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PETITIONER: THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COL. ANILTEJ SINGH DHALIWAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       12/12/1997

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, M. SRINIVASAN

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Srinivasan, J.      The respondent  was an  Army Officer of the rank of Lt. Col. and was posted as Commanding Officer under 116 Engineer Regiment, with  head  quarter,  17  Mta.  Arty.  Brde.  Nine charges were  framed against  him on  24.6.1995 and  General Court Martial was held from 1.7.95 to 10.11.95. He was found guilty on  charges 2,3,8  and 9. He filed Crl. Writ Petition No.1 of  1995 in  the High  Court  of  Sikkim  on  11.12.95. Thereafter on  2.3.1996 the  order of  the Court Martial was confirmed under  Section 154  of the  Army Act.  By judgment dated 9.8.96  the High  Court allowed  the writ petition and quashed the  order or  the Court  Martial. The appellant has preferred this  appeal against  the  judgment  of  the  High Court. 2.   The main  contention of  the appellant is that the High Court has  exceeded  its  power  of  judicial  review  under Article 226 and acted as a court of appeal by discussing and appreciating the  evidence. Reliance  is placed  on Nagendra Nath Bora Versus The Commissioner of Hills Diven and Appeals 1958 SCR  1240 wherein  this court  held that the High Court had no power under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari in order  to quash  an error  of fact, even though it may be apparent   on face of the record unless there is an error of law which  is apparent  on the face of the record. The court observed that  the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to seeing  that the  judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies  exercising quasi-judicial  powers  do not  exceed   their  statutory  jurisdiction  and  correctly administer the law laid down by the Statute under which they act. 3.   In H.S. and I.E. Board, U.P. Versus Bagleshwar AIR 1966 SC 875,  the court  held that  an order passed by a Tribunal holding a  quasi judicial  enquiry which is not supported by any evidence  is in  order which is erroneous on the face of it and  as such  is liable  to be  quashed by the High Court under Article  226. In  Parry &  Co. Versus  Judge, 2nd I.T. Cal. AIR  1970 SC 1334 the court held that a writ is granted generally when a court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction  or   where  the   Tribunal  acts  in  flagrant

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disregard   of  the  rules  of  procedure  or  violates  the principle of  natural justice  where no particular procedure is prescribed. 4.   In Bhagat  Ram Versus State of H.P. AIR 1983 SC 454 the court  held   that  where  a  finding  of  the  disciplinary authority is  utterly perverse, the High Court can interfere with the same. 5.   In S.N.  Mukherjee Versus  Union of  India (1990) 4 SCC 594, the  Constitution Bench  dealt with  a case wherein the appellant had challenged the validity of the finding and the sentence recorded by the General Court Martial and the order of the  Chief of  Army Staff  confirming the same. The court held that  the Supreme  Court under  Article 32 and the High Court under Article 226 have the power of judicial review in respect of proceedings of courts martial and the proceedings subsequent thereto  and can  grant appropriate relief if the said proceedings  have resulted in denial of the fundamental rights guaranteed  under Part  III of the Constitution or if the said  proceedings suffer  from a jurisdictional error or any error  of law  apparent on the face of the record. After elaborately considering  the provisions  of the Army Act and Rules, the  court pointed out that at the stage of recording of findings  and sentence  the Court Martial is not required to record  its reasons.  It will  be advantageous to extract the following passage in the judgment:      "From the  provisions  referred  to      above  it  is  evident    that  the      Judge-advocate plays  an  important      role during  the course of trial at      general court  martial  and  he  is      enjoined to  maintain an  impartial      position. The court martial records      its  findings   after  the   judge-      advocate has summed up the evidence      and has  given his opinion upon the      legal  bearing  of  the  case.  