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PETITIONER: GANPAT RAM SHARMA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SMT. GAYATRI DEVI

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/07/1987

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 2016            1987 SCR  (3) 539  1987 SCC  (3) 576        JT 1987 (3)    99  1987 SCALE  (2)46

ACT: Delhi   Rent  Control  Act,  1958:  Section   14(1)(h)--’Has built’-’Has  acquired’--’Has been  allotted’--Interpretation of--Eviction  of tenant--When arises--Facts necessary to  be pleaded  and proved by landlord--Whether tenant entitled  to protection once condition in clause (h) fulfilled.     Limitation Act,  1963: Article 66--Possession of immova- ble property--Cause of action----When arises or accrues. Words and Phrases: ’Has  built’--’Has acquired’--’Has  been  allotted’--meaning of.

HEADNOTE:     The  respondent  purchased the suit premises  in  April, 1973 and in September, 1973 applied to the Competent Author- ity  under  the Slum Area (Improvement and  Clearance)  Act, 1956 for permission to evict the appellants who were induct- ed into the premises by the erstwhile landlord. The  permis- sion was granted in December, 1974 and three eviction  suits were  filed in April, 1975 on the grounds contained in  Sec- tion  14(1)(a), (h) and (j) of the Delhi Rent  Control  Act. 1958 and the Additional Rent Controller held that the ground under  Section 14(1)(h) was made out against all  the  three appellants. The Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the decree.     Before the High Court in revision, it was submitted that when the landlady purchased the property she and her  vendor had also been aware that the tenants owned a house and  that on  account of this knowledge the respondent had waived  her rights under clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act, that if a  tenant built a house or has been allotted  a  residential accommodation,  he  must  acquire/obtain  vacant  possession before  he was evicted under clause (h), and that  the  area where the allotted quarter was situated was not governed  by the Act 540 and,  therefore,  the ground covered by clause (h)  was  not available to the landlady.     The High Court construed Section 14(1)(h) of the Act  to mean  that  a building constructed by the  tenant  which  is outside  the  purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act  on  the date  of application for ejectment, was yet  within  Section

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14(1)(h),  and held that the word ’or’ showed the  different circumstances  in which a tenant was liable to  be  evicted, that  it  was not necessary for a landlord to  prove  either that  the tenant had built a house and acquired vacant  pos- session  of  the building or that he had been  allotted  and taken  possession of the allotted premises, and  that  there was  no  substance in the argument advanced by  the  tenants that  on account of the knowledge of the landlady  that  the tenants  owned  a  house, she had waived  her  rights  under clause  (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act, and  dismissed  the Revision Petitions.     In  the appeals, it was submitted that there must  be  a suitable  residence,  one which is a good and  a  reasonable substitute  for the appellants or the landlord before  evic- tion could be ordered under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act. Dismissing the appeals by special leave, this Court,     HELD:  1. The Rent Control Act is a beneficial  legisla- tion  to both the landlord and the tenant. It  protects  the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also  ensures  certain  limited rights to  the  landlord  to recover possession in stated contingencies. [550B-C]     2.1 The words ’has built’ or ’has acquired’ or ’has been allotted’  in clause (h) of Section 14(1) clearly mean  that the tenant has already built, acquired or been allotted  the residence  to which he can move and that on the date of  the application  for his eviction, his right to  reside  therein exists. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding  that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause (h)  lead  to  the only conclusion that as on  the  date  of application  the tenant must be possessing a clear right  to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the  same may have been allotted to him. The  words  ’built’ and ’allotted’ did not mean that after building a  residence or  after  allotment  of a residence the  tenant  must  also acquire its possession. [548D-F] 2.2  The  landlord,  in order to be entitled  to  evict  the tenant, must                541 establish  one of the alternative facts  positively,  either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession  of or  has been allotted a residence. It is essential that  the three ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who  seeks eviction  but after the landlord has proved or  stated  that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted  a  residence, whether it is suitable  or  not  and whether the same can be really an alternative  accommodation for  the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge  of the  tenant  and he must prove and  establish  those  facts. [549F-H]     2.3  The  landlord must be quick in  taking  his  action after  the  accrual of the cause of action, and  if  by  his inaction,  the tenant allows the premises to go out  of  his hands  then it is the landlord who is to be blamed  and  not the tenant. [550A-B]     2.4  The High Court was right in holding that  once  the condition  stipulated  in clause (h) was  fulfilled  by  the tenant, he was disentitled to protection. He cannot,  there- fore, claim that he should he protected. [547B-C]     3.1  Article 66 of the Limitation Act,  1963  stipulated that  for  possession  of immovable property  the  cause  of action  arises  or  accrues when the  plaintiff  has  become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition. [550C-D]

