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PETITIONER: GIAN SINGH MANN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1980

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1980 AIR 1894            1981 SCR  (1) 507  1980 SCC  (4) 266  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1992 SC1020  (19)

ACT:      Promotion-Belated  claim  after  eleven  years  without valid explanation for delay cannot be entertained-Article 32 of  the   Constitution-Punjab   Civil   Service   (Premature Retirement) Rules,  1975 do  apply to  the judicial service- Words and  Phrases "public  interest"-Whether the expression is vague  in the  context of  Premature Retirement  Rules of 1965-Withdrawal of judicial work as a policy decision of the High Court  cannot be  challenged-The concept  of  premature retirement does not fall within the scope of Article 311.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner after holding a number of minor posts in the Punjab  Government, was  appointed to  the Punjab  Civil Service (Executive Branch) and subsequently in April 1965 to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). From the post of Senior Subordinate-Judge  he was  reverted  as  Subordinate- Judge. Later,  on 4th November, 1978, the High Court ordered withdrawal of  all judicial  work from the petitioner and on 8th November,  1978 a  Judicial officer  was posted  in  his place. Subsequently  he was  prematurely retired with effect from 30th December, 1978 on which date he completed 25 years qualifying service  for the purposes of Punjab Civil Service (Premature Retirement)  Rules,  1975.  The  petitioner  then filed a  writ petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution in the  Supreme Court  for the  quashing of the orders dated 4th  November,   1978  and   8th  November,  1978,  for  his reappointment as  Senior Subordinate-Judge  and, thereafter, his promotion  to the  Selection Grade  post of  the  Punjab Civil  Service   (Judicial  Branch)  with  effect  from  1st November, 1966  and his  promotion to  the  Punjab  Superior Judicial Service  with effect  from 1st  November, 1967.  He also claimed  an injunction against his premature retirement from service, which relief was refused.      Dismissing the petition, the Court. ^      HELD: (1)  Inordinate delay  without valid  explanation therefor to the claim for promotion itself is a valid ground for  refusal   of  relief   to  a   petitioner.   Successive representations made by the petitioner during the period can

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hardly justify the delay. [509F]      (2) The  High Court  was justified, as borne out by the records, not  promoting the  petitioner to  a  post  in  the Punjab Superior Judicial Service. The view of the High Court was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. [510A-B]      (3) The  Punjab Civil  Service  (Premature  Retirement) Rules, 1975  are applicable  to judicial  officers as  well. These rules  were finalised after consultation with the High Court and  therefore, must  be regarded  as  complying  with Article 234  of the  Constitution. Further, there is nothing in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) which excludes the operation of the Retirement Rules. [510 E] 508      (4) As  a policy  decision was  taken by the High Court that all  the work  pending in  the court  of  the  Judicial officers, in  respect of whom a recommendation for premature retirement  had   been  made  to  the  Governor,  should  be withdrawn immediately  pending a  decision by the Government on  such   recommendation,  it   cannot  be  said  that  the withdrawal of  judicial powers in the case of the petitioner was wrong.  Even his  premature retirement had been properly recommended  as   a  policy   matter  under   the  Premature Retirement Rules. [510G-H]      (5) The  expression "public interest" in the context of premature retirement  has a  well settled meaning. It refers to  cases   where  the  interest  of  public  administration requires the  retirement of  a Government  servant, who with the passage  of years, has prematurely ceased to possess the standard of efficiency, competence and utility called for by the Government  service to  which he  belongs. No  stigma or implication of misbehavior is intended and punishment is not the objective. [511A-B]      (6) There is no discrimination or violation of Articles 14, 16,  17 and  46 of the Constitution in view of the fact, as borne  out by the records, that no other judicial officer whose record  of service  was inferior or equivalent to that of the  petitioner had not been prematurely retired. [511 F, D]      (7) The concept of premature retirement which has found expression  in   the   Punjab   Civil   Service   (Premature Retirement) Rules,  1975, does  not fall within the scope of Article  311.  No  element  of  punishment  is  involved  in premature  retirement  and  Article  311  therefore  is  not attracted. [511 E]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 4659 of 1979      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution.)      G. S. Mann for the Petitioner.      Har Dev Singh for the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      PATHAK, J.-The  petitioner  applies  for  relief  under Article 32  of the  Constitution against  the orders  of the High Court  of Punjab  and Haryana withdrawing judicial work assigned to him and thereafter prematurely retiring him from service.      The petitioner,  after holding  a number of minor posts in the  Punjab Government, was appointed to the Punjab Civil Service (Executive  Branch) and  subsequently in April, 1965 migrated to  the Punjab  Civil Service (Judicial Branch). He remained  a  Judicial  officer  thereafter.  The  petitioner claims that  he was  entitled to  promotion to  a  Selection Grade post in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and