The      members  of   the  court   have  to      express their  opinion  as  to  the      finding by  word of  mouth or  each      charge separately  and the  finding      on each  charge is  to be  recorded      simply as  a finding of "guilty" or      of  "not   guilty".  It   is   also      required that  the sentence  should      be announced  for the  with in open      court. Moreover Rule 66(1) requires      reasons  to  be  recorded  for  its      recommendation in  cases where  the      court  makes  a  recommendation  to      mercy. There is no such requirement      in  other  provisions  relating  to      recording of findings and sentence.      Rule 66(1)  proceeds on  the  basis      that there  is no  such requirement      because if  such a  requirement was      there  it   would  not   have  been      necessary  to   make   a   specific      provision for  recording of reasons      for the  recommendation  to  mercy.      The said provisions thus negative a      requirement to give reasons for its      finding and  sentence by  the court      martial and reasons are required to      be recorded only in cases where the      court     martial      makes      a

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    recommendation  to  mercy.  In  our      opinion, therefore, at the stage of      recording of  findings and sentence      the court  martial is  not required      to record  its reasons  and at that      stage reasons are only required for      the recommendation  to mercy if the      court   martial    makes   such   a      recommendation". 6.   In Chaturvedi  Versus Union  of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, the court  observed that  judicial review  is not  an appeal from a  decision but  a review  of the  manner in  which the decision is  made and  the power of judicial review is meant to ensure  that the  individual receives  fair treatment and not to  ensure  that  the  conclusion  which  the  authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. 7.   Relying on  the aforesaid  relines learned  counsel for the appellants  submit that  the High Court in this case has exceeded its  jurisdiction not  only by  reappreciating  the evidence but  also by  erroneous understanding provisions of the Evidence  Act. It  is argued  by him  that in  this case there has been no violation of principles of natural justice or rules  of procedure  and that  there is ample evidence on record to support the findings of the Court Martial. 8.   Learned counsel  for the  respondent contends  that the court martial  has relied  on inadmissible evidence and over looked certain  relevant evidence on record and its findings are vitiated. He has placed reliance on the ruling in Ranjit Thakur Versus  Union of  India &  Ors. (1987)  4 SCC 611. In that case  the court found that there was failure to enquire from accused  as required  by section  130 of  the Army  Act whether he  objects to  trial by any of the officers present and held that the entire proceedings was vitiated. The court went  on   to  hold   that  the   punishment   awarded   was disproportionately excessive and quashed the same. 9.   Now, we  shall proceed  to consider  the  four  charges found against  the respondent  and the decisions of the High Court thereon.      10.  (a)  Charge  No.  2  reads  as      under:      "IN  A   DOCUMENT  SIGNED   BY  HIM      KNOWINGLY MAKING  A FALSE STATEMENT      ( Army Act Section 57 [a] ) :           In that  he, at field, on 23rd      October    1993,     while    being      Commanding Officer  116 Engr. Regt.      signed 116  Engr. Regy.  letter No.      2012/Gen/SAT/OPV dated 23rd October      1993  addressed   Maj.  Gen.   K.C.      Dhingra, V.S.M.,  GOC 17  Mtn. Div.      stating "It is brought fwd for your      information  that   all  the   SRTs      procured from  M/s. Dhariwal  Steel      Pvt. Ltd.  Calcutta have since been      issued out  for the  constr. of PDs      are likely  to be completely ground      applied  by  30th  October,  1993",      well knowing  the said statement to      be false".      (b)  The Court  Martial dealt  with      it in the following manner:      "Second Charge           After considering the evidence      on record the court find that there      is no denial on the part of accused

