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PETITIONER: MR.FRANCE B.MARTINS & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MRS.MAFALDA MARIA TERESA RODRIGUES

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/08/1999

BENCH: R.P.Sethi, Saghir Ahmad

JUDGMENT:

SETHI,J.

     The  appellants,  promoters/developers   of  Perpetual Apartments,  agreed  to  sell a flat in the  name  of  minor daughter  of  the  respondent.  According to  the  Agreement between   the  parties,  the  price   of  the   flat   being Rs.2,10,000/-  was to be paid on or before September,  1985. The  possession of the flat is stated to have been delivered to the respondent in September, 1985 on payment of the whole of  the  agreed amount.  Despite various requests made,  the appellant  did not execute the sale deed on false  pretexts. In the absence of the sale deed, the respondent- complainant could  not efficaciously enjoy the property for which she is stated to have paid the price.  It was submitted that as the construction   of   the    flat    was   sub-standard,   the respondent-complainant   had   to  incur   an   expense   of Rs.26,000/-  for  immediate repairs.  Her petition filed  on 19.6.1992  was dismissed by the Consumer Disputes  Redressal Forum, Goa (hereinafter referred to as "the District Forum") on  the  ground of limitation vide order  dated  19.10.1992. The  appeal preferred by the respondent was accepted by  the Goa   State   Consumer     Disputes   Redressal   Commission (hereinafter  referred to as "the State Commission") and the matter  was  remitted to the District Forum  permitting  the respondent  to  amend  her complaint.   The  District  Forum again,  vide its order dated 31st March, 1993, dismissed the complaint as barred by time.  The respondent filed an appeal which  was allowed by the State Commission with a  direction to the appellants for specific performance of the Agreement. The  revision  filed  by the appellant before  the  National Consumer   Dispute   Redressal     Commission,   New   Delhi (hereinafter  referred to as "the National Commission")  was dismissed  vide  impugned  order dated  31.1.1994.   Learned counsel  appearing for the appellants has vehemently  argued that  as the complaint filed by the respondent was barred by time,  the State Commission was not justified in issuing the directions  which were confirmed by the National Commission. It  is contended that before insertion of Section 24A in the Consumer  Protection  Act (hereinafter referred to  as  "the Act"),  the period of limitation for preferring a claim  was such period as is prescribed under the Limitation Act and as according  to him the complaint was filed by the  respondent after  seven  years,  the   same  deserved  dismissal.   The argument,  though  attractive  on  the face of  it,  has  no substance  when examined in depth.  Admittedly, no period of limitation  had been prescribed in the Act before  insertion

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of  Section 24A vide amendment made w.e.f.  18th June, 1993. Section  24A of the Act, for the first time, prescribed that the  District  Forum, the State Commission or  the  National Commission  shall not admit a complaint unless the same  was filed  within two years from the date on which the cause  of action arose.  Sub-section (2) of Section 24A authorises the Commission  to entertain complaint even after the period  of limitation  on  the  existence of sufficient cause  for  not filing   the  complaint  within   the  statutory  period  by recording  its  reasons  for  condoning the  delay.   It  is conceded  before  us that the provisions of  the  Limitation Act,  1963 have not been specifically made applicable to the proceedings  under  the  Act.  The Limitation Act  does  not extinguish  a  right  but  only  bars  the  remedy  after  a prescribed  period  of  limitation.   Section  2(j)  of  the Limitation  Act  defines the "period of limitation" to  mean the  period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application  by the Schedule attached to the Limitation  Act and  "prescribed  period"  means the  period  of  limitation computed  in accordance with the provisions of the Act.   It is  not  the case of the appellants that complaint filed  by the  respondent  was  either  a  suit or  an  appeal  or  an application  within  the  meaning of the provisions  of  the Limitation  Act.   When  the  Legislature,  in  its  wisdom, thought  it  appropriate  not  to prescribe  the  period  of limitation  for proceedings under the Act, the courts cannot apply  the provisions by implication.  It has to be kept  in mind  that  the  Act  was  made  for  better  protection  of interests  of  consumers  and  to  make  provision  for  the establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the  settlement  of consumer disputes and matters  connected therewith.   The Act has been enacted to promote and protect the  rights  of  consumers such as:  "(a) the  right  to  be protected  against marketing of goods which are hazardous to life and property;

     (b)  the  right  to  be informed  about  the  quality, quantity,  potency,  purity, standard and price of goods  to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices;

     (c) the right to be assured, wherever possible, access to an authority of goods at competitive prices;

     (d)  the  right  to be heard and to  be  assured  that consumers  interest  will  receive   due  consideration   at appropriate forums;

     (e)  the right to seek redressal against unfair  trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers;  and

     (f) right to consumer education."

