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PETITIONER: DR. VIMLA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/11/1962

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. IMAM, SYED JAFFER AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1963 AIR 1572            1963 SCR  Supl. (2) 585  CITATOR INFO :  D          1963 SC1577  (7,9,10)  RF         1976 SC2140  (10)

ACT: Criminal  Trial-Meaning  of  ’dishonestly’  and   ’  fraudu- lently’-Meaning  of  ’false document’  and  ’forgery’-Indian Penal  Code,  1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 24, 25,  463,  464, 467, 468.

HEADNOTE: Dr. Vimla purchased a car in the name of her minor  daughter Nalini aged about 6 months.  The price of tile car was  paid by her.  The transfer of the car was notified in the name of Nalini  to the Motor Registration Authority.  The  insurance policy already issued was transferred in the name of  Nalini after   the   proposal  form  was  signed  by   Dr.   Vimla. Subsequently, Dr. Vimla filed two claims on the ground  that the  car met with accidents.  She signed the claim forms  as Nalini.  She also signed the receipts acknowledging the pay- ment  of  compensation money as Nalini.  Dr. Vimla  and  her husband  were prosecuted under sections 120 B, 419, 467  and 468  of  the  Indian  Penal Code.   Both  the  accused  were acquitted  by the Sessions Judge.  The State went in  appeal and the High Court convicted Dr. Vimla under s. 467 and  468 of  the Indian Penal Code.  Dr. Vimla came to this Court  by special leave. Held, that appellant was not guilty of the offence under  s. 467  and  468 of the Indian Penal Code.  She was  certainly guilty  of  deceit because though her name  was  Vimla,  she signed  in  all the relevant papers as Nalini and  made  the Insurance Company believe that her name was Nalini, but  the said deceit did not either secure to her advantage or  cause any  noneconomic  loss or injury to the  Insurance  Company. The charge did not disclose any such advantage or injury nor was  there  any  evidence to prove  the  same.   The  entire transaction  was  that  of Dr. Vimla and  it  was  only  put through  in the name of her minor daughter.  Nalini  was  in fact  either a Benamidar for Dr. Vimla or her name was  used for luck or other sentimental considerations.  The Insurance Company  would  not have acted differently even if  the  car

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stood in the name of Dr. Vimla. 586 The definition of ’false document’ is a part of the  defini- tion  of  forgery’ and both must be read  together.   If  so read, the ingredients of the offence of forgery relevant  to the  present case are as follows: (1) fradulently signing  a document  or  a  part of a document  with  an  intention  of causing  it to be believed that such document or part  of  a document was signed by another under his authority ; and (2) making of such a document with an intention to commit  fraud or that fraud may be committed. The expression ’fraud’ involves two elements, deceit and injury    to the person deceived.  Injury is something other than economic loss, that        is, deprivation of property, whether   movable  or  immovable  or of money  and  it  will include and any harm whatever caused to any person in  body, mind,  reputation  or such others.  In short, it is  a  non- economic  or non-pecuniary loss.  A benefit or advantage  to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment  to the  deceived.   Even in those rare cases where there  is  a benefit  or advantage to the deceiver, but no  corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. Haycraft  v.  Creasy, 1801) 2 East 92, in  re.   London  and Globe  Finance  Corporation  Ltd., (1903) 1 Ch.  732  R.  v. Welham,  (1960) 1 All.  E R. 260, Kotamraju Yenkatrayadu  v. Emperor  (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90, Surendra Nath Ghose  v. Emperor,  (1910)  I. L. R. 38 Cal. 75,  Sanjiv  Ratnappa  v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1932 Bom. 545 and Emperor v. Abdul  Hamid, A. 1. R. 1944 Lah. 380, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 213 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated March 24, 1960, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench)Delhi in Criminal Appeal Case No. 41-D of 1958. H.  L. Anand, and K. Baldev Mehta, for the appellant. V.   D. Mahajan and P. D. Menon, for the respondent. 1962.  November 29.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  587 SUBBA  RAO  J.-This  appeal  by  Special  leave  raises  the question   as  to  the  true  meaning  of   the   expression "fraudulently’ in s. 464 of the Indian Penal Code. The  facts either admitted or found by the courts below  may be briefly stated.  The appellant is the wife of Siri  Chand Kaviraj.   On january 20, 1953, she purchased an  Austin  10 Horse  Power  Car with the registration No. DLA.  4796  from Dewan  Ram Swarup in the name of her minor  daughter  Nalini aged  about six months at that time.  The price for the  car was paid by Dr. Vimla.  The transfer of the car was notified in  the name of Nalini to the Motor Registration  Authority. The car at that time was insured against a policy issued  by the  Bharat  Fire  & General Insurance Co.,  Ltd.,  and  the policy  was  due to expire sometime in April,  1953.   On  a request  made  by  Dewan Ram Swarup,  the  said  policy  was transferred in the name of Nalini.  In that connection,  Dr. Vimla visited the Insurance Company’s Office and signed  the proposal  form as Nalini. Subsequently, she also filed  two claims  on the ground that the car met with  accidents.   In connection with these claims, she signed the claim forms  as Nalini  and also the receipts acknowledging the payments  of the  compensation money as Nalini.  On a complaint  made  by