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    for having  written the said letter      to Maj.  Gen. K.C.  Dhingra, V.S.M.      It has  also nowhere  being brought      on record  that prior  to  date  of      writing  this   letter  dated  23rd      October  ,   1992  (Ext.   Q),  the      accused had  ascertained  that  the      said  Arts.  had  been  issued  for      ground  application   although  the      accused has  averred in his unsworn      statement (Ext.  BT)  that  he  had      checked up with Maj P.K. Mangal (PW      16). In  addition to  the above the      following reasons  clearly indicate      the guilt of the accused:-           (a) Maj  P.K. Mangal  (PW  16)           has  deposed   that  on   27th           September, 1992 he was told by           the  accused   that   he   was           issuing  SRTs   from   defence           brick  stores  so  that  early           completion    of     permanent           Defence  OP   Task  could   be           ensured.           (b) PW  16 has  further stated           that  on  the  inster  of  the           accused he  wrote letter dated           24th October,  1993 (Ext.M) to           all  coys   asking   them   to           identify such  PDs  where  the           said SRTs  have  been  utilise           and confirm  the same  by 13th           October, 1992,  this action of           accused is  subsequent to  and           not prior  to his  writing the           said letter (Ext.Q)           (c)  Vide   his  noting  sheet           dated   20th   October,   1993           (Ext.M) addressed to Maj. Gen.           K.C.   Dhingra,   V.S.M.   the           accused  in   para   (c)   had           mentioned that he had accepted           below  specification  SRTs  to           make up  the SRTs  of  defence           brick issued  by him for Job s           - 212.           (d) Vide  his letter  to  Maj.           Gen.  K.C.   Dhingra,   V.S.M.           dated 20th October, 1993 (Ext.           O)  the   accused  had  stated           therein his  opinion the  SRTs           supplied  by   M/s.   Dhariwal           Steel Ltd.  should be  utilise           for   making    up   of    the           deficiency  of  Defence  Brick           SRTs which had been issued for           consturction of PDs.           (e) 673  SRT out of a total of           680 were  found at  ETP-V when           checked  by   Lt.  Col.   K.K.           Khosla (PW  27) and Capt. Sant           Ram  Verma  (PW  25)  on  10th           December, 1993.           (f)   By    common    military           knowledge it  can be  inferred

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         that  between   the  date   of           writing the  letter Ext.  Q-10           i.e. 23rd  October,  1993  and           probable  date  of  completion           given   therein    i.e.   30th           October,  1993   it   is   not           possible  to  apply  the  said           quantity of SRTs on ground". 11.  Before the  High Court the contention of the respondent was that  the letter  Ext. Q-10 on the basis of which charge No. 2  was framed  was written by him in response to a query from the  staff of Court of Inquiry and it was therefore not admissible  in   evidence.  The  High  Court  accepted  that contention and  held that the said letter was not admissible in view  of the  provisions in Rule 182 of Army Rules. It is also held  by the High Court of Army Rules.  It is also held by the High Court that the court material had not taken into consideration a  report of  Lt.Col. K.K.  Khosla  which  was marked as  Ex. AW. On those grounds the High Court held that the findings of the Court Martial were wholly unsustainable. 12.  Both the  reasons given  by the High Court for quashing the finding  of the  Court Martial,  as  stated  above,  are totally erroneous.  As regards the admissibility of Ex. Q-10 in evidence, Rule 182 of the Army Rules is not applicable to the same.   It  is brought to our notice that factually, the Court of  Inquirty commenced  on 28th  September,  1992  and culminated on  14th October,  1993.  The letter Ex. Q-10 was written only  on 23.10.1993  i.e. after the Court of Inquiry concluded.   Further the  letter was  addressed to Maj. Gen. K.C. Dhingra,  VSM.   Admittedly he  was not a member of the Court of  Inquiry and  had nothing to do with the same.  The only  contention   urged  before  us  is  that  he  was  the Commanding officer  Incharge at  the time  when the  alleged offence took  place.  That is not sufficient to attract Rule 182 of the Army Rules. 13.  The Rule reads as follows:      "182  Proceedings   of   Court   of      Inquiry not admissible in evidence      The  proceedings   of  a  Court  of      Inquiry.   or    any    confession,      statement or  answer to  a question      made or given at a Court of Inquiry      shall not  be admissible  the  Act,      nor shall  any evidence  respecting      the  proceeding  of  the  Court  be      given  against   any  such   person      except  upon   the  trial  of  such      person for  willfully giving  false      evidence before the Court."      