27 October 1969
Supreme Court
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GHULAM NABI ZAKI Vs STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR


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PETITIONER: GHULAM NABI ZAKI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/10/1969

BENCH:

ACT: Jammu  and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act (13 of 1964)  s. 14 (2) Second order of detention without additional or fresh facts or material--Validity.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner was arrested on November 9, 1968, by  virtue of an order passed on August 23, 1968, under s. 3(1) (a)  of the  Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act,  1964.   On August 20, 1969, while the petitioner was in detention,  the order  was  revoked,  and under s. 14(1) a  fresh  order  of detention was passed.  The second detention order under s.   14(1) was challenged in this Court. HELD : The detenu was entitled to be released, because,  the second order of detention could not be passed without  there being  additional  or  fresh material in the  hands  of  the detaining authority as required by s. 14(2). [36 E-F] In Hadbandu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 43 followed in Kshetra Gogai v. State of Assam,  [1970] 2 S.C.R. ’517, and Mohd.  Shafi and Mohd.  Yaqub v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, W.P. No. 183/1969 dt. 17-10-1969, it  has been  held,  interpreting  the  similar  s.  13(2)  of   the Preventive  Detention Act, 1950, and s. 14(2) of  the  Jammu and  Kashmir Act, that once an order of revocation  is  made for whatever reason, another order detaining the same person can only be passed if ’some additional or fresh material  is in  the possession of the State Government on  which  action can  be  based,  because, a person who is  entitled  to  his liberty can only be put in a second jeopardy when there  are additional or fresh facts against him.  The fresh  detention order which was sustained in Jagdev Singh v. State of  Jammu and  Kashmir,  [1968]  1 S.C.R. 197 was  a  case  under  the Defence of India Rules, where there is no section equivalent to  s. 13(2) of the Preventive Detention Act or s. 14(2)  of the Jammu and Kashmir Act. [38 A-B, C-E, G-H]

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions No. 168 of 1969. Petition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India  for  a writ in the nature of habeas corpus. B.   Dutta, for the petitioner. S.   K. Dholakia and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hidayatullah, C.J. The petitioner Ghulam Nabi Zaki has  been detained under s. 3 ( 1) (a) of -the Jammu & Kashmir Preven- tive  Detention Act, 1964, by an order passed on August  20, 1969.  He was originally arrested on November 9, 1968, under

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an  order passed under the same section on August 23,  1968. After the first order was passed, a second order was  passed by the 36 government  on  November 12, 1968, under  s.8(2)  read  with 13(1)  (a)(1)  of the Act, stating that in the  interest  of security of the State, the grounds of detention could not be disclosed.   Against the first order, the writ petition  No. 168 of 1969 was filed in this Court.  On September 6,  1969, the  two orders of detention which had been  passed  against the  detenu  were served on him with  the  counter-affidavit filed  in the writ petition.  Previously, both  the  orders, that is to say, the order under s.3 and the order under s. 8 (2),  were  not ’served on the petitioner.   On  August  20, 1969,  the first two orders were revoked, and under  s.14(1) of  the  Act, the same day, a fresh order of  detention  was passed  which is now being challenged in these  proceedings. The same day, yet another order under s. 8 (2) read with  s. 1 3 (1 ) (a) (1) was also passed but it is an admitted  fact that  the  orders  this time too were not  served  upon  the detenu  although  it is alleged in one of  later  affidavits that the gist of those orders was orally communicated to the detenu.  The present petition has been filed to question the second  detention order and is based mainly on  two  points, namely, that the second detention order could not be validly made  except  on  some fresh material,  as  contemplated  by s.14(2)  of the Detention Act, and, secondly, that the  non- service of the order of detention as well as the order under s.8(2) upon the detenu is fatal to his continued detention. In view of our decision on the first of the contentions,  we do not consider it necessary to examine, the second.  In our opinion, the detenu is entitled to his release, because  the second order of detention could not be passed without  there being  additional  or  fresh material in the  hands  of  the detaining authority, as contemplated by s.14(2) of the  Act. We give our reasons below. The  power  to detain persons and to make  orders  regarding them  is contained in s.3 of the Jammu & Kashmir  Preventive Detention  Act, 1964 (Act No. 13 of 1964).  It  enables  the government,  if satisfied with respect to any person with  a view  to  preventing  him from acting  in  certain  -manners described in the section that it is necessary to detain him, to  make an order directing that such a person be  detained. A  similar  power is exercisable under sub.-s.2  by  certain officers of the State.  It is next provided that the grounds of  the  order  of detention must be  disclosed  to  persons affected  by  the  order.  This direction  is  contained  in s.8(1)  which  says  that  when  a  person  is  detained  in pursuance  of  a detention order, the authority  making  the order shall as soon as may be but not later than ten days of the  date  of detention, communicate to him the  grounds  on which  the  order  has  been made,  further  giving  him  an opportunity  of making a representation.  Sub-s. 2 of  s.  8 says "Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be                              37 against the public. interest to disclose." Sections 9 and 10 deal with the constitution of and reference to the  Advisory Boards,  s. 1 1, with the procedure of the Advisory  Boards, and  section  12,  action upon the report  of  the  Advisory Board.   We  need not refer to those sections.   Section  13 then lays down that the maximum period for which any  person may  be detained in pursuance of any detention  order  which has been confirmed under s.12, shall be’ two years from  the date of detention.  Sub.-s.(2) of that section is in

