http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: FIRM SARDARILAL VlSHWANATH AND ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PRITAM SINGH

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/08/1978

BENCH: DESAI, D.A. BENCH: DESAI, D.A. SINGH, JASWANT SEN, A.P. (J)

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1518            1979 SCR  (1) 111  1978 SCC  (4)   1  CITATOR INFO :  C          1979 SC1745  (18)

ACT:      Transfer of  Property  Act,  S.  106-Whether  statutory tenant entitled  to  notice  to  quit  prior  to  action  in ejectment under Rent Restriction Act.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  firm took  the demised premises on lease for a  period of  11 months,  and after the determination of the lease  by efflux of time, it continued in possession and became a statutory tenant. The respondent landlord commenced an ejectment  action against  it under  s. 13  of  the  East Punjab Rent  Restriction Act, 1949, without serving a notice to quit.  The appellant  challenged the  maintainability  of such action, claiming entitlement to a prior quit notice u/s 106 of  the Transfer of Property Act. The claim was rejected by the High Court.      Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court ^      HELD: If  the lease of immovable property determines in any one  of. the modes prescribed u/s 111 of the Transfer of Property Act  and the  tenant lessee continues in possession as a  statutory tenant under the protective wing of the Rent Restriction Act,  there is no question of giving him a fresh notice u/s  106 terminating  the contract of tenancy because the contract  comes to  an end  once the  lease  determines. [120F-H]      Kai Khushroo  Bezonjee Capadia  v. Bal Jerbai Hijribhoy Warden and Anr., 1949 F.C.R. 262 at 272; followed.      Ganga Dutt  Murarka v.  Kartik Chandra  Das  and  Ors., [1961] 3 S.C.R. 813; Bhawanji Lakhamshi and Ors. v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani  and Ors.  [1972] a S.C.R. 890: Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v.  Haji Gulamnabi  Haji Safiabhai,  [1964] 5 SCR 157; Bhaiya  Ram v.  Mahavir Prasad,  1968 (70) P.L.R. 1011; affirmed.      Mangilal v.  Suganchand  Rathi  [1964]  5  S.C.R.  239; Manujendra Datt  v. Purendu  Prasad Roy Chowdhury and Ors. 1 [1967] 1  S.C.R. 475;  Rawal & Co. v. K. C. Ramachandran and Ors., [1974] 2 S.C.R. 629 at 634; distinguished.      Davies v.  Bristow  [1920]  3  K.B.  428;  Morrison  v.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

Jacobs,   [1945]   1   K.B.   577,   R.   Krishnamurthy   v. Parthasarathy, A.I.R.  1949 Madras  780: Ratanlal v. Vardesh Chander [1976] 2 SCR 906; P. V. Rao v. C. V. Ramana [1976] 2 S.C.R. 551; referred to.      Lalitha v.  Avisumma, [1977]  2  R.C.R.  Vol.  10  690; overruled.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

JUDGMENT:      DESAI, J.-  The unsuccessful  tenant in  this appeal by special leave  drawing his  sustenance from  an apparent but unreal conflict  amongst certain  decisions of this Court as noticed by the Kerala High Court in Lalitha v. Avisumma (1), made a furious attempt to re-open the controversy: whether a statutory tenant is entitled to notice as envisaged (1) [1977] (2) Vol. 10 R.C.R. 690. [Kerala FB] 112 by section  106 of  the Transfer  of Property  Act before an action in  ejectment is  commenced against  him under any of the enabling  provisions of  the relevant  Rent  Restriction Act.      Mr. V.  C. Mahajan,  learned counsel  for the appellant canvassed two  contentions before  us: (1) As the respondent landlord had  not terminated the tenancy of the appellant by a notice  to quit  as contemplated by s. 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act, an action in ejectment under section 13 of the East  Punjab Rent  Restriction Act, 1949 (hor short ’the Act’) is  not maintainable;  (2) Though  the landlord sought eviction on  the ground that the building was likely to fall down as  it was  in a  dilapidated condition  and had become unsafe for human habitation, the very fact that for the last 15  years  the  building  is  standing  and  the  tenant  is occupying and  using it,  it would  ipso facto  negative the case of the landlord that the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation.      The backdrop  of facts  is this:  the tenant,  a  firm, under two  separate rent  notes from  two separate landlords having specified  shares in  the demised  premises, took  on lease the  premises  and  the  tenancy  commenced  from  1st January 1960  and the  demise was for a period of 11 months. On the expiry of the period reserved by the lease the tenant continued in  possession. If  the period  reserved under the lease was  of 11  months, obviously  the lease determined by efflux of  time limited thereby as provided in s. 111 (a) of the Transfer  of Property  Act.  Section  116  provides  for effect of  holding over.  If a lessee of property remains in possession thereof  after the determination of the lease and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee or otherwise assents to his  continuing in  possession,  the  lease  is,  in  the absence of  an agreement  to the contrary, renewed from year to year,  or from  month to  month, according to the purpose for which  the property  is leased,  as specified in s. 106. Ordinarily, acceptance  of rent  from a  lessee whose  lease determined by  efflux of  time, would manifest the assent of the lessor  to the  lessee continuing  in possession  and in that event  the lease  would be renewed from year to year or month to month as the case may be, and the lessee would be a lessee holding  over. This  position which emerged under the provisions of  the Transfer  of Property  Act under  went  a basic change  when the  Rent Restriction  Act was put on the statute book.  The lessor,  on the  introduction of the Rent Restriction Act  could not  seek to  evict the lessee on the only ground that the lease determined by efflux of time. The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

