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PETITIONER: GENERAL MANAGER, BHILAI STEELPROJECT, BHILAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STEELWORKERS’ UNION, BHOPAL AND 0 RS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/11/1963

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1333            1964 SCR  (5) 354

ACT: Standing  Orders- Certification-Jurisdiction  of  Certifying Officer-The  Industrial  Employment (Standing  Orders)  Act, (Act  No. 20 of 1946)-The Madhya Pradesh Industrial  Workmen (Standing  Orders) Act (M.P. Act No. 19 of 1959)-The  Madhya Pradesh  Industrial Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.P.  Act No.  26  of  1961). The Madhya  Pradesh  Industrial  Workmen (Standing Orders) Act (M.  P. Act No. 5 of 1962) The  Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act (M.P. Act No. 3 of 1958), s. 25- The C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes and Settlement Act (No. 22 of 1947).

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  submitted for certification  draft  standing orders  on June 9, 1960 to the Certifying Officer under  the Industrial  Employment  (Standing Orders)  Act,  1946.   The respondents raised an objection that the Certifying  Officer had   no  jurisdiction  inasmuch  as  the   Madhya   Pradesh Industrial  Workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959  applied  to this  industry  and  the  Industrial  Employment   (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.  Overruling this objection the Certifying Officer  certified  the  draft  standing  orders  on  August 6,1962.   The respondents appealed to the Industrial  Court, Madhya Pradesh which upheld the objection and set aside  the order of certification as void, being without  jurisdiction. In appeal by special leave: 355 Held:That  though  on  June  9,  1960  when  the  draft standing  orders  were submitted to the  Certifying  Officer under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the  Certifying  Officer had no jurisdiction  to  deal  with them,  the officer had acquired jurisdiction in  the  matter before  August 6, 1962 when he passed the  order  certifying the standing orders.  The Certification cannot be held to be void  merely  because  on  the date  when  the  orders  were submitted, the Certifying Officer had no jurisdiction.   The application   should   be  deemed  to  have   been   renewed immediately  after the officer acquired jurisdiction in  the matter  and so that jurisdiction having continued  upon  the date  of the certification, the certification also would  be with jurisdiction and binding.

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Municipal  Board,  Pushkar  v.  State  Transport  Authority, Rajasthan, [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373, followed.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  Civil Appeals Nos. 764 to  766 of 1963. Appeals  by special leave from the order dated November  16, 1962,  of the Industrial Court Madhya Pradesh at  Indore  in Appeals Nos. 2 /E.S.O./1962, 3/E.S.O./1962 and 4/E.S.O./1962 respectively. S.V.  Gupte, Additional Solicitor-General, Y.  Kumar  and R.B. Dhebar, for the appellants. LN.  Shroff, for respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 746/63). M.K.  Ramamurth v. R.K. Garg, S.C. Agarwal and  D.P.  Singh, for respondent NO.  1 (in C.A. No.756/63). November  8, 1963.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by DAs  GUPTA  J.-These three appeals are directed  against  an order  of  the Industrial Court, Madhya  Pradesh,  in  three appeals  from an order made by one Mr. I.B. Sanyal, who  was the  Certifying  Officer, under  the  Industrial  Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, hereinafter referred to as "the Central  Standing Orders Act." By this order made on  August 6, 1962, Mr. Sanyal had certified the draft standing  orders submitted  by  the General Manager,  Bhilai  Steel  Project, Madhya Pradesh.  On behalf’ of the several Unions, including the  three  Unions, who are the respondents  before  us,  an objection was raised 356 that Mr. Sanyal had no jurisdiction to certify the  Standing Orders  inasmuch as the Madhya Pradesh  "Industrial  Workmen (Standing Orders) Act, 1959 applied to this industry and not the Central Standing Orders Act.  Mr. Sanyal overruled  this objection and passed his order, as already stated, on August 6,   1962  certifying  the  draft  standing   orders.    The Industrial  Court,  Madhya  Pradesh,  to  which  the  Unions appealed against the order of certification has however held that Mr. Sanyal had no jurisdiction to certify the  Standing Orders  and it was the Labour Commissioner, Madhya  Pradesh, who  was competent to certify these.  Allowing  the  appeals the  Industrial Court set aside the order of the  Certifying Officer as void, being without jurisdiction.  It is  against this  order that the present appeals have been  filed  after obtaining special leave of this Court. Before  us,  it is no longer disputed that on June  9,  1960 when  the  draft  standing  orders  were  submitted  to  the Certifying  Officer  under the Central Standing  Orders  Act that   Officer   bad   no  jurisdiction   and   the   Labour Commissioner,  Madhya Pradesh, had jurisdiction  to  certify them.  It has however been urged before us that long  before the  date on which Mr. Sanyal made his order certifying  the standing  orders the Central Standing Orders Act had  become applicable  to this industry to the exclusion of the  Madhya Pradesh Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, and so, the   certification  could  not  be  held  to   be   without jurisdiction.   We have no doubt that if before  the  actual date  of certification Mr. Sanyal as the Certifying  Officer under   the  Central  Standing  Orders  Act   had   acquired jurisdiction  the  certification cannot be held to  be  void merely  because on the date when the orders  were  submitted before  him he had no jurisdiction. (vide  Municipal  Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan & Others(1). The  position  in  law is that the  application  for  certi-