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the company alleging fraud on the part of Dr. Vimla and  her husband,  the police made investigation and  prosecuted  Dr. Vimla  and  her husband Siri Chand Kaviraj in the  Court  of Magistrate  1st Class Delhi.  The ’Magistrate committed  Dr. Vimla and her husband to Sessions to take their trial  under ss.  120-B, 419, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code.   The learned  Sessions judge held that no case had been made  out against  the accused under any one of those sections and  on that  finding, acquitted both of them.  The State  preferred an  appeal  to the High Court of Punjab and the  appeal  was disposed  of  by a Division Bench of that  court  comprising Falshaw 588 and  Chopra,JJ.  The learned judges confirmed the  acquittal of  Siri Chand; but in regard to Dr.Vimla,   they  confirmed her acquittal under s. 419 of the Indian Penal Code, but set aside  her acquittal under ss. 467 and 468 of the  Code  and instead, convicted her under the said sections and sentenced her to imprisonment till the rising of the court and to  the payment  of a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to under-,  go simple imprisonment for two weeks.  Dr. Vimla has  preferred the  present appeal by special leave against her  conviction and sentence. The  facts found may be briefly summarised thus : Dr.  Vimla purchased a motor car with her own money in the name of  her minor daughter, had the insurance policy transferred in  the name of her minor daughter by signing her name and she  also received compensation for the claims made by her- in  regard to  the  two  accidents to the car.  The  claims  were  true claims  and she received the moneys by signing in ,he  claim forms  and also in the receipts as Nalini.  That is to  say, Dr.  Vim]  a  in  fact and  in  substance  put  through  her transactions  in connection with the said motor car  in  the name  of  her minor daughter.  Nalini was in fact  either  a benamidar  for  Dr. Vimla or her name was used for  luck  or other  sentimental  considerations.   On  the  facts  found, neither  Dr.  Vimla got any advantage  either  pecuniary  or otherwise  by signing the name of Nalini in any of the  said documents  nor  the  Insurance Company  incurred  any  loss, pecuniary  or  otherwise, by dealing with Dr. Vimla  in  the name of Nalini.  The Insurance Company would not have  acted differently even if the, car stood in the name of Dr.  Vimla and  she made the claims and received the amounts  from  the insurance  company  in  her name.  On the  said  facts,  the question  that arises in this case is whether Dr. vimla  was guilty of offences under ss. 463 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code. 589 Learned Counsel for the appellant contends that on the facts found, the appellant would  not be guilty of forgery as  she did  not  "fraudulently" sign the requisite forms  and  the receipts  in the name of Nalini, as. by so signing, she  did not  intend  to cause injury to the insurance  company.   In other  words, the contention was that a person does not  act fraudulently  within the meaning of s. 464 unless he is  not only guilty of deceit but also he intends to cause injury to the  person or persons deceived, and as in the present  case the appellant had never had the intention to cause injury to the  insurance company and as on the facts found  no  injury had  been caused at all to the company, the appellant  could not be found guilty under the said sections. Before  we consider the decisions cited at the Bar it  would be  convenient  to look at the relevant  provisions  of  the Indian Penal Code. Section 463 : Whoever makes any false document or part of  a