lessee was  clothed with  the protection of Rent Restriction Act. In  such a  situation the  lessor, unless  he wanted to proceed under  the provisions  of the  Rent Restriction Act, had no  option  but  to  accept  the  rent  and,  therefore, acceptance of rent from a lessee clothed with 113 the protection  of Rent  Restriction Act  would not manifest the intention  of the  lessor to  renew the lease. Something more than  mere payment  and acceptance  of  rent  would  be necessary to  assert that  the lessor  has assented  to  the lessee continuing  in possession and the lessor intended the renewal of  the lease.  Except for  the acceptance  of  rent after the  lease determined  by efflux  of time, nothing was pointed out  to us  to show  that the  lessor had  otherwise assented to  the lessee  continuing in  possession so  as to infer the  renewal of  lease. Therefore,  the lessee in this case is  indisputably a statutory tenant and cannot seek any assistance from  the provisions  contained in  s. 116 of the Transfer of  Property Act. Mr. Mahajan proceeded to make his submission on  the footing that the appellant is a statutory tenant.      If the  tenant is  thus a  statutory tenant  enjoying a status of  irremovability is  he entitled  to  a  notice  as envisaged by  s. 106  of the Transfer of Property Act before an action  for ejectment  can be commenced against him under the Act  ? Is  there any  conflict in  the decision  of this court bearing  on the  subject ? It would be advantageous to refer to  the line of decisions unequivocally asserting that no notice  as contemplated  by s.  106 of  the  Transfer  of Property Act  is necessary  before initiating  an action  in ejectment against  a  statutory  tenant  under  any  of  the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act and thereafter we  would examine  the batch  of  decisions  from which sustenance  is sought  to be  drawn in  support of the submission that such a notice is necessary.      In Kai Kushroo Bezonjee Capadia v. Bai Jerbai Hirjibhoy Warden &  Anr., (1) Mukherjea, J. speaking for the majority, after referring  to Davies  v. Bristow(2),  and Morrison  v. Jacobs,(3) has succinctly expressed on this point as under:           "...it  may  be  pointed  out  that  in  cases  of      tenancies relating  to dwelling house to which the Rent      Restriction  Acts   apply,  the   tenant  may  enjoy  a      statutory immunity  from eviction  even after the lease      has expired.  The landlord  can not eject him except on      specified grounds  mentioned in the Acts themselves. In      such circumstances  acceptance of  rent by the landlord      from  a  statutory  tenant,  whose  lease  has  already      expired, could  not be  regarded as  evidence of  a new      Agreement of tenancy and it would not be open to such a      tenant to  urge, by  way of  defence,  in  a  suit  for      ejectment (1) [1949] F.C.R. 262 at 272. (2) [1920] 3 K.B. 428. (3) [1945] 1 K.B. 577. 114      brought against  him,  under  the  provisions  of  Rent      Restriction Act  that by  acceptance of  rent  a  fresh      tenancy was  created which  had to  be determined  by a      fresh notice to quit." It would  be refreshing  to point out that Patanjali Sastri, J., in  his dissenting  judgment has  not departed  from the aforementioned ratio  of the  judgement, the  dissent  being confined to interpretation of the facts of the case.      In Ganga  Dutt Murarka v. Kartika Chandra Das & ors.(1) Shah, J.,  after  affirming  the  aforementioned  quotation,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