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subsequently to  a post  in  the  Punjab  Superior  Judicial Service. The  claim was  based in  both cases on the footing that a  post had  been reserved  in the  two services  for a member of  the Scheduled  Castes. It  was also asserted that the petitioner was entitled to the posts even 509 without reference to such reservation. The petitioner’s case is that  his service  record was  uniformly good, but as the High Court  was  actuated  by  mala  fides  it  refused  him promotion. He cites some instances to support the allegation of mala  fides, including  the circumstance that having been appointed to  the post  of Senior  Subordinate Judge  he was "reverted" as  Subordinate Judge.  On 4th November, 1978 the High Court  ordered withdrawal of all judicial work from the petitioner and  on 8th November, 1978 a Judicial officer was posted in  his place.  The petitioner then filed the present writ petition  for the  quashing of  the  orders  dated  4th November, 1978 and 8th November, 1978, for his reappointment as Senior  Subordinate Judge  and, thereafter, his promotion to the  Selection Grade  post of  the Punjab  Civil  Service (Judicial Branch)  with effect  from 1st  November, 1966 and his promotion  to the  Punjab Superior Judicial Service with effect  from   1st  November,   1967.  He  also  claimed  an injunction against  his premature  retirement from  service. This Court  entertained the  writ petition  but declined  to grant interim  relief. On  29th December.  1978  the  Punjab Government, accepting  the recommendation of the High Court, sanctioned the  premature retirement  of the petitioner from the Punjab  Civil Service (Judicial Branch) with effect from 30th December,  1978 on  which date the petitioner completed twenty five years qualifying service for the purposes of the Punjab Civil Service (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1965.      In regard  to the  petitioner’s claim  for promotion to the  Selection  Grade  post  in  the  Punjab  Civil  Service (Judicial Branch)  with effect  from 1st November, 1966, and to a  post in  the Punjab  Superior  Judicial  Service  with effect from  1st May, 1967 on the basis that a post had been reserved in  each of  the  services  for  a  member  of  the Scheduled Castes,  it seems  to us that the claim is grossly belated. The  writ petition was filed in this Court in 1978, about eleven years after the dates from which the promotions are claimed.  There is  no valid  explanation for the delay. That the  petitioner was  making successive  representations during this  period can  hardly justify  our overlooking the inordinate delay.  Relief must be refused on that ground. It is not  necessary, in  the circumstances,  to  consider  the further submission  of the respondents that the provision on which the  petitioner relies  as the  basis of  his claim is concerned with  the  appointment  only  of  members  of  the Scheduled Castes  to posts  in the  Punjab Superior Judicial Service and not to recruitment by promotion to that service.      The petitioner  has also  claimed that even without the advantage of  reservation he  is entitled  to promotion to a Selection Grade  post in  the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and to a post in the Punjab 510 Superior Judicial  Service, and  that the  High Court should have promoted  him accordingly.  The position taken in reply by the  High Court  is that the character and quality of the petitioner’s work  and conduct, as evidenced by confidential reports pertaining  to him,  did not  justify his  promotion having regard to the guidelines laid down by the High Court. We have  personally examined  the records  in respect of the petitioner, and  we are unable to say that the view taken by the High Court is unreasonable or arbitrary.

