jammu  and  Kashmir(2) this Court held that the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act were protected by article 31A.  One  of us (Goswami J.)observed :               "From a review of the foregoing provisions  it               is  obvious  that  the Act  contains  a  clear               programme of agrarian reforms in taking  stock               of the land in the State which is not in  per-               sonal cultivation (section 3) and which though               in  personal cultivation is in excess  of  the               ceiling  area (section 4).  A ceiling area  is               fixed  for land or orchards or both  measuring               121  standard acres.  After the land vests  in               the  State, in accordance with the  provisions               of  the Act, a provision is made for  disposal               of  the  surplus land in accordance  with  the               rules." (1) [1973] 2 S.C.C. 713. (2) [1974] 2 S.C.C. 253. 905 The  following  principles can be infered from  the  decided cases  in  order to find whether an impugned  enactment  for acquisition of land is protected by article 31A :               (1) Acquisition of Iand by the State in  order               to enjoy the protection of article 31A  should               be for the purpose of agrarian reform.               (2)  Acquisition of land by taking it  from  a               senior member of the family and giving it to a               junior  member  is not a measure  of  agrarian               reform.               (3)   Acquisition  of  land  for  urban   slum               clearance  or  for  a housing  scheme  in  the

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             neighbourhood  of a big city is not a  measure               of agrarian reform.               (4)  Acquisition of land by the State  without               specifying the purpose for which land is to be               used is not a measure of agrarian reform.               (5) Schemes of rural development envisage  not               only equitable, distribution of land but  also               raising of economic standards and bettering of               rural  health  and social  conditions  in  the               villages.   Provision  for the  assignment  of               land to a Panchayat for the use of the general               community  or for hospitals,  schools,  manure               pits, tanning grounds enure for the benefit of               the rural population and as such constitute  a               measure of agrarian reform.               (6)  Provision  for reservation  of  land  for               promotion  of agriculture and for the  welfare               of   agricultural  population  constitutes   a               measure  of agrarian reform.  Agrarian  reform               is wider than land reform.               (7) If the dominant and general purpose of the               scheme  is  agrarian reform,  the  scheme  may               provide for ancillary provisions to give  full               effect to the scheme.               (8)  A  provision  fixing  ceiling  area   and               providing for the disposal of surplus land  in               accordance  with  the rules is  a  measure  of               agrarian reform. Keeping  in view the above, principles, let us  now  examine the  impugned provisions in the present case.  Section 3  of the impugned Act imposes ceiling on holding of  agricultural and.   Section 4 provides that no person shall hold land  in excess  of  the ceiling area.  Enquiry is to be  made  under section 14 of the Act by the Collector for determining as to what area should be declared to be in excess of the  ceiling area.   On completion of the enquiry if the Collector  finds the holding of a person to be in excess of the ceiling area, he  makes a declaration under section 21 of the  Act  giving particulars of the area which is delimited as surplus  land. Possession  of  the  surplus  and  is  then  taken  by   the Collector.  From the date of delivery of possession the land vests free from all encumbrances in the State Government. 906 Section 27 provides for the distribution of surplus land and fixes priorities for the purpose.  Section 28 made a special provision  in  respect of lands taken over  from  industrial undertakings  to ensure efficient cultivation and  continued supply  of  raw material for those  undertakings.   For  the aforesaid  purpose  if the State  Government  considered  it necessary  to  maintain the integrity of the  land  acquired from  the  industrial  undertaking in one  or  more  compact blocks,  it  might, subject to such  terms  and  conditions, including in particular conditions which were calculated  to ensure the full and continued supply of raw material to  the undertaking  at  a fair price, grant the land  or  any  part thereof  to  a  joint  farming  society  or  member  thereof consisting  as far as possible of the persons  specified  in that  section.  Provision was also made in that section  for terminating the grant of the land for the reasons  mentioned in sub-section (3) of that section and for making such other arrangement  as  the State Government thought  fit  for  the proper   cultivation  of  the  land  and  the   maintenance, production and supply of raw material to the undertaking. It would appear from the preamble to amending Act 27 of 1970 and the affidavit of Shri I. G. Karandikar, Under  Secretary

