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PETITIONER: DR. GHANSHYAM JAISWAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KAMAL SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       16/02/1996

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. G.B. PATTANAIK (J)

CITATION:  1996 SCC  (3)  54        JT 1996 (5)   542  1996 SCALE  (2)596

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      Though the  respondent has  been served by dasti, he is not appearing either in person or through counsel. The facts are eloquent.  In a  suit for  ejectment filed  on April  5, 1984, the  respondent had  entered into a compromise on foot of which the decree for eviction was granted after recording the compromise  and evidence. The respondent did not deliver the possession  of the  demised property  in  terms  of  the compromise decree.  Therefore, the appellant was constrained to lay  execution for  possession of  the property.  In  the first round  of litigation,  the respondent  had  challenged under section  47 of the C.P.C impugning the validity of the compromise decree  which was  turned down  by the  executing Court. The  High Court  dismissed W.P.  No.2849 of  1994  by order dated  August 19,  1994.  Again  the  respondent  laid another objection  under  Section  47  contending  that  the decree is  vague and  incapable of  being executed. That was turned down  by the  executing Court  on September 30, 1994. Against that,  the respondent  filed a  revision in the High Court. The  High Court  in the  impugned order  allowed  the revision by  order dated  June 21,  1995 in  C.R. No.1252/94 since  the   counsel  for  the  appellant  had  reported  no instructions.      The  only   question  is:  whether  the  respondent  is entitled to raise the plea of vagueness? Having entered into the compromise  and suffered  a decree on foot of compromise and also  having raised the plea of non-executability of the compromise decree  and having  become  unsuccessful,  he  is precluded by constructive res judicata of might and ought in Explanation VI to Section 11, to raise any other plea of the executability of  the decree. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in  error in allowing the revision and setting aside the Execution Application.      The appeal  is accordingly  allowed. The  order of  the

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High Court is set aside. The appellant is at liberty to have the decree  executed with  the assistance  of the police. No costs.