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    We may  now examine  the contention  of the  petitioner that the  order of  premature retirement  is invalid. He has assailed  the   application  of  the  Punjab  Civil  Service (Premature Retirement)  Rules, 1975.  He  urges  that  as  a Judicial officer  in  the  Punjab  Civil  Service  (Judicial Branch) he  is not  governed by these rules. It is true that originally rule  7 of  those Rules  provided that they would not apply  to persons  belonging to  any judicial service of the State.  But by notification dated 18th August, 1975, * * * in  exercise of  the  powers  under  Article  234  of  the Constitution  besides   other   provisions,   Rule   7   was substituted by  another rule which did not exempt members of the judicial  service from  the operation  of the  Premature Retirement  Rules.   The  Premature  Retirement  Rules  were finalised  after  consultation  with  the  High  Court  and, therefore, must be regarded as complying with Article 234 of the Constitution.  There is  nothing  in  the  Punjab  Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules which excludes the operation of the  Retirement Rules.  We are  therefore, not  satisfied that the Premature Retirement Rules cannot be applied to the case of the petitioner.      It is urged by the petitioner that the High Court, when it applied  the Premature Retirement Rules, did not consider the case  of the  petitioner on its facts. We have, however, the affidavit  of the  Registrar of  the  High  Court  which states that the case of the petitioner was considered by the High Court  on 26th  October, 1978, and having regard to the policy laid  down by  the  High  Court  it  was  decided  to recommend to  the Government  that the  petitioner should be retired from service in the public interest with effect from 30th December,  1978, the  date on which he completed twenty five years  of qualifying  service. At  the same time it was decided as a matter of policy by the High Court that all the work pending  in the court of a Judicial officer, in respect of whom  a recommendation  for premature retirement had been made to  the Government,  should  be  withdrawn  immediately pending a decision by the Government on such recommendation. It was  in implementation  of that  policy  that  the  order directing withdrawal  of judicial  work from  the petitioner was made. 511      It  is  next  contended  by  the  petitioner  that  the expression "public  interest" in  the  Premature  Retirement Rules is  vague and the rule is for that reason ultra vires. In our  opinion, the  expression in the context of premature retirement has  a well  settled meaning.  It refers to cases where the  interests of  public administration  require  the retirement of  a government  servant who with the passage of years has  prematurely ceased  to possess  the  standard  of efficiency,  competence   and  utility  called  for  by  the government  service  to  which  he  belongs.  No  stigma  or implication of  misbehaviour is  intended, and punishment is not the  objective. It  appears to  us to  be beyond dispute that the  decision  of  the  High  Court  to  recommend  the premature retirement  of the  petitioner in the light of his record of  service must  be regarded  as falling  within the scope of the expression "public interest".      The petitioner  also asserted  that  Judicial  officers whose record  of service  was inferior or equivalent to that of the  petitioner have  not been  prematurely retired,  and have been  retained in service. The High Court, however, has stated that  no such  Subordinate Judge has been retained in service. We  see no  reason why the High Court should not be believed.      Another point  raised by the petitioner is that Article

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311 of  the Constitution  has been violated by the Premature Retirement Rules.  We think  that the  concept of  premature retirement which  has found expression in the Rules does not fall within  the scope  of Article 311. As we have observed, no element of punishment is involved in premature retirement and it is not possible to say that Article 311 is attracted.      The petitioner  has justified  the filing  of this writ petition under  Article 32  of the  Constitution on the plea that his fundamental rights under Articles 14, 16, 17 and 46 are violated. We find no substance at all in that plea.      The petitioner  alleges mala  fides on  the part of the High Court.  It is  a reckless allegation, and impossible to countenance. There  is nothing whatever to indicate that the High Court,  as a  body, was motivated by mala fides against the petitioner.  The instances  alleged by the petitioner in support of  his allegation  of mala  fides fail to prove his case.  The   High  Court   has  offered  a  perfectly  valid explanation in  respect of  each  instance.  The  petitioner points out  that  the  High  Court  has  refused  to  permit encashment of unutilised earned leave. On 512 the material  before us, we are not satisfied that a case of mala fides has been made out.      These are  the only  points raised  by  the  petitioner which deserve consideration. There is no force in them.      The  petition  fails  and  is  dismissed,  but  in  the circumstances there is no order as to costs. V.D.K.                                  Petition dismissed. 513