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document  with  intent  to cause damage or  injury,  to  the public  or to any person, or to support any claim or  title, or  to  cause any person to part with property or  to  enter into  any  express or implied contract, or  with  intent  to commit  fraud  or  that  fraud  may  be  committed,  commits forgery. Section  464  :  A person is said to make a false  document-               First--Which   dishonestly   or   fraudulently               makes, signs, seals or executes a document  or               part of a document, or makes any mark denoting               the   execution  of  a  document,   with   the               intention  of causing it to be  believed  that               such document/or part of a document was  made,               signed,  sealed  or  executed  by  or  by  the               authority  of  a person by whom  or  by  whose               authority  he  knows  that it  was  not  made,               signed, sealed or executed, or at a time 590 at  which he knows that it was not made, signed,  scaled  or executed; or The  definition  of  "false  document"  is  a  part  of  the definition  of "forgery".  Both must be read together.   If so read, the ingredients of the offence of forgery  relevant to  the present enquiry are as follows  , (1)  fraudulently signing a document or a part of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was signed by another or under his authority ;  (2) making of such a document with an intention to commit  fraud or  that  fraud may be committed.  In the  two  definitions, both  mens rea described in s.464 i. e.,  "fradulently"  and the  intention  to  commit fraud in s.  463  have  the  same meaning.   This redundancy has perhaps become  necessary  as the  element  of fraud is not the ingredient  of  other  in- tentions  mentioned  in  s. 463.  The idea of  deceit  is  a necessary  ingredient of fraud, but it does not exhaust  it; an  additional element is implicit in the  expression.   The scope  of  that  something  more  is  the  subject  of   may decisions.  We shall consider that question at a later stage in  the light of the decisions bearing on the subject.   The second  thing to be noticed is that in s. 464  two  adverbs, "dishonestly"  and  "fraudulently"  are  used  alternatively indicating thereby that one excludes the other.  That  means they  are  not  tautological and  must  be  given  different meanings.    Section   24   of  the   Penal   Code   defines "dishonestly" thus : "Whoever  does  anything  with  the  intention  of   causing wrongful  gain  to one person or wrongful  loss  to  another person, is said to do that thing dishonestly". "Fraudulently" is defined in s. 25 thus: "  A  perosn is said to do a thing fraudulently if  he  does that thing with intent to  591 defrand but not otherwise". The word "defraud" includes an element of deceit.  Deceit is not   an   ingredient  of  the  definition   of   the   word "dishonestly"  while  it is an important ingredient  of  the definition of the word "fraudulently".  The former  involves a  pecuniary  or economic gain or loss while the  latter  by construction   excludes   that   element.    Further)    the juxtaposition  of  the two  expressions  "’dishonestly"  and "fraudulently"  used  in the various sections  of  the  Code indicates their close affinity and therefore the  definition of one may give colour to the other.  To illustrate, in  the definition of "dishonestly", wrongful gain or wrongful  loss is the necessary enough.  So  too,   if   the    expresssion

