28 October 1999
Supreme Court
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G.VENKATESHWARA RAO Vs UNION OF INDIA .

Bench: S.P.Kurdukar,R.P.Sethi
Case number: C.A. No.-002660-002660 / 1998
Diary number: 10793 / 1997
Advocates: S.. UDAYA KUMAR SAGAR Vs SUSHMA SURI


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PETITIONER: G.  VENKATESHWARA RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       28/10/1999

BENCH: S.P.Kurdukar, R.P.Sethi

JUDGMENT:

     This  Civil  Appeal by Special Leave is filed  by  theAppellant   who  was  the   appl icant  before  the       Central Administrative  Tribunal, Hyderabad in Original  Application No.   263 of 1994.  The Central Administrative Tribunal (for short  CAT)  by its judgment and order dated March 17,  1997 dismissed  the  original application filed by the  Appellant holding  that the same is devoid of any merits.  It is  this order  which  is  the subject matter of  challenge  in  this appeal.

     2.   The dispute in this appeal relates to filling  up of  the  vacancy  of Office Superintendent Grade II  in  the Guntupalli   Workshop   (Andhra   Pradesh)  Railways.    The notification  dated 28.11.1990 was issued for filling up the said vacancy.  The roster points to be filled were 13 to 18. It  is  common  ground  that 14th point in  the  roster  was reserved  for SC and 17th point for ST.  After following the procedure  for  selection, a provisional list of  empanelled candidates  for the said posts was prepared and issued  vide notification  dated  18.11.1991.  The Appellant was  at  Sl. No.6.   Vacancy at roster point No.  14 was filled in by the SC  candidate  who  was found suitable.   But  however,  the vacancy  for ST at roster point No.  17 could not be filled, as the said candidate was not available.  It is the claim of the  Appellant  that since the vacancy earmarked for the  ST candidate  remained  vacant  and he being the  next  in  the empanelled  list, the vacancy should have been filled in  by appointing him.  This claim was made on the footing that the concerned  authority at Guntupalli Workshop had  recommended to  the Railway Board that for want of ST candidate the said vacancy   be   dereserved  for   general   category.    This recommendation  was  although made sometime in 1991  but  it remained  pending  till 1993 with the Railway Board for  its approval.  In the mean time, restructuring of the cadre took place  vide Office Order No.  32 of 1993 issued on  1.3.1993 promoting  respondent No.  4 in that vacancy.  The Appellant submitted  the  representation  to  the  higher  authorities complaining  that  respondent  No.  4 should not  have  been appointed  and  in  his place, his claim  should  have  been considered.   The  representation of the Appellant  however, came  to  be  rejected in view of the restructuring  of  the cadre.    Being   aggrieved   by   the  rejection   of   his representation,  the  Appellant had filed the  aforesaid  OA before the CAT at Hyderabad.

     3.    It   is  common  ground   that  by   virtue   of restructuring  of  the cadre, the Appellant could  not  have

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been  appointed  as  claimed by him.  Two  contentions  were raised before CAT, Hyderabad :

     i)  That  because of delay on the part of the  Railway Board  to dereserve the vacancy earmarked for ST till  1993, he had lost the opportunity to be appointed against the said vacancy.   If  the  Railway  Board were to  dispose  of  the recommendation  earlier  dereserving  the said  vacancy  for general  category,  the  Appellant, being the  next  in  the empanelled list, would have been appointed.

     ii)  The  post  of Office Superintendent Grade  II  is controlled   by   Workshop  whereas   the  post  of   Office Superintendent  Grade  I is controlled by the Zonal  Railway Level.   The  Workshop  Unit would not be in a  position  to assess  the  vacancies of Office Superintendent Grade I  and for that purpose, Zonal Railway Level ought to have assessed the  vacancies of Office Superintendent Grade I at the  time when  the notification dated 28.11.90 was issued for filling vacancies  of  Office Superintendent Grade II.   Having  not done  so,  a  great injustice has been done to  him  by  not appointing  him in the vacancy although he was empanelled at S.No.  6.

     Both  these  contentions  were  negated  by  the  CAT, Hyderabad in its order which is impugned in this Appeal.

     4.   Mr.  L.N.  Rao, the Learned Advocate appearing in support  of this Appeal reiterated the same contentions  and urged that the view taken by the CAT, Hyderabad is erroneous and  cannot  be  sustained.  While dealing  with  the  first contention,  he urged that if the Railway Board were to take the  decision  expeditiously, the Appellant could have  been accommodated  on  such  dereserved vacancy.  He  urged  that there   was  no  impediment  in   taking  the  decision   of dereservation  and it was merely an inaction on the part  of the  Railway  Board which had deprived the  Appellant  being appointed  against the vacancy.  We do not see any substance in  this contention because nothing has been pointed out  to us from the record which would justify this contention.  The Learned  Counsel for the Appellant drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Y.V.  Rangaiah Vs.  J.  Sreenivasa Rao  & Ors.  (1983) 3 SCC 284 and in particularly, he relied upon  paragraphs 4 and 9.  We have gone through the Judgment and  in  our opinion, the ratio thereof has no  application. It  was  a  case dealing with delay in preparing  panel  for promotional  cadre under the then existing Rules which  were substituted  by new Rules.  The panel was prepared under the new Rules.

     5.   Coming  to  the   second  contention  as  regards restructuring  of  the  cadre, it is quite  clear  that  the restructuring  appears  to have been made for the  efficient working in the Workshop Unit.  We, therefore, do not see any substance in this contention.

     6.   There is no substance in this Appeal.  Appeal  is accordingly  dismissed but however, parties are directed  to bear their own costs.