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PETITIONER: G. NARAYANASWAMY REDDY (DEAD) BYL.RS. AND ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: GOVT. OF KARNATAKA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/04/1991

BENCH: KANIA, M.H. BENCH: KANIA, M.H. VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) RAMASWAMI, V. (J) II

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1726            1991 SCR  (2) 563  1991 SCC  (3) 261        JT 1991 (3)    12  1991 SCALE  (1)913

ACT:      Constitution   of  India:  Article  136-Special   leave petitions-  Non-disclosure of material fact having a  direct bearing on the questions raised-Effect of.

HEADNOTE:      Petitioners’  lands  were acquired by  the  respondents under ss. 17 and 19 of the Bangalore Development Act,  1976. Section 36 of the said Act made applicable the provisions of the   Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  where acquisition   is otherwise than by agreement.      The  notification making the declaration under S. 4  of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the lands in question was  made on 20.9.1977. On 20.9.1984s. 11-A  was  introduced and  brought into force by the Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984 prescribing that where the declaration under s.  4 of  the  Land  Acquisition  ACt  was  published  before  the commencement  of the Land Acquistion (Amendment) Act,  1984, the  award  was  to  be made  within  two  years  from  such commencement.  The awards should have thus been made  within two years from 20.9.1984.      On 11.9.1985 the petitioners obtained an interim  order from  this  Court directing status-quo with  regard  to  the possession  of  the  lands in question in  a  special  leave petition  which  was dismissed on 29.4.87. on  December  16- 17,1987  two writ petitions were filed by the  petioners  in the High Court Challenging the acquisition, contending  that as  the  awards  were  not made  within  two  years  of  the notification  making the declaration under s. 4 of the  Land Acquisition  Act,  the entire  acquisition  proceedings  had lapsed.  The High Court granted interim stay in  respect  of the  acquisition  of  the lands. The  petitions  were  later dismissed.  Appeals  therefrom  were  also  dismissed  by  a Division Bench.      The petitioners preferred these special leave petitions and obtained interim stay of dispossession.      Dismissing the special leave petitions, this Court,                                                        564      HELD:   1.  The  relief  under  Article  136   of   the Constitution   is   discretionary  and  a   petitioner   who

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approaches  this Court for such relief must come with  frank and  full  disclosure  of facts. If he fails to  do  so  and suppresses  material facts, his application is liable to  be dismissed.[566B-C]      2.Whatever  the ultimate effect of the stay orders,  in view  of the provisions of s. 11-A of the  Land  Acquisition ACt, the Fact of the stay orders was highly material in  the determination of these special leave petitions. There was no reference in the special leave petitions to any of the  stay orders and the Court could know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their  counter  affidavit.  The said interim  orders  had  a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of  the  same certainly amounts to suppression  of  material facts.  On  this ground alone, the special  leave  petitions were liable to be rejected. [565G-H; 566A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition Nos. 823-24 of 1990.      From  the  Judgement and Order dated 6.10.1989  of  the Karnataka High Court W.A. Nos. 321 & 322 of 1989.      S.R. Bhat for the Petitioners.      R.N.  Narasimha Murthy, K.H. Nobin Singh,  M.  Veerappa and S.N. Bhatt for the Respondents.      The following Order of the Court was delivered:      A  few  facts are necessary for the disposal  of  these petitions.      The petitioners were the owners of certain lands  which were  acquired  by the respondents under the  provisions  of Sections  17 and 19 of the Bangalore Development  Act,  1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bangalore Act"). Under  the provisions  of  Section 36 of the Bangalore Act,  where  the acquisitions,  otherwise  than  by  agreement,  it  will  be regulated  by the provisions  , as far they are  applicable, of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred  to as  "the  Land Acquisition Act"). Section 11-A of  the  Land Acquisition Act, which section was included in the  said Act in  1984  as  set  out  hereinafter,  very  briefly  states, provides  that the Collector must make his award within  two years  from the date of the publication of  the  declaration and that if no award is made within that period, the  entire proceedings for acqui-                                                        565 sition of the land shall lapse. Under the Explanation to the first  proviso to Section 11-A,"the period during which  any action  or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of  the  said declaration  is  stayed  by an order of  a  Court  shall  be excluded".  It was, inter alia contended by the  petitioners that  as the awards in these cases has not been made  within two  years of the notification making the declaration  under Section   4  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,   the   entire acquisition  proceedings  had lapsed.  That  contention  was repelled  along  with  certain  other  contentions  in   the judgment  of the High Court which is sought to  be  impugned before us. The relevant dates which have to be borne in mind in this connection, are as follows:      The notification making the declaration under Section 4 of  the  Land  Acquisition Act in respect of  the  lands  in question  was made on September 20, 1977. On  September  20, 1984   Section   11-A  which  introduced  into   the   Land, Acquisition  Act  by the Land Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act, 1984,  was  brought into force. Under the first  proviso  to

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Section   11-A  it  was  prescribed  that  where  the   said declaration  (under Section 4 of the Land  Acquisition  Act) has  been  published  before the commencement  of  the  Land Acquisition  (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award must  be  made within  a period of two years from such commencement.  Thus, the  award  should  have been made  within  two  years  from September  20, 1984. On September 11, 1985, the  petitioners obtained  an interim order from this Court directing  status quo  with regard to the possession of the lands in  question in Special Leave Petition No. 294 of 1985 preferred  against the order of the Karnataka High Court dated August 14, 1984, with  which  we are not directly concerned  here.  The  said Special Leave Petition No.294 of 1985 was dismissed on April 29,  1987. On December 16-17, 1987, two writ petitions  were field  by the respective petitioners in the  Karnataka  High Court  challenging  the acquisition on the ground  that  the awards  were not made within the stipulated time.  In  these two writ petitions, the Karnataka High Court granted interim stay of further proceedings in respect of the acquisition of the said lands. These petitions were dismissed by a  learned Single  Judge  of  that High Court  on  November  29,  1988. Appeals against the decision of a learned Single Judge  were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on October 6, 1989, by a  Division  Bench  of  that  High  Court.  The  petitioners preferred these Special Leave Petitions, namely S.L.P.  Nos. 823  and  824 of 1990 against the decision of  the  Devision Bench  of that High Court, and obtained an interim  stay  of dispossession  therein. Whatever the ultimate effect of  the stay  orders, in view of the provisions of Section 11 -A  of the Land Acquisition Act, to which we have already referred                                                        566 earlier,  it  is beyond dispute that the fact  of  the  stay orders  was  highly material in the determination  of  these Special  Leave  Petitions.  Curiously enough,  there  is  no reference in the Special Leave Petitions to any to the  stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when  the respondents  appeared  in response to the notice  and  filed their  counter  affidavit.  In our view,  the  said  interim orders  have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to  suppression of  material facts. On this ground alone, the Special  Leave Petitions  are liable to be rejected. It is well-settled  in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such  relief  must come with frank and  full  disclosure  of facts.  If he fails to do so and suppresses material  facts, his  application is liable to be dismissed.  We  accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions.      There will be no order as to costs of these petitions. R.P.                                          SLPs dismissed.                                                        567