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"fraudulently’  were  to be held to involve the  element  of injury  to  the  person or persons  deceived,  it  would  be reasonable  to  assume that the injury should  be  something other than pecuniary or economic loss.  Though almost always an  advantage to one causes loss to another and vice  versa, it  need  not necessarily be so.  Should we  hold  that  the concept  of  fraud" would include not only deceit  but  also some injury to the person deceived, it would be  appropriate to   hold   by  analogy  drawn  from   the   definition   of "dishonestly"   that   to   satisfy   the   definition    of "’fraudulently"  it  would  be enough if there  was  a  non- economic advantage to the deceiver or a non-economic loss to the deceived.  Both need not co-exist. Let  us now consider some of the leading text  book  writers and,  decisions  to  ascertain  the  meaning  of  the   word "fraudulently". The  classic definition of the word "fraudulently" is  found in  Steplien’s History of the Criminal law of England,  Vol. 2, at p. 121 and it reads "I  shall not attempt to construct a definition  which  will meet every case which might 592 be  suggested,  but there is little danger  in  saving  that whenever  the  words  "fraud"  or  intent  to  defraud"   or "fraudulently"  occur  in  the definition  of  a  crime  two elements  at  least are essential to the commission  of  the crime : namely, first, deceit or an intention to deceive  or in  some  cases mere secrecy ; and secondly,  either  actual injury  or possible injury or to a risk of possible  ’injury by means of that deceit or secrecy............. This  intent is  very  seldom  the  only,  or  the  principal,  intention entertained by the fraudulent person, whose principal object in nearly every case is his own advantage................. A practically conclusive test of the fraudulent character of a deception for criminal purposes is this : Did the author  of the deceit derive any advantage from it which could not have been  had if the truth had been known ? If so it  is  hardly possible   that  the  advantage  should  not  have  had   an equivalent  in loss or risk of loss to someone else, and  if so, there was fraud." It would be seen from this passage that "’fraud" is made  up of  two ingredients, deceit and injury.  The learned  author also realizes that the principal object of every  fraudulent person  in  nearly every case is to  derive  some  advantage though  such advantage has a corresponding loss or  risk  of loss  to another.  Though the author has not visualized  the extremely  rare  situation of an advantage  secured  by  one without  a  corresponding  loss to  another,  this  idea  is persued in later decisions. As regards the nature of this injury, in Kenny’s Outline  of Criminal  Law,  15th  Edn., at p. 333,  it  is  stated  that pecuniary detriment is unnecessary. In Haycraft v. Creasy (1) LeBlanc, observed (1)  (1801) 2 East 92. 593 "by  fraud is meant an intention to deceive; whether  it  be from  any expectation of advantage to the party  himself  or from the ill-will towards the other is immaterial." This  passage for the first time brings out the  distinction between  an advantage derived by the person who deceives  in contrast  to  the  loss incurred  by  the  person  deceived. Buckley.  J., in Re London & Clobe Finance Corporation  Ltd. (1) brings out the ingredients of fraud thus : "To deceive is, I apprehend, to induce a man to believe that a  thing  is  true  which is false,  and  which  the  person

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practising  the  deceit knows or believes to be false.   To.               defraud  is  to deprive by deceit:  it  is  by               deceit  to induce a man to act to his  injury’               More tersely it may be put, that to deceive is               by  falsehood  to induce a state of  mind;  to               defraud  is  by deceit to induce a  course  of               action." The  English decisions have been elaborately  considered  by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Welhant (2).  In  that case,  hire-purchase finance companies advanced money  on  a hire-purchase   form  and  agreement  and   on   credit-sale agreements   witnessed  by  the  accused.   The   form   and agreements  were  forgeries  The accused  was  charged  with offences  of  Uttering  forged  documents  with  intent   to defraud.   It was not proved that he had intended  to  cause any  loss of once to the finance companies.   His  intention had been by deceit to induce any person who was charged with the duty of seeing that the credit restrictions then current were observed to act in a way in which lie would not act  if he  had  known the true facts, namely, not  to  prevent  the advancing  of  large  sums of  money  exceeding  the  limits allowed  by law It, the time.  The Court held that the  said intention amounted to intend to defraud. (1) (1903) 1 ch.. 732. (2) (1960) 1 All.  E. R. 260, 264, 266. 594 Hilbery,  J.,  speaking  for  the  court,  pointed  out  the distinction  between  deceit  and defraud and  came  to  the conclusion  that  ,to  defraud" is to  deprive  by  deceit." Adverting  to  the  argument that the  deprivation  must  be something  of value, i. e. economic loss, the learned  judge observed "We  have, however, come to the conclusion that this is  too narrow  at  view.   While, no doubt, in  most  cases  of  an intention  to defraud the intention is to cause an  economic loss’  there is no reason to introduce any such  limitation. Provided that the intention is to cause the person  deceived to  act  to  his real detriment, it  matters  not  that  lie suffers no economic loss.  It is sufficient if the intention is  to  deprive  him  of a right or  to  induce  him  to  do something  contrary to what it would have been his  duty  to do, had lie not been deceived." On  the  basis of the said principle it was  held  that  the accused  by deceit induced the finance companies to  advance moneys  contrary to the credit restrictions and that he  was guilty  of  the  offence  of  forgery.   This  decision   is therefore  a clear authority for the position that the  loss or,  the  injury caused to the person deceived need  not  be economic  loss.  Even a deprivation of a right  without  any economic  consequences would be enough.  This  decision  has not expressed any definite opinion on the question whether a benefit  to the accused without a corresponding loss to  the person   deceived  would  amount  to  fraud.   But  it   has incidentally  touched upon that aspect.  The  learned  judge again observed. "....................................   This  the  appellant was doing in order that he might benefit by getting  further loans." This may indicate that a benefit derived by the  595 person  deceiving  another may amount to an act  to  defraud that other. A  full  Bench  of  the Madras High  Court  ,  in  Kotamraju Venkatrayadu  v. Emperor (1) had to consider the case  of  a person obtaining admission to the matriculation  examination