observed that  occupation of  premises  by  a  tenant  whose tenancy is  determined is by virtue of protection granted by the successive statutes and not because of any right arising from the  contract which is determined. The statute protects his possession  so long  as the  conditions which  justify a lessor in  obtaining an order of eviction against him do not exist.  Once   the  prohibition   against  the  exercise  of jurisdiction by  the Court  is removed,  the right to obtain possession by the lessor under the ordinary law springs into action and  the exercise  of the lessor’s right to evict the tenant will  not, unless  the statute provides otherwise, be conditioned. Such  occupation would  not confer  any  rights upon  the   appellant  and  would  not  be  required  to  be determined by  a notice  prescribed by  s. 106,  Transfer of Property Act.      In Bhawanji  Lakhamshi & ors. v. Himatlal Jamnadas Dani & ors.(2),  the ratio  in K.  B. Capadia (supra), Ganga Dutt Murarka (supra) was reaffirmed.      A contrary view, according to Mr. Mahajan, is expressed in Mangilal  v. Suganchand  Rathi(3). The  contention before the Constitution  Bench in that case was that the provisions of the  Madhya Pradesh  Accommodation Control  Act, 1955, do not supplant  but supplement  the provisions of the Transfer of Property  Act and that, therefore, before a tenant can be evicted by  the landlord,  he  must  comply  both  with  the provisions of  s. 106  of the  Transfer of  Property Act and those of  s. 4 of the Accommodation Act. The controversy was whether the  M.P. Accommodation  Control Act  was a complete code providing  for its  own procedure  and forum for taking action under it or its provisions have to be reconciled with the  provisions   of  the   Transfer  of  Property  Act.  An analytical examination  of this  judgment would show that it does not  express a  contrary view as canvassed on behalf of the appellant. The tenant in (1) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 813. (2) [1972] 2 S.C.R. 890. (3) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 239. 115 that case  was in  arrears for  a period of 12 months and he was   served with a notice requiring him to remit the amount in arrears  within one  month from  the date  of service  of notice further  stating that  on his failure to do so a suit for ejectment would be filed against him. The tenant replied to the  notice and  sent the  rent in arrears as well as the rent due  right up  to June  30, 1959. The landlord accepted the cheque and encashed it on July 4, 1959, and gave a fresh notice on  July 9,  1959, requiring  the defendant to vacate the premises by the end of the month of July. Nowhere it was contended before  the Court  that the tenant was a statutory tenant and  the action  in ejectment was commenced under one of the  enabling provisions  of the  Accommodation Act, and, therefore, not  entitled to  notice  under  s.  106  of  the Transfer of  Property Act.  On the contrary it was contended that by  acceptance of  the rent  the notice  is waived  and negativing this  contention it  was held  that the defendant having been  under liability  to pay  rent  even  after  the giving  of   notice  the  acceptance  of  the  rent  by  the plaintiffs would  not by itself operate as waiver. The point raised herein  was entirely  and materially  different  from what is  contended before  us. The  contractual tenancy  was determined by  a notice  to quit  and ‘the rent was accepted under protest  and immediately  an action  in ejectment  was initiated. The  landlord did not dispute that the tenant was not entitled  to notice.  It could  not, therefore,  be said that a contrary view was expressed in this decision.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

