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PETITIONER: EAST INDIA CORPORATION LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SHREE MEENAKSHI MILLS LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/04/1991

BENCH: THOMMEN, T.K. (J) BENCH: THOMMEN, T.K. (J) SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR 1094            1991 SCR  (2) 310  1991 SCC  (3) 230        JT 1991 (2)   397  1991 SCALE  (1)761

ACT:      Rent  Control & Eviction: Tamil Nadu  Buildings  (Lease and  Rent  Control) Act, 1960-S. 10, 14  to  16-Eviction  of tenant-Jurisdiction of civil court-Scope of.      Constitution  of  India:  Article  14-  Declaration  of constitutional invalidity  of statutory provision-Effect of.      Mysore  House  Rent and  Accommodation  Control  Order, 1948: Ss. 9, 16 Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960: S. 30(ii).      Code  of Civil  Procedure, 1908: S. 9- Jurisdiction  of Civil  Court under s. 10 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control) Act, 1960-Extent of.      Words & Phrases: Coram non judice.

HEADNOTE:      The respondent field  a suit against the appellant  for recovery  of  possession  of a building on  the  ground  of wilful  deflault  in payment of rent which was Rs.  900  per ;month.  The appellant denied the relationship  of  landlord and  tenant, claiming himself as one of the "associates"  or "co-sharers"  or  "co-owners" of the  building.  The  Munsif decreed  the suit; and the decree was affirmed in appeal  by the  first appellate court as also by the High Court.  Hence the present appeal.      During the pendency of the present appeal, cl. (ii)  of s. 30 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)  Act, 1960,  which exempted from application of the  Act  premises the  monthly rent in respect of which exceeded Rs. 400,  and on  the basis of which the suit giving rise to  the  present appeal  emanated,  was  struck down in a  judgment  by  this Court.**      The  appellant  contended  that as  a  result  of  the declaration  by this Court of the constitutional  invalidity of clause (ii) of s. 30, of the Act,                                                          311 which  excluded from the purview of the Act any building  or part  thereof  let  out on a monthly rent of  Rs.  400,  the decree  of  the civil court became null and void and  of  no effect.  On behalf of the respondent it was  submitted  that the  decree passed by the civil court was not a nullity  for the Act did ;not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court but

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only prohibited execution of a decree of eviction  otherwise than in accordance with the relevant   statutory  provision; and that such a decree was not void, but was merely under an eclipse, and would become executable as and when the bar  is removed..      Allowing the appeal, this  Court,      HELD; 1.1 Section 10 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 prohibits jurisdiction of the  civil court   in  respect  of  eviction of  a  tenant  whether  in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the  provisions of that section and ss. 14 to 16.  The  sole circumstance and the condition precedent to the exercise  of jurisdiction  by a civil  court as stated in second  proviso to s. 10(1) is that the tenant should have denied the  title of  the landlord or claimed right of permanent  tenancy  and the  Controller,  on  such denial or claim  by  the  tenant, reaches  a  decision and duly records a  finding  that  such denial or claim was bona fide and only when these conditions are satisfied jurisdiction of the civil court can be invoked to  pass  a  decree  for eviciton  on  any  of  the  grounds mentioned  in s. 10 or ss. 14 to 16. Except to this  limited extend  the  jurisdiction of the civil court  is  completely barred and the same is vested in the tribunals set up  under the Act. Any suit instituted by a landlord for eviction of a tenant  from  a  building falling within the  ambit  of  the Act,otherwise   than  as  stipulated  by  the  section   is, therefor, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of the  court and any decree of the court in such a suit is null and  void and of no effect. [317D-E, G-H; 318-D,G-H]      Sushil  Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, [1990]  1  SCC page 193, referred to.      1.2 The decision of the Controller is concerned  solely with the bona fides, and not the correctness or validity, of the   denial   or  claim, for these difficult  questions  of title  are  by  the statute reserved  for  decision  by  the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters. [318D-E]      Magiti  Sasamal  v.  Pandab Bissoi,[1962]  3  SCR  673, referred to.      1.3 If the decision of the Controller is that  tenant’s denial or                                                       312 claim is not bona fide, the jurisdiction of the civil  court cannot  be invoked by the landlord and the  Controller  will then  be  the competent authority to order  eviction,  after affording  the  parties a reasonable  opportunity  of  being heard,  on  any  one  of the  grounds  specified  under  the statute,  including the ground that the tenant has,  without bona  fide  denied  landlord’s title  or  claimed  right  of permanent tenancy.[318E-F]      1.4  Although  the  Act  contains  no  express  bar  of jurisdiction  of the civil court, its provisions  explicitly show  that, subject to the extraordinary powers of the  High Court,  and  this Court, such jurisdiction  is  statute  for eviction  of  tenants  "in  execution  or  otherwise".   The provision of the Act are clear and complete in regard to the finality  of  the  orders passed by  the  special  tribunals set up under it, and their competence to administer the same remedy  as  the  civil courts render in  civil  suits.  Such tribunals having been so constituted as to act in conformity with  the fundamental principles of judicial procedure,  the clear and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions  relating  to the special rights  and  liabilities created  by the statute should be decided by  the  tribunals constituted under it. [317A-C]

