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PETITIONER: GIRJA SHANKAR KASHI RAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE GUJARAT SPINNING & WEAVING CO. LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/01/1962

BENCH:

ACT:      Industrial   Dispute-Exclusive    right    of Representative Union to represent employees-Bombay Industrial Relations Act (XI of 1947) ss, 27A, 32, 33, 42 (4).

HEADNOTE:      The Gujarat  Spinning  &  Weaving  Co.  Ltd., closed its  business on May 14, 1953, and sold its assets to  Tarun Commercial Mills Co. Ltd. The old company had  discharged all  its workmen  when  it closed its  business. The  new company  re-started the business  after a week and took in its service the workmen  of the  old company. When the closure took place  a dispute  was pending between the old company and its workman with respect to bonus. The Textile   Labour    Association,   which    is   a Representative Union of the textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad, filed an application before the Labour 891 Appellate Tribunal  where the dispute was pending. The matter  was compromised  and the  old  company agreed to  pay  some  agreed  bonus.  The  textile Jabour Association  gave  an  undertaking  not  to claim compensation  in any other way in any future proceeding.      Later on,  376 employees  of the  old company gave  a  notice  under  s.  42(1)  of  the  Bombay Industrial  Relations   Act,  1947,   and  claimed compensation. The  Textile Labour Association made an  appearance   before  the   Labour  Court   and contended that the application should be dismissed in view  of the  compromise arrived  at before the Labour  Appellate   Tribunal.  The   Labour  Court accepted  the   contention   and   dismissed   the application. The  workmen went  in appeal  to  the Industrial  Court   but  their   appeal  was  also dismissed. They  made a petition in the High Court under Art.  227 of  the Constitution  but that was summarily rejected.  They have  come in  appeal to this Court by special leave. ^      Held,  that   where  a  Representative  Union appears in  any proceeding  under the  Act, no one else can  be  allowed  to  appear,  not  even  the employee at  whose instance  the proceedings might have  been  started  under  s.  42(4).  Where  the appearance  is   by  any   representative  of  the

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employees other  than a  Representative Union, the authorities under s. 32 can permit the employee to appear himself in all proceedings before them. The employee is  entitled to appear through any person in  certain   proceedings  specified   in  s.  33. However, whenever  the Representative  Union makes an appearance,  even the employee cannot appear in any   proceeding    under   the   Act,   and   the representation  must   be  confined  only  to  the Representative Union.  The complete ban laid by s. 27A on  representation otherwise  than  through  a representative of employees remains complete where the   representative    of    employees    is    a Representative Union  that has  appeared.  If  the representative of  employees that  has appeared is other than the Representative Union, ss. 32 and 33 provide for exceptions.      The  bona   fides  or   mala  fides   of  the representative of employees can have nothing to do with the  ban imposed  by s. 27A on the appearance of any  one  else  except  the  representative  of employees as defined in s. 30.      The argument  based on  the so called tyranny of a Representative Union or its motives in taking the  action   it  may   choose  to   take  in  any proceedings after it appears can have no relevance if the  intention of  the legislature is perfectly clear from the provisions of the Act.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal o. 189 of 1961. 892      Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated  November 27,  1957, of the Industrial Court, Bombay,  at Ahmedabad in Appeal (I. C.) 187 of 1957.      C.  T.   Daru,  V.  L.  Narasimhamoorthy,  E. Udayarathnam and S. S. Shukla, for the appellants.      C. K.  Daphtary, Solicitor  General of India, I. M. Nanavati, J. B. Dadachanji and O. C. Mathur, for the respondent No. 1.      N. M.  Barot, Secretary of the Textile Labour Association, for respondent No. 2.      1962. January  30. The  Judgment of the Court was delivered by      WANCHOO,  J.-This  appeal  by  special  leave against  the   order  of  the  Bombay  High  Court summarily   dismissing   the   petition   of   the appellants under  Art.  227  of  the  Constitution raises an  important question  with regard  to the right of  a Representative  Union under the Bombay Industrial  Relations   Act,  No.   XI  of   1947, (hereinafter  called  the  Act)  to  appear  in  a proceeding under  the Act  to the  exclusion of an employee desiring  a change  under s. 42(4) of the Act. The  question arises in this way. The Gujarat Spinning and  Weaving Company Limited (hereinafter called the old Company) closed its business on May 14,  1953   and  sold  its  assets  to  the  Tarun Commercial  Mills   Company  Limited  (hereinafter called the  new  Company).  The  old  Company  had discharged all  its workmen  when  it  closed  its