    In Manujendra  Dutt v.  Purendu Prosad  Roy Chowdhury & Ors.,(1) the  Court was  concerned with  a  case  under  the Calcutta Thika  Tenancy Act,  1949, and  the contention  was that before  action in  ejectment could be commenced against the  defendant,   a  notice   of  six  months’  duration  as contemplated by  s. 106  of the  Transfer  of  Property  Act should have  been served upon him. The factual matrix of the case as disclosed in clause (7) of the lease clearly reveals that the  tenant was  entitled  to  notice  of  six  months’ duration at  the end  of the  term of  10 years,  the period reserved under  the lease,  and it  further provided that if the lessee  was permitted  to holdover  the land  after  the expiry of  the said  term of  10 years,  the lessee  will be allowed a  six months’ notice to quit the, said premises. In the background  of these  relevant facts  it was held that a statutory tenancy  comes into  existence where a contractual tenant  retains  possession  after  the  contract  has  been determined. The  right to  hold  over,  i.e.  the  right  of irremovability thus  is a  right which  comes into existence after the expiration of the lease and until the lease is (1) [1967] 1 S.C.R. 475. 116 terminated or  expires by efflux of the time the tenant need not seek protection under the Rent Act. For, he is protected by his  lease in  breach of  which  he  cannot  be  evicted. Mangilal’s  case   (supra)  was   referred  to  support  the proposition that  before a  tenant could  be  evicted  by  a landlord he  must comply both with the provisions of s. 106, Transfer of  Property Act  and those  of s.  4 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation  Control Act.  The Court negatived the contention that the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act or for  that matter  the Calcutta  Thika Tenancy Act each by itself was  a complete Code with its own scheme of procedure and, there  fore, an action under one or the other would not be governed  by Transfer of Property Act, and in the process overruled the decision in R. Krishnamurthy v. Parthasarathy, (1) wherein  it was  held that s. 7 of  the Madras Buildings (Lease and  Rent Control)  Act had  its  own  procedure  and scheme and,  therefore, there  was no question of an attempt to reconcile  that Act with the Transfer of Property Act. It would be advantageous to note here that this observation has been adversely  commented upon  in a  later decision  of the Constitution Bench  of this  Court in  Raval &  Co. v. K. C. Ramachandran &  ors.,(2) where Alagiriswami, J. speaking for the majority  observed that  the decision of the Madras High Court in  R.  Krishnamurthy’s  case  should  not  have  been summarily dismissed  on the  ground that  it was Contrary to the decision  of this  Court in  Abbasbhai’s  (3)  case  and Mangilal’s case  (supra) and,  therefore, was  not a correct law without  examining  the  provisions  of  that  Act.  The controversy brought  before  the  Court  in  this  case  was whether the  provision of  the relevant Rent Restriction Act was in addition to the provision of the Transfer of Property Act or was in derogation thereof. In other words, whether it would supplement  or supplant the same. Such a contention is entirely and materially different from the contention raised before us that a notice terminating the tenancy is necessary to be  served upon  a statutory  tenant before commencing an action against  him under  any of the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act.  Undoubtedly, the  Court held in Manujendra Dutt’s case (supra), as under:      "The Thika Tenancy Act like similar Rent Acts passed in      different States  is intended to prevent indiscriminate      eviction of  tenants and is intended to be a protective      statute to  safeguard security of possession of tenants

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

    and therefore  should be  construed in the light of its      being a  social legislation.  What section  3 therefore      does is to provide that (1) A.I.R. 1949 Madras 780. (2) [1974] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 634. (3) [1964] 5 S.C.R.. 157. 117      even where  a landlord  has terminated  the contractual      tenancy by a proper notice such landlord can succeed in      evicting his tenant provided that he falls under one or      more  of   the  clauses   of  that  section.  The  word      ’’notwithstanding’’ in section 3 on a true construction      therefore    means  that  even  where  the  contractual      tenancy is  properly  terminated,  notwithstanding  the      landlord’s right  to possession  under the  Transfer of      Property Act  or the  contract of lease he cannot evict      the tenant  unless he, satisfied any one of the grounds      set out  in section  3. Rent  Acts are  not  ordinarily      intended to  interfere with  contractual leases and are      Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently      restrictive and  not enabling, conferring no new rights      of action  but restricting  the existing  rights either      under the contract or under the general law".      It must  be specifically  pointed out that the emphasis in Manujendra’s  case is  that contractual tenancy has to be terminated by a notice before an action for ejectment can be commenced under  the Thika  Tenancy Act  and notwithstanding the non-obstante  clause in  s. 3  of the  Act,  the  tenant cannot  be   deprived  of  his  right  to  a  notice  before termination of  his tenancy  if he  has such  a right either under the  lease or  under the Transfer of Property Act. The decision ultimately  turns upon the interpretation of clause (7) of  the Lease which made it obligatory upon the landlord to serve a notice of six months’ duration either at the time of expiration  of the  lease or if the lessee was allowed to hold over,  at any  time before  commencing the  action  for ejectment. We  must frankly  say  that  the  ratio  in  this decision, does  not run  counter to  the ratio  in Capadia’s case (supra)  and the  decisions in  which  that  ratio  was affirmed.      In Raval  & Co.’s  case (supra),  the  question  raised before the  Court was  whether under  the provisions  of the Tamil Nadu  Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, it was open  to,  the  landlord  to  move  the  Controller  for fixation  of   fair  rent  during  the  subsistence  of  the contractual tenancy. This decision would hardly assist us in resolving  the  controversy  raised  before  us.  Though  R. Krishnamurthy’s case  was expressly  overruled in Manujendra Dutt’s case  (supra) and  held not to be correct law by this Court, the  majority view as expressed by Alagiriswami, J in Raval &  Co.’s case (supra) deprecated its summary dismissal without examining the provisions of the Act. That apart, the majority  view  is  that  even  during  the  subsistence  of contractual  tenancy   the  landlord   can  apply   to   the Controller for  fixation of  fair rent  on the  footing that the’ Act  has a  scheme of  its own  and it  is intended  to provide a complete code 118 in respect  of  both  contractual  tenancies  and  statutory tenancies. This  would indicate that the Act was supposed to supplant and not to supplement the Transfer of Property Act. But that  conclusion would  not throw any light on the point under discussion here.      In Ratanlal  v. Vardesh  Chander,(1) the  tenant  moved this Court challenging a decree for eviction under the Delhi