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   3.2  On the facts of this case it is clear that  Article 66  would  apply in this case because  no  determination  is necessary,  as determination by notice under Section 106  of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary.  [550D- E]     In the instant case, the landlady purchased the property on  April, 9, 1973. She filed an application for  permission after about six months from the date of purchase, and  filed eviction  application after about four months from the  date of  the grant of the permission by the Slum Authority.  Time begins  to run from the date of the knowledge. Knowledge  in this  case is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any  point of  view. There is, therefore, no question of limitation  in this case. [55OH; 551A]     Ved Prakash v. Chunilal, [1971] Delhi Law Times Vol.  7, 59;  Smt Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [1970] Rent  Control  Re- porter Vol. II, 71; Naidar Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain and  anoth- er.  A.I.R. 1966 Punjab 509; Siri Chand v. Jot  Ram,  Punjab Law Reporter Vol. LXIII, 1961, 915; Govindji Khera v.  Padma Bhatia Attorney, [1972] Rent Control Repor- 542 ter  Vol. 4, 195: Harbans Singh and another v. Custodian  of Evacuee Property ’P’ Block and others, A.I.R. 1970 Delhi 82; Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and another, A.I.R. 1941 Allaha- bad  28, 30; Somdass (deceased) v. Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa  Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab Law Reporter Vol. 85, 184 and  K.V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v. M.R. Ry. Manavikrama Zamorin Rajah and others, A.I.R. 1930 Madras 430, referred to.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 215052 of 1980.     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.1980 of the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 138 of 1979. R.F.  Nariman,  P.H. Parekh and Suhail Dutt for  the  Appel- lants. Ashok Grover for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SABYASACHI  MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by special  leave are  from the judgment and order dated 28th of August,  1980 of  the High Court of Delhi. Three appellants, Jai  Bhagwan, Pearey  Lal and Ganpat Ram, were inducted into premises  No. 3240,  Kucha Tara Chand, Daryaganj, Delhi by the then  land- lord,  Shri Dina Nath. The families of the  appellants  con- sisted of about 7 or 8 members per family living in one room each  on the ground floor of the said premises. Shri  Pearey Lal,  one of the appellants, had one side store room  along- with the room and Shri Jai Bhagwan had one small tin shed on the  first floor. The appellants were also sharing the  ter- race.     In 1952 the land and building situated at No. A-6;25, at Krishna Nagar, Delhi was purchased by one Nathu Ram,  father of the appellant Ganpat Ram and Pearey Lal together with the appellant Jai Bhagwan, his son-in-law. The building consist- ed of two room, two kitchens and a Barsati.     Three  applications  were made by the  appellants  under Order  41 Rule 2 of C.P.C. on or about 4th of August,  1980. The High Court pronounced its judgment without disposing  of these  applications  on or about 27th of  August,  1980  and proceeded to hold against the appellants on the basis of  an adverse  inference that the three appellants had  built  the house in Krishna Nagar, whereas a copy of the sale deed           543