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fication of the standing orders, though invalid at the  time it was made because the officer had no (1)  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 373. 357 jurisdiction  to deal with them, became a valid  application when  he  did acquire jurisdiction.  To put  the  matter  in another  way, the application should be deemed to have  been renewed immediately after the officer acquired  jurisdiction in the matter and so, that jurisdiction having continued  up to  the  date of the certification, the  certification  also would  be with jurisdiction and binding.  The question  that requires  examination therefore is: whether before the  date of  certification  i.e.,  August  6,  1962,  the  Certifying Officer  under  the Central Standing Orders Act  bad  become competent  to  certify the standing orders  for  the  Bhilai Steel Project. The answer to this question depends on whether on that date, i.e., August 6, 1962 the Central Standing Orders Act or  the Madhya  Pradesh  Industrial Employment Standing  Orders  Act applied to the Bhilai Steel Industry.  The Central Act,  the Industrial  Employment Standing Orders Act, 1946, came  into force  on  April 23, 1946.  Shortly after this  the  C.P.  & Berar  Industrial  Disputes  &  Settlement  Act,  1947   was enacted.   It  extended  to the  whole  of  Madhya  Pradesh. Sections  2  to  61 of the Act came into force  in  all  the industries  of  Madhya  Pradesh  except  certain  industries specified  in the notification that brought  these  sections into force.  This notification was dated November 20,  1947. By  a  further notification dated July 22, 1958  this  first notification was amended.  The consequence of the  amendment was  that  ss.  2 to 61 of the Act  became  applicable  with effect from August 1, 1958 to the Steel Industry at  Bhilai. In  1959  the Madhya Pradesh Legislature passed  a  separate Act,  Act  No. XIX of 1959 dealing  with  matters  regarding standing orders for industrial workmen.  This repealed s. 30 of  the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes &  Settlement  Act, 1947.  The result was that from the date on which Act.   XIX of  1959 came into force, i.e., December 31, 1960, s. 30  of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes & Settlement Act, 1047, was no longer in force in Madhya Pradesh. 358 The   provisions  of  Act  XIX  of  1959  as   regards   the certification of standing orders were also not applicable to Bhilai because s. 1, sub-s. 3 of this Act while laying  down that  the  Act  applied to  every  industrial  establishment wherein  20 or more workmen were employed and to such  class or  classes of other industrial establishments as the  State Government might by notification specify was made subject to a proviso in these words:- "Provided that it shall not apply except with the consent of the Central Government to an industrial establishment  under the control of the Central Government or a Railway  Adminis- tration or mines or oil-fields." Admittedly,  this consent of the Central Government was  not given to the application of this Act, the Madhya Pradesh Act XIX  of 1959, to Bhilai At the same time, it is not open  to dispute  before us that the Steel Industry at Bhilai was  an industrial  establishment under the control of  the  Central Government.   There was a faint attempt on the part  of  the learned  counsel,  who appeared before us on behalf  of  the respondents,  to suggest that the Steel Industry  at  Bhilai was  not  under the control of the Central  Government.   No such  point  appears to have been raised either  before  Mr. Sanyal  or the Industrial Court.  So, we did not permit  the respondents to raise this point for the first time here.  It