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    Dhulabhai &Ors. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh &  Anr., [1968]  3 SCR 662; Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.,  [1939- 40]  IA  222 (PC,  Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd.  v.  Governor General in Council, [1946] 47 IA 50 (PC  and Barraclough  v. Brown & Ors., [1897] AC 615 (HL), referred to.      In  the instant case, the procedure stipulated  in  the second proviso to s. 10 had not been  complied with. At  the time  of institution of the suite, the building in  question did  not  come  within the ambit of the Act,  owing  to  the exclusionary  provision contained in cl. (ii) of s. 30,  but after leave to appeal was granted, the applicability of  the Act  was extended to the building by reason of the  decision of this Court, declaring the invalidity of cl. (ii) of s. 30 on  account  of its inconsistency with Article  14   of  the Constitution.   Whatever   be  the  consequences   of   that declaration-whether it has rendered the statutory  provision null  and  void and of no effect,  or,  merely  inoperative, unenforceable  and dormant to be revitalised  on  subsequent removal of the constitutional ban-in either event, the civil court  acting without the aid of the exclusionary  provision in  cl. (ii) of s. 30, during the period  of  invalidity,had become coram non judice and its proceedings resulting in the decree a nullity. [319A-D]                                                      313      Ratan Arya & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 385, referred to.      Kiran  Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors.,  [1955]  1 SCR 117 relied on.      V.B.  Patankar & Ors.v. C.G. Sastry, [1961] 1 SCR  591, held inapplicable.      Behram  Khurshed  Pesikaka v. State of  Bombay,  [1955] 1  SCR 613; Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1955]  1 SCR 707; Bhikaji Narain Dhakras & Ors. v. The State of  M.P. JUDGMENT: The State of A.P. & Anr., [1958] SCR 1422, referred to.

&      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: civil Appeal No. 4032  of 1984.      From  the  Judgment and Order dated 13.12.1983  of  the Madras High Court in Second Appeal No. 166 and CMP No.  1714 of 1983.      U.R. Lalit and S. Srinivasan for the Appellant.      Dr.  Y.S.  Chitale, Darshan Singh,  Praveen  Kumar  and Sumit Sen for the Respondent.      The judgment of the Court was delivered by      THOMMEN,  J. The appellant, the East India  Corporation Limited, is the defendant in O.S. No. 623 of 1980, which  is a  suit instituted by the respondent, Shree Meenakshi  Mills Limited,  for  recovery of possession of a building  on  the ground  of  arrears of rent, etc.  The  respondent-plaintiff alleged  that the appellant-defendant was the tenant of  the building  in  question and that it has not paid  the  agreed rent  of  Rs.  900  per month for  a  long  period,  despite persistent demands, and has thus been in "wilful default" of payment  of  the  agreed rent. The  appellant  denied  these allegations.  It  specifically denied  any  relationship  of landlord and tenant between the parties, and contended  that its  occupation of the building was not as a tenant  of  the respondent,  but as one of its "associates" or  "co-sharers" or  "co-owners".  The suit was decreed. The  decree  of  the learned Munsif was affirmed in appeal by the First Appellate Court  as well as by the High Court. All the  three  courts,