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business which  happened before s. 25F relating to retrenchment  was  introduced  in  the  Industrial Disputes Act,  (No. XIV  of 1947). The new Company re-started the  business after  a week and took in its service  the workmen  of the  old Company.  It appears that  at the time the closure took place a dispute was  pending between  the old  Company and its workmen  with respect to bonus. As the closure had taken place while that 893 dispute   was    pending,   the   Textile   Labour Association (hereinafter  called the Association), which is  a Representative  Union of  the  textile workers  in   the  city  of  Ahmedabad,  filed  an application under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act of 1950 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal  where the dispute was pending. In that matter there was a compromise, and though, according  to   the  old  Company,  there  was  no available surplus  to give  bonus, the old Company agreed to  pay bonus  by way  of settlement to the extent of 1/8th of the earnings of the workmen for the year  in dispute; and in consideration of this the Association  on  behalf  of  all  the  workmen discharged as  a result  of closure  agreed not to press for any compensation for their discharge and the  workmen   who  accepted  the  bonus  by  this agreement  gave   in  undertaking   not  to  claim compensation  in  any  other  way  in  any  future proceeding.   This   happened   in   March   1955. Thereafter in  July 1956, 376 persons who had been in the  employ of  the  old  Company  and  were  a minority of its workmen gave notice under s. 42(1) of  the  Act  and  claimed  compensation  for  the closure which  had taken  place  in  1953.  As  no settlement could be arrived at between the parties this was followed by an application under s. 42(4) of the Act before the labour court in October 1956 and these workmen claimed that they should be paid adequate compensation  for the closure of the mill in  view   of  their   past  services.   To   this application both  the  old  Company  and  the  new Company were  made parties.  The  application  was opposed by  both the  companies on various grounds with which  we are  however not  concerned in  the present appeal.  In January  1957, the Association made an  appearance before  the labour  court  and contended that the application should be dismissed in view  of the  compromise which had been arrived at before  the Labour  Appellate Tribunal in 1953. The labour  court  accepted  this  contention  and dismissed the application. 894      Thereupon some  of the workmen went in appeal to the industrial court and their contention seems to have  been that,  though no  individual can  be permitted to  appear in  any proceeding  where the Representative Union  appears as representative of employees,  in   this  case   the  action  of  the Association after its appearance in not supporting the case  of the  workmen before  the labour court was mala  fide; therefore  the Association  should not have  been allowed  to appear on behalf of the employees who  had applied to the labour court and they  should   be  permitted  to  carry  on  their