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may  also be mentioned in this connection that in  the  very notification  made by the Madhya Pradesh Government on  July 22,  1958, that Government made the definite statement  that the  Steel  Industry  at Bhilai was  carried  on  under  the authority of the Central Government.  We think it reasonable to  presume  for  the purpose of  these  appeals  that  this statement  made  by  the Government of  Madhya  Pradesh  was correct.   It  follows  therefore  that  the  Bhilai   Steel Industry  was an industrial establishment under the  control of the Central Government within the meaning of the  proviso to s. 1, sub-s. 3 of Act XIX of 1959 and consequently in the absence of the 359 consent  of the Central Government it did not apply  to  the Bhilai  Steel  Industry.  On and after  December  31,  1960, therefore neither s. 30 of the 1947 Act nor’ Act XIX of 1959 applied  to the Bhilai Steel Industry.  There is  no  escape therefore from the conclusion that on and after December 31, 1960, the Bhilai Steel Industry was governed as regards  the matter of standing orders by the Central Standing Orders Act of 1946. This  continued  to be the position till November  25,  1961 when  Act XIX of 1959 was repealed and was replaced  by  the Madhya  Pradesh Act XXVI of 1961, Madhya Pradesh  Industrial Establishment Standing Orders Act, 1961.  It would seem that this  Act was applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry as  it did not contain any provision similar to the one in  section 1,  sub-s.  3 of the 1959 Act.  The Madhya Pradesh  Act  No. XXVI  of  1961  was however amended in 1962  by  the  Madhya Pradesh Act 5 of 1962.  This Amending Act added to sub-s.  1 of s. 2 of the 1961 Act the following provision:- "Provided that it shall not apply to an undertaking  carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or  a railway administration or a mine or an oil field." The  effect of this was that Act XXVI of 1961  which  became applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry on November 25, 1961 ceased to be applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry on  and from  April  29, 1962, when the President  assented  to  the Amending Act.  After this date the position again became the same as it was immediately before the Madhya Pradesh Act  26 of  1961  came  into force.  That is,  none  of  the  Madhya Pradesh Acts about the standing orders was applicable to the Bhilai  Steel  Industry.   So, the field was  open  for  the Central  Standing  Orders Act to operate in respect  of  the Bhilai  Steel Industry on and from the date when the  Madhya Pradesh Act V of 1962 came into force. We  have therefore reached the conclusion that for  sometime before August 6, 1962 when the order 360 of  certification was passed, the Certifying  Officer  under the  Central  Government  Standing  Orders  Act  had  become competent  to  certify the standing orders  for  the  Bhilai Steel Industry. The  Industrial Court took note of the position that on  the matter  of the standing orders the 1947 Act was repealed  by the  1959  Act with effect from December 31, 1960.   It  was however  of  opinion  that there being  no  specific  saving clause  in  the Act of 1959 as regards the  notification  of July  22, 1958, the Act of 1947 applied to the Bhilai  Steel Industry and that notification not having been superseded by any subsequent notification it continued to be effective  in respect  of  the Bhilai Steel Industry under s.  25  of  the Madhya  Pradesh  General Clauses Act.  On this view  of  the effect of s. 25 of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act it based  its  conclusion that the State Act  continued  to  be

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applicable to the Bhilai Steel Industry. We  are of opinion that s. 25 of the Madhya Pradesh  General Clauses  Act  could not save the  notification  in  question after the 1947 Act was repealed.  That section provides:- "Where  any enactment is repealed and reenacted by a  Madhya Pradesh Act with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment, notification, order,  scheme,  rule, regulation, form or bye-law  made  or issued  under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it  is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue In force,  and be deemed to have been made or issued under  the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is  superseded by  any  appointment,  notification,  order,  scheme,  rule, regulation,  form  or  bye-law  made  or  issued  under  the provisions so re-enacted." It appears clear to us that the effect of the proviso to  s. 1,  sub-s. 3 of Act XIX of 1959 being that this new  Act-the re-enacted   legislation--did  not  apply  to   Bhilai   the notification already issued under the 361 old  Act was clearly inconsistent with the new  legislation. Section  25  of the Madhya Pradesh General Clauses  Act  was therefore of no avail and could not save that notification. For  the  reasons  mentioned  above, we  have  come  to  the conclusion  that  though  on June 9, 1960,  when  the  draft standing  orders  were submitted to the  Certifying  Officer under the Central Standing Orders Act the Certifying Officer had  no  jurisdiction  to deal with them,  the  Officer  bad acquired  jurisdiction in the matter before August 6,  1962, when he passed the order certifying the standing orders. We, therefore, set aside the order of the Industrial  Court, Madhya  Pradesh,  but as that Court has not  considered  the other  objections  raised  by the Unions  in  their  appeals against the certification of the standing orders, we  direct that  the  appeals  be heard by  the  Industrial  Court  and disposed  of  in  accordance with  law  after  deciding  the objections raised on merits. The  appeals  are  accordingly  allowed.   In  the   special circumstances  of the case, we order that the  parties  will bear their own costs in this Court. Appeals allowed. 362