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would show that the said house was bought and not built that by Nathu Ram and Jai Bhagwan, and were not-by the two of the three appellants.     In 1958 Ganpat Ram was allotted a D.D.A. Quarter No. 3 7 at Village Seelampur, Shahdara. By a notification dated 28th of May, 1966. Village Seelampur, Shahdara was declared to be an urban area. By Notification dated 27th March, 1979 issued under section 1(2) of the Delhi Rent Act (hereinafter called ’the  Act’) this village was subjected to the provisions  of the  said  Act.  During 1967-68 one Mrs.  Sushila  Devi  was inducted  into  the quarter at Seelampur,  consisting  of  a room,  a kitchen and a bath room. This lady had applied  for the  allotment of the said quarter in her name  sometime  in 1974.  On  20th  of July. 1980. the  authorities,  in  fact, allotted  the said quarter to her. In 1965-70 Ms. Dev  Karan and Kul Bhushan being the sons of Pearey Lal had been  occu- pying  the  portion of the house at Krishna  Nagar  together with their family members and grand-father, Nathu Ram. Nathu Ram died in 1969. The other portion was occupied by one Kalu Ram  and  his family members being brother of  Jai  BhagWan. There  are  18 people residing at the relevant time  in  the said  house.  The present landlord, the  respondent  herein, purchased  the  suit premises from the  erstwhile  landlord, Dina  Nath on or about 9th April, 1973. On or about 28th  of September, 1973, the present landlord applied to the  compe- tent  authority under the Slum Act for permission  to  evict the appellants from the said premises. On 12th of  December, 1974  the  competent authority under the  Slum  Act  granted permission  to the landlord to proceed in  eviction  against the  three appellants. On or about the 16th of April,  1975, the respondent herein filed three eviction suits against the appellants on the grounds contained in section  14(1)(a),(h) &  (j) of the Act. On 31st of January, 1977, it was held  by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi that the ground  under section  14(1)(h) was made out against all the three  appel- lants. The ground under section 14(1)(a) was also upheld but the appellants were asked to deposit arrears of rent  within a month from the date of the order so as to avail the  bene- fit  of section 15(1) of the Rent Act which  the  appellants availed  of. On or about 24th April, 1979, the Rent  Control Tribunal  confirmed the decree in ejectment on appeal  under section 14(1)(h) of the Act against the three appellants. On further appeal the High Court construed section 14(1)(h)  of the  Act to mean that a Building constructed by  the  tenant which  is outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Act  on  the date  of the application for ejectment, was yet within  sec- tion 14(1)(h) and the tenant was liable to be ejected. 544     In  appeal before us, it was submitted on behalf of  the appellants  that in none of the three judgments,  there  was any  finding as to the suitability of the residence that  is built,  allotted or of which the tenant was acquired  vacant possession  of. None of the courts has re-examined the  size of  the space, the distance and inconvenience that might  be caused,  the number of persons in the tenants’  families  or the  state of residence built or allotted by or to the  ten- ants. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the High  Court dated 28th August, 1980, the tenants have come up in appeal.     In  this  case  the learned Addl.  Rent  Controller  had passed  an  order of eviction under clause  (h)  of  section 14(1)  of the said Act against all the three  appellants  as mentioned before. The said decision was upheld by the Tribu- nal.  It  has been held by the courts below that  the  three tenants  have  built and acquired vacant possession  of  the residential  house  at A-6/25 Krishna  Nagar,  Lal  Quarter,

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Delhi.  It  was held that Ganpat Ram, one  of  the  tenants- appellants  has  been allotted residential quarter  at  317, Seelampur  III, Shahdara, Delhi. Before the High  Court  the judgments  of  the Rent Controller as well as  the  Tribunal were challenged on the grounds, inter alia, that none of the three tenants had built or acquired vacant possession of the residential house No. A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal  Quar- ter,  Delhi. It was further submitted that in any  case  the respondent-landlady was not entitled to claim eviction under clause  (h)  on the grounds of waiver  and  laches.  Counsel submitted before the High Court that Ganpat Ram had not been allotted  the quarter at Seelampur and that in any  case  he was not in possession of the same. He further submitted that the  Act was not applicable to the quarter alleged  to  have been  allotted  to Ganpat Ram, tenant and  as  such  grounds covered  by clause (h) were not available to  the  landlady. Lastly  it  was  submitted that all  the  three  ingredients mentioned  in clause (h) of section 14 of the Act  were  ap- plicable to the landlord. Section 14 of the Act is in  Chap- ter-III  and  controls  eviction of the  tenants.  The  said section  stipulates  that notwithstanding  anything  to  the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises  shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against  the  tenant. Clause (h) deals  with  the  situation where the tenant has, whether before or after the  commence- ment  of the Act, built or acquired vacant possession of  or has been allotted a residence.     The  High Court noted the apparent purpose of  providing clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 14. The High  Court was of the opinion that on account of rapid growth of  popu- lation of Delhi, landlords were  545 tempted  to terminate the tenancies of the existing  tenants and ask for their eviction in order to let out the  premises to  the pew tenants at high rents. Rent Control  Legislation for Delhi and New Delhi was passed for the first time during the  second  world war and since then there  has  been  Rent Control Legislation applicable to various urban areas in the Union  Territory of Delhi. The Rent Control Act was  enacted to  provide  for  the control of rents  and  evictions.  The object  of clause (h), as is apparent, is not to  allow  the tenant  more  than  one residence in  Delhi.  Therefore,  it provided  that in case that tenant builds a  residence,  the landlord could get his house vacated. It also provided  that if the tenant acquires vacant possession of any other  resi- dence, he is not protected. Lastly, it also stipulated  that if a residential premises has been allotted to a tenant,  he is not entitled to retain the premises taken on rent by him. In the instant case, on the three causes on which the  land- lord can claim eviction were present against the tenant, the High Court held that these causes are not joint. These  need not  be conjointly proved or established. These were in  the alternative.  Therefore,  if the landlord is  successful  in proving any one of the causes, he is entitled to an order of eviction  against  the tenant. Counsel  for  the  appellants sought to urge before the High Court that if a tenant  built a house, he must acquire its vacant possession before he can be  evicted  under clause (h). Similarly, it  was  submitted that  if residential accommodation was allotted to a  tenant then he must obtain vacant possession of the same. The  word ’or’  showed, according to the High Court, that  these  were different  circumstances  in which tenant was liable  to  be evicted. These were (i) if the tenant had built a new  resi- dence, or (ii) if he had acquired vacant possession of it or