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the  nature  of a proviso to the first sub-section  we  have quoted.  It says that nothing contained in section 13  shall affect  the power of the government to revoke or modify  the detention  order at any earlier time.  This power,  however, is  subject  to one other provision and that is  section  14 which may be quoted in extensor here.  It reads               14.   Revocation   of  detention   orders.-(1)               Without prejudice to the provisions of section               21 of the General Clauses Act, Samvat 1977,  a               detention order may at any time be revoked  or               modified  by the  Government,  notwithstanding               that  the order has been made by  any  officer               mentioned in sub-section (2) of section 3.               (2)   The revocation or expiry of a  detention               order  shall  not bar the making  of  a  fresh               detention  order under section 3  against  the               same person in any case where fresh facts have               arisen after the date of revocation or  expiry               on which the Government or an officer, as  the               case may be, is satisfied that, such an  order               should be made." The first sub-section is not germane to the matter here, but the  second  is.  Relying upon the second  sub-section,  the detenu  claims  that  the order revoking  the  detention  on August 20, 1969, was followed the same day by another ’order detaining  him,  and as he was in detention  all  the  time, there could not be any fresh material before the  government for  a  second  detention, as required by  the  second  sub- section referred to here.  The State Government contends, on the other hand, that the existence of fresh material is  not a  condition precedent to the passing of a second order  and that  in  any event the second order can be  made  when  the first order is withdrawn or revoked for a technical  defect. According  to the learned counsel for the State  Government, the grounds of detention may be so serious that even if  the detenu  is  to be released because of a defective  order,  a second  order  may  be necessary to  put  him  in  detention immediately after his release. The matter is not res Integra.  In a number of decisions  of this Court -to which reference will be made presently,  this point has been considered and it has been held that once  an order of revo- 38 cation is made, another order detaining the same person  can only  be passed if some additional or fresh material  is  in the  possession of the State Government on which action  can be  based.   The first of these cases is  Hadbandhu  Das  v. District Magistrate, Cuttack and another(1).  In that  case, under almost identical circumstances under section 13 (2) of the  Preventive  Detention Act, 1950, which  is  similar  to s.14(2)  of  the Jammu & Kashmir Act, it was held  ’by  this Court               "The clearest implication of Section 13(2)  is               that   after  revocation  or  expiry  of   the               previous  order, no fresh order may  issue  on               the  grounds  on which the  order  revoked  or               expired had been made." In  other  words, the revocation or expiry of  the  previous order  cannot lead ipso facto to a revival of the  detention by  the  passing of a fresh order, because a person  who  is entitled to his liberty can only be put in a second jeopardy when  there are additional or fresh facts against  him.   If the  section had not spoken of the fresh facts,  the  matter might  have been different, because, then, the courts  would have  been required to see whether there Was any  curb  upon

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the power of the government to detain a person a second time after  his  release on the self-same material.   Indeed,  an earlier  case of this Court does exist in which such a  view was taken and we shall presently refer to it.  The case from the  All  India  Reporter to which we have  referred  was  a decision  of  the Constitution Bench.  It  was  followed  in Kshetra  Gogoi  v. State of Assam(1) and  Mohd.   Shafi  and Mohd.   Yaqub v. State of Jammu & Kashmir(1).  In these  two cases also, the view has been affirmed that the enactment of s.14(2) of the Act or the corresponding section 13(2) of the Preventive  Detention - Act, 1950, makes it  incumbent  upon the Government to base the detention on some fresh facts and not  the old facts on which the detection was  once  ordered but  the revocation of the order took place.  This  view  is binding upon us and applies in the present case. As  against this, reference was made to a decision  of  this Court  in  Jagdev Singh v. State of Jammu &  Kashmir("),  in which  it  is laid down that even after  the  revocation  or expiry  of the period of first detention, a fresh order  can be  made  on  the  same grounds on  which  the  first  order proceeded,  unless the’ action can be said to be mala  fide. There  was, however, no section equivalent to S. 13  (2)  of the  Preventive  Detention Act or S. 14 (2) of the  Jammu  & Kashmir  Act in the Defence of India Rules under which  that detention had  proceeded.  This is sufficient to distinguish the (1) A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 43. (2) [1970] 2 S.C.R. 517. (3)  Writ Petition 183 of 1969, decided on October 17, 1969. (4)  [1968] 1 S.C.R. 197.                              39 earlier  case.   As pointed out in the  All  India  Reporter case, the inference is very compulsive that fresh facts must be  found  for new orders otherwise once the  old  detention comes  to  an  end either by the expiry  of  the  period  of detention or by the cancellation of the order of  detention, a fresh detention cannot be ordered.  Following,  therefore, the string of cases to which we have referred and which  are indistinguishable  from  the facts of the present  case,  we think  the detention of the detenu cannot be sustained.   He is,  therefore,  ordered  to be  released  forthwith  unless required in some other connection. V.P.S.                                          Appeal allowed. 40