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to  Government of Maharashtra that efforts to set  up  joint farming societies contemplated by section 28 of the Act  did not  bear fruit in spite of the fact that the time  for  the setting  up  of  those societies was  extended.   The  State Government then found that short extensions of time for  the setting  up  of those societies was hampering the  full  and efficient  use of land for agriculture and  the  Maharashtra State  Farming Corporation which had been  cultivating  that land for the interim period could not undertake any plans or schemes for the improvement of the land because of the short extensions.   The State Government, therefore, decided  that the  cultivation  of the land might be  continued  with  the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation on a permanent  basis. In arriving at this decision, the State Government was  also influenced  by the consideration that the implementation  of the   joint   farming  societies  scheme   would   lead   to fragmentation   of   the  land  and  hamper   its   economic development.  This led to the insertion of section 28-IAA in the Act and the other amendments of the principal Act by Act 27 of 1970. Conspectus of the different provisions of the impugned  Act, in  our opinion, goes to show that the main purpose  of  the Act was to prevent concentration of agricultural land in the hands  of  a  few.   A  ceiling  was  consequently   imposed regarding  the  extent  of land which might be  held  by  an individual.  Surplus land was distributed in accordance with section  27  of  the Act.  It cannot be  disputed  that  the provisions  of  the  impugned Act in so  far  as  the  above objects  were concerned effectuated the object  of  agrarian reform.  As regards lands which were held by the  industrial undertakings for the purpose of producing and providing  raw material for the manufacture of goods by those undertakings, the  legislature made special provision in order  to  ensure that  the acquisition of the aforesaid land did  not  affect adversely  the production and supply of the raw material  to the  undertaking.  The object was further to make  full  and efficient  use  of  the land for  agriculture  and  also  if considered  necessary to maintain the integrity of the  area so acquired in one or more compact blocks.  The  legislature for  this purpose initially made provision for the grant  of the 907 aforesaid  lands  to  joint farming  societies  but  as  the proposal  to set up these societies did not bear  fruit  the legislature made provision that the aforesaid lands be given for  cultivation to the State Corporation.  Section  28-IAA, in our opinion, was an integral part of a general scheme  of Act  to bring about agrarian reform and, in our opinion  the impugned  provisions of the Act, including  section  28-lAA, are  protected by article 31A of the Constitution.   It  has been  argued by Mr. Sen that distribution of  acquired  land among  landless  persons or poor peasants  is  an  essential attribute  of agrarian reform and that as the lands  of  the industrial  undertakings are not to be distributed but  have to  be  Cultivated by the Farming Corporation owned  by  the State, the acquisition cannot be considered to be a  measure of agrarian reform.  We are not impressed by this  argument. Acquisition  of land held by industrial undertakings is  not to be taken in isolation but as a part of the general scheme and  object  of the Act that there should be  a  ceiling  on private holdings.  While surplus lands of individuals are to be  distributed, the legislature has made special  provision in respect of land held by an industrial undertakings  which had  been  cultivated  for supplying  raw  material  to  the industrial undertaking.  It has been provided in the case of