The Rule  refers only  to the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry or any confession, statement or answer to a question made or  given at  a Court  of Inquiry.   Ex.  Q 10 does not belong to  any of  the above categories.  The latter part of the Rules  refers to  evidence respecting the proceedings of the Court and prohibits the same being given except upon the trial of  such person  for wilfully  giving  false  evidence before that  Court.   That part  of the  rule  is  also  not acceptable.    Moreover,  Ex.Q-10  does  not  refer  to  any query being  put by  the addressee.  It has only referred to an earlier letter dated 20.10.1993.  Reliance is placed upon the caption  in Ex. Q-10 which makes a reference to staff of Court of  Inquiry.  That does not help the respondent in any manner.   We have been taken through the averments contained in the writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court.   They do  not disclose as to how the letter could be

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said to  be falling within the scope of Rule 182 of the Army Rules.   Hence, the  view of  the High  Court is  based on a flagrant  error   that  the  document  was  inadmissible  in evidence. 14.  The  other   reason  given   by  the   High  Court  for interferring with  the findings  is that  Ex. AW by Lt. SRTs out of  a total  of 680  were found at ETP-V when he checked the same  on 10.12.1993.   Lt.  Khosla was examined as PW 27 before the  Court Martial  and there is a specific reference to the  same in  the  order  of  the  Court  Martial.    The respondent places  reliance on  a portion  of that report in which the  responsibility for  the lapses  was attributed to Son. Sukhdev  Singh.   It is  argued that  the report of Lt. Col. Khosla  fixing the responsibility on Sub. sukhdev Singh should have been accepted by the Court Martial.  There is no merit in  this contention.   In  the first  place, the  High Court is  error in  thinking that  the Court Martial had not taken into  consideration Ex.A.W.   On  the other  hand, the Court Martial  has expressly referred to the evidence of Lt. Col. Khosla  himself and  contents of  Ex.AW. Secondly,  the High Court  is wrong  in thinking that the report fixing the responsibility  on  Sub.  Sukhdev  Singh  should  have  been accepted and  the respondent  should have  been  exonerated. Admittedly, Sub.  Sukhdev Singh  is a  subordinate official. The responsibility  for the  stores was with the respondent. He cannot  escape by  contending that a subordinate official was responsible.   It  is for  the Court Martial to consider the said  question and come to a conclusion.  When the Court Martial has held that the respondent was responsible for the lapse, it  was not  for the High Court to interfere with the same as  there was  no omission  on the  part of  the  Court Martial to consider the relevant evidence. 15.(a)    Turning  to   Charge  No.3  the  same  is  to  the following terms:           IN A  DOCUMENT SIGNED  BY HIM  KNOWINGLY MAKING  A      FALSE STATEMENT:- Army Act - Sec. 57(a)                In that he,      as filed,  on 23rd  Oct. 1993  while  being  Commanding      Office 116  Engr. Regt.  signed 116  Engr. Regt. letter      OPW dated  23rd VSM,  DOC 17  MTN Div.  stating "It  is      brought fwd.  for your info. that all the FRTs procured      from M/s.  Dhariwal Steel  Pct. Lt.  Calcutta has since      been issued  out for  the constr. of PDs in the current      working  season.    On  these  PDS  are  likely  to  be      completely ground  applied by  30th  Oct,  1993",  well      knowing the said statement to the false"      (b) The decision of the Court Martial was a followed:      THIRD CHARGE:-   In support of this      finding the  evidence i.e.on record      is as follows:      (a) Lt.  Col. B. Manickam, PW-5 has      deposed that  during second week of      November 1992  he was called by the      accused in  his office where he was      made to  sign the  Bd.  proceedings      pertaining   to    generators   and      alternators  (Ex.U).  At  the  same      time the  accused asked him to take      the Bd.  proceeding  to  Maj.  G.K.      Mediratta (PW  21) and obtained his      signatures   also    on   the   Bd.      proceeding to  whom the accused had      already spoken  to PW  6  has  also      stated that  at no stage the Bd. of      offers has  physically assembled to

