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PETITIONER: GHANSHIAM DAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DEVI PRASAD & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/03/1966

BENCH:

ACT: U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951), s. 9-Brick kiln whether ’building’ within meaning  of section.

HEADNOTE: The respondents owned a brick kiln which they leased out  to the  appellants  in  1950.  They filed a  suit  against  the appellants  claiming rent for the period October 1, 1952  to September 30 1953.  The appellants contended in defence that as a result of the operation of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and  Land Reforms Act the Land in question stood  vested  in the State of U.P. with effect from July 1, 1952 and no  rent was  payable  to the respondents thereafter.  The  suit  was partly  decreed by the trial court but dismissed in toto  by the first appellate court.  In second appeal the High  Court held that the brick kiln wag a ’building’ within the meaning of  s. 9 of the Act and therefore the land did not  vest  in the State.  The appellants came to this Court. HELD : In the absence of a definition in the Act itself  the question  as to what is a ’building’ under s. 9 must  always be question of degree a question depending on the facts  and circumstances  of each case.  The brick kiln in the  present case was a mere pit with some bricks by its sides.  It could not be said to be a ’building’ within the meaning   of S.  9 of  the  Act  and the High Court  therefore  went  wrong  in holding  that the land did not vest in the State. [878  E-F, H] R. v. Neath Canal Navigation, 40 L.J.M.C. 197, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 80 and  81 of 1964. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated the  October 24, 1960 of the Allahabad High Court in  Second Appeals Nos. 2510 and 2511 of 1957. S.   P. Sinha and M. I. Khowaja, for the appellant. J.   P. Goyal, for the respondents The judgment of the court was delivered by Ramaswami, J. The question of law involved in these  appeals is Whether the disputed brick kiln on plots nos. 596 and 597 in  Mauza  Sarwat, Pargana and  District  Muzaffarnagar  and leased  out  to  the appellant is a  "building"  within  the meaning  of  s. 9 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition  and  Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951). The  respondents are the owners of a brick kiln  located  on the two plots nos. 596 and 597 in Mauza Sarwat, Pargana  and

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District  Muzaffarnagar.  They leased out the brick kiln  to the 875 876 appellant  under a registered lease deed dated December  29, 1950. The lease was to take effect from January 1, 1951  and terminate on September 30, 1953.  The rent was fixed at  Rs. 41 per mensem payable annually in the month of October.  The rent  for the period October 1, 1952 to September  30,  1953 remained due against the appellant.  The respondents filed a suit (no. 1125 of 1953) in the Court of Munsif Muzaffarnagar for  the  recovery  of Rs. 492 being arrears  of  rent  from October  1,  1952  to  September 30,  1953.   The  suit  was contested  by  the  appellant who  pleaded  that  after  the passing of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (U.P. Act 1 of 1951)-hereinafter called the ’Act’-the  plots of  land had vested in the State of U.P. under s. 6  of  the Act with effect from July 1, 1952 and the respondents  were, therefore, not entitled to claim any rent from the appellant By  his  judgment  dated February 12,  1955  the  Additional Munsif  Muzaffarnagar held that the brick kiln did not  vest in the State and as it occupied only 1/3rd of the total area of  the land, the respondents were entitled to a decree  for 1/3rd of the rent claimed.  The Munsif accordingly granted a decree for a sum of Rs. 164 and dismissed the balance of the claim  of  the  respondents.  Against the  judgment  of  the Additional Munsif both the parties filed appeals before  the District  Judge.  Both the appeals were disposed,of  by  the Civil  Judge  of Muzaffarnagar by a common  judgement  dated August  19,  1957.  It was held by  the  Additional.   Civil Judge  that  the  brick  kiln could not  be  regarded  as  a "building’  within  the meaning of S. 9 of the Act  and  the entire area of the two plots nos. 596 and 597 had vested  in the  State.  The Additional Civil Judge accordingly  allowed the  appellant’s  appeal  and dismissed the  appeal  of  the respondents.   The  net  result was that  the  suit  of  the respondents  for arrears of rent was dismissed as  a  whole. Against  the  judgment  of the Additional  Civil  Judge  the respondents  filed two Second Appeals nos. 2510 and 2511  of 1957 to the High Court.  The High Court held that the  brick kiln was a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the  Act and  the title to the two plots of land did not vest in  the State  and the respondents acquired the right  of  statutory tenants under a. 9 of the Act and they had a right to demand rent  from the appellant under the terms of the lease.   The High  Court accordingly allowed both the Second Appeals  and granted a decree to the respondents for the entire amount of rent claimed. Section  4  of  the Act deals with the  acquisition  of  the interest of intermediaries.  The section provides as follows :               "4.   (1)  As  soon  as  may  be   after   the               commencement of this Act the State  Government               may,  by notification, declare that as from  a               date  to be specified, all estates situate               in Uttar Pradesh shall vest in the State  and,               as from the               877               beginning    of   the   date   so    specified               (hereinafter called the date of vesting),  all               such  estates, shall stand transferred to  and               vest, except as hereinafter provided, in.  the               State free from all encumbrances.               (2)It   shall  be  lawful  for  the   State               Government,  if it so considers necessary,  to               issue,  from  time to time,  the  notification