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of the Madras University as a private candidate producing to the  Registrar a certificate purporting to have been  signed by  the headmaster of it recognized High School that he  was of  good character land had attained his 20th year.  It  was found  in  that case that the candidate had  fabricated  the signature  of  the  headmaster.  The  court  held  that  the accused was guilty of forgery.  White, C.J., observed : "Intending to defraud means, of course, something more  than deceiving." He illustrated this by the following example: "A  tells B a lie and B believes him.  B is deceived but  it               does not follow that A intended to defraud  B.               But,  as  it seems to me, if A tells B  a  lie               intending  that B should do something which  A               conceives   to  be  to  his  own  benefit   or               advantage,  ’and which, if done, would  be  to               the  loss  or  detriment of B,  A  intends  to               defraud B." The  learned  Chief justice indicated his line  of  thought, which  has some bearing on the question now raised,  by  the following observations : "I may observe, however, in this connection that by s. 24 of the Code a person does a thing dishonestly who’ does it with the intention of causing wrongful gain or wrongful loss.  It is not necessary that there should be an intention to  cause both.   On the analogy of this definition, it might be  said that either an intention (1)  (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 99,96,97. 596 to  secure  a benefit or advantage on the one  hand,  or  to cause loss or detriment on the other, by means of deceit, is an intent to defraud." But,  he  found  in that case that both  the  elements  were present.  Benson,J., pointed out at p. 114 : "I  am of opinion that the act was fraudulent not merely  by reason of the advantage which the accused intended to secure for himself’ by means of his’ deceit, but also by reason  of the  injury which must necessarily result to the  University and, through it to the public from such acts if unrepressed. The  University  is injured, if through the evasion  of  its byelaws, it is induced to declare that certain persons  have fulfilled  the conditions prescribed for  Matriculation  and are entitled to the benefits of Matriculation, when in fact, they  have not fulfilled those conditions, for the value  of its  examinations is, depreciated in the eyes of the  public if  it is found that the certificate of the University  that they  have passed its examinations is no longer a  guarantee that  they have in truth fulfilled the conditions  on  which alone  the University  professes to certify them as  passed, and to admit them  to  the   benefis   of  Matriculation." Boddam,  J.,  agreed  with the  learned  Chief  justice  and Benson, J. This decision accepts the principle laid down  by Stephen, namely, that the intention to defraud is made up of two elements, first an intention to deceive and second,  the intention  to expose some person either to actual injury  or risk  of  possible injury but the learned judges  were  also inclined  to  hold  on  the analogy  of  the  definition  of "dishonestly" in s. 24 of the Code that intention to  secure a  or  advantage to the deceiver satisfies the  second  con- dition  597 The  Calcutta  High  Court   dealt  with  this  question  in Surendra  Nath  Ghose  v. Emperor  (1)  There,  the  accused affixed  his signature to a kabuliat which was not  required by law to be attested by witnesses, after its execution  and