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

Rent Control Act, 1958, inter alia, contending that a notice terminating his  tenancy was  not  served  upon  him  before commencing the  action for  his eviction  and  the  landlord sought to break through the defence by urging that the lease had expired  by efflux  of time limited thereby under s. 111 (a) and  no notice  terminating the  tenancy under s. 106 is needed and  further that forfeiture of the tenancy caused by the subletting contrary to the terms of the agreement can be availed of  by the  landlord even in the absence of a notice as contemplated by s. 111 (g). This decision will have to be examined in greater detail because it was emphatically urged that this decision takes a contrary view. The most important factual aspect  which must  immediately engage our attention is that  the Court  in that case found that the lease merely stating that  " it is for a period less than one, year is ex facie for  ar indefinite period and as such cannot expire by efflux of  time". Now,  if the  Court came to the conclusion that the  lease had  not expired  by efflux  of time and the lease  was   held  to  be  for  an  indefinite  period,  the contractual tenancy  never came  to an  end and  in  Such  a situation s.  106 of  the Transfer  of Property Act would be attract ed  unless there is a contract to the contrary and a notice to  quit is a must before an action for ejectment can be started.  Therefore, it  becomes abundantly clear that in Ratanlal’s case  no question  was raised whether a statutory tenant is  entitled to a notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property  Act. In  fact this  decision supports  the view that no such notice is necessary and this becomes abundantly clear from what we quote hereunder:      "A lease  merely stating  that it  is for a period less      than one year is ex facie for an indefinite period and,      as such,  cannot expire  by efflux  of time. Nor are we      convinced that,  notwithstanding the acceptance of rent      for the  period  of  11  years  the  landlord  had  not      assented to  the holding  over of  the tenancy and that      what emerged  was a  statutory tenancy  which  did  not      require notice in law for valid determination. Possibly      so; not necessarily. However, we, need not explore this      aspect further in the view that  we  take of  the other  submission of the landlord that the lease has been (1) [1976] 2 S.C.R. 906. 119      determined by  forfeiture, not in terms of s. 111(g) of      the TP Act, but on the application of the principles of      justice, equity and good conscience".      It is  manifestly clear that the Court did not lay down a proposition  that a  notice to  quit is  necessary  before commencing an action against a statutory tenant under any of the enabling  provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. On the contrary, apparently  the view  that such  a notice  is  not necessary  is   affirmed  and   simultaneously  a  doubt  is reflected in  saying that the aspect may not be explored any more. However,  it cannot be said that Ratanlal’s case is an authority for  the proposition  that a  notice under s. 106, Transfer of Property Act must be served before initiating an action for  ejectment against  a statutory  tenant.  We  may point out  that the  Court having  not been seized of such a point, has  not referred to K. B. Capadia’s case (supra) and Ganga Dutt Murarka’s case (supra).      In P.  V. Rao  v. C.  V. Ramana,(1) to which one of our esteemed brother, Jaswant Singh, J. was a party, it has been held that  the Andhra  Pradesh Buildings  (Lease,  Rent  and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, is a complete code with its own scheme of  procedure. In  reaching this conclusion the Court