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             referred to in sub-section (1) in respect only               of such area or areas as may be specified  and               all the provisions of sub-section (1) shall be               applicable  to and in the case of  every  such               notification."               Section 6(a) sets out the consequences of  the               vesting  of an estate in the  State.   Section               6(a) reads as follows               "6. When the notification under s. 4 has  been               published     in    the     Gazette,     then,               notwithstanding  anything  contained  in   any               contract  or document or an any other law  for               the time being in force and save as  otherwise               provided  in  this Act,  the  consequences  as               hereinafter   set   forth  shall,   from   the               beginning of the date of vesting, ensue in the               area to which the notification relates, namely               (a)   all  rights, title and interest  of  all               the intermediaries-               (i)   in  every estate in such area  including               land   (cultivable  or  barren),   grove-land,               forests  whether  within  or  outside  village               boundaries, trees (other than trees in village               abadi,  holding or grove),  fisheries,  tanks,               ponds,   water-channels,  ferries,   pathways,               abadi sites, hats, bazars and meals other than               hats,  bazars,  and meals held  upon  land  to               which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1)  of               section 18 apply and,               (ii)in all sub-soil in such estate including               rights, if any, in mines and minerals, whether               being worked or not;               shall  cease  and be vested in  the  State  of               Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances;"               Section 9 of the Act states               "9.   All  wells,  trees  in  abadi  and   all               buildings  situate  within the  limits  of  an               estate,   belonging   to   or   held   by   an               intermediary   or  tenant  or  other   person,               whether residing in the village or not,  shall               continue  to  belong  to or be  held  by  such               intermediary,  tenant or person, as  the  case               may  be,   and the site of the  wells  or  the               buildings with the area.                878               appurtenant  thereto  shall be  deemed  to  be               settled  with him by the State  Government  on               such   terms   and  conditions   as   may   be               prescribed." The  word  "building" has not been defined in  the  Act  and must,  therefore, be construed in its  ordinary  grammatical sense unless there is something in the context or object  of the  statute  to  show that it is used in  a  special  sense different from its ordinary grammatical sense.  In  Websters New  International Dictionary the word "building"  has  been defined as follows               "That  which  is  built specif :  (a)  as  now               generally used a fabric or edifice, framed  or               constructed,  designed to stand more  or  less               permanently,  & covering a space of  land  for               use  as  a  dwelling,  store  house,  factory,               shelter  for  beasts  or  some  other   useful               purpose.   Building  in this  sense  does  not               include a mere wall, fence, monument, boarding               or  similar  structure  though  designed   for

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             permanent   use   where  it  stands,   nor   a               steamboat,  ship  or other vessel  of  naviga-               tion." From  this definition it does not appear that the  existence of a root is always necessary for a structure to be regarded as a building.  Residential buildings ordinarily have  roofs but there can be a non-residential building for which a roof is  not necessary.  A large stadium or an open-air  swimming pool  constructed  at  a considerable  expense  would  be  a building  as it is a permanent structure and designed for  a useful  purpose.   The question as to what is  a  "building" under s. 9 of the Act must always be a question of degree  a question  depending on the facts and circumstances  of  each case.  As  Blackburn,  J.  observed in  R.  v.  Neath  Canal Navigation (1)               "The  masonry on the sides of a canal  is  not               sufficient  to constitute it a ’building’.   A               London  street,  though paved and  faced  with               stonework,  would  yet be ’land’,  whilst  the               Holborn Viaduct would be a ’building." The   question  for  determination  in  the  present   case, therefore,  is whether the kiln leased out to the  appellant is  a "building" within the meaning of S. 9 of the Act.   It has  been found by the first appellate court that the  brick kiln  has no site and is not a roofed structure.  It  was  a mere pit with some bricks by its sides.  It is also admitted in  this  case that there was no structure standing  on  the Bhatta.   Upon these facts, it is clear that the brick  kiln has  no  walls and no roof but it is a mere pit dug  in  the ground  with bricks by its side.  In the  circumstances,  we are  of  the opinion that the brick kiln leased out  to  the appellant, in the present case, is not a "buil- (1)  40 L J. M. C. 197. 879 ding"  within the meaning of s. 9 of the Act.   It  follows, therefore that the title to both the plots nos. 596 and  597 along  with  the brick kiln vested in the  State  Government with  effect from July 1, 1952 and the respondents  are  not entitled to claim any rent from the appellant for the period from October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953. For  the  reasons expressed, we hold that suit no.  1125  of 1953 filed by the respondents should be dismissed and  these appeals must be allowed with costs.                                  Appeal allowed. 880