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rejecting the appellant’s contentions                                                      314 to  the  contrary,  found  that  it  was  a  tenant  of  the respondent; it questioned without bona fide the respondent’s title  as landlord; it was in default of payment  of  rents, and, if was liable to be evicted from the building.  Against these  concurrent  findings, the present appeal  was brought to  this Court by means of a special leave  petition.  Leave was granted by order of this Court dated 24.9.84.      At  the  time of the institution of the  suit,  or  the grant  of leave by this Court, the building in question  did not  come  within the purview of the  Tamil  Nadu  Buildings (Lease  and  Rent  Control) Act, 1960 (’the  Act’)  for  the agreed  rent, as alleged by the plaintiff-respondent and  as found by all the courts, was Rs. 900 per month, and as  such was outside the limit prescribed under section 30(ii) of the Act for a residential building to fall within the  statutory ambit. Section 30, as it stood at the relevant time, stated:           "30. Exemption in the case of certain  buildings.-           Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to-           (i)  any building for a period of five years  from           the  date on which the construction  is  completed           and notified to the local authority concerned; or           (ii)  any  residential building  or  part  thereof           occupied  by any one tenant if the  monthly  rent           paid  by him in respect of that building  or  part           exceeds four hundred rupees.                     "      Clause (ii) of section 30 was, however, struck down  by this  Court in Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State of Tamil  Nadu  & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 385. This Court stated:           "....  Section 30(ii) of the Tamil Nadu  Buildings           (Lease  and  Rent  Control) Act, 1960  has  to  be           struck  down  as violative of Article  14  of  the           Constitution. A writ will issue declaring  Section           30(ii) as unconstitutional". As  a  result  of this  declaration  of  the  constitutional invalidity of section 30(ii), the Act in question, according to  the  appellant,  has to be read as  if  clause  (ii)  of section  30 was never brought into force,  and  consequently all  residential buildings, which are older than five  years (see  clause  (i) of section 30) and let  out  for  whatever rent,  came  within  the  ambit  of  the  Act.  Accordingly, although the suit was properly                                                      315 instituted in the civil court without regard to the  special provisions of the Act, it is now contended that as a  result of  the  declaration  by this Court  of  the  constitutional invalidity of clause (ii) of section 30, which excluded from the purview of the Act any building or part thereof let  out on a monthly rent of Rs. 400 the decree of the civil  court, whatever  be  the merits of the findings on  the  respective contentions of the parties, has become null and void and  of no  effect  whatever. This contention of  the  appellant  is based  on  the  principle  that  any  decree  passed  by  an incompetent  court  is a nullity.  The  appellant’s  counsel relies  on the principle reiterated by this Court in  Sushil Kumar  Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohram [1990] 1 SCC 193  and  the earlier decisions referred to therein on the point. In Kiran Singh  & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors., [1955] 1 SCR  117  at 121, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. pointed out :          "....   It   is  a   fundamental   principle   well          established that a decree passed by a court without          jurisdiction  is nullity,  and that its  invalidity          could  be  set  up whenever and  where-ever  it  is          sought  to be enforced or relied upon, even at  the