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such  land  that  it should be  cultivated  by  the  Farming Corporation in an efficient manner so that the supply of raw material   to  the  industrial  undertaking  might  not   be affected.   It  is,  no doubt,  true  that  distribution  of acquired land among landless persons and poor peasants in  a vast  majority of cases is a part of the scheme of  agrarian reform; the fact that in the case of some huge tract of land which is used for a particular purpose the statute in  order to  prevent its fragmentation and to subserve  that  purpose provides  that  it  should be cultivated by  a  State  owned farming corporation would not justify the inference that the statutory  requirement  in this respect is not a part  of  a general scheme, of agrarian reform.  Section 28-lAA does not operate  in  a vacuum.  The section has to be taken  in  its context  and setting with the other provisions of  the  Act. If  the  provisions  of  the Act  seek  to  remove  economic imbalance  by taking the surplus lands of holders in  excess of  a  ceiling  and if the provisions  of  the  Act  further contemplate  that  most of the, lands after  acquisition  be distributed to poor peasants and landless persons, the  fact that a few blocks of land because of their size and past use for cultivation of raw material for industrial  undertakings are  required  under  the provisions of the Act  to  be  not fragmented,  which  would inevitably be the result  if  they were  to be distributed like other lands acquired under  the Act,  but  to  be  retained  as  compact  blocks  for  being cultivated by the farming corporation so that the industrial undertakings  are not starved of the raw material, the  last mentioned provision cannot be detached from the rest of  the Act  and  struck  down as being not a  measure  of  agrarian reform.  It is no doubt true that acquisition simpliciter of the  land by the State to augment its resources and  without specifying  the  purpose for which it is to  be  used  after acquisition would not get the protection of article 31A.  To decide  the  question  of protection we, must  look  at  the general  scheme of the statute containing provision for  the acquisition,  the object of the acquisition and the  reasons which  weigh  for retaining the land with the State  or  its corporation  and  not  distributing it  among  the  landless persons  and  the  poor peasants. The  concept  of  agrarian reform, it needs to be emphasised. is not static and  cannot always be put in a straitjacket.  With the change of times 908 Under the impact of fresh ideas and in the context of  fresh situations,  the  concept  of agrarian reform  is  bound  to acquire  new dimensions.  A measure which has the effect  of improving the rural economy or promoting rural welfare would be  a  part  of agrarian reform.  Although in  most  of  the cases.  as  already  mentioned, the  agrarian  reform  would require  ,distribution  of  surplus  land  among  the   poor peasants  and  landless  persons  living  in  the  villages, situations  might  well  arise  where it  would  be  in  the interest  of  rural economy that any compact  area  of  land instead  of  being  fragmented  by  distribution  should  be preserved as one compact block and be cultivated by a State- owned  farming  corporation.   The fact  that  part  of  the acquired land would remain vested in the State Government or State-owned  farming corporation would not militate  against the  object of agrarian reform if the continued  vesting  of the land in the Government or the Corporation is a part of a general  scheme of agrarian reform and there is  no  oblique deviation  from the avowed purpose.  In the case  of  Ranjit Singh v. State  of Punjab (supra), part of the acquired land was  to  vest  in the State Government  for  schools,  play- ,grounds, dispensaries, hospitals, waterworks, tubewells and

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as the above vesting was a part of a general scheme of rural welfare,  the statute providing for that vesting was  upheld and  afforded  the  protection of  article  31A.   Ancillary provisions  to  give  full effect to a  scheme  of  agrarian reform.. it may be stressed, would also have the  protection of article 31A, We  may  note that argument has also been  advanced  by  the learned  Attorney General regarding the locus standi of  the appellants  to file the petition giving rise to the  present appeal.   It  is  urged that the appellants  have  no  locus standi  to  file the petition in respect of  land  measuring 10315   acres  as  unconditional  possession   thereof   was delivered in May 1908.   In the alternative, it is submitted that clause (5) of section 21 of   ’the  impugned Act  which was introduced by amending Act 27 of 1970 is severable  from the other provisions of the amending Act and is in any  case constitutionally  valid.  As land measuring 1,0315 acres  in accordance  with the above clause had already vested  before the  filing  ,of the petition in the State  Government,  the appellants  had no locus standi to file petition in  respect of that area of land.  It is III out opinion, not  necessary to  express  an  opinion on the  above  submissions  of  the Attorney  General in view of our finding that  the  impugned provisions   are   protected  by  article  31   A   of   the Constitution. The  appeal  consequently fails and is  dismissed.   In  the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. V.P.S                          Appeal dismissed. 909