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    check  the   generators/alternators      after repairs.      (b) Maj.  G.K. Mediratta,  9PW  21)      has deposed that the Bd. proceeding      were brought  to him by PW 6 and he      signed the  said  Bd.  proceedings.      he has  also averred that the Board      physically never assembled.      (c) Sub.  KKV  Pilla  (PW  24)  has      deposed that  he signed  the  Board      proceedings on  insistence of PW 21      and he  did not  even known at that      stage which  Bd. proceeding  he was      signing.      (d) Major  MMS Bharaj  (PW 11)  has      deposed  that   before  making  the      payment he  had  told  the  accused      that the said Bd. proceeding (Ex.U)      were  neither   countersigned   nor      dated and on the inster. of accused      he put  the date as ’27’ (Exhibited      as U-5)d.  He (PW  11) has  further      stated that  at the  time of making      payment he  had also  informed  the      accused that it will not be correct      to  make   the  payment  since  all      generators  had   not  come   after      repairs.      (e) According to deposition of Hav.      Amin ali  (PW  12)  and  Hay.  B.L.      Prajapati (PW  28), the  generators      kept coming  even after  30th  Nov.      1992 i.e. the date of payment". 16.  The respondent contended before the High Court that the oral evidence  of PWs6, 21 and 24 was not admissible in view of the  provisions of  Section 94 of the Evidence Act as the same was contrary to the proceedings of the Board.  The High Court has accepted the said contention and held that Section 94 of  the Evidence Act barred the admissibility of the oral evidence.  The High Court has also observed that the Members of the  Board who  has deposed  that they  had assigned  the Board proceedings  because the  respondent wanted them to do so should  have been  proceeded against  for  their  lapses. According to  the High  Court the  non consideration  of the said aspect  of the  matter was a gross omission on the part of the  Court Martial.   It was further observed by the High Court  that  the  evidence  of  PW  20  was  omitted  to  be considered by the Court Martial. 17.  None  of  the  reasons  given  by  the  High  Court  is sustainable.   A perusal  of Section  94 of the Evidence Act shows that  it has  no applicability  whatever.  The Section reads thus:      94. Exclusion  of Evidence  against      application of document to existing      facts:-      When language used in a document is      plain in itself and when it applies      accurately   to   existing   facts,      evidence may  not be  given to show      that it  was not  meant to apply to      such facts"      The Section  will come  into play  only when  there  is      document and  the language  of it  has to be considered      with reference to a particular factual situation.  That      Section will  apply only  when  the  execution  of  the

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    document is  admitted and no vitiating circumstance has      been put  forward against  the same.   In  the  present      case, the  document in  question is a proceeding of the      Board.   If at  all, it  can only  be  said  that  said      document contains  an admission made by the signatories      thereto that  they had  checked the  materials and  the      serviceability thereof.   It  is well  settled that  an      admission can  be explained by the markers thereof.  In      Naqubai Versus B. Shama Rao AIR 1956 S.C. 593 the Court      held an  admission is not conclusive as to the truth of      the matter  stated therein  and it  is only  a piece of      evidence, the  weight to  be  attached  to  which  must      depend upon  the circumstances  under which it is made.      The Court  said that it may be shown to be erroneous or      nature so  long as  the person  to whom it was made has      not acted  upon it  at the  time when  it might  become      conclusive by  way of estoppel.  The same principle has      been reiterated  in K.S.  Srinivasan  versus  Union  of      India AIR  1958 S.C.  419, Basant  Singh  Versus  Janki      Singh AIR  1967 S.C.  341 and  P.Ex-s. Co-op.  T.  F.S.      Versus State of Haryana. AIR 1974 S.C. 1121. 18.  The appellants  herein contended  before the High Court that the  relevant provision  of the evidence Act is Section 92, Proviso  1. The  same contention was repeated before us. In our  view neither  Section 92 nor Section 94 is attracted in this  case.   