     The  addition  of Section 24A in the Act reflects  the mind of the Legislature that they had initially not intended to  prescribe  any  period  of  limitation  for  filing  the complaints  under  the  Act.  The reliance  of  the  learned counsel  for the appellants on New India Assurance Co.  Ltd. Vs.   Shri B.N.  Sainani [JT 1997(6) SC 211] also appears to be  misplaced  inasmuch as this Court in that case had  only referred  to  the  practice of the Consumer  Commissions  of applying  the  provisions  of  the Limitation  Act.   It  is important  to  note  that  this Court did  not  approve  the application  of  the Limitation Act to the complaints  under the Act but in the circumstances of the case found that even

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on  assumption of the applicability of the period prescribed for a suit relating to similar relief as preferred under the Act,  the claim was barred by limitation.  This Court  held: "Before insertion of Section 24A in the Act with effect from June  18,  1993  the  Act did not prescribe  any  period  of limitation  for  filing a complaint.  It was,  however,  not disputed  that  early to this the consumer commissions  have been  applying  the  Limitation Act, 1963 to find out  if  a complaint  was  barred by limitation or not.  Since  at  the time  when  the  complaint  in the present  case  was  filed Section  24A was not there, we therefore, fall back from the provisions of the Limitation Act.  Article 44 of Schedule to the Limitation Act, in relevant part is as under:

     Description  of  suit Period of Limitation  Time  from which  period begins to run 44 (b) On a policy of  insurance when  the sum insured is payable after proof of the loss has been  given to or received by the insurers.  Three years The date  of the occurrence causing the loss, or where the claim on the policy is denied either partly or wholly, the date of such denial."

     We are, however clear that prior to its amendment the, Act  had not prescribed any period of limitation for  filing the  complaints  by  the consumers.  Assuming,  but  without holding,  that  the  provisions of the Limitation  Act  were applicable,  we  are of the opinion that the appellants  are not  justified  in  urging that the claim preferred  by  the respondent-complainant  was barred by time.  It is true that the  Agreement  was  executed  somewhere  in  1983  and  the possession    of    the    premises    delivered   to    the respondent-complainant  in 1985.  It is also evident that at no  point  of time the appellants denied their liability  to execute  the  Sale  Deed in favour of  the  respondent.   No period  for  specific  performance  of  Agreement  had  been prescribed  by the parties.  The record produced before  the authorities  under  the Act reveals that the  appellant  had upto  30th  August,  1991, been acknowledging  liability  to deliver  the legal possession of the flat to the respondent. Vide  a  notice  sent to the respondent  by  the  appellants through their counsel on 30th August, 1991 had admitted that the  respondent  had  paid a sum of  Rs.2,00,000/-  and  was liable  to  pay  a  further sum  of  Rs.20,000/-  which  the respondent-complainant   disputed.   The   complainant   was intimated:   "Notice is therefore given to you requiring you to  pay  the said balance sum of Rs.20,000/- within 15  days from  the date and take legal possession of the flat failing which  our client shall be at liberty to charge you interest at  the  balance sum payable to him at the rate of  18%  per annum from the date of the last payment."

     The  respondent-complainant could, at worst, assume on 30th August, 1991 that the appellants were not interested in the  specific  performance  of   the  contract  between  the parties.  Even if the period is computed from that date, the complaint  was filed well within time in terms of Article 54 of  the  Schedule  to  the  Limitation  Act.   There  is  no substance  in  the submission of the appellants that as  the respondent  had allegedly not paid the whole amount, she was not  entitled to the directions as were issued by the  State Commission.  The respondent had categorically stated in para 5  of  her complaint that the consideration amount had  been paid  which was not denied by the respondent.  They had only

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stated  that a sum of Rs.20,000/- was still recoverable from her  regarding  which  she  had   preferred  the  claim   of compensation  for  the  repairs done to the flat as  it  was found  to be constructed of the sub-standard material.   The findings  of fact arrived at by the State Commission do  not require  any interference.  The National Commission was also justified in holding that there was no error of jurisdiction or  material irregularity pertaining to the jurisdiction  in the   order   of   the   State  Commission   requiring   any interference.   There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal which  is accordingly dismissed but under the  circumstances without any order as to costs.