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application. This  contention was  rejected by the industrial court, which was of opinion that it was not  for  an  industrial  court  to  go  into  the question  of   bona  fides   or  mala   fides  for appearance of  a Representative Union and that the law  under   the  Act   was  clear  that  where  a Representative  Union   appeared  it  alone  could represent the  applicants even  in a case under s. 42(4)  of   the  Act.  The  appeal  was  therefore dismissed. Thereupon  the employees appear to have filed a  petition before the High Court under Art. 227  of  the  Constitution,  which  was  summarily rejected. The  High Court  also  refused  to  give leave to appeal. Then there was a petition to this Court for  special leave  which was  granted,  and that is how the matter has come up before us.      The  main   contention  on   behalf  of   the appellants before  us is  that reading the various provisions of  the  Act,  an  employee  making  an application under  s. 42(4)  of  the  Act  is  not debarred  from   appearing  in   the   labour   or industrial  court   and  carrying   on  with   his application even  though the  Representative Union makes an  appearance. It  is submitted that if the interpretation   pressed    on   behalf   of   the respondents  were  accepted  it  would  amount  to tyranny of the Representative Union and this could not be the intention of the legislature in framing the  Act.   It  is  also  contended  that  if  the interpretation   pressed    on   behalf   of   the respondents is correct, the 895 provisions in  the Act  may be liable to be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution.      The case of the respondents on the other hand is that  the provisions  of the  Act are perfectly plain and  provide  that  where  a  Representative Union   appears in any proceeding it alone, to the exclusion even of the employee who might have made an application  under s.  42 (4),  is entitled  to carry on  with the  proceedings and  the  employee concerned has  no locus standi in the matter after the application  has been  filed by  him,  if  the Representative Union  chooses  to  appear.  It  is urged  that   the   so-called   tyranny   by   the Representative Union  can have  no bearing  on the interpretation of  the provisions  of the  Act  if they are  plain in  their intent.  Further  it  is contended  that   there  is  no  question  of  the constitutionality of the various provisions of the Act  in   this  case   as  at  no  stage  has  the constitutionality   of    the   provisions    been challenged by  the appellants,  not even  in their special leave petition.      Before we deal with the interpretation of the various provisions  of the  Act in  this behalf we may point  out that  the constitutionality  of the provisions has never been challenged so far and we therefore   express   no   opinion   as   to   the constitutionality  of  these  provisions.  We  are further of  opinion that the argument based on the so-called tyranny of a Representative Union or its motives in taking the action it may choose to take in any  proceeding after  it appears  can have  no relevance if  the intention  of the legislature as

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it can  be gathered from the various provisions is perfectly plain.      Let us therefore see what the Act provides in this behalf.  The main  provisions with  which are concerned are  contained in  Chap. V  of  the  Act which deals with "representatives of employees and employers, and appearance on their behalf". It may be stated  at the  outset that  the  Act  contains elaborate provisions  for registration  of  unions and approved unions in 896 Chapters III  and IV  respectively and  is in this respect different  from  the  Industrial  Disputes Act. Under  Chap. III  the Registrar  is given the power to  register a  Representative Union for any industry in  any local  area and also the power to cancel    such    registration    under    certain circumstances and  there is  also a  provision for appeal where  a registration  is  cancelled.  Then comes Chap. V which deals with the representatives of employees and employers and appearance on their behalf in  proceedings under  the Act.  Section 27 provides for  recognition  of  an  association  of employers and  its right  to appear in proceedings under  the   Act.  Section   30   enumerates   the representatives of employees and gives an order of preference   in   which   the   six   classes   of representatives of  employees  mentioned  in  that section can  appear or  act in any industry in any local area, the first being a Representative Union for such  industry. It  is not in dispute that the Association   in    the   present    case   is   a Representative Union  in the  textile industry  in that region and has the most preferential right to appear  or   to  act   as  the  representative  of employees in  the textile  industry in  that area. Sections  28   and  29  provide  for  election  of representatives of  employees where  there  is  no Representative Union in respect of any industry in any local  area and  such elected  representatives under s.  30 are  representatives of employees and are fifth  in order of preference. Then we come to ss. 27A,  32 and 33 with which we are particularly concerned in  this appeal.  They may  be  read  in extenso.           "27A-Save as provided in sections 32 and      33, no employee shall be allowed to appear or      act in  any proceeding  under this Act except      through the representative of employees.".           "32-A   conciliator    a    Board,    an      Arbitrator, a  wage Board, a Labour Court and      the  Industrial   Court  may,  if  he  or  it      considers it 897      expedient for  the ends of justice, permit an      individual, whether  an employee  or not,  to      appear in any proceeding before him or it;           Provided that  no such  individual shall      be permitted  to appear in any proceedings in      which a  Representative Union has appeared as      the representative of employees."           "33-Notwithstanding  anything  contained      in  any  other  provision  of  this  Act,  an      employee or  a representative  union shall be      entitled to appear through any person.