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registration,  below the names of the  attestings  witnesses but  without putting a date or alleging actual  presence  at the time of its execution.  The court held that such an  act was  not  fraud within the first clause of s.  464.  of  the Penal  Code  inasmuch  as it was  not  done  dishonestly  or fraudulently  within the meaning of ss. 24 and  25  thereof. Mookerjee,  J.,  defined the words  "intention  to  defraud" thus: "The expression, "intent to defraud" implies conduct coupled with  intention  to deceive and thereby to injury  in  other words,  "defraud" involves two conceptions,  namely,  deceit and injury to the person deceived, that is, infringement  of some  legal  right  possessed by him,  but  not  necessarily deprivation of property." This  view is in accord with the English decisions and  that expressed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court.   This decision  does  not throw any light on  the  other  question whether  advantage to the deceiver without  a  corresponding loss to the deceived would satisfy the second ingredient  of the expression "intent to defraud". A division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Sanjiv Ratnappa v.  Emperor (2) had also occasion to consider the  scope  of the  expression "fraudulently" in s. 464 of the Penal  Code. The  court held that for an act to be fraudulent there  must be some advantage on the one side with a corresponding  loss on  the other.  Adverting to the argument that an  advantage secured  by the deceiver would constitute fraud  Broomfield, J., observed thus "I  think  in view of the Bombay decisions to which  I  have referred we must hold that that (1) (1910) I.T..R. 38 Cal. 75, 89-90.  (2) A.I.R. 1932  Bom.               545, 550. 598 is an essential ingredient in the definition of forgery.  In the  great  majority  of  cases,  the  point  is  not   very material...............  But  there many occasionally  be  a case in which the element of loss or injury is absent and  I think the present is such a case." This decision therefore does not accept the view of White C. J., of the Madras High Court. A  Division Bench of the Lahore High Court,, in  Emperor  v. Abdul                had  also  expressed its  view  on  the meaning  of  the word "fraudulently."  The  learned  Judges accepted  Stephen’s definition but proceeded to  observe  as follows "It may be noted in this connection that the word  "’injury" as  defined in s. 44, Penal Code, is very wide  as  denoting "any harm whatever, illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property." The  learned  judges were willing to assume that  in  almost every case an advantage to one would result in an injury  to the other in the widest sense indicated by s.     44 of  the Penal Code. The other decided case cited at the Bar accept the necessity for  the combination of a deceit by one and injury to  other constitute  an  act  to defraud and  therefore,  it  is  not necessary to multiply citations.  No other decision cited-at the  Bar throws any light on the further  question,  namely, whether  an  advantage  secured to the  deceiver  without  a corresponding loss to the deceived would satisfy the  second condition laid down by the decisions. To  summarize  :  the  expression  "’defraud"  inoslves  two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person  deceived. injury is something    other than (1)  A.I.R. 1944 Lah. 380,382.

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599 economic  loss  that is’, deprivation of  property,  whether movable  or immovable, or of money, and it will include  any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or  such  others.  In short, it is a non  economic  or  non- pecuniary loss.  A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived.  Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. Now  let  us apply the said principles to the facts  of  the present  case.  Certainly, Dr. Vimla was guilty  of  deceit, for  though  her  name  was Vimla, she  signed  in  all  the relevant  papers  as Nalini and made the  insurance  company believe that her name was Nalini, but the said , deceit  did not either secure to her advantage or cause any non-economic loss  or injury to the insurance company.  The  charge  does not disclose any such advantage or injury, nor is there  any evidence  to prove the same.  The fact that Dr.  Vimla  said that the owner of the car who sold it to her suggested  that the  taking  of the sale of the car in the  name  of  Nalini would  be  useful  for income-tax purposes  is  not  of  any relevance  in  the present case, for one  reason,  the  said owner  did not say so in his evidence and for the other,  it was not indicated in the charge or in the evidence.  In  the charge  framed,  she  was  alleged  to  have  defrauded  the insurance company and the only evidence given was that if it was disclosed that Nalini was a minor, the insurance company might  not have paid the money.  But as we have pointed  out earlier, the entire transaction was that of Dr. Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her made minor  daughter for  reasons  best  known to herself.  On  the  evidence  as disclosed,  neither  was  she benefited  nor  the  insurance company incurred loss in any sense of the term. In  the  result,  we  allow the appeal  and  hold  that  the appellant was not guilty of the offence under 600 ss.  467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code.   The  conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside.  Fine, if paid, is directed to be refunded to the appellant, Appeal allowed.