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(iii) if he had been allotted a residence.     The words ’built’ and ’allotted’ do not mean that  after building  residence or after allotment of a  residence,  the tenant must also acquire its possession. If a tenant  builds a  house and does not occupy it, he is liable  to  eviction, according  to the High Court. Similarly, if a  residence  is allotted  to a tenant, but he does not occupy it and  allows others to occupy the same, he is not protected, according to the High Court. The Act provides that building of a house by tenant  or  allotment  of residence to him is  a  ground  of eviction  available to the landlord against his tenant.  The learned  Judge of the High Court was of the view that it  is not necessary for a landlord to prove either that the tenant has built and acquired vacant possession of the building  or that he has been allotted and taken possession of the allot- ted premises. The  landlady in the eviction application alleged  that  the tenants 546 had  built and acquired vacant possession of  a  residential house at A-6 25, Krishna Nagar, near Lal Quarter, Delhi.  It was  denied  by all the tenants but the Controller  and  the Tribunal  on the basis of the evidence on  record  concluded that  the  three tenants have built and have  also  acquired vacant  possession of the said residential premises. It  was further held that the relatives of the three tenants were in actual  physical  possession of the said  house  at  Krishna Nagar.  It  transpired from the record that Dev  Karan.  Kul Bhushan  and Kalu Ram were admittedly related to  the  three tenants and were in occupation of house at Krishna Nagar  as licensee of the three appellants-tenants. This is a  finding of fact and could not have been challenged in second  appeal before the High Court. Learned counsel for the tenants  then submitted  before  the High Court that the  landlady  was  a purchaser of the property from one Dina Nath and she and her vendor  had also been aware that the tenants were owners  of the house in Krishna Nagar. On account of this knowledge  it was  argued  that  the landlady-respondent  had  waived  her rights  under  clause (h) of section 14(1) of the  Act.  The High  Court  found  that  there  was  no  substance  in  the argument. There was no plea that the landlady ever waived or was  guilty of laches. No evidence was led by  the  parties. The  facts were that the respondent-landlady purchased  this property  from  Dina Nath on 9th of April, 1973.  There  was nothing  on record to show that Dina Nath was ever aware  of the  fact  about building or acquiring a  house  at  Krishna Nagar  by  the  three  tenants. The  landlady  on  the  28th September, 1973 filed applications against the three tenants under section 19 of the Slum Area (Improvement &  Clearance) Act,   1956   seeking  permission  to   institute   eviction proceedings.  The  required permission was  granted  by  the competent  authority  on  12th of  December.  1974  and  the present eviction application out of which this appeal arises was  filed on 16th of April, 1975. Therefore, there  was  no question of laches on the part of the landlady. She filed an application  for permission after about six months from  the date of purchase and she filed an eviction application after about  four months from the date of the grant of  permission by the Slum authority.     The landlady claimed eviction of Ganpat Ram,  appellant- tenant,  on  another ground also, namely, that he  has  been allotted residential quarter at 317. Seelampur III.  Shahda- ra. Delhi. This fact was denied by the tenant. A.W. 1 Naresh Chand, an Official of the D.D.A. brought the official record relating  to  the allotment of this quarter. It  was  proved