Hence, the  view of the High Court that the oral evidence  given by  PWs 6, 21 and 24 is inadmissible is totally erroneous. 19.  There is another aspect of the matter to be considered. Section 133  of  the  Army  Act  provides  that  the  Indian Evidence Act  shall subject  to the  provisions of  the  Act applied  to   all  proceedings  before  the  Court  Martial. Section 134  provides that a Court Martial may take judicial notice of  any matter  within the general military knowledge of the  members.   It is quite obvious that in this case the Court Martial  had taken  judicial notice of the fact that a lower official  obeys implicitly  the directions of a higher official.   The respondent  being an official higher in rank to the  aforesaid witnesses,  the  latter  carried  out  his directions by signing the Board proceedings.  The High Court has also  observed that  the  evidence  of  PW  20  was  not considered  by   the  Court  Martial.    We  are  unable  to appreciate how  the evidence  of PW  20 is  relevant in this regard.   Hence, the reasoning of the High Court for setting aside the  finding of  the Court  Martial on  Charge No.3 is wholly unsustainable.   20.  (a)  Charge  No.8  was  in  the following terms:-      SUCH AN  DEFENCE AS IS MENTIONED IN      CLAUSE (f)  OF SECTION  52  OF  THE      ARMY ACT WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD                in that he,      at field,  between 30 Dec. 1992 and      22  July   1993,  while  being  the      Commanding  Officer  of  116  Engr.      Regt. with  intent to defraud, made      payments  of  Rs.  7,720/-  (Rupees      seven thousand seven hundred twenty      only) against  purported supply  of      AIG Stores  as per  Appx ’B’ to the      charge-sheet, well  knowing that no      such items  were infact received in      the said unit      (b). It  is dealt with by the Court      Martial in the following terms.      "Eight Charge:-  The reasons are as

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    follows:      (a) Hav. Rajkumar Singh (PW 30) has      deposed that on 18 March 1993, Hav.      Pillai brought  a CRX for 2 Ltrs of      paint and  4 brushes  75 mm.  As he      was not  dealing with A10 stores he      refused   to    sign    the    CRV.      Thereafter he  was  called  by  the      accused and ordered to sign the CRV      and he  accordingly signed  CRV dt.      18 March 1993 (Ex. BL)      (b) Capt.   A.K.Gautam  (PW 32) has      deposed that  he had  not  received      any ARG  stores in  February  1993.      He  has  further  deposed  that  he      signed the  Bill No.420/92-93 dated      27  February   1993  after  he  had      informed  the  accused  that  Capt.      A.K. Jain has refused to sign since      no  stores   have  been   received.      Capt.  A.K.   Jain  was   also  not      available at  Mile  2  location  at      that   time.        The    accused,      thereafter, instructed  Capt.  A.K.      Gautam (PW  32) to  sing  the  said      bill and he accordingly signed.      (c) Lt. Col. B. Manickam (PW 6) has      deposed that  the accused asked him      to take  on charge ATG stores which      he  refused  since  no  stores  had      arrived.   He further reflected the      deficiency of ATG stores in handing      taking over  noted ME-2  which  was      brought to the notice of accused on      09 June 1993.      (d) The  fact that accused was made      aware  on   09   June   1993   that      physically no  ATG store  had  been      received and  yet he  did not  take      any action, is an indication of his      intent." 21.  The High  Court reversed  the finding on this charge on the same  reasoning as  with reference  to Charge  No.3. The High Court  has held  that the  oral evidence adduced before the Court  Martial was  inadmissible.   The reasons which we have already give when we dealt with Charge No.3 are equally applicable here. 22.  Hence, we  hold that  the High  court  s  in  error  in interferring with  the findings  of  the  Court  Martial  on Charge No.8.      22.  The   Nineth  Charge  read  as      follows:      AN  OMISSION  PREJUDICIAL  TO  GOOD      ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE                In that he,      at filed, between 01 Nov. 92 and 21      Nov. 93  while being the Commanding      Officer  of  116  Engr.  Regt.  and      having  come   to  know  about  the      losses/deficiencies   of    Defence      Brick  Stores   on  charge  of  his      regiment,  improperly   omitted  to      report the said losses/deficiencies      in contravention  of Para  1(c)  of      SAO 13/s/80.