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

distinguished Mangilal’s case (supra) .      Analysing the  position it  clearly  emerges  that  the ratio  in   K.  B.  Capadia’s  case  that  where  the  lease determines by  efflux of  time and  the tenant  continues in possession under  the protection of the Rent Restriction Act he acquires  a status  of  irremovability  unless  there  is something to  show that  he is  a tenant  holding over, mere payment  of   rent  without   necessary  animus   not  being sufficient. Such  a tenant  for the;  sake of convenience is described as  a statutory  tenant. It  would not  be open to such a  tenant to  urge by  way of  defence, in  a suit  for ejectment brought  against him  under the  provisions of the Rent Restriction  Act, that  by acceptance  of rent  a fresh tenancy was  created which  had lo  be determined by a fresh notice to  quit. This  ratio is  neither departed  from  nor controverted in any subsequent judgment of this Court.      A Full  Bench of  the Punjab  & Haryana  High Court  in Bhaiya Ram  v. Mahavir  Prasad (2),  after referring  to the aforementioned decisions  except the  one in K. B. Capadia’s case (supra) and a number of other decisions of various High Courts, answered in the affirmative the question referred to it, viz., whether an ejectment application under (1) [1976] 2 S.C.R. 551. (2) 1968 [70] The Punjab Law Reporter 1011. 120 s. 13  of the  East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act can be filed against  a statutory tenant without the prior issue of notice under  s. 106  of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. We are  of the  opinion that  this decision  represents  the correct law on the subjects.      The  Kerala   High  Court  in  Lalitha’s  case  (supra) observed that  it is  difficult to  resist the impression or conclusion that  the decisions  in Manujendra  Dutt’s case ( supra), Mangilal’s  case (supra) and Ratanlal’s case (supra) do not conflict with each other. A closer reading of all the decisions as  attempted by  us would clearly show that these decisions  are   not  irreconcilable  and  each  has  to  be understood in the context of the points and questions raised in it  and the  background of  factual matrix. Suffice it to say that  on the  question  under  discussion  there  is  no conflict and,  therefore, the  decision in  K. B.  Capadia’s case is  binding and  must be  given effect. Consistent with its ratio, the contention of Mr. Mahajan that the action for ejectment against  the appellant  tenant under  s. 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act must fail for want of notice under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, must be negatived.      Having examined  the matter  on authority and precedent it must  be frankly  confessed that  no other  conclusion is possible on  the first  principle. Lease  of urban immovable property represents  a con  tract between the lessor and the lessee. If  the contract is to be put to an end it has to be terminated by  a notice to quit as envisaged under s. 106 of the Transfer  of Property  Act. But  it is  equally clear as provided by 1,. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act that the lease of  immovable property  determines  by  various  modes therein described.  Now, if  the lease of immovable property determines in  any one of the modes prescribed under s. ]11, the contract  of lease comes to an end, and the landlord can exercise his  right of  re-entry. This  right of re-entry is further restricted  and fettered  by the  provisions of  the Rent Restriction  Act. Nonetheless the contract of lease has expired and  the tenant lessee continues in possession under the protective  wing of  the Rent  Restriction Act until the lessee  loses  protection.  But  there  is  no  question  of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

terminating the  contract because  the contract  comes to an end once  the lease  determines in  any  one  of  the  modes prescribed under s. 111. There is, therefore, no question of giving a  notice to  quit to  such a lessee who continued in possession after  the determination of the lease, i.e. after the contract came to an end under the protection of the Rent Restriction Act.  If the  contract once came to an end there was no  question of terminating the contract over again by a fresh notice. Therefore, both on principle and authority the contention of Mr. Mahajan cannot be accepted. 121      The second  contention requires  re-examination of  the findings of   fact  which this Court ordinarily in appeal by special leave  would not  undertake. After one remand by the first appellate  authority, all the Courts have concurrently found that  the building  is in  a dilapidated condition and unfit for  human habitation  and requires to be constructed. Mr. Mahajan  made a  cryptic submission  that even after the lapse of  15 years  during which  this protracted litigation has moved from court to Court, the building stands erect and the tenant  has used it for the purpose for which it was let out and, therefore, this Court would be shutting its eyes to the reality  if it  affirms the  decree for  eviction on the ground that  the building  is unfit for human habitation. It appears that  the tenant  has been  carrying out  some minor repairs to  keep the  building standing and that he seems to be doing  in his own interest. The finding, however, is that the eastern  wall of the building is altogether out of plumb and it  cannot be  repaired or replaced without the building being vacated  by the  tenant. The  roof of  the building is also uneven  and  that  too  cannot  be  set  right  without eviction. These  are findings supported by evidence and once they are  accepted, the  decree for  eviction deserves to be affirmed.      Accordingly this  appeal fails  and it is dismissed but in the  circumstances of  the case there will be no order as to costs. M.R.                                        Appeal Dismissed 9-520 SCI/78 122