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that  the said quarter was allotted to him in 1958 and  that possession was delivered to him. It was deposed that it  was residential  in  nature. On behalf of the  tenants,  it  was submitted before the High  547 Court  that  the  same was in possession  of  Sushila  Devi. Sushila  Devi had appeared as a witness. She  admitted  that the said quarter was allotted to the tenant, Ganpat Ram, the appellant. After allotment Ganpat Ram was entitled to occupy the  allotted accommodation and possession was delivered  to him.  According  to  the said witness, he  was  not  now  in possession and somebody else was in possession. Evidence was adduced  on  behalf  of  the  tenant  that  he  was  not  in possession and somebody else was in possession. According to the  High Court, if once the condition stipulated in  clause (h)  was  fulfilled, by the tenant, he  was  disentitled  to protection under the Act He cannot thereafter claim that  he should  be  protected. We are of the opinion that  the  High Court was right.     It  was  further alleged that Seelampur  area  known  as Seelampur  where the allotted quarter was situated, was  not governed  by the Act and therefore ground covered by  clause (h) was not available to the landlady. There is no plea  and the  High  Court  found taking into  consideration  all  the relevant  materials that there was no evidence to show  that it  was situated within the area which was not  governed  by the  Act. We are in agreement with the learned Judge of  the High Court.     Before us in appeal, however, several points were sought to  be  urged. It was urged that on a  proper  construction, there  must be a suitable residence, that is to say, a  good substitute for the petitioners or the landlord and a reason- able substitute.     Reliance  was  placed on the decision of this  Court  in Goppulal  v. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji and  another,  [ 1969]  3  SCR 989. There the Court was  concerned  with  the sub-letting before the coming into force of the Act and  was concerned  with section 13(1)(e) of the relevant  Act  which used the expression "has sublet". The present perfect  tense contemplated  a completed event connected in some  way  with the  present  time. The words took within  their  sweep  any sub-letting which was made in the past and had continued  up to the present time. Therefore, this Court held that it  did not  matter that the sub-letting was either before or  after the Act came into force.     The  Delhi  High  Court in the case of  Ved  Prakash  v. Chunilal,  [1971]  Delhi  Law Times Vol. 7,  59,  where  the expression  ’has’  in the Delhi Rent Control  Act.  1958  in section 14(1)(h) came up for consideration. It was held that the  word ’has in clause (h) carries in itself the force  of the  present  tense. It has therefore to be  interpreted  in terms  of  the  words employed in the opening  part  of  the proviso which are to the 548 effect that the Controller may on an application made to him in  the prescribed manner make an order for the recovery  of the  premises and those words meant that on the date of  the application  the  tenant must be having a  residence  either because he might have built the same or might have  acquired vacant possession thereof or it might have been allotted  to him.  Either  of the three situations must be there  on  the date of the application. If that is not so, then clause  (h) of  the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the  Act would have no application.     According to the learned single Judge of the Delhi  High

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Court, the word ’has’ applied with the same force and veloc- ity  to the words ’built’, ’acquired vacant  possession  of’ and  ’been  allotted’. The last words  ’a  residence’  again relate  to all the three contingencies. The word ’has’  con- tains  in itself the meaning of presently  possessing  some- thing.  The ordinary English dictionaries while  giving  the meaning  of  word ’has’ refer to the word ’have’,  which  in turn means ’to hold’, ’possess’.     The  words  ’has built’ or ’has acquired’ or  ’has  been allotted’  clearly mean that the tenant has  already  built, acquired or been allotted the residence to which he can move and that on the date of the application for his eviction his right  to reside therein exists. It was therefore held  that the words as they stood associated with each other in clause (h)  lead to the only conclusion that as on the date of  the application  the tenant must be possessing a clear right  to reside in some other premises than the tenancy premises as a matter of his own rightful choice either because he may have built such premises or acquired vacant possession thereof or the same may have been allotted to him.     In  Smt. Revti Devi v. Kishan Lal, [1970]  Rent  Control Reporter  Vol. II, 71 Deshpande, J. of the Delhi High  Court had  occasion to construe section 14(1)(h) of the  Act.  The landlord  there  applied for eviction of his tenant  on  the ground  that  the tenant had acquired vacant  possession  of another residence within the meaning of section 14(1)(h)  of the  Act. The tenant defended that he had not  acquired  any residence  and that the alleged residence had in  fact  been acquired by his wife and his sister-in-law jointly. The Rent Control  Tribunal  held  that the view  that  under  section 14(1)(h)  the  tenant was liable to be evicted  only  if  he himself had acquired the vacant possession of another  resi- dence  and not by any other member of his  family  including the  wife. The question which came up before the  Court  for decision was whether the acquisition of a separate residence by the wife of the  549 tenant was sufficient ground for the eviction of the  tenant by  the  landlord under proviso (h) of  sub-section  (1)  of section 14: That, however, is not the question here.     In Naidar Mal v. Ugar Sain Jain and another, A.I.R. 1966 Punjab  509, the court had to construe, inter alia,  section 13(1)(h)  of  the Delhi and Ajmer Rent  Control  Act,  1952. There under section 13(1)(h) of the said Act in order to  be liable  for eviction, the tenant must have built a  suitable residence. The Court was of the opinion that merely  because the  tenant  had built a house, would not be  a  ground  for ejectment within the meaning of section 13(1)(h). The  words ’suitable residence’ must be read with all the terms  namely ’built’ ’acquired vacant possession of’ or ’been  allotted’. Although  the onus to prove facts within the special  knowl- edge  of a party must be on him, a landlord bringing a  suit for  eviction  under section 13(1)(h) of the said  Act  must first  allege  the existence of grounds entitling him  to  a judgment. The residence of the tenant must be suitable one.     In  Siri  Chand v. Jot Ram, (Punjab  Law  Reporter  Vol. LXIII,  1961  at  page 915), the Punjab High  Court  had  to construe  the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 and  it was  held that on the date of the suit for ejectment of  the tenant,  in order to succeed, all that the landlord  had  to show  was that he was the landlord and secondly.,  that  de- fendant  was his tenant and thirdly the tenant has,  whether before or after the commencement of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control  Act,  either built a suitable  residence,  or  been allotted a suitable residence.