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         (a)  in   all  proceedings   before  the      industrial court;           (aa) in  all proceedings  before a  wage      board ;           (b) in proceedings before a Labour Court      for  deciding  whether  a  strike,  lock-out,      closure or  stoppage or  change or  an  order      passed by  an  employer  under  the  standing      orders  is   illegal  or   for  deciding  any      industrial  dispute   referred  to  it  under      section 72;           (c) in  such other  proceedings  as  the      Industrial Court may, on application made "in      that behalf, permit;           Provided that a legal practitioner shall      not be  permitted under  clause (c) to appear      in  any  proceeding  under  this  Act  except      before a  Labour Court as provided in section      83A or the Industrial Court;           Provided further  that no employee shall      be entitled  to appear  through any person in      any proceeding  under this  Act  in  which  a      Representative  Union  has  appeared  as  the      representative of employees." 898      It will  be seen that s. 27A provides that no employee shall  be allowed to appear or act in any proceeding  under  the  Act,  except  through  the representative of employees, the only exception to this being  the  provisions  of  ss.  32  and  33. Therefore,  this   section  completely   bans  the appearance of  an employee  or of  any one  on his behalf  in   any  proceeding  after  it  has  once commenced except  through  the  representative  of employees. The  only exceptions  to this  complete ban are  to be found in ss. 32 and 33, to which we shall presently  refer. But  it is clear that bona fides or  mala  fides  of  the  representative  of employees can  have nothing  to do  with  the  ban placed by s. 27A on the appearance of any one else except the  representative of employees as defined in s. 30 and that if anyone else can appear in any proceeding we must find a provision in that behalf in either  s. 32  or s.  33  which  are  the  only exceptions to s. 27A. It may be noticed that there is no  exception  in  s.  27A  in  favour  of  the employee, who might have made an application under s. 42 (4), to appear on his own behalf and the ban which is  placed by  s. 27A  will apply equally to such an  employee. In  order however to soften the rigour of  the provisions  of s.  27A, for  it may well be  that the  representative of employees may not choose  to appear  in many proceedings started by an  employee under  s. 42  (4), exceptions  are provided in  ss. 32  and 33.  The scheme  of these three  provisions   clearly   is   that   if   the Representative Union  appears,  no  one  else  can appear and  carry on  a proceeding,  even if it be begun on  an application under s. 42 (4) but where the Representative Union does not choose to appear there are provisions in ss. 32 and 33 which permit others to appear in proceedings under the Act.      Section 32  gives power  to a  conciliator, a board, a  wage  board,  a  labour  court  and  the industrial court  to permit an individual, whether