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        stage   of   execution  and  even   in   collateral          proceedings.  A defect of jurisdiction, whether  it          is  pecuniary or territorial, or whether it  is  in          respect  of  the subject matter  of  the    action,          strikes at the very authority of the court to  pass          any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured  even          by  consent of parties. If the question  now  under          consideration  fell  to be determined only  on  the          application  of  general principles  governing  the          matter, there  can be no doubt  that  the  District          Court of Monghyr was coram no judice, and that  its          judgment and decree would be nullities."      Dr Y.S. Chitale, appearing for the respondent, however, submits  that  the decree passed by the civil court  in  the present case is not a nullity for the Act has not barred the jurisdiction   of  the  civil  court,  but  only   prohibits execution  of  a  decree  for  eviction  otherwise  than  in accordance  with the relevant statutory provisions.  Such  a decee, he says, is not void, but is merely under an eclipse, and  will become executable as and when the bar is  removed. He refers to section 10 of the Act which reads :           "S.  10.-Eviction of tenants.-(1) A  tenant  shall           not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or           otherwise except in accordance with the provisions           of this section or sections 14 to 16:                                                        316           ...................................................      Relying  on certain observations of this Court in  B.V. Patankar  &  Ors.  v. C.G.Sastry, [1961] 1 SCR  591  in  the context  of the Mysore House Rent and Accommodation  Control Order,  1948, Dr. Chitale submits that, like in  that  case, what  is  prohibited by section 10 in the  present  case  is execution  of the decree and the validity of the  decree  as such is not affected. We do not agree.      Section  9 of the Mysore House Rent  and  Accommodation Control Order, 1948 reads :           "S.  9(1) A tenant in possession of a house  shall           not be evicted therefrom whether in execution of a           decree or otherwise except in accordance with  the           provisions of this clause.           .................................................." Section 16 of that Order reads:           "S.  16.-Nothing  in this order  shall  prevent  a           landlord  from  filing a suit for  eviction  of  a           tenant  before a competent civil  court,  provided           that no decree for eviction of a tenant, passed by           a   civil   court  shall  be  executed  unless   a           certificate  to that effect is obtained  from  the           Controller." Section  16  of the Mysore Order,  1948,  thus  specifically allows  the  institution of a civil suit for eviction  of  a tenant,  although  a  decree  passed by  such  a  court  for eviction  cannot be executed without a certificate  to  that effect from the Controller. Jurisdiction of the civil  court is  thus  not only not barred  but  specifically  preserved, except  for  the  restriction imposed on  the  execution  of decrees  in matters of eviction. On the other hand,  such  a provision  is  significantly  absent  in  the  enactment  in question,  The provisions of the Mysore Order considered  by this  court in B.V. Patankar & Ors. v. C.S.Sastry, [1961]  1 SCR  591  and those of the Act in question here are  not  in pari  materia. The observations of this Court relied  on  by Dr. Chitale are not, therefore, helpful in understanding the provisions in question in the instant case.      Section  10  of  the  Act,  as  seen  above,  prohibits

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eviction  of  a tenant whether in execution of a  decree  or otherwise  except in accordance with the provisions of  that section  or sections 14 to 16. These provisions as  well  as the  other provisions of the Act are a self contained  code, regulating  the  relationship of parties,  creating  special rights and liabilities, and, providing for determination  of such rights                                                        317 and  liabilities by tribunals constituted under the  statute and  whose  orders are endowed with finality.  The  remedies provided  by  the statute in such matters are  adequate  and complete.  Although the statute contains no express  bar  of jurisdiction  of  the civil court, except  for  eviction  of tenants  "in execution or otherwise", the provisions of  the statute are clear and complete in regard to the finality  of the orders passed by the special tribunals set up under   it and  their competence to administer the same remedy  as  the civil  courts render in civil suits. Such  tribunals  having been  so  constituted  as  to act  in  conformity  with  the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, the clear  and explicit intendment of the legislature is that all questions relating  to the special rights and liabilities  created  by the  statute should be decided by the tribunals  constituted under  it. Although the jurisdiction of the civil  court  is not   expressly  barred  the  provisions  of   the   statute explicitly  show that, subject to the extra-ordinary  powers of  the  High  Court and this Court,  such  jurisdiction  is impliedly  barred,  except to the limited  extent  specially provided  by  the  statute.  See  in  this  connection   the principle  stated by this Court in Dhulabhai & Ors.  v.  The State  of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., [1968] 3 SCR 662. See  also Secretary  of  State v. Mask & Co., [1939-40] 1A  222  (PC): Raleigh Investment Co. Ltd. v. Governor General in  Counsil. [1946-47] IA 50 (PC) and Barraclogh v. Brown & Ors.,  [1987] AC 615 (HL).      Judged  by  this test, the jurisdiction  of  the  civil court in respect of eviction of tenants is barred except  to the  extent and subject to the conditions  prescribed  under Section 10. The second provision to section 10(1) reads:                "Provided  further  that  where  the   tenant           denies  the title of the landlord or claims  right           of permanent tenancy, the Controller shall  decide           whether the denial or claim is bona fide and if he           records  a  finding to that effect,  the  landlord           shall  be  entitled  to sue for  eviction  of  the           tenant  in a civil court and the Court may pass  a           decree  for  eviction  on  any  of  the    grounds           mentioned  in the said  sections,  notwithstanding           that  the  Court finds that such denial  does  not           involve forfeiture of the lease or that the  claim           is unfounded".      What  is stated in the second proviso to section  10(1) is  the  sole  circumstance  in which  the  civil  court  is invested with jurisdiction in matters of evictions. But this jurisdiction cannot be invoked otherwise than as  stipulated in the second proviso. This means that the condition                                                        318 precedent  to the exercise of jurisdiction by a civil  court is  that  the  tenant should have denied the  title  of  the landlord  or  claimed  right of permanent  tenancy  and  the Controller  should, on such denial or claim by  the  tenant, reach a decision whether such denial or claim is bona  fide. Upon such decision, the Controller must record a finding  to that effect. In that event, the landlord is entitled to  sue for  eviction  of the tenant in a civil court.  Where  these