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23.  It is  unnecessary for us to consider the discussion of this charge  by the  Court Martial for on the face of it the charge is  unsustainable.   The charge is under Para 1(c) of SAO 13/2/80. A copy of the said SAO has been produced before us.  The relevant part of it reads as follows:      ADJUTANT GENERAL’S BRANCH      SAO  13/s/80  DISCIPLINE-PROCEDURE  FOR  SUBMISSION  OF      REPORTS REGARDING INCIDENTS AND OFFENCES INVOLVING ARMY      PERSONNEL AND FOR THEIR INVESTIGATION.      Incidents and offences to be reported.      1.   The  following  incidents  and  offences  will  be      reported:      (a) All  cases of  assault  and  affray  where  persons      subject to Army Act are involved.      (b) Breaches of discipline:-      (i) Collective insubordinations.      (ii) Suicide, attempted or suspected suicide:      (iii) Murder or an attempt to murder.      (iv) Rape      (v)  MT   accidents  resulting   in  fatal  or  serious      causalities,  accidents   involving  civilian  vehicles      resulting  in   damage  to   property  or  injuries  to      civilians or persons subject to Army Act.      (c) Other  serious  cases  e.g.  unnatural  deaths  not      covered under sub-para (b) above. 24.  It is  quite obvious that the charge framed against the respondent will not fall under Para 1(c).  The charge is not that some other persons brought about losses/deficiencies of defence Brick  Store and  the same  was not  reported by the respondent.  Not is the charge to the effect that it was the respondent himself who caused such losses/deficiencies.  The charge itself  is very  vague.   The High Court is therefore justified in  holding that  the charge  is defective and the respondent cannot be made guilty. 25.  There is  no doubt  that the High Court has erroneously set aside  the findings  of the Court Martial on Charges 2,3 and 8.  Now that we uphold the findings of the Court Martial on the  said charges,  the only question which remains to be considered is  that of punishment awarded to the respondent. Prima facie,  the sentence  awarded  by  the  Court  Martial appears to  be very  service.   But we do not want to decide the question  here.   As the  Court Martial  awarded such  a sentence on  the basis  of the  findings  on  all  the  four charges, namely,  2, 3, 8 and 9 the same cannot be sustained as we  have now  held that  Charge No.9 is unsustainable and the finding  thereon has  been rightly  quashed.  Hence, the question of  sentence has  to be  considered on the basis of three charges  namely 2,  3 and  8 being  found against  the respondent.   That has  to be  done by  the  Court  Martial. Therefore, the  matter has  to be remanded back to the Court Martial for deciding that question. 26.  Consequently the  appeal  is  partly  allowed  and  the judgment  of  the  High  Court  is  set  aside  except  with reference to  its conclusion  on charge  No.9. The  sentence awarded by  the Court Martial is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Court Martial for considering and passing an appropriate sentence  on the basis of findings on Charges 2, 3 and 8. 27.  In the  facts and  circumstances of the case we find it necessary to  invite attention  of  appellants  2  to  4  to consider initiating  appropriate proceedings  against PWs 6, 21 26,  30 and 32 who deposed at the Court Martial that they had  signed   or  prepared   official  record  on  the  oral directions  of   the  respondent   without   verifying   the correctness thereof  which act  of their was in direction of

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duties.   These state  of affairs is highly distressing.  We record our displeasure.