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an 899 employee or  not,  to  appear  in  any  proceeding before him or it. This shows that the complete ban imposed  by   s.  27A   can  be   removed  if  the authorities under  the Act  think it  expedient to permit another  person to  appear and  that person may be  an employee  or not. Thus the employee who has made  an application  under s.  42(4)  may  be permitted to  appear before  the authorities under the Act  ; but  this provision  is  subject  to  a proviso namely that no such individual which would include  an  employee  who  has  himself  made  an application under  s. 42(4), shall be permitted to appear   in    any   proceeding   in   which   the Representative   Union   has   appeared   as   the representative of employees. Reading therefore ss. 27A, 30  and 32  together, it is clear that no one else can  appear in  any proceeding  under the Act except a  representative  of  employees;  but  the authorities are  empowered  to  permit  anyone  to appear whether  he be  an employee or not, if they consider it expedient for the ends of justice (and we have  no doubt  that  where  representative  of employees  does   not   choose   to   appear   the authorities will generally permit the employee who has  made   the  application  under  s.  42(4)  to appear), but this power is subject to the proviso, namely, that  no one  will be allowed to appear if the Representative  Union has  made an appearance. It  will   be  seen  that  the  proviso  puts  the Representative Union  in a special position out of the six  classes mentioned  as representatives  of employees in s. 30. Thus s. 32 makes it clear that where the  Representative Union of the six classes in  s.   30,  appears  no  one  else  can  appear, including  the  person  who  might  have  made  an application under  s. 42  (4). If  the other  five classes  which   are  mentioned   in  s.   30   as representatives   of    employees   appear,    the authorities have  the power  to allow the employee or any other person to appear along with them. 900      Then we  come to  s. 33,  which starts with a obstante clause  and deals  with the appearance of an employee  or a representative union through any person. Section  33 thus is an exception to s. 27A and authorises an employee who could not appear in any proceeding  under the  Act except  through the representative  of  employees  under  s.  27A,  to appear through  any person  in certain proceedings mentioned in  s. 33,  but this again is subject to provisos, with  the first  of  which  we  are  not concerned here.  The second proviso lays down that no employee  shall be  entitled to  appear through any person  in any  proceeding under  the  Act  in which the Representative Union has appeared as the representative of  employees. This  proviso  again gives a  special position  to  the  Representative Union out of the six classes of representatives of employees provided  in s.  30 and  makes it  clear that though  an employee  may  appear  in  certain proceedings specified  in s. 33 through any person in spite  of s.  27A, he  cannot  do  so  where  a Representative   Union   has   appeared   as   the

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representative  of   employees.  Here   again  the position  is   the  same   as  in   s.  32;  if  a representative   of   employees   other   than   a Representative   Union   has   appeared   in   the proceeding the  employee can  also appear  through any person  in the proceedings mentioned in s. 33; but he  cannot do  so where  the representative of employees which  has appeared  even in proceedings under s. 33 is the Representative Union.      The result  therefore of  taking ss.  27A, 32 and 33  together is  that s.  27A first  places  a complete ban  on the  appearance of an employee in proceedings under  the Act  once it  has commenced except through  the representative  of  employees. But there are two exceptions to this ban contained in ss. 32 and 33. Section 32 is concerned with all proceedings before the authorities and gives power 901 to the  authorities under  the Act  to  permit  an employee  himself   to  appear   even   though   a representative of  employees may have appeared but this  permission   cannot  be  granted  where  the representative   Union    has   appeared    as   a representative of  employees. Section  33 which is the other  exception allows  an employee to appear through any  person in  certain  proceedings  only even though  a representative  of employees  might have appeared;  but here  again it  is subject  to this that  no one  else, not even the employee who might have  made the  application, will  have  the right to  appear if a Representative Union has put in appearance  as the representative of employees. It is quite clear therefore that the scheme of the Act is  that where  a Representative Union appears in any  proceeding under  the Act, no one else can be allowed  to appear  not even  the  employee  at whose instance  the proceedings  might have  begun under s.  42 (4).  But where  the appearance is by any  representative  of  employees  other  than  a Representative Union  authorities under  s. 32 can permit the  employee  to  appear  himself  in  all proceedings before  them and  further the employee is entitled  to appear  by any  person in  certain proceedings specified  in s.  33. But whenever the Representative Union  has made an appearance, even the employee cannot appear in any proceeding under the Act  and the  representation must  be confined only to the Representative Union. The complete ban therefore  laid   by  s.   27A  on  representation otherwise  than   through  a   representative   of employees    remains     complete    where     the representative of  employees is the Representative Union that has appeared; but if the representative of employees  that has  appeared is other than the Representative Union  then ss.  32 and  33 provide for exceptions with which we have already dealt. 902 There  can   therefore  be   no  escape  from  the conclusion that the Act plainly intends that where the Representative Union appears in any proceeding under the  Act even  though that  proceeding might have commenced  by an  employee under s. 42 (4) of the  Act,   the  Representative  Union  alone  can represent the  employee and  the  employee  cannot appear or act in such proceeding.

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    In this  view of  the matter  the appeal must fail and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs.                                  Appeal dismissed.