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conditions   are  satisfied,  the  civil  court  will   have jurisdiction  to  pass a decree for eviction on any  of  the grounds  mentioned, in  section 10 or  Sections  14  to  16, notwithstanding  that the Court has found that the  tenant’s denial  of the landlord’s title does not involve  forfeiture of the lease, or, his claim of right of permanent tenancy is unfounded.  Except to this limited extent, the  jurisdiction of  the  civil court in matters of eviction of a  tenant  is completely  barred and the jurisdiction in such  matters  is vested in the tribunals set up under the statute.      Significantly, the jurisdiction of the civil court  can be  invoked only where the controller comes to  a  decision, and  records  a  finding, that the denial or  claim  by  the tenant,  as aforesaid, is bona fide. If the Controller  were to come to the opposite conclusion, no question of  invoking the  jurisdiction  of the civil court would arise.  But  the decision of the controller is concerned solely with the bona fides and not the correctness or validity, of the denial  or claim,  for  these difficult questions of title are  by  the statute reserved for decision by the appropriate civil court which is the more competent forum in such matters  (See  the principle  discussed  in Magiti Sasamal  v.  Pandap  Bissoi, [1962]  3  SCR 673. In such an event, the civil  court  will become competent to pass a decree for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in section 10 or sections 14 to 16. On the other  hand, if the decision of the controller is  that  the tenant’s  denial or claim is not bona fide the  jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be invoked by the landlord and the Controller  will  then be the competent authority  to  order eviction,   after   affording  the  parties   a   reasonable opportunity  of  being  heard, on any  one  of  the  grounds specified  under the statute, including the ground that  the tenant  has, without bona fide, denied the landlord’s  title or  claimed right of permanent tenancy. What is  significant is  that  the decision of the Controller, duly  recorded  by him, as regards the bona fide denial or claim by the  tenant is the condition precedent to the invocation of power of the civil  court.  Any  suit  instituted  by  the  landlord  for eviction  of  a tenant from a building  falling  within  the ambit  of  the  Act, otherwise. Than as  stipulated  by  the section, is, therefore, incompetent for lack of jurisdiction of  the Court and any decree of the Court in such a suit  is null and void and no effect.                                                        319      In  the present case, the procedure stipulated  in  the second proviso to section 10 has not been complied with.  At the  time  of the institution of the suit, the  building  in question did not come within the ambit of the Act, owing  to the  exclusionary  provision  contained in  clause  (ii)  of section  30, but after leave to appeal was granted  by  this Court,  the  applicability of the Act was  extended  to  the building  by reason of the decision of this Court in  Rattan Arya & Ors. v. State  of Tamil Nadu & Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 385 declaring  the  invalidity of clause (ii) of section  30  on account  of  its  inconsistency  with  Article  14  of   the Constitution.   Whatever   be  the   consequence   of   that declaration   -  whether  it  has  rendered  the   statutory provision  null  and  void  and of  no  effect.  See  Behram Khurshed  Pesikaka v. The State of Bombay, [1955] 1 SCR  613 and  Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U.P. and others, [1955]  1 SCR 707 or merely inoperative, unenforceable and dormant  to be revitalised on subsequent removal of the  constitutional ban.  See Bhikaji Marain Dhakras and Others v. The State  of Madhya  Pradesh  and Another. [1955] 2 SCR  589  and  M.P.V. Sundararamier  &  Co.  v.  The State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  &

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Another,  [1958] SCR 1422 in either event, the  Civil  Court acting  without  the aid of the  exclusionary  provision  in clause (ii) of section 30, during the period of  invalidity, has become coram no judice and its proceedings resulting  in the  decree  a nullity. See Kiran Singh & Others  v.  Chaman Paswan & Others, [1955] 1 SCR 117 at 121.      In  the circumstances, we set aside the decrees of  the courts  below.  The appeal is allowed and the  appellant  is entitled to costs throughout. R.P.                                         Appeal allowed.                                                      320