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   The  decision of the Delhi High Court in Govindji  Khera v. Padma Bhatia Attorney, [1972] Rent Control Reporter,  Vol 4.  195 to which our attention was drawn, does  not  advance the case any further.     Before  we  discuss the other aspect the result  of  the several  decisions to which reference has been  made  above, indicate  that the position in law is that the  landlord  in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish  one of the alternative facts positively, either that the  tenant has  built,  or acquired vacant possession of  or  has  been allotted  a residence. It is essential that the  ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has  built acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether  it is suitable or not, and whether the same can  be really  an alternative accommodation for the tenant or  not, are  within the special knowledge of the tenant and he  must prove  and establish those facts. The other aspect  is  that apart from the question  550 of  limitation to which we shall briefly refer is  that  the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accru- al of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows  the premises to go out of his hands then it  is  the landlord  who  is to be blamed and not the  tenant.  In  the light  of these, we have now to examine whether the suit  in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But  quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time, this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord  and the  tenant.  It protects the  tenant  against  unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limit- ed  rights to the landlord to recover-possession  on  stated contingencies.     The  next aspect of the matter is which article  of  the Limitation  Act would be applicable. Reference was  made  to Article  66  and  Article 67 of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963 (hereinafter  called  the Limitation Act)  which  stipulates that  for  possession  of immovable property  the  cause  of action  arises  or  accrues when the  plaintiff  has  become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition. Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined. Article 113 deals with  suit for  which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere  in this  Schedule. On the facts of this case it is  clear  that Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well-settled now. Determination  by notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act  is no longer necessary.     It is well-settled that time begins to run from the date of  the  knowledge. See in this connection the  decision  of Harbans  Singh and another v. Custodian of Evacuee  Property ’P’ Block and others, A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 82 though that was a case under a different statute and dealt with a  different article.  See also Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and  another, A.I.R.  1941 Allahabad 28 at page 30. The Division Bench  of the  Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdass (deceased).  v Rikhu  Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab  Law  Re- porter  Vol.  85., 184 held that in a  suit  for  possession under  Article 113 of the Limitation Act, material  date  is one on which the right to sue for possession arises.     In K.V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v.M.R. Ry. Manavik- rama  Zamorin Rajah and others, A.I.R. 1930 Madras  430,  it was held that where a claim is based upon a forfeiture of  a lease by reason of alienation of the demised land and  noth- ing else, the article applicable for the purpose of  limita-

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tion was clearly Article 143 and the limitation commences to run from the date of the alienation. Here  551 accrual of the right of the landlord is not challenged.  The knowledge  is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any  point of view. There is no question of limitation in this case.     In the premises, we are of the view that the High  Court was  right  and the appeals must fail  and  are  accordingly dismissed with costs. N.P.V.                                         Appeals  dis- missed. 552